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
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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 797

October 4, 1954



PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE • *Address by Secretary Dulles* . 471

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The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXI, No. 797 • PUBLICATION 5602

October 4, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Partnership for Peace

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

I come to this opening of the Ninth General Assembly with a deep sense of the significance of this occasion. This annual gathering of the representatives of 60 nations represents mankind's most hopeful effort to achieve peace with justice. Here is made manifest the close interdependence of today's world and, also, the vast opportunity for constructive results which lie in good partnership efforts.

The people of the United States believe wholeheartedly in the purposes and the principles set out in the charter of the United Nations. That document marks a milestone in the understanding of the nature of peace. It recognizes that peace is not a passive concept but a call to action. It is not enough to dislike war and to denounce it. War has been hated throughout the ages. Yet war has been recurrent throughout the ages. One reason is that men have never put into the winning of peace efforts comparable to those which they put into the winning of a war.

Mankind will never have lasting peace so long as men reserve their full resources for tasks of war. To preserve peace and to do so without the sacrifice of essential freedoms require constant effort, sustained courage, and at times a willingness to accept grave risks. That is the true spirit of peace.

During the past year many nations have actively worked together on behalf of a just and durable peace. There have been moments when, it seemed, the scales between general war and peace were precariously balanced. That hazardous equation still exists. But at least we see the

hazard and strive to shift the balance in favor of peace.

The efforts of the past year are not to be appraised merely by whether they in fact produced concrete settlements. The making of intelligent, resolute, and united efforts for just settlements has itself contributed to peace. It shows a dynamic spirit and a vigilance which are a warning to any potential aggressor. In the past, peace has often been lost by default. That, let us resolve, shall not happen again.

I cannot, of course, now touch on all of the manifold activities which have recently occurred within and without this organization. I shall focus mainly on political efforts with which my own country was associated as an active partner. Let me first speak of the Organization of American States. The inter-American system rests on a long tradition of cooperation for freedom and peace in this hemisphere. Faithfulness to that tradition, and pride in it, have served to spare this hemisphere from such wars as have tragically ravaged Europe and Asia during the last century and more. Last March the Caracas Conference of the American States decided and declared that if international communism gained control of the political institutions of any American State, that would be a danger to the peace and security of them all and call for collective action to remove the threat.

However aggressive communism may be judged elsewhere, we of this hemisphere, with no exception, know that its intrusion here would open grave conflicts, the like of which we have not known before.

In Guatemala there developed an identifiable threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere.

¹ Made before the U. N. General Assembly on Sept. 23 (press release 525).

The American States exchanged views about this danger and were about to meet to deal with it collectively when the Guatemalan people themselves eliminated the threat.

In this connection, there was occasion for the United Nations to apply the principles of our charter which, while affirming the universal jurisdiction of this organization, call for the use of regional arrangements before resort to the Security Council (articles 33 and 52). These provisions had been hammered out in the course of debate at San Francisco, when our charter was adopted. The American States at that time urged that their tested relationship should be coordinated with, and not totally replaced by, the United Nations, which they felt might prove undependable because of veto power in the Security Council. So it was decided to make regional association a major feature of the United Nations peace system.

This year the Organization of American States showed anew that it is ready, able, and willing to maintain regional peace. Thereby, the provisions of the United Nations Charter have been vindicated and the foundation for peace in the American Hemisphere has been solidified.

Germany and Austria

Last year I said here that "the division of Germany cannot be perpetuated without grave risks."² In an effort to eliminate that risk, I went to Berlin last January to confer with the Foreign Ministers of the other three occupying powers. We there joined with Britain and France in presenting a proposal for the unification of Germany through free elections, to be supervised by the United Nations or some comparable impartial body. The Soviet Union countered with proposals which added up to an extension of the Soviet orbit to the Rhine. Accordingly, the dangerous division of Germany still persists. But, I may add, something else persists—that is our resolve, in the spirit of peace, to end the cruel injustice being done to Germany.

Last year I also spoke of an Austrian treaty as being long overdue. I pointed out that as between the occupying powers there was "no substantial item of disagreement." At the Berlin Conference the three Western occupying powers eliminated

the last vestige of disagreement by accepting the Soviet version of every disagreed article. It seemed, for a fleeting moment, that the Austrian treaty might be signed. But then the Soviet Union improvised a new condition. It said that it would not free Austria from Soviet occupation until a German peace treaty was concluded.

There cannot be a German peace treaty until Germany is united. So Austria continues to be an indefinitely occupied nation. Nevertheless, here again, we do not accept as final the denial of justice to unhappy Austria—the first victim of Hitlerite aggression and the object of the 1943 Moscow pledge of freedom and independence. The three Western Powers, constant in the spirit of peace, have again within recent days urged that the Soviet Union sign the Austrian state treaty as a deed which, far more than platitudinous words, will show whether other matters can fruitfully be discussed.

European Unity

The problem of peace in Europe has become more complicated because of the recent setback to the consummation of the European Defense Community. That concept came from recognition that the best guarantee of permanent peace in Europe was an organic unity which would include France and Germany. Also, if this unity merged the military forces of these two and other European countries, that would assure their nonaggressive character. Such forces would clearly be unavailable except as the whole community recognized the need for defensive action.

The votes of Communist deputies more than accounted for the parliamentary majority which in one country shelved the EDC. Thus, they acted to perpetuate European divisions which have recurrently bred wars. However, the free nations concerned do not accept with resignation the perpetuation of what, historically, has been the world's worst fire hazard. They are alert to the peril and are working actively to surmount it.

Korea

Last year when I spoke here about Korea, I was able to report an armistice. That, I said, was not because the Communist aggressors loved peace, but because they had come up against an effective military barrier. I went on to say, "The Korean political conference, if the Communists come to it,

²For text of Secretary Dulles' address before the Eighth General Assembly, see BULLETIN of Sept. 28, 1953, p. 403.

will afford a better test.” It took 7 months of arduous negotiation to bring about the political conference. When it occurred at Geneva, the United Nations side proposed the unification of Korea on the basis of free all-Korean elections to be supervised by the United Nations. This proposal was rejected by the Communist side. They insisted that the United Nations must itself be treated as an instrument of aggression and be debarred from any further activity in Korea.

This counterproposal, insulting to the United Nations, was unanimously rejected by those who proudly hailed the Korean action of the United Nations as the first example in all history of an international organization which had in fact acted effectively against armed aggression.

The United States does not believe that the unification of Korea must await another war. We have exerted all the influence we possess in favor of a peaceful solution of the Korean problem, and we have not lost faith that this solution is possible.

Southeast Asia

At the Geneva Conference the belligerents in Indochina also dealt with the problem of peace. An 8-year conflict of mounting intensity was brought to a close. We can all rejoice that there has been an end to the killing. On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that several hundred thousand in North Viet-Nam have at their desire been transferred to non-Communist areas, and that there still remain millions unwillingly subject to an alien despotism. In this case, an end to fighting has been bought at a heavy price, and the final result is still obscure.

One result, however, has been the driving home to the nations interested in Southeast Asia of the importance of a collective organization for defense against further aggression. At Manila this month eight nations met and negotiated and signed a treaty calling for collective defense against aggression.

The Manila Pact constitutes significant action taken under the charter of the United Nations, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Those who cry out when others exercise their inherent right of self-defense only expose their own aggressive purposes.

The Manila Conference did much more than extend the area of collective security. It adopted the Pacific Charter. Thereby, the eight nations—

Asian and non-Asian—which met at Manila proclaimed in ringing terms the principles of self-determination, self-government, and independence. This charter, and the spirit of fellowship which gave it birth, should serve once and for all to end the myth that there is inherent incompatibility between East and West. The peoples of Asia who are already free, or who seek freedom, need not remain weak, divided, and unsupported in the face of the new imperialism which has already reduced to colonial servitude 800,000,000 people, of what were once 15 truly independent nations.

Atomic Energy

The past year has been marked by intensive efforts in the field of atomic energy. The United States has sought to share its commanding position in this field in ways that would permit many to join in a great new adventure in human welfare. We hoped to turn atomic energy from being an instrument of death into a source of the enrichment of life.

I vividly recall December 8, 1953, when we here heard President Eisenhower propose that the nations possessing atomic material would cooperate under the auspices of the United Nations to create a world atomic bank into which they would each contribute fissionable material which would then be used for the purpose of productivity rather than destruction.³ I shared the drama of that moment and sensed the universal applause which then greeted that proposal—applause which echoed around the world.

Because it seems that oftentimes negotiations publicly conducted with the Soviet Union tend to become propaganda contests, President Eisenhower proposed that these new negotiations should be privately conducted. The United States, after consultation with others, then submitted a concrete, detailed proposal to carry out President Eisenhower's great conception. I myself met several times with the Soviet Foreign Minister at Berlin and at Geneva to discuss this matter. We are quite willing that all documents exchanged between the United States and the Soviet Union during these negotiations be published.

We hoped and believed that, if the Soviet Union would join with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations possessing fissionable

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

U. S. Request to Secretary-General for Agenda Item on Atomic Energy

U.N. doc. A/2734 dated September 23

NEW YORK, 23 September 1954

I have the honour to request, under rule 15 of the rules of procedure, that an item entitled "International co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy: report of the United States of America" be added to the agenda of the General Assembly as an important and urgent question.

In connexion with the above-mentioned request I attach an explanatory memorandum, in accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure.

H. C. LODGE, Jr.
Chairman

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

The President of the United States, in his statement to the eighth regular session of the General Assembly on 8 December 1953, made far-reaching proposals to set up an international atomic energy agency under the aegis of the United Nations to develop plans whereby the peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited. The President further indicated the willingness of the United States to take up with the Powers "principally involved" the development of plans for such an agency.

During the past year the United States has engaged in discussions on this subject with the Powers principally involved with atomic energy matters, and particularly with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. While the attempt to secure the co-operation of the USSR in this endeavour has not been successful, the other Governments with whom the United States has discussed this proposal have indicated general agreement on the objectives of the proposal and on the general nature of the international atomic energy agency.

The United States intends to proceed immediately, in conjunction with the other nations principally involved, to create an international agency to develop the constructive uses of atomic energy. This approach excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As more precise plans take shape, all nations interested in participating and willing to take on the responsibilities of membership will be welcome to join in the planning and execution of this programme.

The United States believes that an international scientific conference of representatives of Governments and scientists would be useful in identifying the technical areas in which progress can best be made in applying atomic energy to peaceful ends, and accordingly suggests that the United Nations should convene such a conference. The United States intends at the appropriate time to describe in greater detail the nature of such a conference and its objectives.

There have been other significant developments during the past year in connexion with peaceful uses of nuclear energy concerning which the United States will report.

The United States believes that an explanation of these matters is of such import to all nations that it warrants the addition of this item to the General Assembly's agenda as an important and urgent matter.

material and atomic know-how, this act of co-operation might set a pattern which would extend itself elsewhere.

The plan we submitted could not have hurt anyone. It was motivated by the hope of lifting the darkest cloud that hangs over mankind. Its initial dimensions were not sufficient to impair the military capability of the Soviet Union, and there was no apparent reason for its rejection. Above all, it was a practicable, easily workable plan, not dependent on elaborate surveillance.

Nevertheless, the proposal was, in effect, rejected by the Soviet Union last April. Its rejection was not because of any alleged defects in the plan itself. Any such would certainly have been negotiable. The Soviet position was, in effect, to say—we will not cooperate to develop peacetime uses of atomic energy unless it is first of all agreed to renounce all those uses of atomic energy which provide the free nations with their strongest defense against aggression.

To date, the Soviet Government has shown no willingness to participate in the implementation of President Eisenhower's plan except on this completely unacceptable condition. Yesterday, when it was known that I would speak on this topic today, the Soviet Union broke a 5 months' silence by delivering a note in Moscow affirming its readiness to talk further. But the note still gave no indication that the Soviet Union had receded from its negative position.

The United States remains ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union. But we shall no longer suspend our efforts to establish an international atomic agency.

The United States is determined that President Eisenhower's proposal shall not languish until it dies. It will be nurtured and developed. We shall press on in close partnership with those nations which, inspired by the ideals of the United Nations Charter, can make this great new force a tool of the humanitarian and of the statesman, and not merely a fearsome addition to the arsenal of war.

The United States is proposing an agenda item which will enable us to report on our efforts to explore and develop the vast possibilities for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. These efforts have been and will be directed primarily toward the following ends:

- (1) The creation of an international agency,

Statement by Ambassador Lodge on Atomic Pool Proposal¹

In his speech yesterday, Secretary Dulles announced the decision of the Government of the United States to press forward with President Eisenhower's vital proposal for the establishment of an international agency to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Secretary Dulles referred to the sincere effort made by the United States to enlist the cooperation of the Soviet Union in this unprecedented offer to share the fruits of modern technology with all nations and peoples. The Soviet Union has refused to join in this venture so far. We can all hope that this refusal is not final.

But in any event, the attitude of the Soviet Union cannot be permitted to deprive the people of the world of the benefits of the greatest scientific discovery of modern times. The other nations which are in a position to contribute to this great venture have indicated their readiness to do so. The United States is determined to join with them without further delay in order that nations and peoples everywhere shall share as soon as possible in atomic progress for peace.

Substantial progress has already been made in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its by-products. A concerted international effort of the kind the United States is prepared to support could hasten the process of bringing this boon to human life out of the laboratory and putting it to work in fields, factories, and hospitals and all other places where people live and work.

The United States therefore proposes the addition to the agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "International Cooperation in Developing the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Report of the United States of America."²

¹Made in the General Committee on Sept. 24 (U.S./U.N. press release 1963).

²For text of formal request, see opposite page.

I am sure that the members of this committee will agree that this is an urgent and important matter in the sense of rule 15 of the General Assembly. The inclusion of this item on our agenda will permit the United States and other governments principally involved in the development of atomic energy to report more fully to this Assembly on the progress already achieved and on the efforts to set up an international atomic energy agency. It will also enable the General Assembly to consider the convening of an international scientific conference under the auspices of the United Nations to help in identifying areas in which further technical progress might be made. I am certain that the great majority of the members of the United Nations are anxious for this opportunity to assist in making the promise of atomic energy a beneficent reality for all people.

The United States believes that this item should be discussed in the Political Committee and recommends that the General Committee so decide.

There is probably no single matter before us at this General Assembly which holds out greater promise for actively and constructively promoting the material welfare of mankind.³

³The General Committee decided unanimously to add the U.S. item to the agenda as an important and urgent matter. After a statement by the Soviet representative, Andrei Vyshinsky, favoring the recommendation, Ambassador Lodge made the following additional remarks:

"Of course, no one will be happier than the representative of the United States to find that the Soviet Union by its actions makes clear its cooperation with this great idea. But let us not forget the words of the old proverb—actions speak louder than words. The world has been waiting for such action since last December 8. Secretary Dulles said yesterday we will be glad to publish the entire correspondence and then the world can reach its own judgment."

whose initial membership will include nations from all regions of the world. It is hoped that such an agency will start its work as early as next year.

(2) The calling of an international scientific conference to consider this whole vast subject, to meet in the spring of 1955, under the auspices of the United Nations.

(3) The opening early next year, in the United States, of a reactor training school where stu-

dents from abroad may learn the working principles of atomic energy with specific regard to its peacetime uses.

(4) The invitation to a substantial number of medical and surgical experts from abroad to participate in the work of our cancer hospitals—in which atomic energy techniques are among the most hopeful approaches to controlling this menace to mankind.

I would like to make perfectly clear that our

planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As our proposals take shape, all nations interested in participating, and willing to take on the responsibilities of membership, will be welcome to join with us in the planning and execution of this program.

Even though much is denied us by Soviet negotiation, nevertheless much remains that can be done. There is denied the immense relaxation of tension which might have occurred had the Soviet Union been willing to begin to cooperate with other nations in relation to what offers so much to fear and so much to hope. Nevertheless, there is much to be accomplished in the way of economic and humanitarian gains. There is no miracle to be wrought overnight. But a program can be made and vitalized to assure that atomic energy can bring to millions a better way of life. To achieve that result is our firm resolve.

Closely allied to this question of peaceful uses of atomic energy is the whole vast and complex question of disarmament. At this Assembly last year, the United States affirmed its ardent desire to reduce the burden of armament. I stated here that the United States would vigorously carry forward the technical studies on armament control and limitation which are vital to any solution of this problem.

London Talks on Disarmament

Last spring the United States participated in discussions in London with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada on a subcommittee of our Disarmament Commission to see whether a fresh approach to the problem could achieve a solution acceptable to the Soviet Union as well as to the free world.⁴ The record of these meetings has now been made public.

It shows that the representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States tried with patience and ingenuity to explore all avenues of agreement with the Soviet Union which would be consistent with the security of all nations. Once more we made clear, as we have again and again in the past, that we seek to eliminate the use of atomic energy for any purposes but those of peace.

These efforts were met by a flat refusal by the Soviet Union even to discuss our proposals on

their merits. The crux of the Soviet position was that, before it will engage in real negotiations on disarmament, it insists upon a paper ban by the major powers of the use of nuclear weapons. The great shield, the supreme deterrent, must first be abandoned, leaving the free nations exposed to the Communists' unrivaled manpower. Once that inequality has been assured, then—perhaps—the Soviet Union will negotiate further from its position of assured supremacy. Such procedure would not increase the security of any free nation.

Reluctantly we must conclude that the Soviet Union has at present no serious desire to negotiate on the disarmament problem. But we shall continue to hope, and to seek, that the Soviet Union may ultimately come to cooperate on a program which could end the wasteful diversion of vast economic wealth and bring it into the constructive service of mankind.

Charter Review

No doubt you will have observed that many of the efforts for peace to which I have referred were conducted outside of the United Nations itself. It should not, however, be forgotten that the organs of the United Nations are themselves steadily carrying forward activities which contribute substantially, even though not spectacularly, to the political, economic, and social conditions which are the foundation for peace. The United States wishes to pay a high tribute to those who perform these indispensable tasks.

If many major political developments have occurred outside the immediate framework of the United Nations, that is due to two causes—one good, one bad:

The charter of the United Nations itself provides that the parties to any dispute which would endanger international peace and security should first of all seek a solution by negotiation, resort to regional agencies, or other peaceful means of their own choice. Only when these methods fail should there be resort to the Security Council. In other words, the Security Council of the United Nations was never intended to be a court of first instance, but only a court of last resort. In this sense, the unprecedented peace efforts of the past year fall within the pattern which our charter itself prescribes.

A second cause exists, and it is disturbing. It is the fact that the membership of the United Na-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 171.

tions falls far short of representing the totality of those nations which are peace-loving, which are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the charter, and which are indispensable parties to many critical international problems. Fourteen nations are now debarred from membership only through the use—in reality the abuse—of the so-called veto power. None of these is in the category of Communist China, which has been found by the United Nations to be guilty of aggression. All 14 are fully qualified for membership. Unless ways can be found to bring peace-loving, law-abiding nations into this organization, then inevitably the power and influence of this organization will progressively decline.

We are approaching the tenth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. All of the member governments and their peoples may properly be thankful for the great accomplishments of the United Nations and for its unique service as a forum for international discussion. However, this coming anniversary must be made more than a date for self-congratulations. It is the time to

take account of weaknesses of our organization and of ways in which it can be made to function better as a guarantor of peace and justice and as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. That, indeed, was the idea of the founders, who planned for a charter review conference to be called at the next annual session of our Assembly.

The search for peace has had its high hopes and its deep frustrations. But after the frustration, there is always renewed hope. On behalf of the United States I would say in my closing words that we believe that international peace is an attainable goal. That is the premise that underlies all our planning. We propose never to desist, never to admit discouragement, but confidently and steadily so to act that peace becomes for us a sustaining principle of action. In that, we know that we shall not be alone. That is not merely because we have treaties of alliance and bonds of expediency. It is because the spirit of peace is a magnet that draws together many men and many nations and makes of them a fellowship of loyal partners for peace.

BULLETIN Marks Twenty-fifth Anniversary

This issue of the BULLETIN marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of an official periodical by the Department of State.

The first issue of *Press Releases*, predecessor to the BULLETIN, appeared on October 5, 1929. It contained, among other documents, a message from Secretary Stimson on the death of the German Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann. The second issue included the text of the British Government's invitation to the London Naval Conference, a message from President Hoover to the President of Argentina on the inauguration of air mail service between their countries, and information concerning the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald.

Issue No. 1 of *Press Releases* also was Publication No. 1 in the Department's newly inaugurated publication program. The consecutive numbering

system begun at that time is still in effect; publication No. 5545, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Volume IV, The Far East*, was released on September 25.

On July 1, 1939, the Department of State BULLETIN first made its appearance, superseding both *Press Releases* and the monthly *Treaty Information* bulletin. The decision to discontinue the latter publications was based on the belief that "a single bulletin containing both treaty information and information on other closely related aspects of the conduct of American foreign relations would constitute a more useful and convenient source for current reference and for filing than two separate publications."

The present format of the BULLETIN was adopted with the issue of October 6, 1946.

Correspondence With Soviet Union on Atomic Pool Proposal

Press release 531 dated September 25

Following are the texts of documents exchanged between the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics between January and September 1954 during the course of negotiations concerning President Eisenhower's proposals before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953.

NOTE HANDED TO AMBASSADOR GEORGI ZAROUBIN BY SECRETARY DULLES, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 11

1. The United States suggests that the conversation with reference to atomic energy should initially be conducted through diplomatic channels, reserving the right of any participant to propose shifting the deliberations to the United Nations pursuant to its resolution suggesting private discussions under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission.¹

2. It is suggested that the diplomatic discussions take place at Washington and wherever else it is convenient for the participants to meet. Presumably Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles would have a private discussion at Berlin.²

3. It is suggested that procedural talks should in their initial stage be limited to the U.S.S.R. and the United States, with the participation of the other nations principally involved as determined in the light of the subject matter to be discussed.

4. The United States is prepared to consider any proposal that the Soviet Union sees fit to make with reference to atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

5. However, the United States believes that the first effort should be to proceed on a modest basis which might engender the trust and confidence necessary for planning of larger scope. That is why the United States urges an early discussion of the proposal made by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953. The United States is prepared to have concrete private discussions about this plan and its possible implementation.

6. The United States suggests that privacy will best serve practical results at this time and that these talks should not be used for propaganda purposes by either side.

NOTE HANDED TO SECRETARY DULLES BY AMBASSADOR ZAROUBIN, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 19

[Translation]

In connection with the aide memoire handed by J. F. Dulles, Secretary of State, to Ambassador G. N. Zaroubin on January 11, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to communicate the following.

1. Paragraph 1 of the U.S. aide memoire states:

The United States suggests that the conversation with reference to atomic energy should initially be conducted through diplomatic channels, reserving the right of any participant to propose shifting the deliberations to the United Nations pursuant to its resolution suggesting private discussions under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission.

On this point there are no remarks.

2. Paragraph 2 of the aide memoire of the U.S.A. states:

It is suggested that the diplomatic discussions take place at Washington and wherever else it is convenient for the participants to meet. Presumably Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles would have a private discussion at Berlin.

On paragraph 2 there are no remarks.

3. In paragraph 3 of the aide memoire of the U.S.A. it is said:

It is suggested that procedural talks should in their initial stage be limited to the U.S.S.R. and the United States, with the participation of the other nations principally involved as determined in the light of the subject matter to be discussed.

Agreement is expressed regarding the considerations stated in paragraph 3 of the aide memoire, keeping in mind that at the specified stage of the negotiations there will be considered the necessity for drawing into the negotiations all powers that bear the chief responsibility for maintaining peace and international security.

4. Paragraph 4 of the aide memoire of the U.S.A. states:

The United States is prepared to consider any proposal that the Soviet Union sees fit to make with reference to atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1953, p. 838.

² I.e. during the four-power conference opening at Berlin on Jan. 25.

In this connection it is necessary to recall the statement made by the Soviet Government on December 21, 1953,³ which pointed out that the Soviet Government proceeds on the basis of the assumption that during the course of the negotiations there will be considered at the same time the proposal of the Soviet Union with regard to an agreement under which the states participating in the agreement would assume the unconditional obligation not to use the atomic, hydrogen, or any other weapon of mass destruction.

5. In paragraph 5 of the aide memoire of the U.S.A. it is said:

However, the United States believes that the first effort should be to proceed on a modest basis which might engender the trust and confidence necessary for planning of larger scope. That is why the United States urges an early discussion of the proposal made by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953. The United States is prepared to have concrete private discussions about this plan and its possible implementation.

The Soviet Government agrees to consider President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8, 1953, and likewise agrees to enter into the said negotiations relating to this proposal. At the same time the Soviet Government considers it necessary to negotiate to the effect that in the discussion of this proposal made by the U.S.A. and the proposal made by the U.S.S.R. as mentioned in paragraph 4, the principle of rotation be observed, with one conference being devoted to the consideration of the U.S. proposal and the next being devoted to the consideration of the U.S.S.R. proposal.

6. Paragraph 6 of the aide memoire of the U.S.A. states:

The United States suggests that privacy will best serve practical results at this time and that these talks should not be used for propaganda purposes by either side.

On this paragraph there are no remarks.

DRAFT DECLARATION HANDED TO SECRETARY DULLES BY MR. MOLOTOV, BERLIN, JANUARY 30

[Translation]

Draft Declaration of the Governments of the United States of America, England and France, Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union Concerning Unconditional Renunciation of Use of Atomic, Hydrogen and Other Forms of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Governments of the United States of America, England, France, Chinese People's Republic and the U. S. S. R., determined to deliver humanity from the threat of destructive war with the use of atomic, hydrogen, and other forms of weapons of mass destruction, desirous of assisting in every way in the utilization of the great scientific discoveries in the field of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes for the well-being of peoples and the amelioration of their living conditions,

³ BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1954, p. 80.

Considering that the unconditional renunciation by states of the use of atomic, hydrogen, and other forms of weapons of mass destruction corresponds to the basic purposes of the organization of the United Nations and would constitute an important step on the road to the complete withdrawal from national armaments of the atomic, hydrogen, and other forms of weapons of mass destruction with the establishment of strict international control guaranteeing the execution of agreement concerning the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, animated by the aspirations of the peoples for a reduction in international tension,

Solemnly declare that they take upon themselves the unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen, and other forms of weapons of mass destruction;

Call on other countries to adhere to the present declaration.

AIDE MEMOIRE HANDED TO SECRETARY DULLES BY MR. MOLOTOV, BERLIN, FEBRUARY 13

[Translation]

1. In the aide memoire presented by the Ambassador of the U. S. S. R. in Washington to the Secretary of State of the U.S.A. on January 19, 1954, the Soviet Government expressed the view that at a subsequent stage of the negotiations on the atomic problem all the powers bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security should be invited to take part.

In a private talk with Mr. Dulles on January 30 last, V. M. Molotov explained that the powers referred to are the Five Powers, namely, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the Chinese People's Republic.

2. In that talk Mr. Dulles expressed the view that Britain, France, and also Canada and Belgium should be invited to join in the negotiations on the atomic problem, and he explained that Canada and Belgium should take part as countries possessing resources of atomic materials.

3. In connection therewith the Soviet Government states that it would have no objection to the participation in the negotiations on the atomic problem at an appropriate stage, besides the Five Powers, of Canada and Belgium, and also believes it necessary to have Czechoslovakia invited to take part in the said negotiations as a country possessing atomic materials.

LETTER FROM SECRETARY DULLES TO MR. MOLOTOV, BERLIN, FEBRUARY 16

DEAR MR. MINISTER: I refer to your Aide Memoire, which you handed me on February 13, 1954, regarding the discussions on the atomic proposal.

In your numbered paragraph 2, you state that I "expressed the view that Britain, France and also Canada

and Belgium should be invited to join in the negotiations on the atomic problem, and (he) explained that Canada and Belgium should take part as countries possessing resources of atomic materials." This statement does not fully accord with my recollection of what I said on the subject on January 30. I would like to clear up the apparent misunderstanding. At that discussion I said that the United Kingdom, Canada and France had all made progress in the atomic field. I then referred to Belgium and other countries which were important sources of raw material. In these circumstances I indicated that if we shifted our talks from a bilateral basis to a broader conference at that stage the United States would raise the problem of what countries should participate.

In connection with the general subject of possible future participation, I should like to call your attention once more to a general statement which I have made repeatedly here in Berlin. This is that the United States is not prepared to participate in any conference with the Chinese Communist regime on the theory that it has, or shares, any special position of responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

I shall hope to be in a position to hand to Ambassador Zaroubin in Washington, shortly after my return, a memorandum on the substance of the President's proposal.

Very truly yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

His Excellency

V. M. MOLOTOV,

*Minister of Foreign Affairs for
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.*

LETTER FROM MR. MOLOTOV TO SECRETARY DULLES, BERLIN, FEBRUARY 18

[Translation]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I confirm the receipt of your letter of February 16, 1954.

Inasmuch as you are already preparing to depart today, I will send my reply to your letter through the Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Washington, Zaroubin.

Respectfully,

V. MOLOTOV

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO ACTING SECRETARY SMITH BY AMBASSADOR ZAROUBIN, WASHINGTON, MARCH 10

[Translation]

In connection with the letter from the Secretary of State of the United States of America of February 16 of this year addressed to Mr. V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R., I am instructed by Mr. V. M. Molotov to state the following:

The views expressed in the letter that it is not considered expedient to define at present which specific coun-

tries should be invited to participate in the talks on the atomic question at a later stage of the talks have been noted.

As already stated in the aide memoire handed to Mr. Dulles by Ambassador Zaroubin January 19, as well as in the private discussion held by Mr. V. M. Molotov and Mr. Dulles at Berlin, the Soviet Government agrees to negotiate with the Government of the United States of America on the atomic question on a bilateral basis. At the same time, in case it is decided to shift these negotiations to a broader basis, there is no objection to an additional examination of the question as to the participants in such negotiations.

With regard to the possible participation of the Chinese People's Republic in the negotiations on the atomic question at a subsequent stage, the opinion of the Soviet Government on this question was stated in the aide memoire of February 13.

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO AMBASSADOR ZAROUBIN BY SECRETARY DULLES, WASHINGTON, MARCH 19

OUTLINE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The United States Government wishes to submit additional tentative views amplifying the proposals for an International Atomic Energy Agency as presented by the President of the United States to the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953:

I. The Objectives of the U.S. Proposals

The U.S. proposes that there should be established under the aegis of the United Nations an International Atomic Energy Agency to receive supplies of nuclear materials from those member nations having stocks of such materials to be used for the following objectives:

A. to encourage world-wide research and development of peaceful uses of atomic energy by assuring that engineers and scientists of the world have sufficient materials to conduct such activities and by fostering the interchange of information.

B. to furnish nuclear materials to meet the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities including the eventual production of power.

II. The International Atomic Energy Agency

A. The Agency would be created by and derive its authority under the terms of a treaty among the participating nations. To the greatest extent practicable, the treaty should define standards and principles which would govern the Agency in the discharge of its functions.

B. Membership—all signatory states would be members of the Agency.

C. Governing Body

1. The highest executive authority in the Agency should be exercised by a Board of Governors, of limited membership representing governments. In determining the composition of the Board of Governors, it might be desirable to take account of geographic distribution and membership by prospective beneficiaries. It is expected that the principal contributors would be on the Board of Governors.
2. It is suggested that decisions of the Board of Governors generally should be taken by some form of majority vote. Arrangements could be worked out to give the principal contributing countries special voting privileges on certain matters, such as allocations of fissionable material.

D. Staff—The Staff of the Agency should be headed by an administrative head or general manager, appointed for a fixed term by the Board of Governors and subject to its control, and, of course, include highly qualified scientific and technical personnel. Under the general supervision of the Board, the administrative head should be responsible for the appointment, organization and functioning of the Staff.

E. Financing

1. Funds for the central facilities and fixed plant of the Agency and its research projects should be provided through appropriation by the participating states in accordance with a scale of contributions to be agreed upon. It is suggested that it might be possible to utilize the general principles governing the scale of contributions by individual members to the UN.
2. Funds for specific projects submitted by member nations to utilize the materials or services of the Agency should be provided by the recipient country concerned through specific arrangements in each case.

F. The administrative headquarters of the Agency could be located at a place mutually agreed upon.

G. Relationship to the United Nations and Other International Bodies—The Agency should submit reports to the UN Security Council and General Assembly when requested by either of these organs. The Agency should also consult and cooperate with other UN bodies whose work may be related to that of the Agency.

H. The facilities of the Agency would include:

1. Plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and issuance of nuclear materials.
2. Physical safeguards.
3. Control laboratories for analysis and verification of receipts and inventory control of nuclear materials.
4. Necessary housing for administrative and other activities of the Agency not included in the preceding categories.

5. Those facilities, as might in time be necessary, for such purposes as education and training, research and development, fuel fabrication and chemical processing.

III. Functions of the Agency

A. Receipt and Storage of Materials

1. All member nations possessing stocks of normal and enriched uranium, thorium metal, U-233, U-235, U-238, plutonium and alloys of the foregoing would be expected to make contributions of such material to the Agency.
2. The United States would be prepared to make as a donation, a substantial initial contribution of nuclear materials towards the needs of the Agency. The USSR would make an equivalent donation towards these needs.
3. The Agency would specify the place, method of delivery, and, when appropriate, the form and composition of materials it will receive. The Agency would also verify stated quantities of materials received and would report to the members these amounts. The Agency would be responsible for storing and protecting materials in a way to minimize the likelihood of surprise seizure.

B. Allocation of Materials by the Agency

1. The Agency would review proposals submitted by participating members desiring to receive allocations of Agency stocks in the light of uniform and equitable criteria, including:
 - a. The use to which material would be put, including scientific and technical feasibility.
 - b. The adequacy of plans, funds, technical personnel, etc., to assure effective use of the material.
 - c. Adequacy of proposed health and safety measures for handling and storing materials and for operating facilities.
 - d. Equitable distribution of available materials.
2. Title to nuclear materials would initially remain with the Agency, which would determine fair payment to be made for use of materials.
3. In order to insure that adequate health and safety standards were being followed, and in order to assure that allocated fissionable material is being used for the purposes for which it was allocated, the Agency would have the continuing authority to prescribe certain design and operating conditions, health and safety regulations, require accountability and operating records, specify disposition of byproduct fissionable materials and wastes, retain the right of monitoring and require progress reports. The Agency would also have authority to verify status of allocated material inventories and to verify compliance with the terms of issuance.
4. Information about all transactions entered into by the Agency would be available to all members.

C. Information and Service Activities of the Agency

1. All member nations possessing information

relevant to the activities of the Agency would be expected to make contributions from that information to the Agency.

2. In addition to data developed as a result of its own activities, the Agency would have available:

- a. Data developed by participating countries as a result of the utilization of the materials, information, services, and other assistance of the Agency.
 - b. Data already publicly available in some of the countries.
 - c. Data developed and previously held by principals or other members and voluntarily contributed to the Agency.
3. The Agency would encourage the exchange of scientific and technical information among nations, and be responsible for making wide dissemination of the data in its possession.
4. The Agency would serve as an intermediary securing the performance of services by one participating country for another. Among the specific activities the Agency might provide would be the following:
- a. Training and education.
 - b. Services concerned with developing codes for public health and safety in connection with the utilization of fissionable materials.
 - c. Consultative technical services in connection with the establishment and carrying on of programs.
 - d. Processing of nuclear materials (i. e., chemical separation and purification, fabrication of fuel elements, etc.).
 - e. Supply of special materials, such as heavy water.
 - f. Design and supply of specialized equipment.
 - g. Special laboratory services such as conduct of experiments and tests.
 - h. Aid in making financial arrangements for the support of appropriate projects.

AIDE MEMOIRE HANDED TO SECRETARY DULLES BY MR. MOLOTOV, GENEVA, APRIL 27

[Translation]

In connection with the memorandum of the Government of the U. S. A. dated March 19, containing supplementary explanations concerning the international organ (agency) of atomic energy, discussed in President Eisenhower's statement of December 8, 1953, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following considerations.

In the aforementioned statement of the President of the U. S. A. which underlined the special danger of the atomic weapon, a proposal was made that the appropriate states allocate a small part of the atomic materials out

of their stocks for the disposal of the International Agency to use for peaceful needs. In the memorandum of March 19 several details of the organization of the aforementioned International Agency were given, but those remarks which were made by the Soviet Government in its statement of December 21 concerning the statement of the President of the U. S. A. on December 8 were completely ignored. Nevertheless, these remarks of the Soviet Government aim to achieve an agreement concerning the prohibition of atomic weapons and to secure the acceptance of an obligation by the states in the very near future not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, which are by their nature weapons of aggression.

In his address of December 8 the President of the U. S. A. declared "My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations." In this statement the President of the U. S. A. also said: "The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved', to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world."

These statements of the President of the U. S. A. expressed wishes for peace, a yearning to find a solution of the problem of the atomic armament race, together with representatives of other countries, and a desire to achieve "agreements, not wars, among nations." Inasmuch as it is the constant aspiration of the Government of the U. S. S. R. to assist in strengthening peace among nations and under present conditions, in particular, to assist in the elimination of the threat of an atomic war, the Soviet Government has expressed readiness to take part in the appropriate negotiations.

However, the Soviet Government has considered and still considers it necessary to call special attention to the following.

First: The proposal of the U. S. A. that the appropriate states place a small part of atomic materials out of their stocks at the disposal of the International Organ to be used for peaceful needs, cannot assist in the achievement of the aims set forth in the aforementioned address of the President of the U. S. A. By such an allocation of a small part of the atomic materials for peaceful needs, the principal mass of the atomic materials will go, as before, for the production of new atomic and hydrogen bombs, which means a further accumulation of atomic weapons and the possibility of creating new types of this weapon of more destructive force. Such a situation means that the states which have the opportunity to produce atomic and hydrogen weapons will not be restrained at all in the further increase of stocks of this weapon.

The allocation of a small portion of atomic materials out of the stocks in existence to be utilized for peaceful needs may only create the appearance that the quantity of atomic materials allocated for the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons is being decreased. But, in reality that is not the case at all. The production of atomic materials in a number of countries has been

growing with each year so fast that the allocation of a certain part for peaceful needs will by no means reduce the quantity of the newly produced atomic and hydrogen bombs. Consequently, even in case the U. S. proposal should be carried out, it would be impossible to say that the atomic armament race is being stopped, as was said in the statement of the President of the U. S. A. of December 8.

The level of science and technique which has been reached at the present time makes it possible for the very application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to be utilized for increasing the production of atomic weapons.

It is well known that it is practically feasible to carry out on an industrial scale a process of obtaining electrical power for peaceful needs by utilizing atomic materials, in which the quantity of the fissionable atomic materials applied in the process not only fails to decrease but, on the contrary, increases. And the harmless atomic materials are converted into explosive and fissionable materials which are the basis for the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons. In other words, the fact that the peaceful application of atomic energy is connected with the possibility of simultaneous production of atomic materials utilized for the manufacture of the atomic weapon is indisputable and has been proved in practice. Such a situation not only fails to lead to a reduction of the stocks of atomic materials utilized for the manufacture of atomic weapons, but also leads to an increase of these stocks without any limitations being applied either to the constantly increasing production of these materials in individual states or to production by the International Agency itself.

Consequently, the proposal of the U. S. A. concerning the allocation of a certain portion of atomic materials to be utilized for peaceful purposes not only fails to stop the atomic armament race but leads to its further intensification.

Second: The U. S. proposal of December 8, as well as the U. S. A. memorandum of March 19, completely evades the problem of the inadmissibility of the use of atomic weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction.

The acceptance of President Eisenhower's proposal would by no means restrict the aggressor in utilizing atomic weapons for any purpose and at any time and consequently would not diminish at all the danger of a war with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Thus, the acceptance of the aforementioned proposal of the U. S. A. would not introduce any change into the existing situation, when states which have at their disposal atomic materials and appropriate manufacturing and technical possibilities for the production of atomic weapons produce them on an increasing scale and accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen bombs of more and more destructive power. Besides, all this takes place under conditions of complete absence of any international agreement whatsoever which binds states in the application of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

However, it cannot be denied that recently there has been widespread uneasiness in many countries in connection with the increase in the destructive power of the atomic weapon and especially in view of the appearance

of the hydrogen weapon. It would be wrong not to consider these well-known facts and the ever-increasingly insistent demands not to permit the use of the atomic and the hydrogen weapon in warfare.

All this justifies the conclusion that neither the U. S. proposal of December 8 nor the U. S. memorandum of March 19 meets the basic purpose—elimination of the threat of atomic war.

In its statement of December 21 the Soviet Government pointed out that if the Government of the U. S. A., as well as the Government of the U. S. S. R. is striving to reduce international tension and strengthen peace, then the efforts of both Governments should be directed toward concluding an agreement for prohibiting the atomic weapon and toward establishing a suitable and effective international control over this prohibition. With such an international prohibition against the atomic weapon, broad possibilities would be opened for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Since the statement of December 8 of the President of the U. S. A. and the U. S. memorandum of March 19 both evade the question of prohibiting the atomic weapon and actually ignore the possibility of further unlimited increase in the production of this weapon and its use by an aggressor, the U. S. proposal for the creation of an international agency for the utilization of atomic energy does not reduce the danger of atomic warfare in the slightest. Moreover, it may even serve ends that are the exact opposite. This proposal to use some portion of the atomic materials for peaceful purposes may create the deceptive appearance of curtailing the production of the atomic weapon and may lead to the relaxing of vigilance on the part of nations with regard to the growing threat of war with the use of this weapon of aggression and mass destruction of people.

The fact that heretofore it has been impossible to conclude an appropriate agreement for the unconditional prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons of mass destruction not only does not diminish the importance of efforts in this direction but, on the contrary, makes such efforts still more necessary, taking into account the ever-increasing danger for nations in connection with the continuing race in the production of the atomic and the hydrogen weapon. This applies especially to those states which have available the corresponding resources in atomic materials and are producing the atomic and the hydrogen weapon.

If the matter were reduced merely to agreements between states, that for peaceful purposes there should be allotted only some small portion of the atomic materials, but the production of the atomic weapon in the future also should not be restricted at all, then such an international agreement would in fact grant an inadmissible sanction to the production of the atomic weapon, which would suit the convenience of the aggressive forces only. This sort of international sanction of the production of the atomic weapon not only would not facilitate the conclusion of an agreement for its prohibition but would, on the contrary, be a new obstacle on the road to the conclusion of such an agreement.

It is indispensable that not merely some portion, but the entire mass of atomic materials be directed entirely to peaceful purposes, that the achievements of science in

this field serve not purposes of war and mass destruction of people but purposes of improving economic life and culture, which would open up unprecedented opportunities for improving industry, agriculture, and transportation, for use in medicine, for perfecting technical processes and the further progress of science.

The prohibition of the atomic and the hydrogen weapon and the utilization of all atomic materials for peaceful purposes, supplying the proper aid to regions that are economically weak, would at the same time promote the possibility of concluding an agreement on the matter of a decisive reduction in conventional types of armaments. This would make it possible to greatly alleviate the tax burden which nations are hearing as a result of the existence in many states of inordinately swollen armies, since the armament race goes on.

Desiring to facilitate the possibility of concluding an agreement for the unconditional and complete prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of appropriate international control, the Soviet Government, having expressed its readiness to take part in negotiations with respect to the proposal of the Government of the U. S. A., has, on its part, introduced the following proposal for consideration:

Being guided by the desire to reduce international tension, the states participating in the Agreement undertake the solemn and unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen, or any other weapon of mass destruction.

This proposal was set down as the basis for the draft of a declaration of the Governments of the U. S. A., Great Britain, France, the Chinese People's Republic, and the Soviet Union, a draft which the Soviet Government communicated on January 30 to the Government of the U. S. A., as well as to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and the Chinese People's Republic. The adoption of the obligation of unconditional repudiation of the use of the atomic and the hydrogen weapon by states, and first of all by the Great Powers, would mean a great step toward relieving humanity of the threat of atomic war with its countless sacrifices and hardships.

The Soviet Government observes that the Government of the U. S. A. has so far not only failed to recognize the necessity for the urgent prohibition of the atomic and hydrogen weapon and for the establishment of appropriate international control over this prohibition, but it has also failed to express readiness to come to an understanding on the unconditional repudiation by states of the use of the atomic, the hydrogen, or any other weapon of mass destruction. In this connection, the Soviet Government attaches special importance to achieving coordination between the positions of the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. with regard to the adoption by states of the solemn and unconditional obligation not to use the atomic, the hydrogen, or any other weapon of mass destruction. Consideration of the separate proposals regarding partial utilization of atomic materials for peaceful purposes, without agreement between states on repudiating the use of the atomic weapon, would not contribute anything at all toward reducing international tension and the danger of war. Besides, it might lead to a blunting of the vigilance of nations with regard to this danger.

In view of the considerations cited and in accordance with General Eisenhower's statement concerning the desire of the U. S. A. to reduce international tension, the Soviet Government considers it urgently necessary in the first place to arrive at an agreement between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. on the question of repudiating the use of the atomic weapon, without which the negotiations initiated cannot yield the proper results, in which the peoples of our countries and other states are interested.

As far as the other questions dealt with in the U. S. memorandum of March 19 are concerned, the inadequacy and one-sidedness of which are obvious, they can be considered as a supplement, after arriving at agreement on the fundamental questions.

INFORMAL PAPER LEFT WITH MR. MOLOTOV BY SECRETARY DULLES, GENEVA, MAY 1

1. I have now read the aide-memoire of the Soviet Union of April 27 re the proposal for "an international atomic energy agency" submitted to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on March 19. This aide-memoire criticizes the proposal on the grounds that it would not substantially reduce atomic material stockpiles, or control the making or use of atomic weapons or remove the threat of atomic war.

2. These criticisms misconstrue the purpose of the US proposal of March 19. By its terms this proposal was not intended as a measure for the control of atomic weapons or for solving itself the various other problems mentioned in the Soviet note. Its purpose was the more limited one of initiating international cooperation in the field of atomic energy on a basis which would avoid many of the obstacles which have heretofore blocked any agreement. In this way the proposal could contribute to improving relations among the cooperating nations and thereby to facilitating solution of the more difficult problem of effective control of atomic energy for military purposes.

3. Accordingly, the US cannot concur in the view of the Soviet Union that creation of an international agency to foster the use of atomic materials for peaceful purposes would not be useful in itself. On the contrary, it believes that such an agency could have valuable results both in encouraging closer cooperation among the participating nations and in expediting more extensive use of atomic energy for purposes beneficial to mankind. The US therefore regrets that the Soviet Union is not willing to explore this matter further at this time.

4. In view of the lack of interest now of the Soviet Union in pursuing this proposal, the US will feel free to examine the creation of such an agency with other nations which might be interested. If the Soviet Union should later decide that it wishes to take part in any such discussions, the US will, of course, welcome its participation.

5. The US proposal of March 19 was, of course, not intended as a substitute for an effective system of control of atomic energy for military purposes. The US will continue, as heretofore, to seek means of achieving such control under reliable and adequate safeguards. It is

prepared to continue exchanges of views with the Soviet Union for that purpose, and will shortly submit to the Soviet Union comments on its proposal referred to in its aide-memoire of April 27.

**MEMORANDUM HANDED TO AMBASSADOR
ZARUBIN BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MERCHANT, WASHINGTON, JULY 9**

The United States has further considered the draft declaration of January 30 and Aide-Memoire of April 27 delivered by the Soviet Union to the United States. The United States wishes to make the following comments:

I.

1. The President's speech of December 8, 1953 to the United Nations General Assembly pointed out the dangers of the atomic armaments race and stressed the desire of the United States to remove these dangers by any effective method which includes adequate safeguards against violations and evasions. The United States would welcome any system of disarmament which would serve to protect the peoples of the world from the threat of war and relieve them of the heavy burden of military defense in a manner consistent with their security.

2. The United States is also aware of the difficulties which have been experienced since 1946 in trying to negotiate a disarmament plan. From that date until the present, the United States has persistently sought, alone and in concert with other nations, to find ways of easing the burden of armaments and of lessening the threat of war. In the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 through 1948, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments from 1947 through 1950, in the special meetings of the Six Permanent Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1949 and 1950, and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission since 1951, the overwhelming majority of nations was able to reach agreement—the Soviet Union alone prevented progress.

3. Despite this discouraging record, the President, in his address on December 8, stated that the United States, heeding the resolution of November 28, 1953 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, was "prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved' to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace but the very life of the world."

II.

4. In his address, the President also stated that the United States would carry into these talks a new proposal for an international atomic energy agency to expedite the use of atomic energy to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. In its memorandum of March 19, the United States explained in more detail its views on the method for converting this conception into a practical reality. The Aide-Memoire of April 27 of the Soviet Union appears to misconstrue completely the purpose of this specific proposal.

5. This proposal was intended to make a beginning toward bringing to the peoples of the world the peaceful benefits of atomic energy. This offer by the United States to join with other nations having atomic facilities to furnish fissionable material and atomic energy technology for the common benefit, would provide a new opportunity for international cooperation. Successful cooperation in the implementation of the President's proposal would surely result in an improved atmosphere, which, in turn, could significantly improve the prospects for genuine, safeguarded international disarmament. The proposal itself was not put forward as a disarmament plan.

6. The Soviet Aide-Memoire of April 27 states in effect that the USSR will not cooperate in steps to achieve peaceful benefits of atomic power for the world until the United States agrees to a ban on the use of atomic weapons. The primary reason given for this position is that under the President's United Nations proposal, stockpiles of weapon grade material could continue to increase after the international agency had been established. Yet the Soviet proposal for a ban on weapons' use would not in any way prevent such increases in stockpiles. Accordingly, the United States cannot agree that the Soviet position provides a valid objection to proceeding at this time with steps for promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

7. The Soviet Union also appears to assume that any form of peaceful utilization of atomic energy must necessarily increase stocks of materials available for military purposes. In reality, however, ways can be devised to safeguard against diversion of materials from power producing reactors. And there are forms of peaceful utilization in which no question of weapon grade material arises.

8. The United States believes that the nations most advanced in knowledge regarding the constructive uses of atomic energy have an obligation to make it available, under appropriate conditions, for promoting the welfare of peoples generally. At the present stage of nuclear technology, the United States believes that it is now possible to make a beginning in this direction. Accordingly, the United States will feel free to go ahead with its proposal with other interested nations, even though the Soviet Union does not wish to pursue it at this time. If at a later time the Soviet Union should decide to take part in any such discussions, the United States will continue to welcome such participation.

III.

9. The Soviet Union refers to its proposal of January 30 for an international agreement calling for unconditional renunciation of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. The United States has thoroughly and earnestly considered this proposal in accordance with its oft-declared policy to examine with an open mind all suggested approaches to the problem of disarmament.

10. In the opinion of the United States, any effective plan for disarmament must provide satisfactory answers to two fundamental questions:

a. First, will the plan result in an actual reduction or

elimination of national armaments in a manner consistent with the security of each nation? A paper promise not to use weapons will not enable the nations safely to reduce their armaments. The very existence of any weapon poses the possibility of its use, despite promises not to do so, which can be broken without notice.

b. Second, will the plan materially reduce or eliminate the danger of aggression and warfare? If any plan would, in fact, tend to increase the danger of resort to war by a potential aggressor, it would not accomplish the basic purpose of disarmament.

11. The Soviet Union's proposal of January 30 fails to meet either of these basic tests, or to offer any hope for beneficial results in the disarmament field:

a. It would leave unimpaired existing armaments and continued armament production. This is clear from the terms of the Soviet proposal itself. There would be only an exchange of promises not to make use of weapons which are still retained. There could be no certainty that these assurances would be observed. The maintenance of stocks of weapons and the continued manufacture of weapons would bear ominous witness to the danger that the assurances might be disregarded.

b. The danger of aggression and war would not be lessened if the Soviet proposal were put in effect. Indeed, it could be increased, since the deterrent effect upon a potential aggressor of the existence of nuclear weapons would doubtless be lessened if his possible victims had undertaken an obligation not to use them. Such an aggressor might be tempted to initiate an attack in the hope that the ban would prevent or delay the use of such weapons in the defense of his victims. Yet, the aggressor with nuclear weapons would be in a position to repudiate his past assurances and employ nuclear weapons whenever it suited his interests. Thus, such a plan might merely serve to induce aggression and weaken its victims.

12. Not only does the Soviet proposal fail to meet the necessary tests of any effective plan to prevent atomic warfare, but it would in fact harm the chances of adoption of any such effective plan. For surely the Soviet proposal, if it were accepted, would tend to create the deceptive impression that the danger of atomic warfare had somehow been limited and weaken the vigilance of the people regarding a threat which had, if anything, increased. This false sense of security could discourage further efforts to achieve genuine disarmament under effective safeguards, which would actually enhance the security of all, reduce the danger of war, and lighten the heavy burden of armaments.

IV.

13. The United States reaffirms, as it did in the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 17, 1950, that, whatever the method used, aggression itself is the gravest of all dangers. Only if there is aggression will the world be exposed to the horrors of modern war.

14. The signatories of the United Nations Charter have undertaken solemn assurances not to commit aggression. In conformity with its historic traditions, the United States will never violate that pledge. But, as indicated, the United States is convinced that the only truly effective way to ensure that aggression will not take place and that nuclear weapons will not be used in war is to adopt a safeguarded, balanced system of disarmament. Such a system could materially reduce the chance of successful aggression, and thereby minimize the risk of any aggression at all.

15. The United States continues to believe that a solution of the armaments problem is essential. Despite its inability to accept the Soviet proposal, the United States is ready at all times to discuss acceptable measures for effective disarmament under proper safeguards. It is prepared to do so either in the continuation of private exchanges or in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In view of the urgency of disarmament, the United States will welcome such a continuation if the Soviet Union considers it a useful means for seeking a common approach to this problem.

16. The United States also hopes that, in the light of the foregoing, the Soviet Union will wish to comment further on the concrete proposal submitted by the United States on March 19, 1954. In any event the United States is prepared to renew with the Soviet Union at any time the talks on the President's proposal.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, July 9, 1954.

AIDE MEMOIRE HANDED TO AMBASSADOR BOHLEN BY MR. GROMYKO,⁴ MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 22

[Translation]

The Soviet Government has examined the U.S. Government's memorandum of July 9, 1954, which is in answer to the U.S.S.R. Government's aide memoire of April 27 and considers it necessary to state the following:

In the above-mentioned aide-memoire of April 27 the Soviet Government set forth certain observations in connection with the U.S. Government's proposal concerning the establishment of an International Organ for Atomic Energy, which was discussed in President Eisenhower's statement of December 8, 1953. The Soviet Government drew attention to the fact that the implementation of the U.S.A.'s proposal, which provides that appropriate states allot from their stockpiles a certain part of atomic materials to the disposition of the International Organ to be used for peaceful purposes, cannot contribute to stopping the atomic armaments race. In this connection the fact was pointed out that states which have the ability to produce atomic and hydrogen weapons will in no way be hampered in further increase of stockpiles of them by allotting only a small part of atomic materials to peace-

⁴ Andrei Gromyko, Deputy Foreign Minister.

ful purposes while the main body of these materials will as before go for production of atomic weapons.

In the above-mentioned aide memoire of April 27 the Soviet Government also drew attention to the fact that the United States of America's proposal avoids the question of the impermissibility of using atomic weapons which are weapons of mass destruction, and that acceptance of this proposal of the U.S.A. would bring about no change in the existing situation, whereby states disposing of atomic materials and corresponding possibilities for production of atomic weapons are producing them on an ever-increasing scale and are building up stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs of ever greater destructive force.

Such a situation would mean that in fact inadmissible international approval would be given to the production of atomic weapons, a fact which not only would not facilitate the attainment of agreement regarding prohibition of atomic weapons and their removal from state armaments but on the contrary would create new obstacles on the path of reaching such agreement. It is not hard to understand that this would serve the purpose only of a potential aggressor; thus the U.S.A.'s proposal does not satisfy the basic aim—to remove the threat of atomic war.

In its memorandum of July 9 the Government of the U.S.A. speaks of its desire to seek, together with other countries, ways of lessening the threat of war and lightening the armaments burden. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that, if the Government of the U.S.A. as well as the Government of the Soviet Union desires to lessen the threat of war and lighten the armaments burden, the efforts of both Governments should be directed toward the attainment of an agreement regarding prohibition of atomic weapons with the establishment of strict international supervision over this prohibition and regarding substantial limitation on conventional armaments of states.

With just this end in mind the Soviet Government has more than once advanced proposals in the United Nations which provide for the conclusion of an international convention regarding unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction and regarding substantial limitation of conventional armaments. In advancing these proposals the Soviet Government based itself on the fact that they answer the ever-increasing popular demands to put an end to the armaments race, including in field of atomic weapons, and to take urgent measures to deliver humanity from the horrors of destructive atomic war. Despite the assertion contained in the American memorandum of July 9, it is not the Soviet Union but the Government of the U.S.A. which has up to the present time prevented the conclusion of an agreement under conditions acceptable to all sovereign and equal states, both regarding prohibition of atomic weapons and also regarding substantial limitation of conventional armaments with establishment of effective supervision over fulfillment of such decisions.

International agreement regarding prohibition of atomic weapons with establishment of appropriate supervision over this prohibition would open wide possibilities for use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

As is known, up to this time it has not been possible

to reach appropriate international agreement regarding unconditional prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, in view of the fact that the United States from the very beginning of the arising of the atomic problem has refused to take part together with other states in an international agreement prohibiting atomic weapons.

However, the circumstance that it has not been possible to reach such agreement up to the present time should not diminish the significance of efforts to reach the required agreement between interested states.

Such a new effort on the Soviet Government's part to find a way out of the existing situation was the Soviet Union's proposal that states take upon themselves the *unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen, or other types of weapons of mass destruction*. This proposal in the form of a draft of an appropriate declaration by states was transmitted to the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, on January 30.

Renunciation by states of the use of atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons of mass destruction would be an important step on the path toward removal from state armaments of these types of weapons and establishment of strict international supervision guaranteeing fulfillment of an agreement regarding prohibition of use of atomic energy for military purposes. Acceptance of the above-mentioned declaration would have tremendous significance in the matter of removing the threat of war in which atomic weapons would be used, would contribute to strengthening international trust and lessening international tension, and also to improving atmosphere, the importance of which the U.S. Government refers to in its aide memoire.

As is apparent from the U.S. Government's memorandum of July 9, the Government of the U.S.A. has taken a negative position with regard to the above-mentioned proposal of the Soviet Union. As an objection to the Soviet proposal the U.S. Government refers to the alleged fact that it cannot be sure that an agreement regarding unconditional renunciation by states of use of atomic and hydrogen weapons will be carried out. However, if one takes this point of view, one must in such a case recognize that almost any international treaty or any agreement, and also consequently obligations undertaken in accordance with it, must be placed in doubt. It stands to reason that it is impossible to agree with this, since it contradicts established principles and standards of relations between states.

In reality the international obligations of states which could arise out of a declaration regarding the renunciation of use of weapons of mass destruction could have not less but rather far more significance than certain important international agreements concluded in the past whose positive significance is generally recognized.

It is known that during the First World War, when there was as yet no corresponding international agreement, there were widely used such weapons of mass destruction as suffocating and poisonous gases and also other types of chemical weapons which met with the decisive condemnation of peoples. Specifically in this connection the necessity was recognized of concluding an interna-

tional agreement forbidding the use of such types of weapons of mass destruction of people. As a result, the Geneva Protocol concerning prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons was signed in 1925. It is known that this protocol played an important role in preventing the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons during the Second World War, as a result of which peoples were spared the grave consequences of use of these weapons by belligerents.

This fact shows that international agreements containing obligations not to use specific types of weapons in war are not only possible but necessary and are important means of struggling for the strengthening of peace. This should be all the more applicable to an agreement concerning the most destructive weapons known to mankind, atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Also groundless is the allegation contained in the U.S. Government's aide memoire that international agreement on the renunciation by states of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons could increase the danger of war, as is also the assertion that the existing situation, which is characterized by an unlimited race in the field of production of atomic weapons, creates greater security than the conclusion of an agreement on renunciation by states of the use of the types of weapons mentioned. Such an assertion is in clear contradiction to the actual situation and to the facts. It was specifically with the appearance of atomic and then hydrogen weapons, and also of rocket and other new types of weapons of mass destruction of ever-growing destructive force, that the armaments race, including the race in production of atomic and hydrogen weapons, especially gained intensity and at the same time the threat increased of atomic war with all the grave consequences ensuing therefrom for all peoples.

On the other hand, the renunciation by states of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons would change the international situation, would assist in further reduction of tension in international relations and would lighten the burden of the armaments race and excessive expenditures on the maintenance in many states of swollen armed forces. This, in its turn, would create conditions for the transition to the next step, to complete the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their removal from the armaments of states.

In the Soviet Government's aide memoire of April 27 of this year attention was drawn to the fact that it is possible to carry out the process on an industrial scale of generating electrical energy through utilization of atomic materials whereby the quantity of fissionable materials used does not decrease but rather, on the contrary, increases. At the same time nondangerous materials are turned into dangerous and explosive materials capable of serving as the basis for production of atomic and hydrogen weapons. This means that the peaceful use of atomic energy is tied to the possibility of simultaneously producing explosive atomic materials for manufacture of atomic weapons, which immutably leads to an increase in the scale of production of atomic weapons and an increase in the stocks of these.

In the U.S. Government's memorandum it is stated that forms of peaceful utilization of atomic energy are possible in which ways can be found to guarantee against

seepage of materials from factories producing energy and that according to the opinion of the U.S. Government there are forms of peaceful utilization in which the question of materials going into production of atomic weapons does not arise. The Soviet Government is ready to examine in course of further negotiations the U.S. Government's views on this question.

The proposal of the U.S. Government and the proposal of the Soviet Government, as well as the views expressed by both Governments in the course of negotiations show that it has not yet been possible to harmonize the positions of the parties on a number of substantive questions. In the course of negotiations the Soviet Government insisted and continues to insist on the necessity for international agreements which would insure that atomic energy would not be permitted to be used for military purposes and would make its use possible only for peaceful purposes, for the good of mankind. The U.S. Government also states that it desires to cooperate in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

Inasmuch as reconciling positions of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union on this question has an important significance for the achievement of international agreement regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the Soviet Government deems it desirable for both Governments to continue efforts to bring the positions of the parties closer together. One must not consider that the possibilities of making the positions of the parties agree have been exhausted, especially if one takes into account the fact that a number of concrete questions which arise, both in connection with the proposal of the Soviet Union and in connection with the proposal of the United States, have not yet been subjected to proper examination. Moreover, thorough examination of these questions could assist in further clarification of the possibilities of reaching an appropriate agreement.

In this connection the Soviet Government would consider it expedient to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to certain important principles which one must not overlook in considering the question on international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Soviet Government proceeds from the principle that an important prerequisite to international agreement in this field is recognition that any such agreement should not place any one state or group of states in privileged position whereby this state or group of states could enforce its will on other states. This is particularly worthy of emphasis in connection with the U.S. Government's proposal having to do with structure and governing bodies of the International Agency.

Any International Organ created on the basis of an appropriate agreement between states can only successfully carry out its functions if its competence, sufficiently wide to permit it effectively to fulfill the tasks entrusted to it, is not at the same time utilized to the detriment of the security of some of the other states. It can answer its purpose only if its competence and tasks, as well as its practical activity, are in conformity with generally recognized principles of the charter of the United Nations.

The Soviet Government shares the opinion of the U.S. Government regarding the thesis that the appropriate International Organ would report concerning its activity

to the Security Council and the General Assembly. It goes without saying that when, in this connection, questions arise having to do with the security of some of the other states, necessary decisions must be taken specifically by the Security Council in accordance with its powers as the Organ on which is placed principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security. This was recognized as early as January 1946 when the first decision of the United Nations concerning atomic problems was taken.

The Soviet Government taking into consideration the declaration of the Government of the U.S.A. concerning willingness at any time to renew the negotiations connected with the peaceful uses of atomic energy, for its part declares its willingness to continue these negotiations for the examination of the proposals of the Soviet Government as well as the proposals of the Government of the U.S.A.

In conclusion, the Soviet Government would like to know the opinion of the U.S. Government as to whether it is not desirable that all documents which have been mutually exchanged between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America during the course of the conversations which have taken place on the atomic problem should be published in the press of the Soviet Union as well as the press of the U.S.A. respectively in order that public opinion might be informed concerning the contents of these negotiations. In this connection the Soviet Government takes into consideration the fact that in the course of the conversations which have taken place between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., communications have appeared in the press which imprecisely elucidate certain questions concerning the position of the parties.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR BOHLEN TO MR. GROMYKO, MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 23

DEAR MR. GROMYKO: I have the honor to refer to the aide-memoire which you handed to me on September 22 and to inform you that the United States Government is willing to publish all documents exchanged between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding the proposal advanced by the President of the United States of America on December 8, 1953, with respect to the international use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

Nine-Power Conference on European Security

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 530 dated September 25

I am now leaving to attend the nine-power conference in London. It has been called to consider

the serious situation resulting from the rejection of the plan for a European Defense Community. We shall explore new approaches to the difficult problems which the EDC plan was designed to solve.

The failure of EDC has raised doubt as to the validity of certain assumptions which have been at the very heart of the Atlantic security system. One such assumption is that the German Federal Republic will be associated with the family of free nations as a sovereign and equal partner and will make a material contribution to the common defense program. Another is that the nations of Western Europe will achieve a high degree of military, political, and economic unity among themselves.

Now the feasibility of the whole collective security program must be reexamined.

Most Americans have come to realize that it is no longer possible to turn back the clock and seek security through isolation. We also know that we cannot afford to gamble our safety and our survival on arrangements and programs that have no reasonable prospect of providing genuine security.

We are encouraged by the initiative taken by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France in developing new proposals. The United States believes that the primary responsibility for new proposals rests with the European States. Therefore, we take with us no specific proposals of our own. But we do go, to be helpful if we can.

U.S. DELEGATION TO LONDON TALKS

Press release 528 dated September 24

Following is the U.S. delegation to accompany Secretary Dulles to the nine-power talks opening in London on September 28:

Assistant to Mr. Dulles

Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary

Special advisers

Winthrop W. Aldrich, Ambassador to Great Britain
Robert R. Bowie, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Representative to European Coal and Steel Community

James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner to Germany
H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

John C. Hughes, U.S. Permanent Representative on North Atlantic Council

Carl W. McCordle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Press officer

Henry Suydam, Chief, News Division, Department of State

Advisers

Col. Joseph C. Anderson, Deputy Chief, European Division, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Roger Ernst, Assistant for Plans and Coordination, European Division, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Russell Fessenden, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

Charles D. Hilles, Hicog Representative, Bonn Working Group, Bonn

Coburn B. Kidd, Officer in Charge, German Political Affairs, Department of State

Edwin M. Martin, Director, Office of Political Affairs, U.S. Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations, Paris

Ben T. Moore, Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

John M. Raymond, Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs, Department of State

Jaques J. Reinstein, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State

Col. Richard S. Silver, Military Assistant to Assistant Secretary Hensel, Department of Defense

William R. Tyler, Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

Coordinator

Arthur C. Nagle, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Secretary of delegation

Donald B. Eddy, Senior Conference Officer, Office of International Conferences, Department of State

Anniversary of Death of Bulgarian Patriot

Statement by Under Secretary Smith

Press release 522 dated September 22

Seven years ago tomorrow Nikola Petkov was hanged by the Bulgarian Communist Government because he dared to oppose it. As the leader of the opposition, Petkov waged a courageous struggle for representative government, justice, and human liberties, but his voice was silenced in the traditional Communist manner. Since his death the forces against which he fought have gained full control in Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian Communist regime, by means of the judicial murder of Nikola Petkov, demonstrated once again its callous disregard for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It has continued to conduct itself in this manner, thereby not only violating the provisions of the Treaty of Peace but also the dictates of justice and humanity.

The American people and the other peoples in the free world have not forgotten Nikola Petkov.

His self-sacrifice remains an inspiring example to free men everywhere. To the millions of oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain Petkov is justly a symbol of determination that one day they will again have governments of their own choosing.

First U.S. Flood Relief Cargo Leaves for Austria

The first U.S. relief cargo for victims of this summer's Danube River floods was scheduled to leave for Austria about September 14, according to an Foa announcement of September 8. The cargo, consisting of some 9,500 tons of corn for livestock feed, was to be loaded on the Liberty ship *Norcuba* of the North Atlantic & Gulf Steamship Company at Philadelphia. The ship is expected to reach Trieste the first week in October, where the corn will be delivered to the Austrian Government for shipment by rail to Austria.

This is the first shipment of 25,000 metric tons of corn, valued at \$1.9 million, to be sent to Austria under President Eisenhower's offer of agricultural commodities for European flood victims. The remainder of the 25,000 tons will follow in the near future. Needs of the other countries named by President Eisenhower in the U.S. offer—the Federal Republic of Germany, Yugoslavia, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—are being surveyed by local authorities, Red Cross officials, and U.S. representatives.

After a survey of the flood areas, the Austrian Government found that corn was needed to help replace the feed grain and feed potatoes lost in the July floods. The 25,000 tons of corn not only will help Austrian farmers by fully replacing their feed crop losses but also will help to maintain the overall Austrian food supply at pre-flood levels.

President Eisenhower authorized the use of the corn for Austria under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. Title II of this act permits the President to grant surplus agricultural commodities from Commodity Credit Corporation stocks to friendly nations or populations in order to meet famine or other urgent relief requirements.

The Austrian Government has agreed to provide transportation for the 25,000 tons of corn from Trieste to Austria and to distribute it on an

equitable basis, according to crop losses and free of charge, to the flood victims. As specified by the U.S. legislation, the corn will be identified as a gift for the people of Austria from the people of the United States.

Iranian Message of Sympathy Concerning Hurricane Damage

White House Office press release dated September 10

The White House on September 10 made public the following exchange of cables between the President and the Shah of Iran.

The President to the Shah

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY: Your Imperial Majesty's message of sympathy concerning the tragic loss of life and property which a hurricane recently inflicted on the northeastern coast of the United States has touched me deeply. It is further evidence of your humanitarian feelings which are so widely recognized. I appreciate your message and the spirit which inspired it, and I wish to take this occasion to assure you again of my admiration for the way you have led your nation through the difficulties of the past few years to the present point where a future full of opportunity is opening before you and your people.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Shah to the President

MR. PRESIDENT: I was deeply distressed by the news of the tragic loss of life and property which the recent hurricane inflicted upon your nation. I would like to express to Your Excellency and to the noble people of the United States the heartfelt sympathy of myself and that of my people.

REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

Visit of President Tubman

The Department of State announced on September 21 (press release 519) that arrangements are being completed for the visit of William V. S. Tubman, President of Liberia, and his party, who will visit Washington in October at the invitation of President Eisenhower. In extending the invitation in April this year, the President recalled

the traditional bonds of warm feeling which unite Liberia and the United States and emphasized the admiration of Americans for the achievements of Liberia and the role it plays in Africa.

His Excellency will arrive at Washington on October 18. After a state visit of 3 days in Washington, President Tubman expects to make an extended tour of about 3 weeks through the United States, which will take him to Baltimore, Akron, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, New York, Atlanta, and New Orleans; he will then depart for Haiti.

The President plans to visit various educational institutions, including Howard University, Morgan State College, the University of Chicago, Lafayette College, Lincoln University, Atlanta University, Tuskegee Institute, and Langston University.

U.S.-French Talks on Indochina

Press release 529 dated September 25

At the suggestion of the French Government, Guy La Chambre, Minister of State in Charge of Relations with the Associated States in the French Government, and General Paul Ely, French Commissioner General in Indochina, are coming to Washington to participate in conversations with officials of the U.S. Government which are expected to last from September 27 through September 29.

M. La Chambre and General Ely will take advantage of the presence in Washington of French Finance Minister Edgar Faure, who has arrived to take part in meetings of the Boards of Directors of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. M. Faure will join M. La Chambre and General Ely in their conversations with the U.S. Government.

These talks will be of an informal, exploratory nature and will concern matters primarily of mutual interest to the two Governments, particularly the status of U.S. financial assistance for the French Union forces in Indochina. Conversations will be held with high officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the Foreign Operations Administration.

The Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have been informed through their representatives in Washington of the purpose of these

talks and will continue to be kept informed. The means by which the U.S. Government can most effectively assist the three Associated States will be the subject of continuing consultations with their governments.

U.S.-Pakistan Friendship

by *Horace A. Hildreth*
*Ambassador to Pakistan*¹

In Pakistan we have a young nation, seven years of age, born at a time of trouble and turmoil and inheriting so many difficult problems that many people did not expect it to survive as long as it already has survived. Pakistan has by no means solved all of its pressing and difficult problems, but with the passage of even a few years, it has assumed a position of leadership in one of the troubled and uncertain areas of the world.

Pakistan has definitely repudiated communism as being utterly unacceptable to the principles of the Moslem religion. . . . The Government of Pakistan has recently outlawed the Communist Party and imposed the same restrictions on the freedom of mobility of the Russian diplomatic representatives in Pakistan that Russia has imposed upon the freedom of mobility of the diplomatic corps in Moscow. This does not mean, however, that the Communists have given up their efforts in Pakistan.

Having rejected communism largely on religious grounds, Pakistan has definitely cast its lot with the West with a degree of courage and firmness that is heartening to the entire Western world. The leadership of Pakistan is devoted to sound Moslem principles and is willing and anxious to take full advantage of modern developments that have occurred in the Western world in all walks of life. But most important of all, despite the vicissitudes facing Pakistan, their "will to do" never diminishes. In a world where too many peoples seem incapable of making up their minds, it is indeed heartening to see this young nation facing so many problems and forging ahead with determination, courage, and an honest appraisal of the facts of life.

¹ Excerpts from an address made at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., on Sept. 23 (press release 523 dated Sept. 22).

In addition to having cast its lot with the West, Pakistan is a firm friend of the United States, and the help that the United States has been able to give in the past and may be able to give in the future is not only appreciated but is helping to build a nation that is dedicated to the same principles for which the United States is working throughout the world.

Death of Japanese Fisherman

Statement by John M. Allison
*Ambassador to Japan*¹

I have just been informed of the death of Mr. Aikichi Kuboyama, member of the crew of the *Fukuryu Maru*. I speak on behalf of the Government and people of the United States in expressing extreme sorrow and regret at this most unhappy event. My deepest sympathy is extended especially to the family of the deceased.

Shipments to Hong Kong

Exporters now may ship more than 25 additional commodities to Hong Kong without applying for individual export licenses, the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, announced on September 16.

Items added to the list of nonstrategic commodities which may be exported under general license GHK without prior application to the Bureau include certain rubber gloves, boots and shoes; naval stores; dried fruits; pharmaceuticals; photographic, projection, and optical goods; and dental office and laboratory equipment.²

A detailed list of these additional items is published in the Bureau's Current Export Bulletin No. 737, dated September 16.

Correction

BULLETIN of September 27, 1954, p. 434: In the text of the Bonn communique, the sixth line of the second paragraph should read "and the free world, should, in the view of the two."

¹ Issued at Tokyo on Sept. 23 (press release 524).

² For an announcement of previous additions to the list, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1954, p. 157.

U.S. Program for Return of Historic Objects to Countries of Origin, 1944-1954

by Ardelia R. Hall

The Department of State last month returned through the embassies at Washington important historic and artistic objects lost and displaced from their respective countries during World War II. The receiving governments, in turn, will arrange for the restoration of the items to the former owners. The objects have been recovered in the United States under the Government's postwar program for the restitution of cultural property. The most valuable of these objects entered the United States through trade channels.

All the objects returned at this time formerly belonged to state or municipal collections in Europe. They included Dutch archives of the Netherlands East Indies dating from 1767 to 1939; German archives of the 15th and 17th centuries, mainly from the town of Grebenstein in Hesse; English documents on parchment of the 17th century from London and Laxfield; a collection of 250 ancient seals, gems, and other objects from the Staatliche Münzsammlung (State Coin Collection) at Munich; 50 gold medals and coins from the historic collection of the Staatliche Kunstsammlung (State Art Collection) in the Schlossmuseum at Weimar; a banner from Aachen; a painting by the Dutch artist, Brekelenkam, from the Düsseldorf Kunstsammlung; a rare Würzburg missal of 1495 from the Mainfränkisches Museum at Würzburg; and, most important of all, a 10th-century codex or bound manuscript containing one surviving page of the Hildebrandslied from the Landesbibliothek (State Library) at Kassel and a 14th-century codex of "De Africa" by Petrarch, from the Biblioteca Civica of Trieste.

The Hildebrandslied (Song of Hildebrand) was an heroic poem in High German, written

about the year 800 A. D. The two surviving pages owned by the Kassel Library are among the most valuable manuscripts of world literature. The text was copied on parchment by the monks of Fulda. For over a thousand years these two parchment pages have survived. They were bound with a 10th-century manuscript on religious subjects, "Liber Sapientiae," where they were apparently reused as the end-pages of the later manuscript. The ancient poetry, written on the first page (*recto*) and the last page, or page 76 (*verso*), of the codex, is not only the oldest example of German poetry but also the oldest example of writing in the German language.

Unfortunately the bound manuscript which has now been found contains only the second page of the Hildebrandslied. The first page (see cut) had been removed from the manuscript and is missing. All efforts to trace the missing page have thus far been unsuccessful. It is, however, known that the first page was missing as early as November 1945, when the bound manuscript came into the possession of a New York dealer. Its removal from the codex is probably the greatest single loss to literature resulting from World War II.

Manuscript Collection at Kassel

The library at Kassel lost all its books and printed materials in a bombing raid in September 1941. The manuscript collection was believed to have been saved. However, at the end of the war, two of the manuscripts—the Hildebrandslied Codex and the Willehalm Codex (see cut)—the two chief possessions of the library, were found to have been taken from the war repository. They had

been packed together in a small box and stored for safety in a bunker at Bad Wildungen in August 1943. The bunker was reported to have been carefully guarded until the last months of the war, when the custodians were displaced. The American Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officers were not immediately informed, when Allied troops entered the town, of the repository and its importance. In June 1945 the State Conservator of Greater Hesse reported to the American Military Government that the bunker had been entered and the two famous manuscripts were missing. At the time it could not be ascertained whether the box with the manuscripts had been removed by German civilians, displaced persons, or American troops.

The loss of these irreplaceable manuscripts became the subject of an extensive search in Germany. Dr. Theodore A. Heinrich, the American director of the Wiesbaden Central Collecting Point, made every effort to trace them. Now that the Hildebrandslied has been found in the United States, the United States Government will try to determine whether the missing page of the Hildebrandslied and the 14th-century Willehalm Manuscript were also brought to the United States. A description of the missing manuscripts is being publicized so that American institutions may be alerted to the loss. Should they be found in American possession, they may be turned over to the nearest public library with the request that arrangements be made for their safe transfer to the Department of State at Washington.

Descriptions of these two treasures of the Kassel Library have been published many times. The Hildebrandslied is to be found described in many books¹ and most encyclopedias, and the Willehalm manuscript is published in a large folio volume.²

The Song of Hildebrand

The missing page of the Hildebrandslied consists of 24 lines of the poem, written in Irish minuscule on parchment, 28.5 by 21 centimeters or 11 inches by 8¼ inches in size. There are three small holes in the right-hand margin and a large hole at the end of the last line.

The Song of Hildebrand recounts the story of Hildebrand and his son, who after many years of

separation meet and, without knowing each other, engage in combat. The poem breaks off with no indication of the outcome of the battle. There is an early Norse saga which refers to the Hildebrandslied and says that the son was killed, but in the later sagas the son is defeated and forced to recognize his father.

The two pages of the Hildebrandslied are the only surviving remnant of the many sagas and ballads of that early period. They were first kept in the cloister at Fulda and were presented to the Kassel Library early in the 19th century by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, who first recognized the manuscript as a unique example of German poetry. The Grimms were distinguished scholars of Kassel. Their research in poetry and popular tales became the foundation of the science of folklore, and their works have been read throughout the world. In 1814 Jacob Grimm was sent to Paris to obtain the restitution of the valuable collections of books that Napoleon had carried off from Kassel.

The Willehalm Manuscript

The lost Willehalm Codex of Wolfram von Eschenbach is a bound manuscript of the 14th century, containing 396 folios and 62 miniatures. Thirty-three of the miniatures are completed, and the rest are partly finished. The manuscript is 41.5 by 29 centimeters or 16¼ inches by 11⅝ inches in size. The script is a fine, precise, pointed Gothic minuscule of a severe style.

The poem by Wolfram von Eschenbach in the missing Willehalm Codex relates the heroic deeds of the Christian knight, Willehalm. In one of the miniatures illustrating Willehalm's adventures, the hero is kneeling before Charlemagne, and in another he is seated before Tybalt, Arabele, and the three queens.

The illumination of the manuscript shows strong English influence and belongs to the Cologne school. The ornamental initial on the first page was executed with skill and versatility. Framed in a triple Gothic arch, Christ in Glory is bestowing His blessing; the Evangelists' symbols are at the corners. Below, the donor of the book, the Landgrave of Hesse, kneels in prayer; beside him is his coat of arms with the lion of Hesse. This is the oldest known colored representation of the arms, other than the 13th-century Landgrave

Footnotes at end of article.

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Du crist wir an den du unsir heil
 Du got du mensche miter halbe teil
 Du schepfer du geschefet kind
 Du lew du arm du mensche du kind
 Du alt vor allem ane genge
 Du ung du menslich gedreng
 Du och uns mider armen sloz
 Du an diner man craft so groz
 Daz tu man dich gemerzen mac
 A ller creature be iac
 Herre ster an dinen henden
 S var lebit inden wir wenden
 O ster welen nothen sender
 O her uns vnd ouch vnder
 Al obir diner gotheit wider



S ller wilheit
 eyn anedant
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 mit vnde ge
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 Vnde sinde doch verbere
 Mit dem wir gar vnvangen sin
 V aru son tu helpe schin
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 E yn got vnd doch drualt
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W ie hat din gotlich list gelindert
 Daz al daz element wildert
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 Dm gotlich wilheit siur
 S var daz element gerit
 Dm woer an lost daz leidit
 Der planeten craft arbeit
 Wu si den himel wid nahen
 Der sterren snelle vnder galien
 Dm eines hant verluir
 O b dich redde nu nicht vir dringit
 Des genitit nun sindic muir
 S mit du bist sloz vnde bunt
 Der ruse der vrit ein selden port
 Der sunden heil der selde hort
 E yn sise obir alle sise
 S unne mir daz ich dich mize
 V n dine namen bringen zu lobe
 Des hohe soebir alle himel obe
 Des groze deme hymele ist zu groz
 Des leuge hat nigen widir sloz
 S wo du wilt vn her sal
 S uzir laz dir gevallen wal
 S vgar ich si vir sundit



escutcheons preserved in the Marburg Church of St. Elizabeth.

On the vine framing the page a monk is reading at a lectern, and there are charming, droll figures of rabbits and monkeys. The manuscript is dated by a Latin entry on folio 395 *verso*: "In the year of our Lord one thousand three hundred and thirty-four, the illustrious Prince Henry, Landgrave and Lord of the Land of Hesse, had this written in honor of St. William Marchionis at his court; never to be transferred but to remain forever in the possession of his heirs."

The 14th-century manuscript of "De Africa," a Latin poem by Petrarch, was fully identified by the library of the city of Trieste and also was marked with the stamps of the famous Petrarch collection owned by the library. The manuscript was sent on September 20, 1954, to the United States Political Adviser to the Commander British-United States Zone, Free Territory of Trieste, to be restored to the municipal library on behalf of the United States Government.

Traditional Principles Upheld

The recovery of these manuscripts and of other rare books and objects of art dispersed during or following World War II has been a part of United States Government policy. The protection of cultural property and respect for its ownership are based upon the traditional principles upheld by the United States Government. These principles were incorporated in the General Orders No. 100 promulgated by President Lincoln and in all editions of the Rules of Land Warfare of the Department of the Army.

President Eisenhower, when he was Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, during World War II, issued orders unrivaled in their firm expression of a determination to preserve the historic and cultural heritage of Europe. In a directive of May 26, 1944,³ General Eisenhower stated:

Shortly we will be fighting our way across the continent of Europe in battles designed to preserve our civilization. Inevitably, in the path of our advance will be found historical monuments and cultural centers which symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve.

It is the responsibility of every commander to protect and respect these symbols whenever possible.

A subsequent directive of November 9, 1944,⁴ announced the policy of cultural restitution:

It is the policy of the Supreme Commander to take measures to facilitate the eventual restitution of works of art and objects of scientific or historical importance which may have been looted from United Nations governments or nationals. . . .

It is also the policy of the Supreme Commander to avoid, as far as military necessity will permit, damage to all structures, objects or documents of cultural, artistic, archaeological, or historical value; and to assist wherever practicable in securing them from deterioration upon the process of war. . . .

You will ensure that the prevention of looting, wanton damage and sacrilege of buildings by troops is the responsibility of all commanders and you will ensure that the seriousness of offenses of this kind is explained to all Allied personnel.

After the extent of the Nazi confiscations had become known, the Allied Powers issued a solemn warning in the London Declaration of January 5, 1943,⁵ that they intended "to do their utmost to defeat the methods of dispossession practiced by the governments with which they are at war against the countries and peoples who have been so wantonly assaulted and despoiled." The Allied Powers reserved all rights to declare invalid such transfers of property. It was specifically stated that works of art were included. Concerted efforts to rectify the injustices were sought at international conferences⁶ and through inter-Allied agreements.⁷

The Allied war agencies concerned with the protection of the international cultural heritage had long but informative names. In the United States the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas was established on August 20, 1943, under Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts and David E. Finley, Director of the National Gallery of Art. The British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives and other Material in Enemy Hands was set up by Prime Minister Churchill on May 9, 1944.

Objects Appearing in U.S.

The problem of looted and displaced works of art appearing in the United States was first brought to the attention of the American Commission in September 1944 on behalf of Cardinal Spellman, who was one of the members of the American Commission.⁸

Following World War II, the State-War-Navy

Coordinating Committee approved a government policy,⁹ which states:

The introduction of looted objects of art into this country is contrary to the general policy of the United States and to the commitments of the United States under the Hague Convention of 1907 and in the case of objects of a value of \$5,000 or more is a contravention of Federal law. It is incumbent on this Government, therefore, to exert every reasonable effort to right such wrongs as may be brought to light.

The effective protection of works of art begun under General Eisenhower's directives, carried out by the Allied armies and military governments, and completed by the Allied High Commissioners in Austria and Germany prevented the dispersal of hundreds of thousands of objects and greatly minimized the problem of recovery. The number of dispersed objects of cultural importance which have been found in the United States is relatively small compared with the millions of objects of art, books, and archives from over 2,000 repositories which were taken into the custody of the U.S. Military Government in the American Zone of Germany alone.¹⁰

A review of the works of art and other objects of cultural value which have been recovered in the United States in the 10-year period since the program was initiated in September 1944 shows that between 1944 and 1954 a total of 66 cases involving 1,586 objects have been brought to the attention of the Department of State. Of this total, 40 cases have been concluded and 1,194 objects recovered and transferred through diplomatic channels to the rightful owners.¹¹ In the 11 cases completed in September, 360 objects were transferred to the embassies in Washington. There are 15 cases currently under investigation involving 32 objects and 2 collections. When these are completed, all missing objects which are known to have appeared in the United States and have come to the attention of the Government will have been recovered.

The success of the recovery program is due to the generous response of American educational and cultural institutions and to the unfailing support of the Government agencies in Washington. The Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department has been most efficient in handling cases involving violations of United States customs laws. Shirley Stephens, the head of enforcement in the Bureau of Customs, has been directly responsible for the continued effectiveness of the program. Mr. Stephens was consulted by the American Com-

mission in 1944, when the matter was first under consideration, and he has taken a direct part in every case that has been under investigation by the Bureau of Customs since that date.

The advice and assistance of officers of the Department of Justice, including Julian D. Simpson, Harold P. Shapiro, and John Murphy, have been invaluable to the solution of the most difficult cases.

Special acknowledgment should also be made to Mr. Finley, Director of the National Gallery, for his contribution to the work of the American Commission and for his cooperation with the Department of State in taking temporary custody of the objects when they are received in Washington.

The following American institutions are among the many that have also given invaluable assistance and expert advice about the objects: the Smithsonian Institution, the Library of Congress, the Freer Gallery of Art, the National Gallery of Art, the Los Angeles County Museum, the University of Florida, the Art Institute of Chicago, the John Herron Art Institute of Indianapolis, the Museum of Fine Arts of Boston, the Fogg Museum of Art and the Busch-Reisinger Museum of Harvard University, the Detroit Institute of Arts, the Palace of the Legion of Honor Museum of San Francisco, the Duluth (Minnesota) Public Library, the Columbus (Ohio) Public Library, the Princeton University Library, the New York Public Library, the Frick Art Reference Library, the Morgan Library, the Cornell University Library, the Syracuse University Library, the Numismatic Society of New York, the Institute of Fine Arts of New York University, the Frick Collection, the New York Historical Society, the University of Pennsylvania Library, the Philadelphia Museum of Art, the Rhode Island School of Design, the Museum of Williams College, the Museum of Houston (Texas), and Lawrence College.

Response to Recovery Program

Directors of these institutions have made the following comments upon the Government program:

This museum has been instrumental in uncovering several items belonging to European museums during the past 3 years. We are most anxious to cooperate with the return of these objects, as part of the reciprocal activities of the major museums. . . .

I am glad to see from your letter and the statements attached to it [on return of looted objects] that the attitude of the Government is exactly as we felt it would be. . . .

I very much hope that you will be able to receive the objects and return them to the institutions from which they were mistakenly taken. In conclusion, let me applaud the effort which you are making to right this kind of wrong. . . .

I am delighted that machinery has been set up whereby this kind of property can be restored to its rightful owners. Such conduct makes me proud to be an American citizen. . . .

The membership of the College Art Association of America empowered its executive committee to express approval of the Government's efforts in behalf of the restitution to rightful owners of works of art, which was described as "a cultural enterprise without historical precedent."

When the objects have been transferred to the recipient governments, the return has brought many expressions of gratitude. The French Government, on the recovery of a painting looted in Paris from a famous Jewish collection in 1941, expressed its appreciation to the Department of State and also sent a letter of thanks to the museum which had assisted in the return.

The director of the Berlin Hauptarchiv, when he heard that a rare manuscript had been recovered, wrote, "Seldom has a letter caused so much joy as yours of the 24th of June concerning the return of the Testament of Frederick the Great. For your very good news we beg to express our sincerest thanks." On the occasion of the formal opening of the Johannes Gutenberg Celebration at Mainz, Germany, on June 24, 1950, the Mayor of Mainz spoke of the appreciation of his city for the efforts of the United States Government in returning the 500-year-old Mainz Psalter to Germany and in consenting to the exhibition of the famous and precious book in Mainz for the duration of the commemoration. An official of the German Foreign Office at a ceremony marking the return of several works of art said, "It is with the greatest satisfaction and sincere gratitude that I accept on behalf of the Federal Government these treasures which are returned to us as former German properties. They will be given to their legitimate owners or their successors as soon as possible. We all have had the very satisfactory experience during and after the war that there are men of good will in every

country on earth, who—unaffected by the passions of the moment—strive toward the realization of higher ideals and toward justice."

Italian Government officials have expressed their gratitude for the assistance of the United States authorities in the recovery of works of art. In the case of the restitution to the Biblioteca Civica of Trieste of the 14th century Petrarch manuscript, the Italian Ambassador expressed "his warmest gratitude and deep appreciation of the assistance offered by the American authorities in the recovery of the masterpiece."

A Polish representative, on receiving two paintings belonging to the State Collection at Warsaw, wrote, "May I express to you my sincerest thanks for your kind cooperation and help in the recovery of the paintings by Cornelis van Poelenburgh and Quiryn Gerrits van Brekelenkam."

Most of the historic and artistic objects which have been recovered in the United States were lost from state museums, libraries, or archives or from churches. All of the relatively few works of art of private ownership which have appeared were confiscated by the Nazis from Jewish collectors, who were the chief victims of Nazi plundering in Western Europe.

By the restoration of these looted objects to their former Jewish owners, a grievous wrong has been righted. And by returning the dispersed objects which had passed from public collections in Europe to private hands in the United States, the U.S. Government has performed a great public service. It is a service not only to the nations which have regained precious symbols of their cultural heritage but also to all lovers of art and literature, who will find these valuable objects once more available to the public.

Footnotes

1. Guilelmus Grimm, *De Hildebrando* (Gottingae, 1830) ; Wilhelm Hopf, *Die Landesbibliothek Kassel, 1580-1930* (Marburg, 1930), pp. 31, 32; *Das Hildebrandslied* (Kassel, 1937) etc.

2. Robert Freyham, *Die Illustrationen zum Casseler Willehalm Codex*; Wilhelm Hopf, *loc. cit.*, pp. 99-102.

3. *Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, 1946* (Washington, 1946), p. 102.

4. *The Museum News*, Jan. 1, 1945.

5. BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1943, p. 21; *United States Economic Policy Toward Germany*, Department of State publication 2630, p. 52.

6. *United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, Department of State publication 2187; *Inter-American*

Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Department of State publication 2497.

7. BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, Appendix 1, p. 340.

8. Report of the American Commission . . . , p. 23.

9. BULLETIN of Feb. 23, 1947, p. 358.

10. Articles published in the *Information Bulletin* of the Office of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany dealing with the restitution of art in the U.S. Zone of Germany include:

"Recovery and Protection of Art Treasures," Aug. 4, 1935;

"Back from the Salt Mines," Nov. 3, 1945;

"Operation 'Lost and Found,'" July 1, 1946;

"Restitution Program Reviewed," Oct. 28, 1946;

"Restitution," March 3, 1947;

"Silver Train to Hungary," May 26, 1947;

"Germany Makes Restitution," June 1950.

11. Articles dealing with the recovery of war-dispersed art in the United States include:

"Rare Mainz Psalter of 1457, Looted, Returned to U.S. Zone in Germany," BULLETIN of Mar. 27, 1950, p. 487;

"Mainz Psalter Returned," *Information Bulletin*, June 1950.

"Mainz Exhibiting Treasured Psalter," BULLETIN of Aug. 28, 1950, p. 349.

"Recovery of Lost European Treasures," Department of State Record, May-June 1951, p. 39.

"The Recovery of Cultural Objects Dispersed During World War II," BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 337.

"Cultural Articles Returned," *Information Bulletin*, July 1952.

"Royal Treasures Returned to Ryukyu Islands," BULLETIN of June 8, 1953, p. S19.

• Miss Hall, author of the above article, is Arts and Monuments Adviser, Department of State.

Administration of Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954

White House Office press release dated September 9

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on September 9 issued an Executive order providing for the administration of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.

Under that act agricultural surplus commodities, aggregating \$700 million in value, may be sold abroad for local currencies over a period of 3 years, and such commodities, up to \$300 million in value, may be given to friendly peoples in the event of national disaster or famine.

The Executive order assigns to the Secretary of Agriculture primary responsibility for sales under the act, including the development of overseas markets for agricultural commodities, and assigns primary responsibility for the grants for famine relief to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

A number of other Federal agencies will participate in the administration of these activities. In order that their activities may be properly coordinated, the President has established an in-

teragency advisory committee which will be headed by a representative of the White House Office.

The Executive order provides that the local currency proceeds of overseas sales of agricultural commodities under the act shall be held in the custody of the Treasury Department and shall be released by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget for use in connection with the purposes authorized by the act. Those purposes are: (1) the development of new markets for United States agricultural commodities; (2) the acquisition of strategic and critical materials; (3) the procurement of military equipment, materials, and facilities; (4) the purchase of goods or services for other friendly countries; (5) the promotion of balanced economic development and trade among nations; (6) the payment of U.S. obligations abroad; (7) the promotion of multilateral trade and economic development; and (8) international educational exchange activities.

The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 provides a supplementary means of dealing with existing stocks of agricultural products with primary emphasis upon the

objective of reducing surplus crops through overseas marketing. The statute provides that private trade channels shall be used to the maximum extent possible, that marketings under the act shall not interfere with usual U.S. marketings or disrupt world prices, and that activities under the act shall be carried on so as to further U.S. objectives abroad.

In his message to the Congress in January of this year on the subject of agriculture¹ the President stated that our food stocks can be used for constructive purposes that will benefit the people of the United States and our friends abroad. With effective administration, mobilizing the total resources of Government and private channels, substantial strides will be made in achieving this goal.

The President, in connection with the Executive order, issued an important policy statement concerning foreign trade as related to agriculture. The statement, representing the work of an interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of Clarence Francis, special consultant to the President, was approved by the President on September 9.

TEXT OF POLICY STATEMENT

The general foreign economic and trade policy set forth in the President's message to Congress of March 30, 1954,² is applicable to and in the general interest of American agriculture. United States farm programs, both short-run and long-run, should be consistent with this policy.

United States agriculture, as well as other segments of the economy, stands to gain from such a sustained policy of expanding world trade, based upon the most productive use in each country of the available labor, natural resources, and capital. Therefore, it is in the long-run interest of the American farmer, as well as all Americans, for this country to work with other nations in a mutual effort to expand international trade, and to promote the fuller convertibility of currencies, the freer movement of investment capital, and the interchange of technical and scientific information.

Today, the United States agricultural situation is complicated by two factors on the domestic

front: (1) prices of many farm products are not competitive with world prices; and (2) production of certain farm products is badly out of balance with demand, thus creating rapidly mounting surplus stocks which overhang and tend to unsettle both domestic and foreign markets. Both of these factors promise to remain operative for some time. It therefore becomes necessary to reckon with them in any formulation of an agricultural foreign trade policy for the United States.

Consistent with the principles set forth in the President's message of March 30, 1954, it is essential that our agricultural foreign trade policy take into account the position of other countries and that our policy be understood by them.

Today, the magnitude of the U.S. holdings of many commodities is such as to be capable of demoralizing world commodity markets should a policy of reckless selling abroad be pursued. This potential greatly alarms other countries despite the fact that past behavior of the United States has shown no intention of pursuing a harmful policy.

At the same time, the United States cannot accept the role of limiting its sales in world markets until other countries have disposed of their production. The adjustment of world supply to world demand will require adjustments of production in other countries, as well as the United States.

The capacity of certain areas of the world to produce food and fiber in excess of current market takings presents a basis and a hope for improving living standards around the world—provided ways can be found for improving marketing and distribution systems and enlarging the purchasing power of consumers. This represents a challenge to the nations of the world to develop sound means for utilizing their productive capacity in the improvement of living standards.

1. The world supply and demand situation in agricultural products requires, in the interest of the general welfare, an orderly and gradual liquidation of our surpluses. Such a policy, arrived at with the full knowledge of friendly nations, would go far to eliminate fear arising from uncertainty.

2. The United States cannot be satisfied with the position of holding its own supplies off the market and accumulating surpluses while other countries dispose of their entire production. Ac-

¹ H. Doc. 292, 83d Cong., 2d sess., transmitted Jan. 11, 1954.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 19, 1954, p. 602.

cordingly, the United States will offer its products at competitive prices. At the same time, the United States will not use its agricultural surpluses to impair the traditional competitive position of friendly countries by disrupting world prices of agricultural commodities.

3. The United States will seek in cooperation with friendly countries to utilize its agricultural surpluses to increase consumption in those areas where there is demonstrable underconsumption and where practical opportunities for increased consumption exist or can be developed in a constructive manner. The United States will attempt to utilize such opportunities in a manner designed to stimulate economic development in friendly countries and to strengthen their security position.

4. The United States recognizes that the movement of goods in foreign trade is dependent upon the enterprise of private business—foreign and domestic. In implementing these policies with respect to agricultural commodities, the U. S. Government will seek to assure conditions of commerce permitting the private trader to function effectively.

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CLARENCE FRANCIS

DEAR MR. FRANCIS: The Executive order which I have issued today establishing administrative arrangements for the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 provides, as you know, for an Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal with a representative of the White House Office as Chairman.

I request you to assume responsibility for organizing this Committee and to serve as its Chairman. I shall look to you for advice concerning policy issues that may develop.

In connection with the work of your Committee I shall expect you to be guided by the policy statement concerning foreign trade as related to agriculture which I have approved and issued today. I regard this document as an important announcement of the philosophy of this Administration with respect to agricultural foreign economic policy. It should generate confidence both at home and abroad as to our purposes in this vital area of international economic relations.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AGENCY HEADS³

I have today issued an Executive order providing for the administration of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. It is the purpose of this letter to further define relationships among the several agencies of the executive branch which will have key responsibilities in assuring successful administration of this program.

The act provides for the use of surplus commodities to further many of our existing domestic and foreign programs, and in some instances, it expands or liberalizes them. These programs are currently carried on by many agencies of the Government. Accordingly, it is desirable to place the administration of the new act in those agencies and to make it possible for them to make their proper contribution in connection with the disposition of agricultural surpluses.

The very fact that a number of agencies have a responsibility in one or another aspect of surplus disposition makes effective coordination absolutely essential. It is therefore directed that a committee, to be known as "The Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal," be established to assist the agencies concerned in bringing into harmonious action, consistent with the over-all policy objectives of this Government, the various agricultural surplus disposal activities vested in them by, or assigned to them pursuant to, the Act. The Committee should be composed of a representative of the White House Office, as chairman, and one representative of each Government department and agency which is, consonant with law, designated by the Chairman to have representation on the committee. I shall look to the Chairman to advise me concerning policy issues which arise. I shall expect the Secretary of Agriculture to assure the effective coordination of day-to-day operations through appropriate interagency relationships.

The following arrangements are prescribed in

³ Sent on Sept. 9 to the following: the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Secretary of the Treasury, Clarence Francis, Special Consultant to the President, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Administrator of General Services, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

order to facilitate the best administration of the Act:

1. Existing pertinent interagency coordination arrangements are to be followed.

2. This program must be carried out in accordance with and in furtherance of our foreign policy objectives. I wish to reemphasize that the Secretary of State is the officer responsible for advising and assisting me in the formulation and control of foreign policy. I look to him as the channel of authority within the executive branch on foreign policy as I do to the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury in their respective fields.

3. The delegation to the State Department of responsibility for negotiations with foreign governments is intended to give recognition to State Department's central responsibility in this area. Other agencies directly concerned with the substance of the negotiation, however, must continue to carry substantial responsibility in such negotiations. Moreover, it is assumed that these other agencies will conduct day-to-day discussions with representatives of the foreign governments in implementing basic agreements reached with such governments. Such discussions, of course, must be in conformance with the foreign policy responsibilities of the State Department and the chiefs of our diplomatic missions.

4. It is imperative that we continue to coordinate United States programs affecting other nations. For this reason, the accompanying Executive order makes this program subject to my previous instructions with respect to coordination of United States activities in foreign countries. Under those instructions, the chief of the diplomatic mission is the principal officer of the United States in each country and has full responsibility and authority for assuring effective action in that country.

5. In order to coordinate most effectively the various agricultural surplus disposal programs abroad, I shall expect the Secretary of Agriculture to utilize to the maximum extent practicable the facilities, services and experience of the Foreign Operations Administration.

6. I am requesting the Secretary of Commerce to provide the focal point in the Government for assisting private enterprise with respect to barter transactions referred to in the act. This arrangement would be one more step toward assuring the maximum utilization of private channels in the execution of this program.

7. It is contemplated that the Office of Defense Mobilization shall utilize the facilities and services of the General Services Administration for the purchase and handling of materials under section 104(b) of the act.

In January of this year, I stated in my message on Agriculture that surplus agricultural stocks can be used for constructive purposes that will benefit

the people of the United States and our friends abroad. Enactment of this legislation is a major step forward in achieving that broad objective. With effective administration, mobilizing the total resources of Government and private channels of trade, we should make substantial strides towards achieving the above goals.

I have forwarded an identical letter to the other officers of the Government principally concerned with carrying out the Executive order.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10560⁴

ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code (65 Stat. 713) and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Section 1. *Department of Agriculture.* Except as otherwise provided in this order, the functions conferred upon the President by Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture.

Section 2. *Foreign Operations Administration.* The functions conferred upon the President by Title II of the Act are hereby delegated to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

Section 3. *Department of State.* (a) The functions of negotiating and entering into agreements with friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations conferred upon the President by the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State.

(b) All functions under the Act, however vested, delegated, or assigned, shall be subject to the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States as such policy relates to the said functions.

(c) The provisions of Part III of Executive Order No. 10476 of August 1, 1953 (18 F. R. 4537, ff.),⁵ are hereby extended and made applicable to functions provided for in the Act and to United States agencies and personnel concerned with the administration abroad of the said functions.

Section 4. *Foreign currencies.* (a) There are hereby delegated to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (1) so much of the functions conferred upon the President by the Act as consists of fixing from time to time the amounts of foreign currencies which accrue under Title I of the Act to be used for each of the several purposes described in paragraphs (a) to (h), inclusive, of section 104 of the Act, and (2) the function conferred upon the President by the last proviso in section 104 of the Act of waiv-

⁴ 19 Fed. Reg. 5927.

⁵ BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1953, p. 240.

ing the applicability of section 1415 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1953.

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to prescribe regulations governing the purchase, custody, deposit, transfer, and sale of foreign currencies received under the Act.

(c) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not limit section 3 of this order and the foregoing subsection (b) shall not limit subsection (a) above.

(d) Purposes described in the lettered paragraphs of section 104 of the Act shall be carried out, with foreign currencies made available pursuant to section 4 (a) of this order, as follows:

(1) Those under section 104 (a) of the Act by the Department of Agriculture.

(2) Those under section 104 (b) of the Act by the Office of Defense Mobilization. The function, conferred upon the President by that section, of determining from time to time materials to be purchased or contracted for for a supplemental stockpile is hereby delegated to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

(3) Those under section 104 (c) of the Act by the Department of Defense.

(4) Those under sections 104 (d), (e), and (g) of the Act by the Foreign Operations Administration. The


function, conferred upon the President by section 104 (g) of the Act, of determining the manner in which the loans provided for in the said section 104 (g) shall be made, is hereby delegated to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

(5) Those under section 104 (f) of the Act by the respective agencies of the Government having authority to pay United States obligations abroad.

(6) Those under section 104 (h) of the Act by the Department of State.

Section 5. *Reports to Congress.* The functions under section 108 of the Act, with respect to making reports to Congress, are reserved to the President.

Section 6. *Definition.* As used in this order the term "the Act" means the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480, approved July 10, 1954, 68 Stat. 454) and includes, except as may be inappropriate, the provisions thereof amending other laws.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 9, 1954.

Sweden Removes Import License Requirements on Some Items

Press release 533 dated September 25

The following joint statement of the Departments of Commerce and State was released on September 25:

The U.S. Government notes with satisfaction the Swedish Government's decision to liberalize its dollar trade effective October 1, by removing import license requirements from a large number of commodities which until now have been subject to tight licensing and foreign exchange control. This free list covers about 45 percent of total Swedish imports in 1953.

Simultaneously, the Swedish Government announced that goods which are not on this free list but are free-listed for Western European and certain other countries (OEEC¹ free list) will be imported from the dollar area in greater quantities, either directly from the dollar area or indirectly from those non-dollar areas. The Swedish Government also announced that it will continue

to investigate the possibility of adding other items to the dollar free list.

While all details are not yet available, it is understood that the dollar free list is composed of raw materials, semimanufactures, and a large number of finished goods. Included in the list among other items are almost all chemical products, all hides and skins, rubber products, wood goods, all paper other than newsprint, textile raw materials, yarn, cord fabrics, shoes, hats, and stone, clay, and glass products of various kinds.

Extensive free-listing is also applicable to engineering products. All manufactures of iron and metal, the greater part of iron and steel products, and all machines, apparatus, and instruments, with the exception of cameras, projectors, and musical instruments, are free-listed. Also included are equipment for railways, streetcars, motorcycles, and bicycles. In the field of foodstuffs, imports are free-listed among others for dried fruits and raisins, rice, canned fish and canned fruits, juices, and a number of other products. Finally, the list includes raw materials for plastics and a large number of products of less importance such as small boxes, handbags, fishing tackle, tobacco pipes, fountain pens, and many

¹ Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

other consumer goods. It is important to note that the free list includes a great majority of the commodities on which Sweden granted tariff concessions to the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Such details as are now available can be obtained from the European Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D. C., and from all field offices of the Department of Commerce, which will also have the information on additional details to be released later by the Swedish Government.

In announcing these actions, the Swedish Gov-

ernment referred to the discussions which have lately taken place in Western Europe on the problem of attaining a more general system of currency convertibility. Sweden thus joins a number of other Western European countries in efforts to improve productivity and reduce costs and prices by increased competition. This voluntary action by the Swedish Government is commendable not only as an aid to expanded dollar trade with Europe, which the United States Government values highly, but also as another example of constructive policy by countries whose financial positions permit measures in the direction of freer trade.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings ¹

Adjourned During September 1954

XXVII Art Biennale	Venice	June-Sept. 30
XV International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	July 6-Sept. 7
UNESCO International Seminar on Adult Education in Rural Areas	Denmark	Aug. 14-Sept. 4
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 5th Session.	New York	Aug. 20-Sept. 13
8th Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 22-Sept. 12
International Scientific Radio Union: 11th General Assembly	The Hague	Aug. 23-Sept. 2
Congress of the Life-Saving Federation	Algiers	Aug. 24-Sept. 5
WHO Executive Committee: 5th Session	Geneva	Aug. 25-Sept. 11
Interparliamentary Union: 43d Conference	Vienna	Aug. 27-Sept. 2
UNESCO Regional Seminar on the Arts and Crafts in General Education and Community Life.	Tokyo	Aug. 28-Sept. 25
U.N. World Conference on Population	Rome	Aug. 31-Sept. 10
International Mathematical Union: 2d General Assembly	The Hague	Aug. 31-Sept. 1
International Electrotechnical Commission: 50th Anniversary Meeting	Philadelphia	Sept. 1-16
International Society of Cell Biology: 8th International Congress	Leiden	Sept. 1-7
FAO Third Regional Meeting on Food and Agricultural Programs and Outlook in Latin America.	Buenos Aires	Sept. 1-10
First International Congress and Second International Seminar on Vocational Guidance.	Bonn	Sept. 1-15
10th International Congress of Mathematicians	Amsterdam	Sept. 2-9
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Conference	Manila	Sept. 6-8
International Sugar Council: Executive Committee Meeting	London	Sept. 6-10
ICAO Legal Committee: 10th Session	Montreal	Sept. 7-28*
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee Meeting	London	Sept. 7-10
International Sugar Council: 1st Meeting of 2d Session	London	Sept. 8-10
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group IX	Geneva	Sept. 10-22
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 5th Session	Manila	Sept. 10-16
27th International Congress of Industrial Chemistry	Brussels	Sept. 11-19

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences Sept. 24, 1954. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; U.N., United Nations; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif internationale des radio communications); WHO, World Health Organization; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ILO, International Labor Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Adjourned During September 1954—Continued

FAO Meeting on Desert Locust Control	Rome	Sept. 13-17
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: 10th General Assembly	Rome	Sept. 14-29
International Technical Committee for the Prevention and Extinguishing of Fire: Meeting of Permanent Council	Rouen	Sept. 16-19
International Federation for Documentation: 21st Conference	Belgrade	Sept. 19-26
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 24th Session	Rome	Sept. 20-25
IX International Exposition of Preserved Foodstuffs and Packing	Parma (Italy)	Sept. 20-30
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund: 9th Annual Meeting of Boards of Governors	Washington	Sept. 24-29

In Session as of September 30, 1954

International Exposition and Trade Fair	São Paulo	Aug. 21-
UNESCO International Seminar for Museum Staff and Educators	Athens	Sept. 12-
Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia ("Colombo Plan"): Officials Meeting	Ottawa	Sept. 20-
ICAO Air Navigation Commission: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 21-
U.N. General Assembly: 9th Regular Session	New York	Sept. 21-
ICAO Air Transport Committee: 23d Session	Montreal	Sept. 27-
FAO Council: 20th Session	Rome	Sept. 27-
ICAO Council: 23d Session	Montreal	Sept. 28-
Nine-Power Conference	London	Sept. 28-

Scheduled October 1–December 31, 1954

International Congress of Chronometry	Paris	Oct. 1-
International Philatelic and Postal Exhibition	New Delhi	Oct. 1-
Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia ("Colombo Plan"): Ministerial Meeting	Ottawa	Oct. 4-
FAO Working Party on Fertilizers: 4th Meeting	Tokyo	Oct. 4-
FAO Working Party on Rice Breeding: 5th Meeting	Tokyo	Oct. 4-
Paso Executive Committee: 23d Meeting	Santiago	Oct. 4-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 42d Annual Meeting	Paris	Oct. 4-
ITU International Telephone Consultative Committee: XVII Plenary Assembly	Geneva	Oct. 4-
ICAO North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting: 3d Session	Montreal	Oct. 5-
10th General Conference on Weights and Measures	Paris	Oct. 5-
UNESCO Seminar for Leaders of Youth Movements	Habana	Oct. 5-
Caribbean Commission - UNESCO Joint Conference on Education and Small-Scale Farming in Relation to Community Development	Port-au-Spain	Oct. 6-
2d International Meeting of Communications	Genoa	Oct. 6-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 4th Session	Tokyo	Oct. 6-
Paso 14th Pan American Sanitary Conference and 6th Meeting of the Regional Committee of WHO	Santiago	Oct. 7-
General Assembly of the International Commission of Criminal Police: 23d Session	Rome	Oct. 9-
FAO International Rice Commission: 4th Session	Tokyo	Oct. 11-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 5th Session	Geneva	Oct. 11-
South Pacific Commission: 13th Session	Nouméa (New Caledonia)	Oct. 11-
International Wheat Council: 16th Session	London	Oct. 12-
U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 3d Session and Working Party on Prevention and Speedy Disposal of Claims	Tokyo	Oct. 13-
Southeast Asia Communications Coordinating Meeting	Bangkok	Oct. 18-
Paso Executive Committee: 24th Meeting	Santiago	Oct. 22-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 2d Meeting	Vancouver	Oct. 25-
ILO Metal Trades Committee: 5th Session	Geneva	Oct. 25-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Experts on the Aspects of Economic Development Programs	Bangkok	Oct. 25-
GATT <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee for Agenda and Intersessional Business	Geneva	Oct. 26-
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 9th Session of Contracting Parties	Geneva	Oct. 28-
International Exposition in Bogotá	Bogotá	Oct. 29-
UNESCO Executive Board	Rio de Janeiro	Oct. 31-
U.N. ECAFE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparations of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East	Bangkok	Nov. 1-
UNESCO Budget Committee	Montevideo	Nov. 1-
UNESCO Executive Board	Montevideo	Nov. 1-
FAO European Forestry Commission and Working Party on Afforestation	Geneva	Nov. 3-
14th International Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy	Luxembourg	Nov. 7-

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled October 1–December 31, 1954—Continued

International Philatelic Exposition	São Paulo	Nov. 7–
FAO 3d Inter-American Meeting on Livestock Production	Buenos Aires	Nov. 8–
ILO Governing Body: 127th Session	Rome	Nov. 8–
U.N. ECAFE Mineral Resources Subcommittee: 1st Session	Bangkok	Nov. 8–
FAO Meeting on Economic Aspects of the Rice Situation	Rangoon	Nov. 11–
UNESCO General Conference: 8th Session	Montevideo	Nov. 12–
Third Inter-American Accounting Conference	São Paulo	Nov. 14–
Inter-American Commission of Women: 10th General Assembly	Port-au-Prince	Nov. 14–
Customs Cooperation Council	Brussels	Nov. 15–
ICAO Special European-Mediterranean Communications Meeting	Paris	Nov. 16–
Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy (4th Extraordinary Meeting of Inter-American Economic and Social Council).	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 22–
ICEM <i>Ad Hoc</i> Subcommittee on Draft Rules and Regulations	Geneva	Nov. 22–
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee	London	Nov. 22–
International Sugar Council: Executive Committee	London	Nov. 23–
ILO 8th International Conference of Labor Statisticians	Geneva	Nov. 23–
International Sugar Council: Second Session	London	Nov. 24–
ICEM Subcommittee on Finance: 6th Session	Geneva	Nov. 25–
Caribbean Commission: 19th Meeting	Cayenne (French Guiana)	Nov. 29–
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration: 8th Session	Geneva	Nov. 30–
NATO Ministerial Meeting of the Council	Paris	November*
FAO Fourth World Forestry Congress	Dehra Dun (India)	Dec. 11–
Inter-American Seminar on Secondary Education	Santiago	Dec. 29–

Chinese Communist³ Attacks on Free World Shipping

Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the United Nations¹

I am making public today for the first time an official list, recently completed, which shows that the shooting down of an unarmed British airliner off Hainan Island last July 22² was but the latest of at least 39 warlike acts by the Chinese Communists against the ships and aircraft of free nations in the last 4 years. This is issued for the information of the public. It speaks for itself.

When the attack off Hainan took place, not only the United States and Britain, whose citizens lost their lives, but people all over the world were alarmed at this action against humanity and international law. My purpose in making public this list of 38 additional attacks is to show that the Hainan shooting was no isolated incident but part of a pattern of constant aggressive pressure against the free world.

¹ Issued by the U. S. Mission to the United Nations on Sept. 19 (U.S./U.N. press release 1956 dated Sept. 17).
² BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 165, and Aug. 9, 1954, p. 196.

This tabulation shows 26 incidents involving the British flag, 5 involving the United States, 2 involving Denmark, 2 involving Panama, and one each involving Norway, France, and Portugal.

In turn, this series of acts of piracy must be viewed as part of a still larger pattern. I refer to the Chinese Communist record in Korea; the campaigns of extermination against the Chinese people themselves, in which millions have lost their lives; the boast of the Chinese Communist leaders that they have the second largest army in the world—second only to the Soviet Union. Within this larger pattern, the many violent actions off the Chinese coast over the past 4 years seem to reveal the basic character of the Red Chinese regime—a regime committed to any means whatever, but especially to violence, in order to achieve its aims of conquest.

From July 1950 through June 1954 the Chinese Communists made 38 attacks on foreign ships and aircraft, as follows:

1950

- July 20, 1950: British S.S. *Tak Shing* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries in the vicinity of Lafsami, the ship's location possibly within 2 miles of Lafsami.
- July 24, 1950: The Panamanian ship S.S. *Flying Dragon* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries on Lafsami. The ship was hit.

August 2, 1950: An Air France plane was fired on by Chinese Communist A/A guns, Ladrone Island.

August 3, 1950: The 300-ton British freighter *Nambce* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries on the Nam Shan Islands. There were no hits and no casualties.

August 6, 1950: The American ship S.S. *Steel Rover* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries in the Lama Island group; the ship was just entering Hong Kong.

August 7, 1950: The British ship S.S. *Hand Sang* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries in the Lama Islands; the ship was just outside Hong Kong waters; two British officers were slightly wounded.

August 8, 1950: The Norwegian ship S.S. *Pleasantville* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries in the Lama Islands. The ship was just outside Hong Kong.

August 13, 1950: A Pacific Overseas Airways plane, under U.S. flag, was fired on by Chinese Communist machine guns from an island near Macao.

August 17, 1950: The British destroyer *Concord* was repeatedly shelled by Chinese Communist batteries on the Lama Islands, then by batteries on the Ling Ting Islands. One enlisted man was wounded.

September 16, 1950: The British ship S.S. *Sing Hing* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries from the Lama Island group.

September 17, 1950: The British ship S.S. *Mahaderi* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries in the Lama Island group.

October 7, 1950: The Danish S.S. *Emilie Maersk* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries on the Lama Island group.

November 7, 1950: Portuguese sloop *Gonealo Velho* was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries on the Lafsami Islands. The ship was just outside Hong Kong waters on the regular Hong Kong-Macao route.

December 8, 1950: A Panamanian flagship was shelled by Chinese Communist shore batteries off Wu Yu Island, near Amoy. No damage, no casualties.

December 9, 1950: The British tug *Allegiance* was fired on by shore batteries at Putao (Pak Leak) Island, in the Wan Shan Island group. The tug was returning from the rescue of the Philippine S.S. *Joseph S.* The master and two crew members were slightly injured.

1951

February 13, 1951: The British-registered *Calter II*, a motor vessel, was shelled by Chinese Communist shore batteries on Ling Ting Island. The ship was outside Hong Kong waters. The British master and British chief officer were injured.

April 10, 1951: The British ship *Jade Leaf* on its way from Hong Kong to Chuen Chow was forced by weather conditions to anchor near Namao Island, off Swatow. The master did not know that the area was prohibited. The ship was fired on by Chinese Communist shore-battery machineguns. The ship was hit once and there were no

casualties. Later, while entering Swatow, the ship was buzzed by unidentified planes.

April 16, 1951: Chinese Communist shore batteries on outer Ling Ting Islands fired on the British S.S. *Victoria Peak* causing some of the cargo to ignite.

May 3, 1951: The British tug, *Caroline Moller*, while towing barge, was fired on by Chinese Communist shore batteries on the Ling Ting islands.

June 8, 1951: The British S.S. *Edith Moller* was shelled by Chinese Communist armed junk and shore batteries near Hong Kong.

June 8, 1951: The Danish ship *Marieskou*, while going up the Pearl River estuary, was shelled by Chinese Communist island batteries.

August 12, 1951: Enroute Hong Kong to Chuanchow, the British S.S. *Jade Leaf* took shelter in Tang Sang harbor. The ship, being mistaken for Nationalist, was attacked by the Chinese Communists. The attack resulted in the killing of the boatswain.

September 2, 1951: Between Hong Kong and Macao, the British flag *Yu Men*, on the regular Hong Kong-Macao run, was fired on by a Chinese small craft.

November 26, 1951: A vessel off Swatow fired on a U.S. Navy plane.

1952

January 1952: The Asiatic Petroleum Company's oil lighter *BPM 88*, sailing under British flag, was intercepted and detained by the Chinese Communists, on the fringe of Hong Kong territorial waters.

September 25, 1952: On the regular Hong Kong-Macao route the British flag S.S. *Tak Shing* was fired on and detained by an armed Chinese Communist naval vessel. The *Tak Shing* was taken to Lafsami Island where two passengers were removed.

September 25, 1952: In answer to the distress call, the H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* and consort arrived to give escort to the *Tak Shing* to Hong Kong. While still in British territorial water, 4 miles from Lafsami, Chinese Communist shore batteries fired on the *Mounts Bay*. The *Mounts Bay* returned fire and silenced the batteries.

October 13, 1952: While pursuing a suspected smuggling junk, a Hong Kong revenue launch in the vicinity of Ling Ting Island was fired on by a Chinese Communist shore battery.

November 2, 1952: A Chinese Communist armed junk took into custody two British seamen in a whale boat sailing around Hong Kong Island—about half way between Lama Island and the Ling Ting Islands. The men were taken to Canton, questioned intensively, and were returned to Hong Kong on March 19, 1953, having been detained for more than 4 months.

1953

January 18, 1953: Chinese Communist A/A fire off Swatow shot down U.S.N. *Neptune* plane. U.S.C.G. *Mariner* crashed taking off after rescue. U.S. destroyer fired on by

shore batteries, later chased by hostile craft. Total casualties were eleven missing.

March 21, 1953: Chinese Communist gunboat seized U.S. yacht *Kert* about 5 miles west of Lantau Island, 6-7 miles north of Lufshani. The following Americans were taken into custody and not released until September 1954: Richard Applegate, Benjamin Krasner, and Donald Dixon. Three Chinese, who were with the Americans, have not been released.

April 30, 1953: A Chinese Communist gunboat attacked a British-registered motor junk in international waters near Soko Island and Sang Lau Point off the southwest tip of Lantau Island. After taking refuge in British waters, a Chinese Communist gunboat and four Communists in naval uniform pursued the junk and after some shooting took it. The Hong Kong Marine Department later rescued the crew.

May 25, 1953: As it was leaving Amoy, the British S.S. *Nigelock* received small arms fire from Communist-held Hu Hsu Island.

June 30, 1953: At Scrag Point Chinese Communist shore batteries fired on the S.S. *Hydratock* of British registry.

September 9, 1953: A Chinese Communist gunboat fired on Hong Kong *ML 1323* in disputed waters in the Pearl River estuary. Resulting casualties: 6 British navy crew members and one captain of the Royal Hong Kong defense force killed.

November 11, 1953: Chinese Communist shore batteries fired on S.S. *Inchulva*, under British flag, while entering Wenchow.

November 12, 1953: The S.S. *Inchulva* again attempted to enter Wenchow. It was again shelled with no damage.

1954

June 4, 1954: Chinese Communists took British forces yacht *Elinor* which, while on a pleasure cruise, entered Chinese Communist waters through navigational error. 2 officers and 7 men aboard were detained till July 10.

Chinese Representation in the United Nations

*Statement by Ambassador Lodge
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

Madam President, let me first of all express on behalf of the United States appreciation for the statesmanlike address with which you have just favored us, and let me say too that we take great satisfaction in the way in which you have con-

¹ Made at the opening session of the Ninth General Assembly on Sept. 21 (U.S./U.N. press release 1958).

ducted yourself as president of this General Assembly during the year just ending.

Let me also, as representing the host country, extend a cordial welcome to the delegates and the alternates, expressing the hope that your stay here will be fruitful and enjoyable.

Now, Madam President, for reasons which are well known, the United States will not engage in a discussion of the substance of this question that has been raised by the representative of the Soviet Union. Indeed, we will make a motion as follows: I move that the Assembly decide not to consider at its Ninth Session during the current year any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

Logically, this motion takes precedence over the Soviet proposal,² and therefore I ask that rule 93 of the Rules of Procedure be invoked. This rule reads as follows: "If two or more proposals relate to the same question, the General Assembly shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted. The General Assembly may after each vote on a proposal decide whether to vote on the next proposal." That is the end of rule 93.

That rule, you will observe, gives the Assembly the power to decide questions of precedence, and I accordingly ask the Assembly to decide to vote first on my motion. Put that first, and then I will ask to vote on the motion itself.

I therefore ask the chair to put the following proposal to the Assembly, that the Assembly decides to consider first the motion just offered by the representative of the United States. Then after that motion has been voted on, it would then be in order to vote on the substantial proposal which I have made.³

² The Soviet draft resolution (U.N. doc. A/L. 176) proposed that representatives of the People's Republic of China take the seat of China in the General Assembly and in other organs of the United Nations.

³ The Assembly decided to consider the U.S. motion first, by a vote of 45-7 (Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, U.S.S.R.), with 5 abstentions. The U.S. draft resolution (U.N. doc. A/L. 177) was then approved by a vote of 43-11 (Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia), with 6 abstentions.

Status of Tariff Concessions Under GATT

Press release 517 dated September 20

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Public views were requested on September 21 regarding the status of tariff concessions granted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in view of the possibility of modification of article XXVIII of the agreement.

Article XXVIII, as it stands at present, provides that on or after July 1, 1955, any country may withdraw tariff commitments with regard to any particular product. However, a country wishing to withdraw a concession first must try to reach some basis of agreement with other interested contracting parties concerning such withdrawal. A possible basis for agreement would be the granting of new concessions as compensation for the withdrawn concession. If such efforts to arrive at agreement fail, the country can nevertheless proceed with its intended action and the other interested country then becomes free to withdraw equivalent concessions in order to restore balance in the agreement.

Because of concern that extensive use of the unilateral procedure might lead to a rather rapid increase in world tariffs, the date at which this procedure might become available, which originally was January 1, 1951, has twice been postponed. Proposals to modify the application of article XXVIII are expected to be made at the coming Ninth Session of the General Agreement which opens on October 28.

Interested persons may express views with regard to any aspect of this matter, including the general question of modification of the article, as well as possible changes in individual concessions which the United States has received or granted. Such views will be carefully considered before a final decision is reached as to the U.S. position. Certain views on this subject were presented at the hearings on the GATT review of September 13 through September 17, held by the U.S. delega-

tion to the review session.¹ These views will be made available to the trade-agreements organization for consideration along with information and views presented at the coming hearings.

Written views should be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information, the interdepartmental organization which receives views with regard to trade agreement matters, by October 18. Public hearings will also be held by the committee, opening on October 18 in the auditorium of the National Archives Building, Eighth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C. Applications for appearances before the committee should be made by October 6 and should be accompanied by a written brief or by a preliminary outline indicating as specifically as possible the subject on which the individual wishes to be heard. A written brief must in all cases be submitted before the individual makes his appearance. Applications to be heard should be made to the Chairman, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C.

Article XXVIII now provides, in effect:

1. On or after July 1, 1955,² any contracting party may, by negotiation and agreement with any other contracting party with which such treatment was initially negotiated, and subject to consultation with such other contracting parties as the contracting parties determine to have a substantial interest in such treatment, modify, or cease to apply, the treatment which it has agreed to accord under article II to any product described in the appropriate schedule annexed to the General Agreement. In such negotiations and agreement, which may include provision for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products, the contracting parties concerned shall endeavor to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favorable to trade than that provided for in the agreement.

2. (a) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned cannot be reached, the contracting party which proposes to modify or cease to apply such treatment shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken the con-

¹ For Assistant Secretary Waugh's statement at the opening of the review session, see BULLETIN of Sept. 27, 1954, p. 458.

² The applicable date in the case of Brazil is Jan. 1, 1954.

tracting party with which such treatment was initially negotiated, and the other contracting parties determined under paragraph 1 of this article to have a substantial interest, shall then be free, not later than 6 months after such action is taken, to withdraw, upon the expiration of 30 days from the day on which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the contracting parties, substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the contracting party taking such action.

(b) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned is reached but any other contracting party determined under paragraph 1 of this article to have a substantial interest is not satisfied, such other contracting party shall be free, not later than 6 months after action under such agreement is taken, to withdraw, upon the expiration of 30 days from the day on which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the contracting parties, substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with a contracting party taking action under such agreement.

NOTICE ISSUED BY INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE

Pursuant to section 4 of the Trade Agreements Act approved June 12, 1934, as amended (48 Stat. (pt. 1) 945, ch. 474; 65 Stat. 73, ch. 141), and pursuant to paragraph 4 of Executive Order 10082 of October 5, 1949 (3 CFR, 1949 SUPP.; p. 126), notice is hereby given by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements that, in connection with the forthcoming review and renegotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with a view to strengthening that agreement, it is intended that consideration will be given to enhancing the firmness of the tariff concessions. In particular, consideration would be given the modification of the application of the provisions of article XXVIII of the General Agreement by extension of the date after which such provisions may be invoked, or otherwise.

Article XXVIII, which is one of the most important provisions of the General Agreement in relation to the firmness of the concessions on individual products, provides that these concessions, originally negotiated in the case of the United States at Geneva in 1947, at Annecy in 1949, or at Torquay in 1950 to 1951, may be modified or withdrawn on or after a specified date, following consultation and negotiation with other contracting parties, without the necessity of terminating the entire agreement. The article envisages that the balance between the concessions granted by the various contracting parties shall be maintained, preferably through the negotiation of new concessions in compensation for any modifications or withdrawals made, but through retaliatory modifications by other parties if agreement cannot be reached on new concessions. The date on and after which the pro-

visions of article XXVIII may now be invoked is July 1, 1955, except for concessions in Schedule 111 (Brazil) and concessions initially negotiated by other contracting parties with Brazil as to which such provisions may now be invoked. No modification of article XXVIII would affect the right of any contracting party to withdraw or modify individual concessions pursuant to article XIX (commonly called "the escape clause") of the General Agreement.

Pursuant to section 4 of the Trade Agreements Act, as amended, and paragraph 5 of Executive Order 10082, information and views as to any aspect of the proposals announced in this notice may be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information in accordance with the announcement of this date issued by that committee. Information and views submitted, orally or in writing, to the chairman of the United States delegation for the review and renegotiation of the General Agreement, in connection with the hearings held under his direction from September 13 through September 17, 1954, will be made available to the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

By direction of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements this 21st day of September, 1954.

CARL D. CORSE
*Chairman, Interdepartmental
Committee on Trade Agreements*

NOTICE ISSUED BY COMMITTEE FOR RECIPROCITY INFORMATION

The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements has issued on this day a notice of intention to consider possible modification of the firmness of the tariff concessions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The Committee for Reciprocity Information hereby gives notice that all applications for oral presentation of views in regard to the foregoing proposals shall be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information not later than 12:00 noon October 6, 1954, accompanied by a written brief or by a preliminary outline indicating the subject as specifically as possible on which the individual wishes to be heard. A written brief must, in all cases, be submitted before the individual makes his oral appearance. Communications shall be addressed to "The Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C." Fifteen copies of written statements, either typed, printed, or duplicated shall be submitted, of which one copy shall be sworn to.

Written statements submitted to the Committee, except information and business data proffered in confidence, shall be open to inspection by interested persons. Information and business data proffered in confidence shall be submitted in separate pages clearly marked "For official use only of Committee for Reciprocity Information."

Public hearings will be held before the Committee for Reciprocity Information, at which oral statements will be heard. The first hearing will be at 10:00 a. m. on

October 18, 1954 in the auditorium of the National Archives Building, 8th and Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C. Witnesses who make application to be heard will be advised regarding the time of their individual appearances. Appearances at hearings before the Committee may be made only by or on behalf of those persons who have, prior to that appearance, filed written briefs and who have within the time prescribed made written application for oral presentation of views. Statements made at the public hearings shall be under oath.

Copies of the notice issued today by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements may be obtained from the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C. and may be inspected in the Field Offices of the Department of Commerce.

By direction of the Committee for Reciprocity Information this 21st day of September 1954.

EDWARD YARDLEY
*Secretary, Committee for
Reciprocity Information*

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Germany

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 1953. TIAS 2792.

Ratification deposited: Spain, August 25, 1954.

Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Accession deposited: Cuba, September 8, 1954.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement amending article 5 of the agreement of November 26, 1949 (TIAS 1994) for the use of funds made available in accordance with the agreement on settlement for lend-lease, reciprocal aid, surplus war property and claims of June 7, 1946 (TIAS 1528). Effected by

¹ Not in force.

exchange of notes at Canberra September 3, 1954. Entered into force September 3, 1954.

El Salvador

Cooperative program agreement for agricultural development, pursuant to the general agreement for technical cooperation of April 4, 1952 (TIAS 2527). Signed at San Salvador July 16, 1954.

Entered into force: August 10, 1954 (the date notification of ratification was given the United States by El Salvador).

Agreement for a cooperative program of productivity, pursuant to the general agreement for technical cooperation of April 4, 1952 (TIAS 2527). Signed at San Salvador August 31, 1954. Enters into force on date that notification is given the United States of publication of the agreement in the *Diario Oficial* of El Salvador.

Greece

Agreement to correct certain errors in the English text of the convention of February 20, 1950 (TIAS 2901) for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the estates of deceased persons. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens August 3 and 19, 1954. Entered into force August 19, 1954.

Mexico

Agreement for a cooperative project with Escuela Superior de Agricultura "Antonio Narro," pursuant to the general agreement of June 27, 1951 (TIAS 2273), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico June 17, 1954. Entered into force June 17, 1954.

Panama

Agreement extending the *modus vivendi* signed September 14, 1950 (TIAS 2481), providing for maintenance of the Boyd-Roosevelt Highway pending entry into force of the highway convention, also signed September 14, 1950. Effected by an exchange of notes at Panamá August 12, 26, and 30, 1954. Entered into force August 30, 1954.

Viet-Nam

Agreement relating to duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges on relief supplies and packages for Viet-Nam. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon August 20 and 26, 1954. Entered into force August 26, 1954.

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Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
†516	9/20	Robertson and Laurel: Philippine trade.
517	9/20	Request for views on GATT.
†518	9/21	Bohan: Economic relations with Latin America.
519	9/21	President Tubman's visit.
*520	9/21	Educational exchange.
*521	9/21	Educational exchange.
522	9/22	Smith: Anniversary of Petkov's death.
523	9/22	Hildreth: U.S.-Pakistan.
524	9/23	Allison: Death of Japanese fisherman.
525	9/23	Dulles: Partnership for peace.
*526	9/24	Visit of Mayor of Paris.
†527	9/25	Claim against U.S.S.R. for B-29.
528	9/24	Delegation to 9-power talks in London.
529	9/25	U.S.-French talks on Indochina.
530	9/25	Dulles: Departure for London.
531	9/25	Correspondence with U.S.S.R. on atomic pool.
†532	9/25	Legation in Libya made Embassy.
533	9/25	Liberalization of Sweden's dollar trade.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Foreign Relations of the United States . . .
the *basic source* of information on U.S. diplomatic history

1937, Volume IV, The Far East

Documents published in this volume deal chiefly with problems arising from the outbreak of undeclared war between China and Japan in July 1937, especially with efforts by the United States and other powers to restore peace. This is the second of two volumes dealing with the Far East crisis in 1937, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Volume III, The Far East*, having been released in June.

In 1937 China faced Japan, with the Soviet Union watching from the sidelines and discussing developments with other powers. Nine hundred pages of contemporary papers deal with not only efforts to end the undeclared war but also other phases of the war itself and repercussions affecting the United States.

The principal chapter of this volume relates to a conference called at Brussels under the terms of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding China to explore the possibility of peaceful solution of the conflict between Japan and China. Chapters are also included on American relations with China, Japan, and Siam (Thailand).

Copies of this volume may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$4 each.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 798

October 11, 1954



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Humphrey 548*

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The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXI, No. 798 • PUBLICATION 5610

October 11, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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Washington 25, D.C.

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Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

Agreement on Restoration of German Sovereignty and German Association with Western Defense System

FINAL ACT OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE HELD AT LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28-OCTOBER 3

The Conference of the Nine Powers, Belgium, Canada, France, German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States met in London from Tuesday September Twenty-eighth to Sunday October Third. It dealt with the most important issues facing the Western world, security and European integration within the framework of a developing Atlantic community dedicated to peace and freedom. In this connexion the Conference considered how to assure the full association of the German Federal Republic with the West and the German defence contribution.

Belgium was represented by His Excellency Monsieur P.-H. Spaak.

Canada was represented by the Honourable L. B. Pearson.

France was represented by His Excellency Monsieur P. Mendès-France.

The Federal Republic of Germany was represented by His Excellency Dr. K. Adenauer.

Italy was represented by His Excellency Professor G. Martino.

Luxembourg was represented by His Excellency Monsieur J. Bech.

The Netherlands was represented by His Excellency J. W. Beyen.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was represented by Rt. Hon. A. Eden, M. C., M. P.

The United States of America was represented by the Honourable J. F. Dulles.

All the decisions of the Conference formed part of one general settlement which is, directly or indirectly, of concern to all the NATO powers and

which will therefore be submitted to the North Atlantic Council for information or decision.

1. Germany

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that their policy is to end the Occupation régime in the Federal Republic as soon as possible, to revoke the Occupation Statute and to abolish the Allied High Commission. The Three Governments will continue to discharge certain responsibilities in Germany arising out of the international situation.

It is intended to conclude, and to bring into force as soon as the necessary parliamentary procedures have been completed, the appropriate instruments for these purposes. General agreement has already been reached on the content of these instruments and representatives of the Four Governments will meet in the very near future to complete the final texts. The agreed arrangements may be put into effect either before or simultaneously with the arrangements for the German defence contribution.

As these arrangements will take a little time to complete, the Three Governments have in the meantime issued the following Declaration of Intent:

Recognising that a great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people; and

Desiring to associate the Federal Republic of Germany on a footing of equality with their efforts for peace and security.

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America desire to end the Occupation régime as soon as possible.

The fulfilment of this policy calls for the settlement of problems of detail in order to liquidate the past and

to prepare for the future, and requires the completion of appropriate Parliamentary procedures.

In the meantime, the Three Governments are instructing their High Commissioners to act forthwith in accordance with the spirit of the above policy. In particular, the High Commissioners will not use the powers which are to be relinquished unless in agreement with the Federal Government, except in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation and in cases where the Federal Government has not been able for legal reasons to take the action or assume the obligations contemplated in the agreed arrangement.

II. Brussels Treaty

The Brussels Treaty will be strengthened and extended to make it a more effective focus of European integration.

For this purpose the following arrangements have been agreed upon:

- (a) The German Federal Republic and Italy will be invited to accede to the Treaty, suit-

ably modified to emphasise the objective of European unity, and they have declared themselves ready to do so. The system of mutual automatic assistance in case of attack will thus be extended to the German Federal Republic and Italy.

- (b) The structure of the Brussels Treaty will be re-inforced. In particular the Consultative Council provided in the Treaty will become a Council with powers of decision.
- (c) The activities of the Brussels Treaty Organisation will be extended to include further important tasks as follows:

—The size and general characteristics of the German defence contribution will conform to the contribution fixed for EDC.

—The maximum defence contribution to NATO of all members of the Brussels Treaty

**Following are the texts of Annexes I and II to Article 107 of the European Defense Community Treaty.*

Annex I to Article 107

1. *War weapons.*
 - a. Portable firearms, with the exception of hunting weapons and calibres less than 7mm.
 - b. Machine guns.
 - c. Anti-tank weapons.
 - d. Artillery and mortars.
 - e. Anti-aircraft weapons (D.C.A.).
 - f. Smoke-screen, gas and flame producing apparatuses.
2. *Munitions and rockets of all types for military use.*
 - a. Munitions for war weapons defined in Paragraph 1 hereinabove and grenades.
 - b. Self-propelled weapons.
 - c. Torpedoes of all types.
 - d. Mines of all types.
 - e. Bombs of all types.
3. *Powder and explosives for military use, including materiel primarily used for propulsions by rockets.*

Exemplified will be products principally for civilian use, specifically:

Pyrotechnical compounds;
Priming explosives:
Fulminate of mercury;
Nitride of lead;
Trinitroresorcinate of lead;
Tetrazene;
Chlorated Explosives;
Nitrate explosives with dinitrotoluene, or with dinitronaphthaline;
Hydrogen-peroxide at less than 60%;
Nitrocelluloses;
Black powder;

Nitric acid at less than 99%;

Hydrate of hydogen at less than 30%.

4. *Armored equipment.*

- a. Tanks.
- b. Armored vehicles.
- c. Armored trains.

5. *Warships of all types.*

6. *Military aircraft of all types.*

7. *Atomic weapons.*

- 8. *Biological weapons.*¹
 - 9. *Chemical weapons.*¹
- } According to definitions given in Annex II, hereinbelow.

10. Constituent parts which can be used only in the construction of one of the items enumerated in groups 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 hereinabove.²

11. Machines which can be used only for the manufacture of one of the items enumerated in groups 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 hereinabove.²

Annex II to Article 107

The present annex shall be deemed to include the weapons defined in Paragraphs I-VI and the manufacturing facilities especially designed for their production. Nevertheless, the provisions of Paragraphs II-VI of this annex shall be deemed to exclude any device or assembly, apparatus, production facilities, product and agency utilized for civilian purposes or serving research for sci-

¹ The Commissariat may exempt from the requirement of authorization chemical and biological substances the use of which is primarily civilian. If the Commissariat decides that it is unable to grant such exemptions, it shall limit the control which it exercises solely to the use of such substances.

² The production of models of, and the technical research concerning, the materials defined in paragraphs 10 and 11 hereinabove are not subject to the appropriate provisions of Article 107.

Organisation will be determined by a special agreement fixing levels which can only be increased by unanimous consent.

—The strength and armaments of the internal defence forces and the police on the Continent of the countries members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation will be fixed by agreements within that Organisation having regard to their proper function and to existing levels and needs.

The Brussels Treaty Powers agree to set up, as part of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, an Agency for the control of armaments on the Continent of Europe of the continental members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation. The detailed provisions are as follows.

1. The functions of the Agency shall be

(a) to ensure that the prohibition of the manu-

facture of certain types of armaments as agreed between the Brussels Powers is being observed;

(b) to control the level of stocks held by each country on the Continent of the types of armaments mentioned in the following paragraph. This control shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

2. The types of armaments to be controlled under 1 (b) above shall be

(a) weapons in categories I, II and III listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty;*

(b) weapons in the other categories listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty.

(c) A list of major weapons taken from Annex I to the same Article to be established hereafter by an expert working group.

Measures will be taken to exclude from control

entific, medical and industrial purposes in the spheres of pure and applied science.

I. Atomic Weapons.

a. An atomic weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilize, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning.

b. Furthermore, any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under Paragraph a, shall be deemed to be an atomic weapon.

c. Any quantity of nuclear fuel produced in any one year in excess of 500 grammes will be considered material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, atomic weapons.

d. Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235 (including Uranium 235 contained in Uranium enriched to over 2.1 per cent by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear fission or fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials shall be considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the chemical or physical form in which they exist.

II. Chemical Weapons.

a. A chemical weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant,

paralysant, growth-regulating, anti-lubricating or catalyzing properties of any chemical substance.

b. Subject to the provisions of Paragraph c, chemical substances, having such properties and capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in Paragraph a, shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

c. Such apparatus and such quantities of the chemical substances as are referred to in Paragraphs a and b which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from this definition.

III. Biological Weapons.

a. A biological weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, harmful insects or other living or dead organisms, or their toxic products.

b. Subject to the provisions of Paragraph c, insects, organisms and their toxic products of such nature and in such amounts as to make them capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in a shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

c. Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the insects, organisms and their toxic products as are referred to in Paragraphs a and b which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from the definition of biological weapons.

IV. Long-range Missiles, Guided Missiles and Influence Mines.

a. Subject to the provisions of Paragraph d, long-

Footnote continued on next page.

materials and products in the above lists for civil use.

3. As regards the weapons referred under paragraph 2 (a) above when the countries which have not given up the right to produce them have passed the experimental stage and start effective production, the level of stocks that they will be allowed to hold on the Continent shall be decided by the Brussels Treaty Council by a majority vote.

4. The continental members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation agree not to build up stocks nor

range missiles and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the velocity or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the velocity.

b. Subject to the provisions of Paragraph *d*, influence mines are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by influences which emanate solely from external sources, including influence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof.

c. Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in Paragraphs *a* and *b* shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

d. Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-aircraft defense with the following maximum characteristics, are regarded as excluded from this definition :

Length, 2 meters ;

Diameter, 30 centimeters ;

Velocity, 660 meters per second ;

Ground range, 32 kilometres ;

Weight of war-head, 22.5 kilogrammes.

V. Naval Vessels other than Minor Defensive Craft.

Naval Vessels other than minor defensive craft mean :

a. Warships over 1,500 tons displacement.

b. Submarines.

c. All warships powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines or jets.

VI. Military Aircraft.

Complete military aircraft and components thereof, as listed below :—

a. Air frames—center section spars, wing panel spars, longerons.

b. Jet engines—centrifugal impellers, turbo discs, burners, axial flow center shafts.

c. Reciprocating engines—cylinder blocks, super-charger impellers.

to produce the armaments mentioned in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) beyond the limits required (a) for the equipment of their forces, taking into account any imports including external aid, and (b) for export.

5. The requirements for their NATO forces shall be established on the basis of the results of the Annual Review and the recommendations of the NATO military authorities.

6. For forces remaining under national control, the level of stocks must correspond to the size and mission of those forces. That level shall be notified to the Agency.

7. All importations or exportations of the controlled arms will be notified to the Agency.

8. The Agency will operate through the examination and collation of statistical and budgetary data. It will undertake test checks and will make such visits and inspections as may be required to fulfil its functions as defined in paragraph 1 above.

9. The basic rules of procedure for the Agency shall be laid down in a Protocol to the Brussels Treaty.

10. If the Agency finds that the prohibitions are not being observed, or that the appropriate level of stocks is being exceeded, it will so inform the Brussels Council.

11. The Agency will report and be responsible to the Brussels Council, which will take its decisions by a majority vote on questions submitted by the Agency.

12. The Brussels Council will make an Annual Report on its activities concerning the control of armaments to the Delegates of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

13. The Governments of the U.S.A. and Canada will notify the Brussels Treaty Organisation of the military aid to be distributed to the continental members of that Organisation. The Organisation may make written observations.

14. The Brussels Council will establish a Working Group in order to study the draft directive presented by the French Government and any other papers which may be submitted on the subject of armaments production and standardisation.

15. The Brussels Treaty Powers have taken note

of the following Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and record their agreement with it:

THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR DECLARES:

that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II and III of the attached lists;

that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list. Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent supreme commander of NATO;

that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organisation to ensure that these undertakings are observed.

List Appended to the Declaration by the Federal Chancellor

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs I to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

- I. Atomic weapons
Text as in Annex II paragraph 1 to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty with the deletion of (c).
- II. Chemical weapons
- III. Biological weapons
- IV. Long distance missiles, guided missiles, magnetic and influence mines
- V. Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes
"Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes are:
(a) Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement.
(b) Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement.
(c) All warships which are driven by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines".
- VI. Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes

The closest possible co-operation with NATO shall be established in all fields.

Results of London Conference

Statement by Secretary Dulles¹

The London Conference produced solid results. It worked out a system, in place of the European Defense Community, which can preserve and strengthen the Atlantic community by giving it a hard core of European unity. Thus, it salvages many of the values of the EDC plan and will give opportunity for the other values to be achieved by further effort. The fact that all of this was done, and done within 33 days of the rejection of EDC, shows the vitality of the Atlantic community. Under this new plan:

German sovereignty will be restored, and beginning today the Allied High Commissioners will forego the exercise of most of their occupation rights.

Germany will join NATO and make its indispensable contribution to the defense of the West. This will be done within a Continental system of armament controls.

Western unity will be developed within the framework of the Brussels Treaty. The treaty members will become identical with the projected membership of EDC, the United Kingdom being an additional member. Their Council will have broad authority and can act in many important matters by a majority vote. Thus national authority gives way to European authority.

The United Kingdom has made a momentous long-term commitment of its military forces to the continent of Europe.

Much of what was agreed on will, of course, require further approvals by other nations and by parliaments.

When I went to London, I said that the initiative rested with the European powers.² They had exercised that initiative.

The result is what the Europeans decided on for themselves. The United States will, I hope, co-operate with the result, because to do so will be very much in our national interests.

¹ Made at Washington National Airport on Oct. 4 (press release 547).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 489.

III. United States, United Kingdom and Canadian Assurances

The United States Secretary of State set forth the willingness of the United States to continue its support for European unity, in accordance with the following statement.

If, using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here,

and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defense Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew the assurance offered last spring in connection with the European Defense Community Treaty to the effect that the United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to the area exists and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area.

The United Kingdom confirmed its active participation in the Brussels Treaty Organisation and gave the following assurance about the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe.

The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, four divisions and the Tactical Air Force, or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR's views.

This undertaking would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty's Government to omit this procedure.

If the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the formations are maintained.

Canada reaffirmed in the following statement its resolve to discharge the continuing obligations arising out of its membership in NATO and its support of the objective of European unity.

As far as we are concerned, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer cooperation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. While we emphasise, then, our belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation we welcome the proposed extension of the Brussels Treaty. We shall look forward to a growing relationship, within the framework of NATO, with the new Brussels Treaty Organisation, composed of countries with whom we are already bound by such close ties.

IV. NATO

The powers present at the Conference which are members of NATO agreed to recommend at the

next ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council that the Federal Republic of Germany should forthwith be invited to become a member.

They further agreed to recommend to NATO that its machinery be reinforced in the following respects:

(a) All forces of NATO countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of those which NATO has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

(b) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with NATO strategy.

(c) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.

(d) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent, subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(e) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(f) Arrangements shall be made for the closer coordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(g) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments and equipment, logistics, and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

The Conference recorded the view of all the governments represented that the North Atlantic Treaty should be regarded as of indefinite duration.

V. Declaration by the German Federal Government and Joint Declaration by the Governments of France, United Kingdom and United States of America

The following declarations were recorded at the Conference by the German Federal Chancellor and by the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom and United States of America.

Declaration by German Federal Republic

The German Federal Republic has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.

Upon her accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, the German Federal Republic declares that she will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the two treaties. In particular the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States.

Declaration by the Governments of United States of America, United Kingdom and France

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic,

Being resolved to devote their efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in particular with the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter

- (i) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
- (ii) to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
- (iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations take preventive or enforcement action;
- (iv) to ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Having regard to the purely defensive character of the Atlantic Alliance which is manifest in the North Atlantic Treaty, wherein they reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire

to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and undertake to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the Charter and to refrain, in accordance with those principles, from the threat or use of force in their international relations,

Take note that the German Federal Republic has by a Declaration dated October 3rd accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states:

DECLARE THAT

1. They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.

2. In their relations with the Federal Republic they will follow the principles set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

3. A peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

4. The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.

5. The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

6. They will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three Governments,

for their part, will consider the offending government as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking other measures which may be appropriate.

7. They will invite the association of other member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with this Declaration.

VI. Future Procedure

The Conference agreed that representatives of the governments concerned should work out urgently the texts of detailed agreements to give effect to the principles laid down above. These will be submitted, where appropriate, to the North Atlantic Council, and to the four Governments directly concerned with the future status of the Federal Republic. The Conference hoped that it would be possible to hold a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on October 22 to decide on the arrangements affecting NATO. This will be preceded by meetings of the four Foreign Ministers on the question of German sovereignty and of the nine Foreign Ministers.

These agreements and arrangements constitute a notable contribution to world peace. A Western Europe is now emerging which, resting on the close association of the United Kingdom with the Continent and on growing friendship between the participating countries, will re-inforce the Atlantic community. The system elaborated by the Conference will further the development of European unity and integration.

ANNEX

Draft Declaration and Draft Protocol to Brussels Treaty

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, parties to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948, for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence,

Aware that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy,

Noting with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe,

Convinced that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the treaty,

DECIDE,

In application of Article IX of the treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty, as revised and completed by the protocol (and list of agreements and documents to be specified in the final text).

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE BRUSSELS TREATY

H. M. King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, H. R. H. the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, H. M. the Queen of the Netherlands, H. M. the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other realms and territories, head of the Commonwealth, parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the treaty, on the one hand,

And the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

Inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security,

Desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe,

Convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims:

ARTICLE I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the treaty, as revised and completed by the present protocol (and the list of agreements and documents).

ARTICLE II

(A) The subparagraph of the preamble to the treaty "to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" shall be modified to read:

"To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe."

(B) The following new article shall be inserted in the treaty as Article IV:

"IV. In execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

The present Article IV of the treaty and the succeeding articles shall be renumbered accordingly.

(C) Article VIII, formerly Article VII, of the treaty, shall read:

"For the purpose of consulting together on all questions dealt with in the present treaty and its protocol and the agreements and other documents set out in Article I above and of strengthening peace and security and of promoting

unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer cooperation between member states and with other European organisations, the high contracting parties will create a council, which shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

"At the request of any of the high contracting parties, the council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the high contracting parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability."

ARTICLE III

The present protocol and the agreements set out in Article II above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government. They shall enter into force upon the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification.

ANNEX

Statement by the United States Secretary of State (The Hon. John Foster Dulles) at the Fourth Plenary Meeting [September 29]

At the time when we thought that the European Defense Community Treaty would promptly be put to a vote of the French Parliament—that was some time last spring—the United States indicated that it would be prepared to make a declaration with respect to its intentions as to the maintenance of armed forces in Europe in the event that the European Defense Community Treaty should come into force. The text of that message¹ was communicated to the six nations that were signatory to the European Defense Community Treaty, and also to the United Kingdom. The essence of that declaration was that the United States would continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists, and that we would continue to maintain such forces in accordance with the agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area. There were other provisions of that declaration. In fact, there were six, one of which related

to treating the North Atlantic Treaty as a treaty of indefinite duration, rather than only for a fixed period of years.

I do not need, I think, to read the full text of that declaration, because it has, as I say, been communicated to all of the governments who are represented here. You doubtless are already familiar with, and can readily consult, the text which was sent to you at that time. That declaration was made, as I say, in anticipation of the coming into force of the European Defense Community Treaty. The declaration was made after consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States. It would have been as solemn and definitive an obligation as the United States is constitutionally capable of making in this matter.

I should perhaps explain that under our constitutional system the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and, as such, has the right to determine their disposition. That is a right which cannot be impaired by action of the Congress. Also, while Congress has no authority to deprive the President of his right as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to make such disposition of those forces as he believes to be in the interest of the security of the United States, it is equally the case that one President of the United States is not constitutionally able to bind his successors in this matter.

Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the armed forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice which he gets from his military advisers.

Therefore it is not constitutionally possible for the United States by treaty, by law, or in any other way to make a legally binding, fixed commitment to maintain any predetermined quota of armed forces in any particular part of the world for any particular period of time.

It is nevertheless possible for the President to define a policy which in his opinion makes it appropriate to maintain certain elements of the armed forces of the United States in certain areas in pursuance of that policy. And if the policy is a basic and fundamental one, it is extremely unlikely that that allocation of forces would be altered. Now, this declaration that I refer to was

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1954, p. 619.

designed to involve an exercise, to the fullest degree possible under our constitutional system, of the determination of our Government to support the European Defense Community by contributing armed forces which would be subject to integration with its forces, and that declaration was made with the confidence that the policy that it reflected would be pursued because of the very great interest which the United States has in the creation of unity in Europe, and the fact that our Nation has historically shown its willingness to make tremendous contributions if, in its opinion, that will aid in the real unification of Europe.

I might recall that the European Recovery Plan—the Marshall plan as it was called—was made pursuant to a congressional act which said that the purpose was to promote the unification of Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty was an engagement which was quite unprecedented for the United States. It was quite unprecedented for the United States to make that kind of long-range alliance with other countries. That was directly contrary to our earlier policies which had been pursued for over 100 years. That action was taken only after the European countries themselves had first come together under this Brussels Treaty which we are talking about so much today. It was the encouragement which came from that which very largely led to our going on and joining in the commitments of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The first action taken to provide military aid to Europe was under the Military Defense Assistance Act of 1949. The language of it was that it was designed to promote the integration of the defense of Europe. I think that the history of our action, both our positive action and negative action, shows that we respond in many ways like a barometer to the climate which exists in Europe. If the climate is one of unity and cohesion, our assistance and aid of every kind goes out. If the climate is one of dissension, disunity, revival of threats of war, perpetuation of the cycle of recurrent war, then our tendency is to withdraw. The declaration which we felt able to make in support of the European Defense Community was on the assumption that that was a permanent act which would tie together organically the countries of Europe which in the past have been separate and among whom war has been bred. We felt that it tied them together so permanently, so organically, that we could regard that old chapter as a closed chap-

ter and could hopefully commit our strength to Europe in the confidence that our soldiers over here in Europe would be in a structure which was safe and sound, that we were not putting our troops in the midst of what has historically been the world's worst fire hazard.

Now, a committal of that character is not lightly made, and I would say in all frankness that as the situation stands today it would not be possible for the President of the United States to renew that committal. There has been a great wave of disillusionment which has swept over the United States, and it is particularly manifest in the Congress—a great wave of disillusionment over what has happened, and a feeling that, after all, the situation in Europe is pretty hopeless and the United States had better not make any long-term commitments to be part of it.

That conclusion is so disastrous in my opinion both for the nations of Europe and for the United States that I hope most ardently that what is done here will make it possible to come to a different conclusion, and that it will change the atmosphere, the feeling, in the United States to a degree which will permit of a renewal of the pledge by the United States to maintain in Europe such elements of its armed forces as may be necessary or appropriate to contribute our fair share of what is needed for the common defense of this North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists. I cannot say at this moment that a renewal of that commitment is possible. I can say, and must repeat, that, as things stand today, it is not possible. But if, out of the elements of the situation with which we are dealing—if, using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defense Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew a pledge comparable to that which was offered in connection with the European Defense Community Treaty.

Obviously the context of the pledge would have to be changed, because in the form in which it was given it related distinctively to the European Defense Community Treaty.

Just what rephrasing would be required to give

it the new look that would be appropriate to the new situation, that is a matter which I have not studied and which could not usefully be studied until we know whether or not a promise of genuine and durable unity will come out of the deliberations of this gathering and those which may succeed it.

That, Mr. Chairman, is as clear a statement as I can make today of the position of my Government in relation to this matter. We are extremely anxious to contribute all that we can from a material and constitutional standpoint to promote the kind of unification which will above all end a situation which has led to recurrent wars which have weakened and drained the Western nations so that our whole Western civilization is in jeopardy as never before in a thousand years.

In reason you can count on us. I think that what we have done since the end of the war in terms of economic contribution, military contributions, the willingness to contribute our best and ablest brains in terms of both military and economic matters, all of that I think is a proof which cannot be challenged as to what our disposition is in this matter. You can be confident that that disposition will be reflected by genuine support to the extent that is appropriate if there is, on this side, the movement toward unity, if there is a beacon light still ahead, if we do not feel that we have come to a watershed where efforts toward unity finally are ended and we are going down on the other side into the abyss of continuing disunity. I do not think that is going to happen. If it does not happen, then you can count on the United States' acting in support of what the European countries do. I believe that you will find that the American flag, with all it symbolizes, will continue to fly alongside of your own here in Europe.

Statement by the United Kingdom Secretary of State (The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M. P.) at the Fourth Plenary Meeting [September 29]

Gentlemen, I think we all feel that we have just listened to a statement from the United States Secretary of State of very rare quality and much valued frankness. What he has said to us, those of us who are European, is I think all that in present conditions we could possibly expect from the United States.

As we survey these post-war years we, I fear, too readily at times take for granted what this generous brother has done for us in Europe at a time when but for his help all must have collapsed in confusion and, perhaps, into communism also. On behalf of the country I represent here, I would like to assure him that what the United States has done are not—"All good deeds past, forgot as soon as done"—but will be remembered with thankfulness, and not for our own sakes alone. So I would like to tell Mr. Foster Dulles that the words he has said, so far as our Government are concerned, will be examined with gratitude and with understanding, and that we shall do our best—I believe this conference will do its best—to prove worthy of that greater confidence the United States will show as we establish our ability to prove our unity and our strength.

Now in all this I am conscious that my own country has a part to play. I do not want to go back over the full history of past declarations and past undertakings, though there are perhaps one or two that I ought to mention if the setting of what I want to say this afternoon is to be understood. We gave, as the United States Government gave, a series of undertakings to the Epc. We gave them by treaty, we gave them by agreement, we gave them by declarations, and, as I have already informed my colleagues, we stand by those undertakings and we are ready to reaffirm them. They are not, I think, unimportant, but some of them are, it is true, inapplicable in the absence of Epc. Some of those that have as a result of the disappearance of Epc now disappeared may, and probably will, be covered by the proposals which this conference is now considering. The provision of automatic military assistance, for instance, which was contained in our treaty with Epc will be reproduced, I trust, by the proposed enlargement of the Brussels Treaty. Co-operation between the armed forces; the deployment and integration of those forces; consultation about the level of forces, will all now take place, though perhaps within a different framework.

I am very conscious, and so are my colleagues, that there is one particular plane on which many of you here would wish us to make our position clearer, and where, if we were able to do so, it might assist the work of this conference. This relates to the maintenance of British forces on the

continent of Europe, and in respect of that I have a new proposal to put to my colleagues. The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to SACEUR—four divisions and the tactical Air Force—or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting capacity.

The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR's views. This undertaking would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty's Government to omit this procedure. If maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, then we would invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the formations are maintained.

My colleagues will realise that what I have announced is for us a very formidable step to take. You all know that ours is above all an island story. We are still an island people in thought and tradition, whatever the modern facts of weapons and strategy may compel. And it has been not without considerable reflection that the Government which I represent here has decided that this statement could be made to you this afternoon. I want only to add this: we are making it in just the same spirit as Mr. Dulles spoke just now, because we hope that by doing so we shall make a contribution to enable this conference to succeed, and recreate confidence on this European continent, and make it possible for us to show an example of unity to the world. Of course, you will understand that what we have just said, and the undertaking we are prepared to give, does depend on the outcome of our work. If we succeed here, then this undertaking stands; if we do not, H. M. Government could not regard itself as committed to what I have said this afternoon. That applies to the whole of our work, all the work that we are doing here. So I can only conclude by saying I hope the conference will consider that what we have said will be a contribution to bring us at least a stage nearer the successful conclusion of our labours.

Statement by the Canadian Minister for External Affairs (The Hon. Lester Pearson) at the Fourth Plenary Meeting [September 29]

Mr. Chairman, this item on the agenda, which I apologise for returning to—item 5—is headed “United Kingdom and United States Declarations.” I assume that under it I would be quite in order in expressing great appreciation for the statements which have been made by you and by Mr. Dulles this afternoon, and I hope I would not be ruled out of order if I make a short declaration on behalf of my own country.

Your statement, Mr. Chairman, if I may say so, was one of historic importance. If it is thought, as it sometimes is, that the United Kingdom looks across the Channel more intensely in war than in peacetime, that feeling certainly must have been removed by your statement earlier this afternoon. To me it was all the more impressive because I recognise that the source of the power and the glory of this island has been its vision across the seas.

The statement of Mr. Dulles was also important, not only for the development of European unity but for that larger Atlantic Community development with which we are all concerned. Indeed, as I see it, European unity cannot be effectively secured unless the lines not only across the Channel but across the Atlantic are strong and unbroken. My country has a part to play in this Atlantic aspect of the problem. Therefore, we accept the continuing obligations arising out of our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and we are resolved to continue to do our best to discharge them. The disappearance of EDC does not, we think, affect those obligations, because EDC—though we were indeed disappointed in its disappearance—because EDC, as we saw it, was a means to an end and not an end in itself. We are here to find an alternative method to accomplish the same purpose. That alternative method, that alternative arrangement, must include the association of Germany not only with the defence of Europe and the West, but—and this is, I am sure, equally important—with the development of the Atlantic Community; an association to be brought about in such a way that the fears that we have inherited from the unhappy past will be replaced by a new and better hope for the future.

So new methods are being discussed this week

and new solutions are being sought. As far as we are concerned, however, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic Community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, enduring and whole-hearted support for NATO is for us a policy above politics on which I think our friends can rely.

That support in defence matters is now worked out each year by consultation through the appropriate agencies of our organization—that is, NATO. Apart from mutual aid, it now takes the form of naval forces, an infantry brigade group, and an air division of 12 jet fighter squadrons stationed in Europe. We will continue to assist in the common defence through the existing NATO procedures until better ones are agreed on. The presence of these Canadian forces on the European continent is not only a measure of our military contribution to the common defence but an evidence of our belief in the future of the North Atlantic Community.

While we emphasize, then, our belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we welcome the proposed extension of the Brussels Treaty. We shall look forward to a growing relationship within the framework of NATO to the Brussels Treaty countries with whom we are bound by such close ties.

We are sure, and I hope our confidence will be realized—I know it will—that these new arrangements through Brussels can be developed without weakening or diminishing NATO in any way in its essential functions, because NATO, with Germany associated with it under agreed arrangements, should, we think, be a stronger force than ever against war, and for the progressive development of the Atlantic Community.

We are also certain, Mr. Chairman, that in this development the United States, which has played such a magnificent, generous, and indeed essential part, will continue to be able to do so. Mr. Dulles has given us hope in that regard this afternoon.

We Canadians, being neighbours of the United States, know as well as anybody else that that country does not fail to accept and to meet, successfully, any great international challenge which faces it. We are certain that in the days ahead it will continue to meet the challenge of assist-

ing in the development of European unity and the Atlantic Community—and the two go together.

The work, then, which we are doing this week must, in order to succeed, make possible the continued contribution of the United States to these great objectives. If that is done, and I know it is going to be done, it will also, I assure you, make it much easier for my own country to continue to do its share.

ANNEX

Conference Paper on a German Defence Contribution and Arrangements To Apply to SACEUR's Forces on the Continent

The nine Governments represented at the London Conference agree to instruct representatives to draw up in Paris, in concert with the military and civilian agencies of NATO through the Secretary General, detailed proposals, for approval by the North Atlantic Council, for a German defence contribution and arrangements to be applied to SACEUR's forces on the Continent. These detailed proposals shall be based on the following principles agreed between the nine Governments:

1. (a) The seven Brussels Treaty Powers will conclude a special agreement setting out the forces each of them will place under SACEUR on the Continent.

(b) The German contribution shall conform in size and general characteristics to the contribution fixed for the Epc brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make it suitable for NATO.

(c) The terms of this special agreement will be agreed with the other NATO countries.

(d) If at any time the NATO Annual Review recommends an increase above the figures in the Brussels Special Agreement such increase will require the unanimous approval of the Brussels Powers expressed in the Brussels Council or in NATO.

(e) The Brussels Powers will ask that arrangements be made for SACEUR to designate a high-ranking officer who will be instructed to transmit regularly to the Brussels Treaty Organisation information acquired as indicated in 3 (f) below in order to permit that Organisation to establish that the figures agreed among the Brussels Powers are being observed.

2. All forces of NATO countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of the forces which NATO has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command. The strength and armaments on the Continent of the internal defence forces and of the police belonging to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation shall be fixed by agreements made within this Or-

ganisation, taking into account the task for which they are intended and on the basis of existing levels and needs.

3. Arrangements to apply to SACEUR's forces :

(a) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with NATO strategy.

(b) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.

(c) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his

consent subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(d) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(e) Arrangements shall be made for the closer co-ordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(f) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments, equipment, logistics and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence¹

BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, BELGIUM, FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, AND THE NETHERLANDS

Brussels, 17th March, 1948

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Belgium, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas,

Resolved

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Belgium
His Excellency Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
His Excellency Mr. Gaston Eyskens, Minister of Finance,

The President of the French Republic, President of the French Union

His Excellency Mr. Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and

His Excellency Mr. Jean de Hauteclocque, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in Brussels,

Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg
His Excellency Mr. Joseph Bech, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and

His Excellency Mr. Robert Als, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Luxembourg in Brussels,

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands

His Excellency Baron C. G. W. H. van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and

His Excellency Baron Binnert Philip van Harinxma thoe Slooten, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Netherlands in Brussels,

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

¹ Reprinted from BULLETIN of May 9, 1948.

The Right Honourable Ernest Bevin, Member of Parliament, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and

His Excellency Sir George William Rendel, K. C. M. G., Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty in Brussels,

who, having exhibited their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organize and coordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article VII as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialized agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialized agencies.

They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

ARTICLE IV

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

ARTICLE V

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.

They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE VII

For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create a Consultative Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

ARTICLE VIII

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that Party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that Party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the High Contracting Parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any Party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

ARTICLE IX

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.

Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government will inform each of the High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

ARTICLE X

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Brussels, this seventeenth day of March 1948, in English and French, each text being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other signatories.

For Belgium:

(L. S.) P. H. SPAAK.

(L. S.) GASTON EYSKENS.

For France:

(L. S.) G. BIDAULT.

(L. S.) J. DE HAUTECLOCQUE.

For Luxembourg:

(L. S.) JOSEPH BECH.

(L. S.) ROBERT ALS.

For the Netherlands:

(L. S.) W. VAN BOETZELAER.

(L. S.) VAN HARINXMA THOE SLOOTEN.

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

(L. S.) ERNEST BEVIN.

(L. S.) GEORGE RENDEL.

Understanding U.S. Foreign Policy

Statement by Under Secretary Smith¹

For some years I have been looking forward to leading what you might call a normal existence. But now that the time for my actual retirement from Government service has come, I realize how much I am going to miss it.

Aside from the satisfaction one gets from trying to do something for our country, there are the personal human relationships. During more years of service than I like to say—in the Army, in the Intelligence Service, as an Ambassador in the field, and, finally, in the Department of State—I have worked with the very splendid people in all of those services. And I must take this opportunity to pay tribute to the dedicated and devoted men and women who are serving the Government in and out of uniform. At the same time, I wish that more of our young people who are about to enter active life could realize the richness of experience and the satisfaction that comes with such service. I feel so strongly about this that I have told the President and Secretary Dulles that even though I am retiring to private life I am myself ready to assist at any time and in any way I can.

These are difficult days for our country and for the whole free world even though we are having and will have our diplomatic victories. I know myself that the best planning and the best execution of planning cannot attain really good or really definite results without the understanding and support of the American people generally. And so my parting thought and indeed my appeal to each of you who hears me is this:

Take a real interest in what the Department of State is doing to safeguard the ideals of America and its security throughout the world.

Think seriously and sympathetically about the problems it faces in its unending task of working for peace and security for ourselves and for mankind generally.

If you can, take an active part in groups and associations dedicated to the achievement of these goals.

And finally and most important of all, try to realize that some of the most important successes

¹ Made on Oct. 1 (press release 545) on the eve of his retirement.

in the conduct of foreign policy are those that can't be talked about.

The President and his Secretary of State, who are charged with the direction of our foreign policy—I should say our nonpartisan foreign policy, because basically it is nonpartisan—are tire-

less in their efforts to make of this world a better place to live in freedom, in security, and with an ever-expanding opportunity for constructive and rewarding work. They and the career services which assist them deserve all you can give them in the way of understanding and of support.

The American Memorial Library—A Monument to the Spirit of Berlin

by James B. Conant

*U. S. High Commissioner for Germany*¹

When, 2 years ago, I came to Berlin for the first time after the war, the conferences I had there included a number of meetings with businessmen and trade-union leaders. At those meetings it was time and again pointed out to me how much the strength of Berlin depended on its economic rehabilitation. "Berlin needs orders," was what everyone kept telling me. Today we may state with some satisfaction that, despite the continuous influx of refugees from the East, economic conditions in Berlin are steadily improving and the number of unemployed is today smaller than it has been since the war.

When I asked what contribution the free world could make toward further reinforcing Free Berlin to enable it to fulfill its unique task, I received a somewhat different reply. I was told that Berlin should also be promoted as a cultural center. The building which we are dedicating today is a symbol of our joint efforts in that field. We all know that we must not direct our attention exclusively to material things, and that the existence of Berlin as an outpost of the free world is guaranteed not only by a sound economy but above all by a prospering cultural life. We all are looking forward with confidence to the day when Berlin will resume its proper position and

again become the capital of a Germany reunited in peace and freedom. Until that day it will remain the duty of the free world, especially of the Federal Republic and the three protecting powers which are present here, to do everything to reinforce and support Berlin as a symbol of liberty. This applies not only to the economic and military spheres but also to the intellectual sphere.

This library, which is located so close to the sector border, reminds us how important it is, at this time of difficulties and tensions, to remember the great cultural values of our free Western culture in a divided world. This library is intended to show the importance of Berlin as one of the great intellectual centers of resistance against slavery.

Cultural Tradition of Berlin

At the same time, this library is intended to continue the great cultural tradition of this city, which has for centuries played a prominent part in the intellectual life of Germany. In the 18th century King Frederick I of Prussia tried to make Berlin the Athens of the North. The Charlottenburg Castle was built as a "little Versailles" for Queen Sophie Charlotte. Gottfried Leibniz headed the Prussian Academy. At the beginning of the 18th century Johann Joachim Winckelmann, the man who made a decisive contribution toward the understanding of Greek culture, was

¹ Translation of an address made at the opening ceremonies for the American Memorial Library at Berlin on Sept. 17 (Hico press release).

a student of a local gymnasium. Later on Frederick the Great tried to have Kant, the great philosopher, come to Berlin, and when during a cabinet meeting he received word that Johann Sebastian Bach had come to Berlin for a visit, he said to his ministers: "Let us interrupt our meeting and see whether we can make old Bach play for us."

I would like to recall to your mind the cultural life of Berlin in the 19th century, when the famous Friedrich-Wilhelm University was founded and Wilhelm von Humboldt was Prussian Minister of Education. His famous brother, Alexander von Humboldt, the scientist and explorer, is also not forgotten.

And who could forget the names of those who helped shape the cultural and intellectual life of Berlin in this century: Friedrich Meinecke, the historian; Karl Justi, the expert on the history of art; Alfred Kerr, the art critic; the great Max Liebermann; Else Lasker-Schuler, the poetess; and Kurt Tucholsky, just to name a few.

But these impressive cultural achievements of Berlin in the past should not lead us to forget the present. All those who come to Berlin are surprised to see that the cultural life of Berlin is so vigorous despite all this city went through, despite all the distress and restrictions which result from its island position. No other German city has so many theaters, opera houses, universities, libraries, etc. No other German city has attracted since the war so many artists from all over the world as has Berlin on the occasion of its Festival Weeks. The Free University of Berlin was founded despite, or even as a result, of the blockade. The Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra is one of the most famous orchestras in the world. The compositions of Boris Blacher, director of the Berlin conservatory, have become known in countless other countries; his newest composition was recently played for the first time in America. His predecessor, Werner Egk, is equally responsible for Berlin's reputation as a city of music.

Most of the schools of Berlin have been reconstructed and offer thousands of refugee children an education in an atmosphere of freedom. The Technical University has steadily gained in importance and its reconstruction is making good progress. The students and professors of the Free University are doing pioneer work in developing new methods of education. The School for Ped-

gogics, the School of Fine Arts, and the School of Political Science are in every respect the equals of similar institutions in the Federal Republic. Finally, within the framework of this understandably incomplete enumeration, I would like to refer to the reconstruction of a large part of the Berlin Art Library. It would be futile to try to name all those who contributed toward the cultural resurgence of Berlin; however, the Senator for Public Education, Professor Dr. Tiburtius, and his predecessor, the late Stadtrat May, must not go without mention.

Origin of Library Plan

Today we are dedicating a library which, we hope, will take its place among the great cultural institutions of Berlin. It has been named the American Memorial Library. To whose memory is it dedicated? Let me briefly recall the history of the plan to build this library. When in 1951 certain American funds were made available to the Berlin aid program, it was suggested that these funds should be used above all for projects of cultural importance. Thus, shortly after the blockade had been successfully ended, it was decided to use a part of those American funds for constructing a monument recalling German-American cooperation in those difficult times.

The United States was not at all interested in erecting a monument to itself in Berlin, a monument perhaps in the form of a huge eagle—the heraldic emblem of the United States—or some other colossal sculpture. What we envisaged was a monument to remind coming generations of the time when the fate of this city was the major concern of all nations of the free world, of the time when Americans could work and fight together with the brave Berliners to break the ring of slavery which threatened to strangle the city. We intended to create a monument of permanent value, not so much in the material sense, but a monument to the spirit this city displayed in those days of extreme crisis. A German-American Committee was set up to determine the most appropriate use to be made of these funds. That Committee consisted of representatives of the city council, of industry, the trade unions, and of education. I am especially pleased that it chose a library.

The unnatural division of the city was responsible for the insufficient number of libraries avail-

able to Berliners. Naturally, East Berlin has its libraries too, but everyone knows that the reader there is limited in his intellectual fare solely to that provided by a single totalitarian regime.

The difference between Communist libraries and the libraries of the free West is the difference between a culture based on the totalitarian principle of authority and a culture based on the principle of freedom. As long as the East-West tension exists, as long as the world remains divided not only politically and economically but, above all, in the cultural sphere, so long will this library, located within sight of the East, be a symbol of the superiority of freedom of thought over the spirit of slavery. I recall the words of your unforgettable Mayor Reuter which were enclosed in the cornerstone of this American Memorial Library:

Founded at a time when the people of Berlin in the free part of their city defended their right to freedom and independence steadfastly and imperturbably, despite severe afflictions, this building will remind the living and coming generations of the unconquerable forces of the free spirit and moral duty.

This library in which we have gathered has not been built according to traditional architectural plans. Certain experiences we have had in America with the adaptation of the library system to the requirements of our times have been taken into account. We certainly do not pretend to teach Europe a lesson on how to run a library. What we have done in planning this type of library is to adapt European tradition, which is much older than ours in the United States, to present-day American conditions, which, I believe, also exist to a large extent in Europe.

Link With America

Incidentally, European and American ideas concerning libraries were first brought together a hundred years ago, when the first public library of the United States was opened in Boston in 1854. The *spiritus rector* of that library was George Ticknor, of Harvard University, the University with which I myself had the honor of being affiliated for so many years. Ticknor had traveled in Germany, and it was the high level of German public libraries which particularly impressed him during a protracted sojourn in this country. So he tried to achieve a similarly high standard for the future American libraries. When the plans

Message From Secretary Dulles¹

You are about to dedicate the American Memorial Library, a monument raised in honor of the men who helped to keep freedom alive in Berlin. By doing so they helped to make it possible for your countrymen in the surrounding Soviet Zone to hold steadfast to the spirit of that Western civilization and Christian culture which binds us all together.

The Soviet refusal to permit the reunification of Germany brings with it the danger that Communist ideas will find acceptance among the people of the Soviet Zone because they are the only ideas reaching them.

No weapon against such a danger could be more effective than a great library. Moreover, I am confident that when, by unceasing efforts, a reunified Germany shall have been achieved, this library will serve as a source of strength for the spiritual life of a great unified nation.

¹Delivered by Ambassador Conant to Mayor Walther Schreiber of Berlin on Sept. 17.

for the public library in Boston were being prepared, a conflict developed between Ticknor and the then president of Harvard, Dr. Edward Everett. Everett insisted on libraries being exclusively places of research work. Ticknor, on the other hand, envisaged the inclusion of popular literature, access to the stacks, and, in short, an appeal to the public at large. Fortunately the ideas of Ticknor prevailed and the Boston Public Library, the first of its type in America, became the predecessor of thousands of similar institutions which served the scientist as well as the simple citizen and student. As a boy I spent many hours in the Boston Public Library, and the way to go there was never too long for me.

Just as a hundred years ago Ticknor took home German ideas to America, ideas which decisively influenced the American library system, thus some of his ideas have returned today to the country where they originated.

The library which we are opening today is dedicated to the principle of service to the public at large. It applies to all strata of the population, to the laborer as well as to the scientist, to the specialist as well as to the juvenile for whom it establishes a first contact with the cultural inheritance of our civilization. In addition to serving as a remembrance of German-American cooperation at a time when this city gave proof of its will to freedom, this American Memorial Library will

serve that spirit which is best expressed by the words of Jefferson which are inscribed at the entrance to this library:

This Institution will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate error so long as reason is left free to combat it.

The present ideological differences between the free world and the world of slavery cannot be characterized more clearly. The actuality of the statement made by Jefferson shows that his words are just as valid today as they were more than 150 years ago. And they will remain valid in the future. Let us face the future in that spirit of confidence which marks the words of Jefferson. Having that confidence we can rest assured that the day will come in which present differences between the East and the West in Germany will be eliminated, in which the traces of temporary partition will have disappeared in a Germany reunited in freedom.

In dedicating this library, we honor the past and face the future with confidence.

U.S.-French Talks on Indochina

Press release 542 dated September 29

Following is the text of the communique based upon the exchange of views September 27-29, 1954, between Acting Secretary Smith, M. Guy La-Chambre, French Minister of State for Relations with the Three Associated States, and M. Edgar Faurc, Finance Minister of France.

Representatives of the two Governments have had very frank and useful talks which have shown the community of their views, and are in full agreement on the objectives to be attained.

The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954, has provided a firmer basis than heretofore to assist the free nations of Asia in developing and maintaining their independence and security. The representatives of France and the United States wish to reaffirm the support of their Governments for the principles of self-government,

independence, justice and liberty proclaimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 1954.

The representatives of France and the United States reaffirm the intention of their governments to support the complete independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Both France and the United States will continue to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in their efforts to safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance the welfare of their peoples. In this spirit France and the United States are assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the resettlement of the Vietnamese who have of their own free will moved to free Viet-Nam and who already number some 300,000.

In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the further development of national forces for this purpose, the representatives of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of its Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned, within the limits permitted under the Geneva agreements and to an extent to be determined. The United States will consider the question of financial assistance for the Expeditionary Corps in these circumstances in addition to support for the forces of each of the three Associated States. These questions vitally affect each of the three Associated States and are being fully discussed with them.

The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be direct to that state. The United States representatives will begin discussions soon with the respective governments of the Associated States regarding direct aid. The methods for efficient coordination of French and United States aid programs to each of the three Associated States are under consideration and will be developed in discussions with each of these states.

After the bilateral talks, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Washington of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam were invited to a final meeting to have an exchange of views and information on these matters. The representatives of all five countries are in complete agreement on the objectives of peace and freedom to be achieved in Indochina.

U. S. Relations With Latin America

by Merwin L. Bohan

*U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council*¹

In these dark days of intercontinental rumor and alarm, it is all too easy to forget that what we so assiduously seek abroad—peace and understanding among nations—has already been sought and found in our own Western Hemisphere. Indeed, those of us who labor in the inter-American vineyard are sometimes afraid that the very fact that we have won our major objective in this area makes our people a little less conscious of the continued need to tend and nurture the solidarity that has come to characterize the relations of the 21 American Republics—a solidarity which in the political as in the economic field is of vital importance to the United States. All of which serves as explanation for my requesting your indulgence in allowing me to spend a few minutes in examining what Latin America is and what it represents in terms of our present and future scheme of things.

First as to what it is. It is a group of 20 sovereign Republics which occupy almost one-fifth of the world's land area. The countries comprising it range in size from Brazil, which is so big that it would take another Texas for the United States to equal it, down to little El Salvador, which would only make a good-sized western county. Differences in race are almost as notable. In some countries, such as Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia, Indian blood predominates; in others, such as Argentina and Uruguay, the population is almost exclusively of European origin. In still others, such as northeastern Brazil and in the coastal fringes of the Caribbean, considerable Negro blood is to be found.

In fact, I sometimes wonder if we do not do a disservice to understanding in talking so much about Latin America, for it has created in our minds a concept of oneness and sameness which the facts do not bear out. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as Latin America, but rather 20 sovereign and quite individualistic peoples. Even among the 18 which once formed a part of the Spanish Empire and thus have a common tongue (Brazil speaks Portuguese; Haiti, French), the differences are clearly apparent to even the most superficial observer. This has been brought about in part by differences in racial background but mainly because economics has discouraged intercourse and communication between the countries of Latin America while encouraging it between each of those countries and Europe and the United States. In other words, each country—since the passing of such continental figures as Bolívar and San Martín—has worked out its destiny generally uninfluenced by its sister Latin American Republics, and each has reacted, in its own individualistic fashion, to the influences which have played upon it from abroad.

Those influences, down to the outbreak of World War I, were far stronger from Europe than from the United States. As late as the 1920's, drawing room French rather than counting house English was the language of polite society. Paris remained the center of the universe, and it was quite generally accepted that the United States was the land of crass materialism, home of the almighty dollar.

In the brief span of 30 years, all of this has changed. European influence has become more nostalgia than substance; the dynamic forces of today move along lines of longitude rather than of latitude.

¹Address made before the combined service clubs at Madison, Wis., on Sept. 21 (press release 518).

How has all this come about? It would be quite natural—but also quite inaccurate—to seek the answer among the cataclysmic changes of World War II. That conflict merely magnified the effects of a directional shift which began even before World War I, accelerated during the 1920's, and became dynamic in the 1930's. The triumph—not of North American influence but of something much finer that had been distilled during the thirties—inter-American understanding—came at Rio de Janeiro in 1942 when, under the awful shadows of Pearl Harbor, the American Republics threw in their lot together. After 1942 it could be fairly said that political solidarity had been achieved in the Western Hemisphere.

During the war this solidarity was reflected in all fields. Latin American air bases played a vital role in the success of the North African campaign, radical increases were registered in the production of strategic materials throughout the hemisphere, and cooperative efforts effectively controlled enemy espionage and propaganda activities.

But even before the coming of peace, the fullness of that understanding was being challenged. Our wartime President had passed on; Sumner Welles, the statesman who had given substance and reality to the good-neighbor policy, had fallen from power; and United States interests, so closely focused on Latin America during the early years of the conflict, were now dispersed on a global basis.

It is not to be wondered that many of our friends and neighbors to the south misinterpreted our policies, especially in the field of economic aid for Europe and Asia, as indicating a cooling of our interest in them. The more thoughtful realized that the billions we were pouring into reconstruction of the war-devastated areas were proportionately as important to them as to us, perhaps more so since fully one-half of their foreign commerce was with the areas of the world in which United States aid was most heavily concentrated. But the *caboclos* of Brazil and the *rotos* of Chile no longer felt as close as they once did to their envied cousins in the fabulous land to the north.

The currents of our relations during the post-war years have ebbed and flowed—never regaining the fullness of understanding achieved in the early forties; never deteriorating to a point where

the gains of the late twenties and the 1930's were too seriously compromised, for a reciprocal appreciation of the interdependence of the countries of the New World has taken deep and permanent root in the consciousness of all Americans.

This state of things, favorable as it is if compared to the early years of the century, is not a good enough example of what the New World has to teach the Old in terms of understanding and cooperation among the nations. Sustained improvement in our relationships, in the opinion of many competent authorities, depends more on economic than on political factors. Those that hold this view point out that, once suspicion of the United States was laid to rest in the thirties, political understanding was comparatively easy since, revolutions and dictatorships notwithstanding, liberty and the dignity of man are basic concepts held in common by all 21 American Republics. In the economic field the problem is more complicated. There are few common denominators to bridge the gulfs that tend to separate countries of such dissimilar stages of development and levels of living.

Economic Approach

There is much to be said for the economic approach to better understanding. Latin America is in the throes of a far-reaching economic and social revolution. Everywhere government is alive to the demands for a better and a fuller life, and while many of the efforts to provide it have set in motion self-defeating inflationary pressures, the area as a whole has made giant strides in the last decade.

This progress, however, merely whets desire. Population growth is such that further advances in the standard of living require a progressively higher rate of economic development. To achieve that higher rate in turn requires an ever-growing volume of financial resources.

The domestic resources of the other American Republics have provided fully 90 percent of the financing of their economic development. The balance has come from foreign private investment and from public credit extended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and our own Export-Import Bank. Domestic resources, in turn, have been drawn in large measure from the proceeds of exports. All of which explains the constant preoccupation of the other

American Republics with such problems as the prices of primary commodities, foreign markets for export products, and financial assistance in the economic development process.

You will recall that at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held in Caracas, Venezuela, in March of this year, the United States did not feel that it was in a position to come to grips with the major economic problems of the other American Republics.² Indeed, the timing of the Caracas meeting, from the standpoint of the United States, was difficult, since several important aspects of our foreign economic policies were in the process of being defined. Dr. Milton Eisenhower's report and recommendations were under consideration in the various interested departments of our Government; the Randall Commission had just reported; and Senator Capehart's invaluable Latin American study had just been made public.

For these reasons, many of the countries attending the Inter-American Conference felt that a later meeting, devoted to economic problems, would be more fruitful of results. The United States concurred in this reasoning, and it was therefore agreed that there would be a meeting of ministers of finance and economy in Brazil in the fall of the present year. The definitive date for the meeting has since been set for November 22.

Preparation for Rio Meeting

The Executive establishment has been deeply concerned with the need for making the Conference a success, and the President, at the suggestion of the Secretary of State, named a sub-Cabinet committee shortly after the Caracas meeting to thoroughly review United States policies. This committee, under the chairmanship of Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, has worked long and faithfully and has made every effort to develop sound positions with respect to the problems which will be brought up for discussion at Rio. As has already been indicated, those problems will mainly concern prices, markets, and financial cooperation. The Latin Americans want (1) United States assistance in assuring fair and equitable prices for their raw materials; (2) assurances of stable

tariffs and an expanding United States market for their products; and (3) financial and technical cooperation in their economic development.

There will undoubtedly be a different approach to these problems, however, than has been the case at previous conferences, where results were often judged by the quantitative production of resolutions and declarations couched in such generalized language as to satisfy the most diverse and even conflicting views. At Rio there is every reason to believe that specific proposals will be advanced to deal with each of the more important economic problems.

The most intensive preparations in the memory of old conference hands are being made. A special committee of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, which is supervising the preparations, has met regularly twice a week since March, even during the worst of the Washington summer, which is, as many of you know, as tough a test of sincerity of purpose as can be devised. The staff of the Pan American Union has produced an impressive series of background reports, while the Economic Commission for Latin America, under the leadership of Dr. Paul Prebisch and aided by a panel of Latin America's outstanding economists, has been hard at work in developing material for the Conference. All of this in addition to individual country preparations, such as these I have already described in the case of the United States.

There is no need for any particular crystal ball to forecast some of the Latin American proposals which will be introduced at Rio. Among them the following merit mention:

1. Consultation in connection with the disposal of agricultural surpluses;
2. Consideration of possible measures to stabilize prices of primary products including the use of stockpiles to avoid extreme fluctuations in the prices of strategic and other mineral products;
3. Reduction of U.S. tariffs and avoidance of restrictions on the importation of Latin American products;
4. Consideration of special treatment with respect to trade for underdeveloped countries in order to encourage economic development;
5. Utilization by the United States of income taxes collected on the operations of U.S. firms in Latin America to promote economic development in that area;

² For a report on the Conference, see *BULLETIN* of Apr. 26, 1954, p. 634.

6. Establishment of a regional development institution to provide loan and equity capital for private enterprise;

7. Increased credit facilities for Latin America by the International and Export-Import Banks;

8. The setting up of target amounts for yearly public and private investment, with public investment making good any deficit in the quota of private investment.

The foregoing are by no means all the questions that will be raised. The point to be kept in mind, however, is that specific solutions rather than general pronouncements will be sought at Rio.

It is clear that we cannot wholly satisfy all these aspirations. In the case of prices, we have a mutual interest in satisfactory price relationships since this means prosperity for all concerned, but we certainly do not have the resources to enter into any global price-parity formulas or plans involving vast financial commitments. We can assist in efforts to diversify the economies of the Latin American countries, thus lessening dependence on one or a few export products, and possibly take other measures to mitigate the effects of price fluctuations. However, the best assurance we can offer of relative stability and "fairness" of price is to maintain the high level of United States economic activity which is the major factor in raw-material demand.

In the field of commercial policy, our record with respect to Latin American products is a reassuring one. Approximately four-fifths of our imports from Latin America are on the free list and therefore not subject to duty, while the average rate on the balance is generally quite low, somewhat under 10 percent ad valorem. In addition, during the past 20 years the United States has probably done more than any major trading country of the world to reduce its tariffs.

There are other strong points in our position. We are prepared at Rio to again reaffirm our deep and abiding interest in the economic development of our neighbors and our willingness to cooperate with them in that field; we are prepared to improve and expand our programs of technical cooperation; and to reassure them as to the availability of sufficient public foreign credit resources to meet new, foreseeable needs for the financing of sound projects for which private capital is not readily available and whose financing is within

the debt-carrying capacity of the borrowing country.

Continued consideration is being given in Washington to the policies the United States will follow at Rio, and this is fortunate, since 7 weeks still remain in which positive and constructive decisions may be taken—a process which, I would like to emphasize, does not, in the case of Latin America, necessarily imply any demands on the pocketbook of the American taxpayer. The other American Republics are not seeking grants in aid but cooperation of a kind that is mutually profitable to all the parties to it. The sound extension of credit is not only a profitable course for debtor and creditor alike but builds up consuming areas which, in turn, mean greater markets for American products. Our foreign trade with Latin America has grown from 1.7 billion dollars in 1938 to 6.9 billion in 1952, thus making it the principal foreign trade area for the United States. It accounts for between one-fifth and one-fourth of our exports and supplies approximately a third of our imports. Further, more private United States investments are concentrated in Latin America than in any other region of the world, the total value of such investments now exceeding 6 billion dollars.

I would like to conclude with the following brief but eloquent quotation from Dr. Milton Eisenhower's report to the President on United States-Latin American relations:

There is no doubt in my mind about the future of Latin America. Her people are on the march. They are determined to improve their standards of living. They have the resources and the manpower to do so.

Latin America is destined to be an economically powerful area of the globe. While it will always have economic relations with Europe and other parts of the world, its firmest and most extensive relations can and should be with the United States.

In the long view, economic cooperation, extended to help the people of Latin America raise their level of well-being and further their democratic aspirations, will redound to their benefit and to ours.

Working together, the nations of this Hemisphere can, if history should so decree, stand firmly against any enemy in war, and prosper mightily together in times of peace.

Visit of President Magloire

White House press release dated September 21

The White House announced on September 21 that President Eisenhower has invited President Paul Magloire of the Republic of Haiti to make

a state visit to the United States. President Magloire has accepted this invitation and is expected to arrive in the United States on January 26, 1955. It is anticipated that President Magloire will remain in Washington for 3 days. He will be accompanied by Mrs. Magloire.

The visit is a further demonstration of the cordial relations and historic friendship between the United States and the Republic of Haiti. President Magloire was elected in 1950 for a term ending in 1957.

U.S., Canada Agree on Need for Distant Early Warning Line¹

On April 8, 1954, the Governments of Canada and the United States issued a joint announcement, which, after referring to the construction of the Pinetree radar chain, announced plans for the establishment of a further radar system "generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada."² The Canadian Government subsequently decided that it would be appropriate, as a part of its contribution to the common defense requirements of the two countries, for Canada to undertake responsibility for financing, constructing, and operating this new system, which is generally referred to as the "Mid-Canada Line."

During the time that plans for the Mid-Canada Line have been under development, studies have also been going on to determine the feasibility of providing even earlier warning of the approach of hostile aircraft.

As a result of these studies, the Canadian and United States Governments have agreed in principle that there is a need for the establishment of a distant early warning line across the far northern part of North America and have directed that detailed planning for such a line should be initiated at once. The basis of participation by the two countries in the construction and operation of the line, and the division of costs, will be determined after the detailed plans have been considered and agreed.

In developing the complete system for warning

of the approach of hostile aircraft and for the control of interceptor forces, the two Governments have followed a policy of building outward from the likely target areas. Thus the first step, which has now been largely completed, was the construction of the main control and warning radar installations in the continental United States and the populated part of Canada. The second step, which is now under way, is the provision of the Mid-Canada Line. A third measure, the need for which has now been agreed upon between the two Governments, will be the provision of a distant early warning line across the most northerly practicable part of North America. Portions of the complete warning and control system in Canada will be extended to seaward on both flanks of the continent by the United States.

The establishment of these North American defense installations is a costly and difficult task, which is being undertaken because our security requires it and is being accomplished successfully because of the readiness of Canadians and Americans to work together in a common cause.

Bill To Control Level of Lake Michigan Vetoed

Statement by the President

White House Office press release dated September 3

I have withheld my approval of H.R. 3300, "To authorize the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago, under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, to help control the lake level of Lake Michigan by diverting water from Lake Michigan into the Illinois waterway."

The bill would authorize the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago, under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of the Army, to withdraw from Lake Michigan, in addition to all domestic pumpage, a total annual average of 2,500 cubic feet of water per second into the Illinois waterway for a period of 3 years. This diversion would be 1,000 cubic feet per second more than is presently permitted under a decree of the Supreme Court of the United States dated April 21, 1930. The bill also would direct the Secretary of the Army to study the effect in the improvement in conditions in the Illinois waterway

¹ Released to the press by the Department of Defense on Sept. 27; released simultaneously by the Canadian Government.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1954, p. 639.

by reason of the increased diversion, and to report to the Congress as to the results of the study on or before January 31, 1957, with his recommendations as to continuance of the increased diversion authorized.

The bill specifies that the diversion would be authorized in order to regulate and promote commerce, to protect, improve, and promote navigation in the Illinois waterway and Mississippi Valley, to help control the lake level, to afford protection to property and shores along the Great Lakes, and to provide for a navigable Illinois waterway. No mention is made of possible improvement of sanitary conditions or increase in hydroelectric power generation on the waterway.

I am unable to approve the bill because (1) existing diversions are adequate for navigation on the Illinois waterway and Mississippi River, (2) all methods of control of lake levels and protection of property on the Great Lakes should be considered before arbitrarily proceeding with the proposed increased diversion, (3) the diversions are authorized without reference to negotiations with Canada, and (4) the legitimate interests of other States affected by the diversion may be adversely affected. I wish to comment briefly on each of these points.

I understand that waterborne traffic on the Illinois waterway has grown in the last 20 years from 200,000 tons to 16,000,000 tons annually. The Corps of Engineers advises, however, that the existing diversions of water are adequate for navigation purposes in the Illinois waterway and the Mississippi River. Surveys are now under way by the International Joint Commission and the Corps of Engineers to determine the best methods of obtaining improved control of the levels of the Great Lakes and of preventing recurrence of damage along their shores. Reasonable opportunity to complete these surveys should be afforded before legislative action is undertaken.

The diversion of waters into and out of the Great Lakes has historically been the subject of negotiations with Canada. To proceed unilaterally in the manner proposed in H.R. 3300 is not wise policy. It would be the kind of action to which we would object if taken by one of our neighbors. The Canadian Government protested the proposed authorization when it was under consideration by the Congress and has continued its objection to this bill in a note to the Department

of State dated August 24, 1954.¹ It seems to me that the additional diversion is not of such national importance as to justify action without regard to the views of Canada.

Finally, as is clear from the report of the Senate Committee, a major purpose of the proposal to divert additional water from Lake Michigan into the Illinois waterway is to determine whether the increased flow will improve existing adverse sanitation conditions. The waters of Lake Michigan are interstate in character. It would seem to me that a diversion for the purposes of one State alone should be authorized only after general agreement has been reached among all the affected States. Officials of several States adjoining the Great Lakes, other than Illinois, have protested approval of the bill as being contrary to their interests and not in accord with the diversion authorized under the 1930 decree of the Supreme Court. Under all of these circumstances, I have felt that the bill should not be approved.

Austria Thanks U.S. for Gift of Fodder Corn

White House Office press release dated September 4

The White House on September 4 made public the following message to the President from Theodor Koerner, President of Austria.

Decision of United States Government to make 25,000 tons of fodder corn available for free distribution among Austrian flood victims² prompts me to express deep-felt thanks to you, Mr. President, in my own name and in the name of the Austrian people and at the same time to express admiration for the material generosity and high humanitarian spirit with which the American people and government constantly display their willingness to help the whole world. The gift of fodder corn not only represents quantitatively an extraordinary contribution for the relief of the emergency caused by the disastrous flood but will also contribute considerably toward overcoming as rapidly as possible production difficulties originating in the catastrophe.

¹ Not printed.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 490.

Loss of Americans and Japanese in Hakodate Typhoon

Press release 540 dated September 28

Following is the text of a message from the Prime Minister of Japan to Secretary Dulles, together with Acting Secretary Smith's reply.

Prime Minister Yoshida to Secretary Dulles

SEPTEMBER 27, 1954

The Honorable JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State.

On my arrival at Ottawa, I was greatly shocked to receive a report that some sixty United States' Forces members and dependents perished in the sinking of the *Toyamaru* at Hakodate last Sunday [September 26]. I lament the loss of so many American lives and hasten to express to you my sincere condolences.

SHIGERU YOSHIDA
Prime Minister of Japan

General Smith to Prime Minister Yoshida

SEPTEMBER 28, 1954

His Excellency SHIGERU YOSHIDA
Prime Minister of Japan
Through the American Embassy,
Ottawa.

I wish to thank you for your message to Secretary Dulles regarding the loss of American lives in the Hakodate typhoon. The people of the United States share the deep sense of tragedy felt by you and the Japanese people at this unparalleled disaster. Your thoughtfulness is greatly appreciated.

WALTER BEDELL SMITH
Acting Secretary of State

Negotiations on Revision of Philippine Trade Agreement

Press release 539 dated September 28

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

The U. S. delegation for the Philippine trade negotiations issued formal notice on September 28 that it would hold hearings beginning at 10 a. m., November 1, 1954, in Washington, at the Tariff Commission hearing room, with respect to possible

modification of the 1946 Agreement on Trade and Related Matters between the two countries. A preliminary announcement of these hearings was made by the Department of State on August 11, 1954.¹

The notice of the delegation states that applications for oral presentation of views and information, as well as written briefs or statements, must be presented to the delegation not later than 12 noon, October 22, and that only those persons will be heard who by that date have presented written briefs or statements and filed applications to be heard. The notice points out that the negotiations will cover all aspects of the 1946 agreement, and particularly the provisions regarding tariff preferences (article I), commodity quotas and their allocation (articles II and III), exchange rates and controls (article V), national treatment for Americans in the development of Philippine natural resources (article VII), and nondiscrimination and termination (article X).

Twelve copies of the written briefs or statements are to be supplied to the delegation, either typed, printed, or duplicated. One copy should be sworn to. These communications should be addressed to "The Chairman, United States Delegation for Philippine Trade Negotiations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C."

NOTICE OF HEARINGS

Notice is hereby given by the United States Delegation for Philippine Trade Negotiations of intention to conduct negotiations with the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of revising, subject to the approval of the Congresses of the two countries, the Agreement on Trade and Related Matters entered into between the United States and the Philippines on July 4, 1946 pursuant to Public Law 371 of the 79th U.S. Congress ("Philippine Trade Act of 1946"). A continuation through December 31, 1955 of the reciprocal free trade provisions of the Agreement was recently approved by the two Congresses (Public Law 474 of the 83rd U.S. Congress) to permit time for the consultations and negotiations to which this notice refers.

The negotiations will cover all aspects of the 1946 Agreement and particularly the provisions regarding tariff preferences (Article I), commodity quotas and their allocation (Articles II and III), exchange rates and controls (Article V), national treatment for Americans in the development of Philippine natural resources (Article VII), and nondiscrimination and termination (Article X).

Any persons who have views or information which they wish to present to the Delegation with respect to possible

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 23, 1954, p. 264.

modification of the 1946 Agreement in these or other respects are invited to do so in the public hearings which will be held before the Delegation beginning at 10:00 a. m., November 1, 1954. The Delegation will also receive information and views in writing. Presentations will be given equal consideration, whether written or oral. Anything which is confidential should be so labeled on the cover sheet and separated from nonconfidential material.

Applications for oral presentation, and the submission of written statements or briefs, must be made to the Delegation not later than 12:00 noon, October 22. All such communications should be addressed to "The Chairman, United States Delegation for Philippine Trade Negotiations, Department of State, Washington, 25, D. C." Twelve copies of written statements, either typed, printed or duplicated, shall be submitted, of which one copy should be sworn to.

Only those persons will be heard who have presented written briefs or statements and filed applications to be heard by the closing date indicated in the preceding paragraph. The hearings will be held in the Hearing Room of the Tariff Commission at 7th and F Streets, Washington, D. C. Applicants for oral presentation will be advised regarding the time of their individual appearance. Statements made at the public hearings shall be under oath.

By direction of the Chairman of the United States Delegation for Philippine Trade Negotiations this twenty-eighth day of September, 1954.

F. PATRICK KELLY
Executive Secretary
United States Delegation for
Philippine Trade Negotiations

Formal Opening of U.S.-Philippine Trade Talks

Press release 516 dated September 20

The following remarks were made by Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, and Senator José P. Laurel, Chairman of the Philippine delegation, on the occasion of the formal opening of the U.S.-Philippine trade talks on September 20.

REMARKS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTSON

President Eisenhower has asked me to extend to you the warm greetings of the United States Government as well as his personal felicitations on this occasion signaling the opening of the discussions on the United States-Philippine Trade Agreement.

Secretary of State Dulles also extends his greetings and has asked me to convey to you his sincere

regrets at not being able to participate in this opening ceremony. As you know, he has just made a quick trip to Europe and will not be returning to Washington before proceeding to the United Nations General Assembly.

More than a year ago the President of the Philippines requested a re-examination and readjustment of the provisions of the 1946 Agreement on Trade and Related Matters Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. President Eisenhower replied at that time that the United States stood ready to give sympathetic consideration to any specific proposals which the Philippine Government might wish to advance.¹

We are now about to commence our discussions. I am confident that they will be frank and cordial and that the results will be fruitful and will represent the best interests of our two countries.

I think these discussions are another example of the close and friendly relations existing between us. This is a relationship of free and sovereign nations which sit down together and discuss frankly any differences in point of view and which are prepared to reach an understanding in a spirit of compromise and mutual trust.

Senator Laurel, it is indeed a pleasure and an honor to welcome such a distinguished visitor from your great Republic. We are well aware of your years of devoted public service and of the esteem in which you are held in your own country. I should like to convey to you my own country's high esteem and warm welcome.

REMARKS BY SENATOR LAUREL

In behalf of the Philippine Economic Mission, I acknowledge with profound appreciation the greetings of the President and the Secretary of State of the United States, which you have just conveyed to us.

We particularly cherish the personal felicitations from President Eisenhower, whose loyal and worthy services when we were still a Commonwealth have forged an indissoluble bond of mutual regard and affection between him and our people.

President Magsaysay has entrusted me with the pleasant task of expressing the gratitude of the Government and people of the Republic of the Philippines to the Government and people of the United States for their sympathetic attitude to-

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 7, 1953, p. 316.

ward the revision of the 1946 Agreement on Trade and Related Matters. This attitude was manifested by the readiness with which President Eisenhower approved the holding of these negotiations and the speedy enactment by the Congress of a statute in effect extending for 18 months the free trade between our two countries in order to facilitate the successful re-examination of said trade agreement.

Secretary Robertson, I share your feeling of confidence that these discussions will be conducted in utmost candor and cordiality, which auger their felicitous conclusion. The Philippine delegation will participate in the discussions in a spirit befitting the free and friendly collaboration which exists between our two countries. I am sure we shall be able to reach a satisfactory agreement which will promote our common interests and mutual advantage.

Secretary Robertson, I am deeply touched by the kind words of welcome which you have addressed to me personally. There is no more gratifying experience for me than to be so warmly received in this great country since I last came here as a humble student 36 years ago.

Department Engages ANTA

Press release 541 dated September 29

The Department of State has engaged the American National Theatre and Academy to act as its agent for the purpose of encouraging and facilitating tours abroad by American individuals and groups in musical, theatrical, and other fields.

This project is an extension of the continuing exchange programs handled by the International Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending Article 45 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (TIAS 1581), relating to the permanent seat of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Enters

into force on date on which the forty-second instrument of ratification is deposited with ICAO.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Ratified by the President: September 14, 1954.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953.²

Signature (ad referendum): Ecuador, September 7, 1954.

Telecommunications

International telecommunications convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954.³

Ratifications deposited: Yugoslavia, August 16, 1954; France and Algeria, and Overseas Territories of the French Republic and Territories administered as such,² August 19, 1954.

Final protocol to the international telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954.²

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, August 16, 1954.

Additional protocols to the international telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force December 22, 1952.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, August 16, 1954.

Trade and Commerce

Declaration regulating the commercial relations between certain contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Japan. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953. Entered into force November 23, 1953 for the United States. TIAS 2917.

Acceptance effective: Germany, September 2, 1954.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement for a cooperative program of housing in Colombia, pursuant to the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation dated March 5 and 9, 1951 (TIAS 2231). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá June 24 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ These comprise: French Equatorial Africa (Gabon, Middle-Congo, Oubangui-Chari, Chad); French West Africa (Senegal, French Sudan, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Niger, Haute-Volta, Dahomey, Mauretania); French Somaliland; French Settlements in India; French Settlements in Oceania; Madagascar and Dependencies; New Caledonia and Dependencies; Saint Pierre and Miquelon Islands; Territories under French Trusteeship (Cameroon, Togo).

Germany

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington July 22, 1954.

Ratified by the President: September 22, 1954.

Guatemala

General agreement for technical cooperation. Signed at Guatemala City September 1, 1954. Entered into force September 1, 1954.

Peru

Agreement terminating the agreement of April 1 and 9, 1952 (TIAS 2723), as amended, providing for an agricultural experiment program in Peru. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima April 27 and May 11, 1954. Termination became effective May 18, 1954.

FOREIGN SERVICE

First Foreign Service Officers Under New Program Take Oath

Press release 543 dated September 30

The first group of Foreign Service officers to be appointed under the Secretary of State's integration program received their oath of office on September 30. The program calling for the integration of the Departmental and Foreign Service was one of the recommendations advanced by the Secretary's Public Committee on Personnel, headed by Henry M. Wriston.

Following are the names and home towns of the officers appointed:

Harlan P. Bramble, Portland, Oreg.
W. Clyde Dunn, Chapel Hill, N. C.
Richard B. Freund, Chicago, Ill.
Paul T. Meyer, East Orange, N. J.
Harry K. Baker, Chevy Chase, Md.
Douglas N. Batson, Poplarville, Miss.
James H. Boughton, Westport, Conn.
Louis Mason Drury, Chevy Chase, Md.
Tobias J. Boyd, Johnstown, Pa.
Delbert D. Mehaffy, Mediapolis, Iowa.
Joseph B. Tisinger III, Takoma Park, Md.
Betty-Jane Jones, Milwaukee, Wis.
Gloria E. Abiouness, Norfolk, Va.

Legation in Libya Elevated to Embassy

The United States announced on September 25 (press release 532) the elevation of its Legation in Libya to the status of an Embassy.

At the same time, the White House announced that the President has named John L. Tappin to be U.S. Ambassador to Libya. He succeeds Henry S. Villard, who has served as Minister of the United States to Libya

since February 1952 and who has recently been appointed Principal Political Adviser on Near Eastern and African Affairs to the U.S. delegation of the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations.

Consular Offices

The consulate at Tananarive, Madagascar, was closed to the public on July 1, 1954, and officially closed on August 31, 1954.

Recess Appointments

The President on September 25 made the following recess appointments:

Robert F. Woodward to be Ambassador to Costa Rica.
Robert C. Hill to be Ambassador to El Salvador.

John L. Tappin to be Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Libya.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 511 dated September 16

The Department of State on September 25 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Volume IV, The Far East*. Documents published in this volume deal chiefly with problems arising from the outbreak of undeclared war between China and Japan in July 1937, especially with efforts by the United States and other powers to restore peace. This is the second of two volumes dealing with the Far East crisis in 1937, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Volume III, The Far East*, having been released last June 26.¹

In 1937 China faced Japan, with the Soviet Union watching from the sidelines and discussing developments with other powers. Nine hundred pages of contemporary papers deal with not only efforts to end the undeclared war but also other phases of the war itself and repercussions affecting the United States.

A conference was called at Brussels under the terms of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6,

¹ BULLETIN of July 12, 1954, p. 73.

1922, regarding China, to explore the possibility of peaceful solution of the conflict between Japan and China. This conference forms the principal chapter in this second volume on the Far East in 1937. Chapters are also included on American relations with China, Japan, and Siam (Thailand).

As long ago as 1937 the role played by Soviet diplomacy and Communist intrigue in China was emerging.

Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson at Nanking cabled on January 12 that the Chinese military at Sianfu—where Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been kidnapped a month before and released under mysterious circumstances—“had linked themselves closely with the Communists in a common purpose to fight the National Government” (p. 553). In the spring months Red propaganda agencies were discovered to be using “American ownership, real or simulated,” as protection against Chinese jurisdiction (pp. 692–94).

On May 12, however, Mr. Johnson mentioned “General Chiang Kai-shek’s reported willingness to come to a working agreement with the Communist forces in the northwest” (p. 597), and on June 25 Consul General C. E. Gauss, at Shanghai wrote (p. 688):

As the Department is aware from political reports from China, some sort of *rapprochement* has taken place between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang and Nanking Government.

Mr. Gauss noted further that “the activities and support of the Third Internationale (at Moscow) are being directed away from criticism and attack on the National Government of China toward the development of a ‘popular front’ of opposition to Japan.”

By November 3 Ambassador Johnson could report that official Chinese sources hoped for a Soviet-Japanese nonaggression pact similar to the Soviet-Chinese pact of August 21 (p. 151). The same sources argued that “communism internally is a domestic Chinese problem”—contrary to usual Japanese announcements.

President Roosevelt’s “quarantine” speech at Chicago on October 5 brought various reactions abroad. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies at Moscow sent telegrams on Soviet comment (pp. 87–8, 100–1, 119–20). Dated between October 18 and 29, these indicated press and official pleasure over the chance of United States exercising restraint upon

Japan. Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov declared that “the Soviet Union was prepared to take a strong position if it were in cooperation with the United States, France, and England” (p. 120).

On November 10 Ambassador William C. Bullitt at Paris cabled a report of an interview with French Premier Chautemps (pp. 172–4), in which the latter spoke as follows:

I understand how much the President may desire to do something today to preserve peace; but I should infinitely rather have him say nothing than make speeches, like his speech at Chicago, which aroused immense hopes when there is no possibility that in the state of American opinion and the state of mind of the Senate he can follow up such speeches by action. Such a policy on the part of the United States merely leads the dictatorships to believe that the democracies are full of words but are unwilling to back up their words by force, and force is the only thing that counts today in the world (p. 173).

On November 16 Japanese Embassy Counselor Suma told Assistant Secretary of State Hugh R. Wilson (pp. 194–6) what Japan thought of the situation: “the Chicago speech of the President and the association by the State Department of the United States with the action of the League (of Nations) had shaken Japan’s belief in our friendly attitude; nevertheless, the President had followed his Chicago speech by a fireside talk (October 12), which had done much to restore the friendly sentiments of the Japanese for us” (p. 194).

An interesting account of the relationship between American press representatives and delegates attending the Brussels Conference is given in a telegram on November 21 from Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the American delegation (pp. 221–4). As Mr. Davis noted, it was difficult to explain that the United States only intended “to seek with all the other powers at the Conference a peaceful solution of the conflict in the Far East” (p. 222).

Aside from discussions at Geneva and Brussels, the new volume contains chapters on protection of American rights in the area of the undeclared war, sinking by Chinese and Japanese action respectively of the liner *President Hoover* and the gunboat *Panay*, assistance of various kinds to China, representations to China on behalf of Americans, narcotic traffic in China, Japanese Army pressure on their government, representations to Japan in regard to oil, fisheries, and other

interests, Japan's ban on U.S. naval visits to the Pacific mandated islands, Japanese aid in search for the missing Amelia Earhart plane, and a new friendship treaty with Siam.

A final volume for 1937, that on the American Republics, will appear shortly.

Copies of this volume (IV, 911 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$4 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Technical Cooperation—Jordan Program. TIAS 2819. Pub. 5238. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Jordan, amending agreement of February 12, 1952, as amended—Signed at Amman Apr. 7, 1953.

Mutual Aid Settlement—Release of Netherlands Obligations on Behalf of Indonesia Under Agreement of May 28, 1947. TIAS 2820. Pub. 5239. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, the Netherlands, and Indonesia. Exchange of notes—Signed at The Hague Sept. 17 and Djakarta Oct. 15, 1952, and at Washington Apr. 8, 1953.

Technical Cooperation Program. TIAS 2821. Pub. 5240. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Lebanon, amending agreement of June 26, 1952—Signed at Beirut Apr. 14, 1953.

Air Transport Services—Nonassertion of Sovereign Immunity From Suit. TIAS 2828. Pub. 5248. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 19, 1953.

Global Relations of the United States. Pub. 5536. General Foreign Policy Series 91. 12 pp. 10¢.

An article (Department of State BULLETIN reprint), with maps and illustrations, by S. Whittemore Boggs on the study of the spherical surface of the globe in relation to the comprehension and better understanding of many world problems and cultural relationships.

Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala. Pub. 5556. Inter-American Series 48. 95 pp. 35¢.

A description of the growth of international communism in Guatemala and its attempt to get a foothold in the Western Hemisphere by gaining control of the political institutions of an American Republic.

People to People—Diplomacy. Pub. 5492. International Information and Cultural Series 36. 29 pp. 20¢.

A report on the conduct of the International Educational Exchange Service in carrying out its program of leadership, as authorized by the Congress, in coordinating the exchange of foreign policy objectives of government and private agencies.

U.S. Participation in the U.N.—Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1953. Pub. 5459. International Organization and Conference Series III, 100. 277 pp. 70¢.

An annual report, with tables and charts, on the important part the United States has played in the activities of the United Nations system and of its efforts to translate the terms and objectives of the charter into reality.

Technical Cooperation—Public Health and Sanitation Program. TIAS 2756. Pub. 5366. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iraq. Effected by exchange of notes—Dated at Baghdad June 9 and July 27, 1952.

Technical Cooperation—Economic Development Program. TIAS 2757. Pub. 5367. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iraq. Effected by exchange of notes—Dated at Baghdad October 23 and November 16, 1952.

Technical Cooperation—Water Resources Development Program. TIAS 2758. Pub. 5415. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iraq. Effected by exchange of notes—Dated at Baghdad December 11, 1951, April 28 and May 21, 1952.

German External Debts. TIAS 2792. Pub. 5230. 355 pp. \$1.

Agreement, with annexes and appendices, between the United States and Other Governments—Signed at London February 27, 1953.

Settlement of United States Claim for Postwar Economic Assistance to Germany. TIAS 2795. Pub. 5286. 15 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at London February 27, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Application to Eritrea of Program for Technical and Science Education. TIAS 2803. Pub. 5264. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ethiopia. Effected by exchange of notes—Dated at Addis Ababa June 19 and 25, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Application to Eritrea of Agricultural Education Program. TIAS 2805. Pub. 5266. 1 p. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ethiopia—Signed at Addis Ababa June 25, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Program of Agriculture. TIAS 2806. Pub. 5267. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ethiopia. Effected by exchange of notes—Dated at Addis Ababa June 23 and 30, 1953.

Mutual Defense Assistance—United States Military Assistance Advisory Group to Saudi Arabia. TIAS 2812. Pub. 5227. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia, implementing agreement of June 18, 1951. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Jidda June 27, 1953.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 2813. Pub. 5228. 29 pp. 15¢.

Agreement, with annex and exchange of notes between the United States and Venezuela—Signed at Caracas August 14, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Well Drilling Under Program for Water Resources Development. TIAS 2814. Pub. 5261. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ethiopia. Effected by exchange of notes—Dated at Addis Ababa June 27 and 30, 1953.

Economic Cooperation. TIAS 2816. Pub. 5235. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, pursuant to agreement of July 6, 1948, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at London February 25, 1953.

Training Program in the United States of America for Japanese National Safety Force Officers. TIAS 2817. Pub. 5236. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo March 17 and 18, 1953.

Economic Cooperation—Guaranties under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as Amended. TIAS 2818. Pub. 5237. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 13 and April 2, 1953.

Agricultural Experiment Station in El Salvador. TIAS 2822. Pub. 5245. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador, extending Memorandum of Understanding of October 21, 1942, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador April 16 and 21, 1953.

Agricultural Experiment Station in El Salvador. TIAS 2823. Pub. 5246. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador, extending Memorandum of Understanding of October 21, 1942, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador June 30, 1953.

Civil Aviation Mission to Panama. TIAS 2824. Pub. 5241. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Panama, amending and extending agreement of March 31, 1949. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Panamá April 14 and May 8, 1953.

Economic Cooperation. TIAS 2826. Pub. 5243. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Portugal, amending agreement of September 28, 1948, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 22 and 25, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Agriculture and Natural Resources Development Programs. TIAS 2827. Pub. 5247. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia. Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá May 25, and June 9, 1953.

International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft. TIAS 2847. Pub. 5288. 17 p. 10¢

Convention between the United States and Other Governments. Opened for signature at Geneva June 19, 1948—Entered into force with respect to the United States September 17, 1953.

The Philippines—1954. Pub. 5508. Far Eastern Series 66. 14 pp. 10¢.

A background summary on the Philippines since gaining its independence on July 4, 1946, its strategic importance to the free nations of the world, and its growing influence in the Far East as a constructive and effective democratic counterforce to the spread of communism.

The Record on Disarmament. Pub. 5581. International Organization and Conference Series III, 102. 20 pp. 15¢.

A report of the U.S. Deputy Representative to the Disarmament Commission on the London meeting of the Subcommittee of Five on the Disarmament Commission meetings from May 13 to June 22, 1954.

The United Nations—An Appraisal for 1954. Pub. 5554. International Organization and Conference Series III, 101. 22 pp. 15¢.

A balance sheet of the costs, accomplishments, and aims of the United Nations, its importance as a forum for world opinion, and its effective part in the progress of the free world in its fight for peace and the common benefit of all mankind.

Aerial Mapping Project in Thailand. TIAS 2759. Pub. 5371. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Thailand. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bangkok November 8 and December 3, 1952.

Validation of Dollar Bonds of German Issue. TIAS 2793. Pub. 5212. 92 pp. 30¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Bonn February 27, 1953. Confirmation of Effectiveness in Berlin. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 25 and April 9, 1954.

Certain Matters Arising From the Validation of German Dollar Bonds. TIAS 2794. Pub. 5280. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Bonn April 1, 1953. Confirmation of Effectiveness in Berlin. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 25 and April 9, 1954.

Settlement of Indebtedness of Germany for Awards Made by the Mixed Claims Commission. TIAS 2796. Pub. 5287. 15 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at London February 27, 1953.

International Wheat Agreement. TIAS 2799. Pub. 5183. 175 pp. 50¢.

Agreement between the United States and Other Governments, revising and renewing agreement of March 23, 1949—Open for signature at Washington April 13-27, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Program of Agriculture. TIAS 2829. Pub. 5249. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with Memorandum of Understanding, between the United States and Liberia—Signed at Monrovia June 23, 1953.

Army Mission to El Salvador. TIAS 2825. Pub. 5242. 19 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador May 21, 1953.

Cooperating To Improve Free World's Economy

*Statement by George M. Humphrey
Secretary of the Treasury*¹

At the opening of the meeting it was my privilege to bring you the welcome of the President of the United States in behalf of the American people. Now I should like to express my own gratification at being with you again and representing the United States in the second of these annual meetings which have been held since I became Secretary of the Treasury. It is a great pleasure to renew our pleasant associations and to have the opportunity to discuss problems of mutual interest with you.

Since our last meeting the free world has continued to advance toward our common objectives of a healthier and wider flow of trade and money. The President of the United States in his March 30 message to our Congress has set the guidelines for our foreign economic policy.² Last month he emphasized that this message remains firmly our position. Our objective is "to obtain, in a manner that is consistent with our national security and profitable and equitable for all, the highest possible level of trade and the most efficient use of capital and resources." Greater freedom from restrictions and controls and the increased efficiencies which arise from expanding markets and the freer play of economic forces are essential to the attainment of this higher trade level.

During the past year genuine progress has been made in removing restrictions and strengthening our economies. Production and trade remain at high and sounder levels. Good money policies are more widespread. Price levels have become more

stable. Balances of international payments are in better equilibrium. Currency convertibility—a most desirable condition for a freer and healthier international trade—has become a nearer prospect, as the Fund report points out.

I think it is worthy to note how far the trade-agreements program of the United States has moved to reduce our tariffs and eliminate restrictions against imports through the negotiation of reciprocal agreements. During 1953, only 45 percent of the total value of our imports were subject to any import duties. Fifty-five percent were duty free. The duties collected on our dutiable imports represented only 12 percent of their value. To some extent, of course, the ratio of the duties collected to the value of imports reflects a rise in the prices of imported articles. Nevertheless, it is clear that the average cost, to the rest of the world, of sending their goods to us is now comparatively low.

The United States has taken and will continue to take its part in trying further to remove unnecessary restrictions on international trade under the program set forth by the President in his March 30 message to our Congress, and our most recent moves toward customs reform are another step in that direction.

In view of the stronger international position of many other countries, we should reasonably look forward to gradual further lifting of their present restrictions on their trade with the rest of the world and with us.

I think it is generally recognized that probably the greatest contribution which the United States can make to expanding and profitable international trade is a healthy and growing economy at a high level of activity here in the United States. This helps sustain a high level of demand for the world's goods and so fosters trade on a mutually beneficial basis. To sustain a high level of economic activity in this country is the keystone of our policy.

Over the long term, economic progress must be based upon a substantial flow of new private investment, both national and international. The

¹ Made before the opening joint session of the Boards of Governors, International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D. C., on Sept. 24. Mr. Humphrey is the Governor for the United States.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 19, 1954, p. 602.

Message From President Eisenhower

The following letter from the President was read by Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey to the opening session of the annual meeting of Boards of Governors, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, on September 24:

I am delighted to send greetings to the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund at their Ninth Annual Meeting in Washington.

The International Bank and the International Monetary Fund during the past year have again demonstrated that they are active and effective instruments in promoting international cooperation toward the well-being of the free world. The United States heartily approves the Fund's efforts to free the world from restrictions on the flow of trade and money and to foster sound monetary policies and currency convertibility. The Bank has notably aided the member countries in their economic development and has helped promote conditions under which greater flow of private investments can take place.

The Fund and the Bank have our best wishes for success and the assurance of our support. I anticipate with confidence a successful year for both institutions.

International Bank in its relatively brief career has done much to improve the climate for investment. Its loans for the development of basic facilities in the member countries have provided the groundwork for other forms of investment. The bank can be an important supplement to the flow of private investment, but it cannot be a substitute for it.

In 1953 the International Bank disbursed \$240 million in loans to member countries. By way of comparison, the outflow of private capital from the United States has been about \$900 million a year for the last 6 years. In addition, the subsidiaries abroad of American companies have re-invested earnings at an average rate of about \$600 million a year.

To complete the picture, the U.S. Government has lent over \$400 million a year net of repayments. All in all, these various sources—the International Bank, private U.S. investors, and the U.S. Government—have added more than \$2 billion a year to the capital available to foreign countries. Three-fourths of this has come from pri-

vate investors. Naturally the great bulk of this investment has been made in those countries where experience has shown the principal is most safe and where reasonable return of earnings can be best assured.

All countries must of course rely upon domestic savings for the great bulk of their economic development. The encouragement of savings and of capital formation at home and the investment of these savings at home in productive enterprise, as well as investment from abroad, are dependent on sound monetary and investment policies and assurance of safety of principal and fair treatment of investors, which give people confidence in their currency and in the preservation of its value. I am sure the discussions we shall have during the next few days will help to assess the importance of these elements in vigorous and successful international investment.

I am looking forward to hearing the views of the other Governors on the problems of international exchange and capital investment and the related matters, which are the occasion for our annual meetings. I know that during these meetings we will all become better acquainted and have the opportunity to obtain a better understanding of our mutual interests and problems, which we can all approach in a real spirit of optimism so amply justified by the widespread improvement in economic conditions in the free world.

Current U. N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

General Assembly

International Law Commission. Sixth session. Nationality Including Statelessness. Survey of the Problem of Multiple Nationality (Prepared by the Secretariat). A/CN.4/84. May 14, 1954. 149 pp. mimeo.

Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand and Yemen. The Tunisian Question. A/26S3, July 29, 1954. 6 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

- Question of Defining Aggression. Comments received from Governments regarding the report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. A/2689. August 6, 1954. 14 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Sixth Session. A/CN.4/88. August 5, 1954. 60 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-General. A/2655. August 11, 1954. 12 pp. mimeo.
- Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. A/2646/Add. 2. July 23, 1954. 30 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. A/2657/Add. 3. August 13, 1954. 75 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of Australia. A/2651. August 20, 1954. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of Belgium. A/2652. August 11, 1954. 20 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of Denmark. A/2653. August 17, 1954. 27 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the French and British Governments in respect of New Hebrides. A/2654/Add.1. August 13, 1954. 10 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the British Government. A/2657/Add.1. August 12, 1954. 69 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the British Government. A/2657/Add.2. August 13, 1954. 74 pp. mimeo.
- Question of Organizing an International Professional Conference To Prepare the Final Text of an International Code of Ethics for the Use of Information Personnel. Report of the Secretary-General. A/2691. August 16, 1954. 12 pp. mimeo.
- Constitutions, Electoral Laws and Other Legal Instruments Relating to Political Rights of Women. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/2692. August 18, 1954. 52 pp. mimeo.
- Election of Five Members of the International Court of Justice. List of Candidates Nominated by the National Groups. Note by the Secretary-General. A/2695. S/3281. August 20, 1954. 36 pp. mimeo.
- Appointments To Fill Vacancies in the Membership of Subsidiary Bodies of the General Assembly. United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Note by the Secretary-General. A/2699. August 23, 1954. 2 pp. mimeo.
- Questions Relating to Economic Development. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/2702. August 23, 1954. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by Greece. Application, Under the Auspices of the United Nations, of the Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples in the Case of the Population of the Island of Cyprus. Letter dated 16 August 1954 to the Secretary-General from the President of the Council of Ministers of Greece. A/2703. August 20, 1954. 7 pp. mimeo.
- Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by Burma. Complaint by the Union of Burma Regarding Aggression Against it by the Government of the Republic of China. Letter dated 20 August 1954 from the Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. A/2704. August 20, 1954. 2 pp. mimeo.
- Freedom of Information: Report of the Economic and Social Council. Note by the Secretary-General. A/2705. August 23, 1954. 2 pp. mimeo.
- Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by Australia. Admission to the United Nations of Laos and Cambodia. Cablegram dated 22 August 1954 from the Minister for External Affairs of Australia, addressed to the Secretary-General. A/2709. August 23, 1954. 1 p. mimeo.
- Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by Costa Rica. Establishment of a World Food Reserve. Letter dated 22 August 1954 from the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. A/2710. August 23, 1954. 7 pp. mimeo.

Disarmament Commission

- Letter Dated 22 July 1954 from the Representative of India to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. DC/54, July 23, 1954. 1 p. mimeo.
- Fourth Report of the Disarmament Commission. DC/55, July 29, 1954. 9 pp. mimeo.

Security Council

- Report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General Concerning the Jerusalem Incident. S/3278. August 6, 1954. 27 pp. mimeo.

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to September 27 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 511 of September 16, 516 of September 20, 518 of September 21, and 532 of September 25.

No.	Date	Subject
*534	9/27	East German refugees.
†535	9/28	Note on Noel Fields.
†536	9/28	Note on Hermann Field.
*537	9/28	Educational exchange.
*538	9/28	Educational exchange.
539	9/28	Notice on Philippine trade hearings.
540	9/28	Correspondence with Yoshida.
541	9/29	Contract with ANTA.
542	9/29	U.S.-French talks on Indochina.
543	9/30	First FSO's under new program.
*544	10/1	Educational exchange.
545	10/1	Smith: Retirement statement.
†546	10/2	Barbour: International Peasant Union.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 799

October 18, 1954



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The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXI, No. 799 • PUBLICATION 5616

October 18, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Four-Power Agreement on Trieste

Press release 554 dated October 5

ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT

At noon today in London a Memorandum of Understanding on Trieste was initialed by representatives of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Yugoslavia. Llewellyn E. Thompson, United States Ambassador to Austria, initialed the Memorandum of Understanding for the United States and Mr. Geoffrey Harrison, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, initialed for the United Kingdom. The Ambassadors of Italy and Yugoslavia in London, Signor Manlio Brosio and Dr. Vladimir Velebit, initialed the document for their two Governments. The text of the Memorandum of Understanding is being communicated to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Today's initialing came as a successful conclusion to conversations among the four Governments which have been carried on for eight months in an endeavor to work out arrangements for the Free Territory of Trieste which would be acceptable to the Governments of Italy and Yugoslavia. The United States Government welcomes the understanding reached today which it believes will lead to improved relations and closer cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia. The United States Government takes this opportunity to declare it will give no support to claims of either Yugoslavia or Italy to territory under the sovereignty or administration of the other. The United States Government is confident that it will be possible for the two countries to resolve any outstanding problems by friendly negotiations in a spirit of mutual understanding.

Arrangements are being made for the early termination of Allied Military Government, the

withdrawal of American and British forces from the area under their occupation and the assumption by Italy and Yugoslavia of responsibility in the areas as defined by the agreement initialed today.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

Identical Letters From Mr. Harrison and Mr. Thompson to Ambassador Brosio

My Government refers to the decision recorded in the Memorandum of Understanding of the 5th of October, 1954 between the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia by the terms of which responsibility for the area of the Free Territory of Trieste administered by the United Kingdom-United States Military Government will be relinquished by it and assumed by Italy. In order to assure that the termination of Military Government and the assumption of administration by Italy as well as the withdrawal of United Kingdom and United States troops and entry of Italian troops take place promptly and smoothly, it is proposed that the Italian Government designate a representative to meet at an early date with the Commander of the United Kingdom-United States Zone to formulate the pertinent arrangements. My Government hopes to be able to carry out these steps within one month of the date of initialling of the Memorandum of Understanding.

Identical Letters From Ambassador Brosio to Mr. Harrison and Mr. Thompson

It gives me pleasure to acknowledge, etc. etc., My Government has designated General Edmondo de Renzi as its representative to meet with

Statement by Secretary Dulles on Trieste Agreement

Press release 553 dated October 5

Ever since the end of the war there has been controversy as to the status of the Trieste area. The United States as one of the occupying powers has had a responsibility in this matter. It had become urgent to arrive at a settlement because the lack of a settlement has created strain between two Governments—Italy and Yugoslavia—and made it difficult to develop a solid and dependable collective defense of Southern Europe.

Now at last this difficult problem is to be settled as the result of many months of negotiations. The United States and the United Kingdom have in this matter extended their good offices to enable the Italian and Yugoslav Governments to come to a mutually satisfactory solution. This settlement will restore to Italy the city of Trieste and the surrounding area and will allow the retention by Yugoslavia of that portion of the Free Territory of which it is the occupying power and where the people are predominantly Yugoslav. The agreement includes provision for the protection of minorities.

The United States hails this gratifying demonstration of the will for peace showing itself through deeds. The problem has been one of great complexity, which defied solution for 9 years. But it has now yielded to the broad statesmanship which has been put to work upon it. This event will, we hope, open a new era which will bring political tranquillity to the peoples directly involved and greater security to all of the free nations of Europe.

The solution of this matter reflects credit upon many. I am confident, however, that none will question the outstanding contribution to a settlement which was made by United States Ambassador L. E. Thompson and Mr. Geoffrey Harrison, United Kingdom Assistant Under-Secretary of State, who dealt with this matter continuously for 8 months. U.S. Deputy Under Secretary Robert D. Murphy, on his recent trip to Europe, composed the small but stubborn remaining differences.

the Commander of the United Kingdom-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste to formulate the arrangements for the change in administration in that area of the Free Territory of Trieste for which Italy will assume responsibility. It is understood that as soon as the boundary adjustments have been carried out the entry of Italian troops will take place at the time specified in these arrangements and simultaneously with

the final withdrawal of British and American forces and the assumption of responsibility by Italy.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ITALY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES AND YUGO- SLAVIA REGARDING THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE

1. Owing to the fact that it has proved impossible to put into effect the provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty relating to the Free Territory of Trieste, the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia have maintained since the end of the war military occupation and government in Zones A and B of the Territory. When the Treaty was signed, it was never intended that these responsibilities should be other than temporary and the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia, as the countries principally concerned, have recently consulted together in order to consider how best to bring the present unsatisfactory situation to an end. As a result they have agreed upon the following practical arrangements.

2. As soon as this Memorandum of Understanding has been initialled and the boundary adjustments provided by it have been carried out, the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia will terminate military government in Zones A and B of the Territory. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States will withdraw their military forces from the area north of the new boundary and will relinquish the administration of that area to the Italian Government. The Italian and Yugoslav Governments will forthwith extend their civil administration over the area for which they will have responsibility.

3. The boundary adjustments referred to in paragraph 2 will be carried out in accordance with the map at Annex I.¹ A preliminary demarcation will be carried out by representatives of Allied Military Government and Yugoslav Military Government as soon as this Memorandum of Understanding has been initialled and in any event within three weeks from the date of initialling. The Italian and Yugoslav Governments will im-

¹ Not printed. The map reproduced here was especially prepared for the BULLETIN.



mediately appoint a Boundary Commission to effect a more precise demarcation of the boundary in accordance with the map at Annex I.

4. The Italian and Yugoslav Governments agree to enforce the Special Statute contained in Annex II.

5. The Italian Government undertakes to maintain the Free Port at Trieste in general accordance with the provisions of Articles 1-20 of Annex VIII of the Italian Peace Treaty.²

6. The Italian and Yugoslav Governments agree that they will not undertake any legal or administrative action to prosecute or discriminate against the person or property of any resident of the areas coming under their civil administration in accordance with this Memorandum of Understanding for past political activities in connexion with the solution of the problem of the Free Territory of Trieste.

7. The Italian and Yugoslav Governments agree to enter into negotiations within a period of two months from the date of initialling of this Memorandum of Understanding with a view to concluding promptly an agreement regulating local border traffic, including facilities for the movement of the residents of border areas by land and by sea over the boundary for normal commercial and other activities and for transport and communications. This agreement shall cover Trieste and the area bordering it. Pending the conclusion of such agreement, the competent authorities will take, each within their respective competence, appropriate measures in order to facilitate local border traffic.

8. For a period of one year from the date of initialling of this Memorandum of Understanding persons formerly resident ("pertinenti"—"zavičajni") in the areas coming under the civil administration either of Italy or of Yugoslavia shall be free to return immediately thereto. Any persons so returning, as also any such who have already returned, shall enjoy the same rights as the other residents of these areas. Their properties and assets shall be at their disposal, in accordance with existing law, unless disposed of by them in the meantime. For a period of two years from the date of initialling of this Memorandum of Understanding, persons formerly resident in either of these areas and who do not intend returning

thereto, and persons presently resident in either area who decide within one year from the date of initialling of this Memorandum of Understanding to give up such residence, shall be permitted to remove their movable property and transfer their funds. No export or import duties or any other tax will be imposed in connexion with the moving of such property. Persons wherever resident who decide to sell their movable and immovable property within two years from the date of initialling of this Memorandum of Understanding will have the sums realised from the sale of such property deposited in special accounts with the National Banks of Italy or Yugoslavia. Any balance between these two accounts will be liquidated by the two Governments at the end of the two year period. Without prejudice to the immediate implementation of the provisions of this paragraph the Italian and Yugoslav Governments undertake to conclude a detailed agreement within six months of the date of initialling of this Memorandum of Understanding.

9. This Memorandum of Understanding will be communicated to the Security Council of the United Nations.³

LONDON, the 5th of October, 1954.

MANLIO BROGIO
GEOFFREY W. HARRISON
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON
DR. VLADIMIR VELEBIT

Annex II.

SPECIAL STATUTE

Whereas it is the common intention of the Italian and Yugoslav Governments to ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination of race, sex, language and religion in the areas coming under their administration under the terms of the present Memorandum of Understanding, it is agreed:

1. In the administration of their respective areas the Italian and Yugoslav authorities shall act in accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 10th of December, 1948, so that all inhabitants of the two areas without discrimination may fully enjoy the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down in the aforesaid Declaration.

2. The members of the Yugoslav ethnic group in the

³ Transmitted to the President of the Security Council on Oct. 5 and circulated as U.N. doc. S/3301.

² Department of State publication 2960.

area administered by Italy and the members of the Italian ethnic group in the area administered by Yugoslavia shall enjoy equality of rights and treatment with the other inhabitants of the two areas.

This equality implies that they shall enjoy:

- (a) equality with other citizens regarding political and civil rights as well as other human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Article 1;
- (b) equal rights in acquiring or performing any public services, functions, professions and honours;
- (c) equality of access to public and administrative office; in this regard the Italian and Yugoslav administrations will be guided by the principle of facilitating for the Yugoslav ethnic group and for the Italian ethnic group, respectively, under their administration a fair representation in administrative positions, and especially in those fields, such as the inspectorate of schools, where the interests of such inhabitants are particularly involved;
- (d) equality of treatment in following their trade or profession in agriculture, commerce, industry or any other field, and in organising and operating economic associations and organisations for this purpose. Such equality of treatment shall concern also taxation. In this regard persons now engaged in a trade or profession who do not possess the requisite diploma or certificate for carrying on such activities, shall have four years from the date of initialling of the present Memorandum of Understanding within which to acquire the necessary diploma or certificate. They will not be prevented from exercising their trade or profession because of failure to have the requisite documents unless they have failed to acquire them within the aforementioned four year period;
- (e) equality of treatment in the use of languages as defined in Article 5 below;
- (f) equality with other citizens in the general field of social assistance and pensions (sickness benefits, old age and disability pensions including disabilities resulting from war, and pensions to the dependents of those killed in war).

3. Incitement to national and racial hatred in the two areas is forbidden and any such act shall be punished.

4. The ethnic character and the unhampered cultural development of the Yugoslav ethnic group in the Italian administered area and of the Italian ethnic group in the Yugoslav administered area shall be safeguarded.

- (a) They shall enjoy the right to their own press in their mother tongue;
- (b) the educational, cultural, social and sports organisations of both groups shall be free to function in accordance with the existing laws. Such organisations shall be granted the same treatment as those accorded to other corresponding organisations in their respective areas, especially as regards the use of public buildings and radio and assistance from public financial means; and the Italian and Yugoslav authorities will endeavour to ensure to

such organisations the continued use of the facilities they now enjoy, or of comparable facilities;

- (c) kindergarten, primary, secondary and professional school teaching in the mother tongue shall be accorded to both groups. Such schools shall be maintained in all localities in the Italian administered area where there are children members of the Yugoslav ethnic group, and in all localities in the Yugoslav administered area where there are children members of the Italian ethnic group. The Italian and Yugoslav Governments agree to maintain the existing schools as set out in the list attached hereto for the ethnic groups in the area under their administration and will consult in the Mixed Committee provided for in the final Article of this Statute before closing any of these schools.

Such schools shall enjoy equality of treatment with other schools of the same type in the area administered, respectively, by Italy and Yugoslavia as regards provision of textbooks, buildings and other material means, the number and position of teachers and the recognition of diplomas. The Italian and Yugoslav authorities shall endeavour to ensure that the teaching in such schools will be performed by teachers of the same mother tongue as the pupils.

The Italian and Yugoslav authorities will promptly introduce whatever legal prescriptions may be necessary so that the permanent organisation of such schools will be regulated in accordance with the foregoing provisions. Italian speaking teachers, who on the date of the initialling of the present Memorandum of Understanding are employed as teachers in the educational system of the Yugoslav administered area and Slovene speaking teachers who on the said date are employed as teachers in the educational system of the Italian administered area shall not be dismissed from their positions for the reason that they do not possess the requisite teaching diploma. This extraordinary provision shall not be used as a precedent or be claimed to apply to any cases other than the categories specified above. Within the framework of their existing laws the Yugoslav and Italian authorities will take all reasonable measures to give the aforementioned teachers an opportunity, as provided in Article 2 (d) above, to qualify for the same status as regular members of the teaching staff.

The educational programmes of such schools must not be directed at interfering with the national character of the pupils.

5. Members of the Yugoslav ethnic group in the area administered by Italy and members of the Italian ethnic group in the area administered by Yugoslavia shall be free to use their language in their personal and official relations with the administrative and judicial authorities of the two areas. They shall have the right to receive from the authorities a reply in the same language; in verbal replies, either directly or through an interpreter; in correspondence, a translation of the replies at least is to be provided by the authorities.

Public documents concerning members of these ethnic groups, including court sentences, shall be accompanied by a translation in the appropriate language. The same shall apply to official announcements, public proclamations and publications.

In the area under Italian administration inscriptions on public institutions and the names of localities and streets shall be in the language of the Yugoslav ethnic group as well as in the language of the administering authority in those electoral districts of the Commune of Trieste and in those other communes where the members of that ethnic group constitute a significant element (at least one quarter) of the population; in those communes in the area under Yugoslav administration where the members of the Italian ethnic group are a significant element (at least one quarter) of the population such inscriptions and names shall be in Italian as well as in the language of the administering authority.

6. The economic development of the Yugoslav ethnic population in the Italian administered area and of the Italian ethnic population in the Yugoslav administered area shall be secured without discrimination and with a fair distribution of the available financial means.

7. No change should be made in the boundaries of the basic administrative units in the areas which come under the civilian administration of Italy or Yugoslavia with a view to prejudicing the ethnic composition of the units concerned.

8. A special Mixed Yugoslav-Italian Committee shall be established for the purpose of assistance and consultation concerning problems relating to the protection of the Yugoslav ethnic group in the area under Italian administration and of the Italian ethnic group in the area under Yugoslav administration. The Committee shall also examine complaints and questions raised by individuals belonging to the respective ethnic groups concerning the implementation of this Statute.

The Yugoslav and Italian Governments shall facilitate visits by the Committee to the area under their administration and grant it every facility for carrying out its responsibilities.

Both Governments undertake to negotiate forthwith detailed regulations governing the functioning of the Committee.

LONDON, the 5th of October, 1954.

MANLIO BROGIO

DR. VLADIMIR VELEBIT

List of Existing Schools

Referred to in Article 4 (c) of Annex II
(Special Statute) of Memorandum of Understanding

1. Slovene Schools presently functioning in the area coming under the administration of Italy in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding

1. Kindergartens

- a) Municipality of Trieste (Trst):
Barcola (Barkovlje) Via San Fortunato 1,
Gretta (Greta)
San Giovanni (Sv. San Giacomo (Sv. Jakob)
Ivan)
Servola (Skedenj) San Saba (Sv. Sobota)

- Longera (Lonjer) Basovizza (Bazovica)
Trebiciano (Trebbe) Villa Opicina (Opicina)
S. Croce (Sv. Kriz) Prosecco (Prosek)
- b) Commune of Duino-Aurisina (Devin-Nabrezin):
Malchina (Mavhinje) Duino (Devin)
Aurisina (Nabrezina)
- c) Commune of Sgonico (Zgonik):
Sgonico (Zgonik) Gabrovizza (Gabrovica)
- d) Commune of Monrupino (Repentabor):
Monrupino (Repentabor)
- e) Commune of S. Dorligo della Valle (Dolina):
S. Dorligo d. Valle Bagnoli della Rosandra
(Dolina) (Boljunec)
S. Antonio in Bosco Domio (Domjo)
(Borst)

2. Elementary Schools

- a) Municipality of Trieste (Trst):
S. Giacomo (Sv. Via S. Francesco (Ul. Sv
Jakob) Franciska)
Via Donadoni (Ul. Servola (Skedenj)
Donadoni)
Cattinara (Katinara) Roiano (Rojan)
S. Anna (Sv. Ana) S. Giovanni (Sv. Ivan)
Barcola (Barkovlje) Villa Opicina (Opicina)
Prosecco (Prosek) S. Croce (Sv. Kriz)
Trebiciano (Trebbe) Gropada (Gropada)
Basovizza (Bazovica)
- b) Commune of Duino-Aurisina (Devin-Nabrezina):
Aurisina (Nabrezina) Sistiana (Sesljan)
Duino (Devin) S. Giovanni di Duino
(Stivan)
Medeazza (Medja Ceroglie (Cervlje)
vas)
Malchina (Mavhinje) Slivia (Slivno)
S. Pelaggio (Sem-
polaj)
- c) Commune of Sgonico (Zgonik):
Sales (Salez) Gabrovizza (Gabrovica)
Sgonico (Zgonik)
- d) Commune of Monrupino (Repentabor): Mon-
rupino (Repentabor)
- e) Commune of San Dorligo della Valle (Dolina):
S. Dorligo della Valle Bagnoli della Rosandra
(Dolina) (Boljunec)
S. Antonio in Bosco S. Giuseppe della Chiusa
(Borst) (Rimmanje)
Domio (Domjo) Caresana (Mackovlje)
Pese (Pesek)
- f) Commune of Muggia (Milje):
Stramare (Stramar) S. Barbara (Sv. Barbara)

3. Professional Schools and Courses

- a) Municipality of Trieste (Trst):
Industrial Professional School at Roiano (Rojan)
Industrial Professional School at S. Giovanni
(Sv. Ivan)
Two-Year Industrial Professional Course at
Villa Opicina (Opicina)
Two-Year Commercial Professional Course at
Prosecco (Prosek)
Two-Year Commercial Professional Course at
Cattinara (Katinara)
Professional Course at S. Croce (Sv. Kriz)
- b) Commune of Duino-Aurisina (Devin-Nabrezina):
Two-Year Industrial Professional Course at
Aurisina (Nabrezina)
- c) Commune of S. Dorligo della Valle (Dolina):
Two-Year Industrial Professional Course at S.
Dorligo d. Valle (Dolina)
The above-mentioned professional courses shall
be changed into professional schools in accord-
ance with the Italian law.

4. *Secondary Schools*—Trieste (Trst):

Junior High School
Via delle Scuole Nuove-S. Giacomo (Sv. Jakob)
Senior High School
Via Lazzaretto Vecchio, 9
State Teachers' School
Piazzale Gioberti—S. Giovanni (Sv. Ivan)
Commercial Academy
Piazzale Gioberti, S. Giovanni (Sv. Ivan)

II. *Italian Schools presently functioning in the area coming under the administration of Yugoslavia in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding*

1. *Kindergartens*

Kopar (Capodistria)

2. *Italian classes in Kindergartens in:*

Izola (Isola d'Istria)	Secovlje (Sicciolo)
Piran (Pirano)	Novigrad (Cittanova)
Buje (Buie)	Umag (Umago)

3. *Elementary Schools*

Umag (Umago)	Brtonigla (Verteneglio)
Kostajnica (Castagna)	Novigrad (Cittanova)
Kopar (Capodistria)	Piran (Pirano)
Sv. Lucija (S. Lucia)	Secovlje (Sicciolo)
Buje (Buie)	Groznjan (Grisignana)
Momjan (Momiano)	Sv. Nikolaj (S. Nicolo)
Izola (Isola d'Istria)	Prade (Prade)
Senedela (Semedella)	Strunjan (Strignano)

4. *Professional Schools*

Kopar (Capodistria)
Izola (Isola d'Istria)
Secovlje (Sicciolo)
Buje (Buie)
Umag (Umago)
Novigrad (Cittanova)
Italian Division of Trade School for Girls
(Three year course) at Kopar (Capodistria)

5. *Secondary Schools*

Classical High School (eight years)
Kopar (Capodistria)
Scientific High School (eight years) Piran (Pirano)
Commercial Technical School (two years) Deola
(Isola d'Istria)

This agreement is a real achievement of statesmanship which should assist substantially in the development of greater security in Southeastern Europe against any possible encroachment. I am sure that you share with me the hope that this accord will foster the enhancement of peace and the well-being of the peoples of Europe.

Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Koca Popovic of Yugoslavia

Press release 557 dated October 6

On the occasion of the announcement of agreement on the Trieste question, I wish to convey to you and your representatives who dealt with this issue my profound gratification at the successful outcome of the London negotiations. I wish to congratulate you and them on the patience and understanding shown.

This accord is an excellent demonstration of what can be achieved through cooperation and understanding when there exists a sincere desire to find a solution to a difficult international problem. It is a real achievement of statesmanship and lays a firmer foundation for cooperation among free nations to increase their mutual security and welfare. In addition to these improved general prospects the settlement of this issue also opens the way to concrete and forward looking steps in the solution of economic and military problems in which your country and mine have a common concern.

Herbert Hoover, Jr., Assumes Office as Under Secretary

Press release 549 dated October 4

Following is the text of a statement made by Herbert Hoover, Jr., upon assuming office as Under Secretary of State on October 4.

It is with a deep sense of responsibility that I undertake the duties of the Under Secretary of State at the invitation of President Eisenhower and of yourself [i.e. Secretary Dulles].

I want you to know that I feel that it is a very great honor to join with the many members of the Department and of the Foreign Service who have dedicated themselves to the service of our country in these difficult times. And I particularly feel that it is a great privilege to serve under you in the constructive leadership which you are giving so actively to our foreign policy.

MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY DULLES TO ITALIAN AND YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTERS

Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino of Italy

Press release 556 dated October 6

On the occasion of the announcement of agreement on Trieste I wish to convey to you and your representatives who dealt with this issue my profound gratification at the successful outcome of the London negotiations. This accord is proof indeed of what can be achieved through cooperation and understanding when there exists a sincere desire to find a solution to an involved international problem.

The Defense of Europe: A Progress Report

by Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther

*Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe*¹

As you probably know, my assignment calls for the defense of Europe, from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey, a distance of some 4,000 miles. My purpose this evening is to give you a progress report on how we are doing in Europe.

The day before yesterday, I left Germany—Northern Germany—where I had attended 4 days of maneuvers. The maneuvers that we have had this year are the largest we have had since General Eisenhower came to Europe in the early part of 1951. And I can say that they were also the most successful maneuvers that we have staged. I spent 2 days with General Hoge, of the Central Army Group, which was largely an American-French maneuver, and a day and a half with General Gale of the Northern Army Group—General Gale being a British Commander. It was a two-sided maneuver that had as the commander on one side a Belgian Commander and under him two Belgian divisions, a Canadian brigade, American troops, atomic artillery, and British troops. On the opposing side was a Netherlands Commander with British troops, Netherlands troops, and some American troops, and, again, atomic artillery.

That maneuver is the most successful one we have had, and the improvement in the functioning of our troops was very marked over what it was 7 years ago and very obvious over what it was a year ago. As you may have read in the press, the atomic side was played very extensively. In the tactical use of the atomic bomb, atomic bombs were dropped from airplanes and also projected

from atomic artillery. It is still too early to evaluate the lessons of the maneuver, but it is clear that we are on the threshold of a new type of warfare which is going to change, to a considerable extent, tactics and organization. However, having said that, I also should like to reiterate that it does not change the necessity for the troops on the ground or the so-called tactical air support which you know so well.

I'd like now to move to our general progress in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from the standpoint of buildup of our forces, starting with the time when General Eisenhower arrived in January 1951. Now he found, when he arrived in Europe, a very low state of morale. You will recall at that time that we were about to be ejected from the Korean peninsula. And in Europe itself, the new and better world which we had been led to believe was going to follow the last war had given way, as a result of incidents in Europe and throughout the world, to the stark realism that Soviet imperialism was again on the march. General Eisenhower found precious few troops. But what was worse still was that there was no way to use the troops that he did have, no way to employ those resources in a common strategy.

Now, some 3¾ years later, that situation has changed considerably. We now have, division-wise, between 90 and 100 divisions. Not all of those are D-day divisions; some are D plus 15, some are D plus 30. But they constitute a very substantial force. In the field of aircraft—air forces—the increase has been even greater, although that still happens to be one of our greatest shortages. We feel that as of now we still do not have enough to meet an all-out act of Soviet aggression successfully, and that is why we have asked our

¹ Address made before the National Security Industrial Association at New York, N. Y., on Sept. 29.

political superiors, the North Atlantic Council, to furnish more troops. And one element of that additional strength has come in the question of German forces.

The second element, as we move ahead, is that it will take, from the time of decision, approximately 2 years until we have German ground forces, and approximately 3 years until we have German tactical air forces. So we are actually moving our planning cycle ahead for a period about 3 years hence. And we say that, as of that time, if we do have that German contribution and if we are able to use atomic bombs against an act of aggression, if it should take place, we will have a reasonably good chance of defending Europe successfully against an all-out act of Soviet aggression. Those two conditions, however, must be met.

Now, of the status of the first one you are well aware, namely, that after 7 years of consideration, a project for bringing the German troops into use for the defense of Europe was rejected by the French Parliament, and the nine foreign ministers are meeting in London right now—they finished their session this evening. It's now a few minutes after 3 o'clock in the morning in London, and those foreign ministers are sleeping, I hope peacefully, getting ready for the session which starts again tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock. This is an extremely important session. It's vital that the nine foreign ministers meeting reach a solution on this critical problem.

France and EDC

Having said that, I should like to spend a moment so that you will understand why the French Parliament rejected the EDC. The idea of EDC—the European Defense Community—was to make a German contribution available for the defense of Europe. But, since that is more of a political problem than a military problem, that new organization had to be backed by a political framework, and the framework was to be the European Defense Community—a move toward a united Europe with only six countries participating: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and Western Germany. The French Parliament decided that united concept, that federal concept, if you will, was premature. But it is well that you understand that most of the people in France, and a great many of the people who voted against this in the Parliament, were not against

German rearmament as such. They were against that particular vehicle for bringing German rearmament into being; and the part that they objected to was this federalization, or, as it has been described in Europe, the supernational aspect of the European Defense Community Treaty. I bring that up because there has been considerable misunderstanding that the French are against German rearmament.

Now there are many French who are against it, and I think you should know why they are against it because, whether you agree or not, I feel that it is essential in this alliance that we understand the point of view of the other man. You know well that France and Germany have had three wars in the last 80 years. You know that there was a large resistance movement in France against the Germans during the war and that created a great amount of bitterness. You may not know that there were 700,000 French laborers deported to Germany, and many of them felt that they had a very unhappy existence. In addition to that, there were 240,000 of the so-called upper classes who were shipped to Germany and spent considerable time in prisons like Dachau and Buchenwald, and of that group, over 100,000 failed to return. So it is not difficult to see that there is a considerable amount of bitterness still existing on this subject.

And in case you are inclined to be impatient of bitterness, I would recall to you that, after our own Civil War, the last state that came back into the Union returned in 1877—12 years after the end of that war—and the bitterness did not end then. Those were people that we knew, that spoke the same language and were very good friends.

So if you consider the idea of bitterness, please bear in mind that the French situation does have a point that should be considered. I don't say that, having considered it, they should not have passed EDC, but I say that if we criticize them we should understand their side of the argument.

What the solution is going to be at London it's too early to say. I am sure of this—I am sure Mr. Mendès-France, who is the French Premier, is going with the determination to solve this problem. I am sure that he is resolved to find an arrangement for bringing the Germans into an organization where they will be able to contribute to the defense of Europe. What, again, will be the means for that is a subject that is being negotiated now, and it would not be profitable to go into that matter because the situation is extremely fluid.

On the question of the second element, you'll recall that I said that in order to defend Europe successfully we had to have a German contribution, which I think we are going to get, and we must also be able to use atomic bombs to repel an act of aggression. Now, in attacking that problem, I would like to tell you that this has been one of the strongest points that the Soviet propaganda has been directed against. The Soviets, if you will recall, starting more than 2 years ago, have been saying, "We will agree to nothing in the way of disarmament unless atomic bombs are banned." You will recall that, when the President made his atomic-pool proposal last December the eighth, the first answer of the Soviets was, "Yes, we shall participate provided that there shall be a banning of the atomic bomb."

When the disarmament convention met in London—for about the fifth time in the last several years—in May of this year, there was no agreement because the Soviets said, "Yes, we'll consider disarmament if the atomic bomb is banned. That must be the first thing." And that element is one of the main points of the Soviet propaganda now.

Now you must understand, and I'm sure you do—and you'll forgive me if I labor the point—the Soviets are much more clever now than they have ever been before in the way they are handling their propaganda. We thought Uncle Joe was tough—and he was. But the new regime, the the triumvirate of Mr. Malenkov, Mr. Molotov, and Mr. Khrushchev, is infinitely more clever and infinitely more dangerous than Uncle Joe ever was. We might even say we never had it so good as under Uncle Joe. They are conducting a very tough campaign, and to meet that we must realize we are in the major leagues and are going to be in the major leagues for some time.

Now, we feel that it would be a great error for the West to agree to the banning of atomic bombs because even with the German contribution we are not going to be able to match the Soviets in the field of conventional troops and conventional armament. And we are trying to redress that deficiency by the use of the atomic bomb. Obviously, if we cannot redress that, it changes the picture very materially and very adversely.

Now a variant—although the Soviets have not actually advanced this, but many of their followers have—a variant of that is this, and this makes

an appeal, "Well, let's ban the atomic bomb except in retaliation." Now, let's just examine that for a second, and let's use the case of Dien-Bien-Phu as an illustration.

At Dien-Bien-Phu, the Communists put 42,000 against 12,000. Normally 42,000 are going to beat 12,000, and they did in that case. If you agree to use the atomic bomb only in retaliation, that would mean that the side with the 12,000 could not use it to redress this imbalance. The side with the 42,000 might never care to use it. If they could win without it, why should they allow themselves to be subjected to a retaliatory measure? So we say—we, who are charged with a certain element of planning for the defense of Europe—that it would be to the disadvantage of the United States and the other nations in NATO to agree to this proposal of the Soviets.

Now that does not mean that we do not agree to disarmament. If there is a safe and secure disarmament plan across the board which will make war impossible, we are for that. But simply because atomic bombs do create casualties—and very heavy casualties against women and children—is no reason why we should become sentimental over this question as to what weapons must be used. The chore is to make war itself impossible. However, the Soviets are very clever on this, and in an area which is very, very close to Soviet bombers you can well understand the appeal that the campaign is going to have. It isn't dangerous yet, and I say that most of the people on the Continent are not thinking about it very much. But sooner or later they will, and sooner or later we are going to have a real problem on our hands in the counter-propaganda field. That brings me to my next point and that is this question of ideas.

The Cold War

You gentlemen represent here a portion of American industry, you and your predecessors, who have made a tremendous contribution in making America great. You were not worried—or your predecessors, the pioneers—about obstacles, and you've made our country the strongest and wealthiest country in the world. That's created a type of psychology that the Americans can do anything. And in the field of production, in the field in which you gentlemen are doing so well, that is true.

But it does not follow that just because we can

get more bulldozers on a job and overcome all difficulty, we are going to win the other struggle—the struggle which is being waged very vigorously now and is commonly known as the cold-war struggle—the battle for men's minds, if you will. And we are up against some very fine experts in that field.

You gentlemen have made your success, in large measure, not only by overcoming those obstacles but by selling your products. And in that you have appealed to the mind. Certainly the talents which you have put to use in advertising your products could be put to use in working in this field, which, if anything, is even more important than the military field. And make no mistake about it, the Soviets are very, very clever in that field, and they are beginning to do well, especially since Comrade Stalin passed out of the picture. They have a field which they are able to exploit because the conditions, the social conditions, which were so damaged during the war—and again take France as an illustration, with its badly damaged railroads and housing—and the social improvement which would normally come to a country have been delayed as a result of rearmament. What is more logical than that the workmen, who have had those benefits delayed, should show a certain amount of resentment over continuing to pay high taxes?

Just the day before yesterday—no, it was 2 days before that—I met a painter, and that painter was getting 28,000 francs a month. Twenty-eight thousand francs a month is \$80. He has to leave his house at seven-thirty in the morning, and he gets home at seven o'clock at night, and, somehow, he seems to work on Saturdays. I'm not sure about that, but he's always away on Saturday. He has one child, he gets a little social security for that, but his total pay is \$110. Now, if he should buy a ton of hard coal in France, which I assure you he never does, it costs him \$54. A pound of butter costs him about 90 cents. Bread is cheaper, rent is cheaper, a few things are cheaper than they are here. But he lives a very tough existence. He doesn't happen to be a Communist, this particular one, but 5 million like him are Communist in France. Not that they know the slightest idea about Marxism; not that they care. They are talking about a social system, and the Communists have been able to capitalize on that. But that is the kind of audience that requires the kind of

leadership that we are going to have to exert in order to overcome that situation.

Now in this country—and I see a great many Americans—many of you here have been to our headquarters—I know there is a growing impatience about Europe and particularly about France. And you have reasons to be exasperated, I am sure. But will you please bear in mind, as you become exasperated, that the one fellow who is getting the advantage of that is Mr. Malenkov, and he is sitting back chuckling all the time, because he hasn't even been smart enough to devise some of these divisive influences. So, if we must be tough with our allies, I hope we can do it in sorrow rather than in anger. Because the most important thing in this alliance—and the thing which has been accepted by all of the 14 member nations of 400 million people—is that we are not going to win this struggle unless we do it together and in common. Make no mistake about that.

From time to time there are advocates of the "fortress America" theory. But just for the sake of argument let us assume that you could prove mathematically that you could win a war on the "fortress America" concept—and I say "for the sake of argument" because I don't admit it. But I don't want to go into that. You don't win the cold-war struggle by it, and that may be the one that we're going to have with us for a generation or two generations. If we lose that, then we have lost everything.

So, as we consider these elements of military strength, my plea to you is to consider the spiritual side of it. The leadership of the United States is of paramount importance in this struggle. You hear, from time to time, that there is anti-Americanism in Europe. There is—not as much as you hear. There would be a great fear if it were ever indicated that the Americans were going to pull out of Europe.

We hear from time to time from people who say, "Well, let's work out a separate arrangement with the Germans. You have said that the Germans are important and necessary for the defense of Europe." That is true. The other part, which we didn't say, because it's based on the North Atlantic Treaty, is that we also need France. So the story is we must have both Germany and France to defend Europe.

Now I recognize that this does not give you any prescription as to what you're to do, and I can

only hide behind the wisecrack which Will Rogers made some years ago when he was talking about the submarine problem. He said, "The submarine problem is a simple one to solve. All you have to do is bring the ocean to a boil, and, when the submarine comes to the top, knock it off." Well, somebody said, "Will, how do you get the ocean to a boil?" "Well," he said, "I'm only defining the general principle, the details are up to you."

And I'm leaving the details to you gentlemen because it's a field that is primarily in the civilian field and not in the military field.

To be just a little more specific, however, than Will was, I would say this: Certainly respect and support of the leaders who are working in this field is one of the paramount contributions you can make, plus recognition that the job that they are doing is a very difficult one and one for which there probably is no answer. Many of these problems are still going to be with us many years from now.

In the last 7 years I have had occasion to work with three Secretaries of State: General Marshall, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Dulles. I think they have all been men of great quality, and I admire each and every one of them. I would say that Mr. Dulles has the toughest job and he needs every bit of support that you can give him now. It is not a matter of political affiliation—he's up against a very difficult situation.

Need for an Informed Public

Secondly, I feel that in our public opinion and in our know-how—which is a thing that you gentlemen know in the industrial field—in the know-how in this ideological field, we have to increase our fund of knowledge very materially. By reason of our power position the mantle of leadership has fallen on our shoulders, but we are ill-equipped to execute it; and we must change that situation.

Now what do I mean by that? Well, your own children—how much are they studying the subject, how much do they know of Europe, and how much are they working on it in their college courses? How many of your sons and daughters are trying to get into the Foreign Service, a field of tremendous importance for the future of the United States? The Foreign Service has recently

been reorganized to make the opportunities more attractive, and I'm not here recruiting for them, but I've seen them in operation and the job they do is of tremendous importance. But above all, I'm making my plea for an understanding and a realization that these problems cannot be solved in simple ways.

As for the future, I have confidence that we're going to succeed. I am not one who believes that the Soviets have no weaknesses. There is a tendency to feel that every Soviet is six feet tall; but that isn't true. There are some dumb ones just like we have them.

But to consider some of their internal weaknesses I need only point to one. Mr. Khrushchev pointed out, a year ago, that in the year 1953 the Soviet Union had in Russia 9 million less head of cattle than it had in 1928. In 1928 its population was 152 million; now its population is perhaps 210 million. In the production field you know the story—it takes a Soviet citizen about 3 months' work to buy a suit of clothes, a suit that would ordinarily cost here about \$80.

Those are internal problems which are going to give Mr. Malenkov many a headache, and that particular one, the last one, will give him a first-class headache—and let us pray that it will be a real good one! He has promised that he is going to change that, but he's got 210 million kibitzers who are going to know whether he changes it, though they may not know whether his figures on steel are correct.

So I feel that the progress we have made has been significant and that we have no reason to cringe in fear before this monolithic dictatorship. It is nothing that we can underestimate, but, on the other hand, there's no reason why we should feel that the problem is impossible.

NATO is *your* organization. It will continue to thrive if it has the active participation of the people of the United States; and a group such as you will realize that our problems can only be solved by the application of wisdom and patience and perseverance—frequently in the light of most irritating conditions.

As for the cold war itself, I'm sure we can handle that with clear poise and steady purpose if we remain dedicated to the unity of our cause. For free men there is no other way for survival.

European Command Reports on Offshore Procurement Program

STATEMENT BY GEN. ORVAL R. COOK¹

I am glad to welcome you gentlemen to the Headquarters of the United States European Command here at Camp des Loges [near St. Germain, on the outskirts of Paris]. It is the first opportunity I have had to meet with the press since we moved here from our Frankfurt headquarters in May.

This Headquarters—US EUCOM, to use its abbreviation—is headed by General Gruenther, whom most of you know. His position of Commander in Chief, US EUCOM, is in addition to his international responsibilities as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In discharging his U.S. European Command responsibilities, General Gruenther has delegated to me, as Deputy Commander in Chief, US EUCOM, broad authority.

The primary reason for inviting you here today is that there is one program in particular under our jurisdiction which I thought you might be interested in at this time—the U.S. offshore procurement program. I believe this subject is newsworthy now because we have just computed the total of contracts placed by the Army, Navy, and Air Force this past fiscal year throughout the European and NATO areas. We are thus able to give you specific information on the program for the year ended June 30 and, in the light of these new figures, to make some observations on what the whole OSP program is accomplishing.

For those of you not familiar with the term “offshore procurement program,” let me explain briefly what it is.

Since 1946 our allies have made great strides in economic recovery and in building up their own defense capabilities. The United States, through the Mutual Security Program, has provided assistance to these countries by furnishing equipment for their military forces which was beyond their own capacities to provide. This U.S. military assistance program for the European NATO countries since 1949 has amounted to some 12 billions of dollars, more than half of which has been delivered. The program has effectively supplemented the substantial efforts which these countries themselves have been making.

U.S. assistance is provided in two ways—first, in the form of defense items manufactured for the Mutual Security Program in the United States and shipped here; and second, in the form of U.S.-type equipment and supplies which we procure here in Europe and transfer to the several countries for their defense force. To instruct the recipients of this military equipment in its use, maintenance, and repair, the defense assistance program is augmented by an extensive training program conducted by the United States Armed Forces both here and at home.

We also buy supplies and services throughout Western Europe for the U.S. troops stationed here in Europe. The supplies are principally foodstuffs, but the services are diversified and include many items such as repairs to and parts for U.S. combat vehicles.

The buying of military equipment and goods and services in the European NATO area we call “offshore procurement.” The name obviously comes from the fact that it describes purchases made beyond the shores of the United States.

The subordinate commands and agencies of this Headquarters placed offshore procurement con-

¹Made at a press conference at the Headquarters of the U.S. European Command on Oct. 4. General Cook is Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command.

tracts with the industrial establishment of Western Europe totaling more than 612 millions of dollars in the past fiscal year. Approximately two-thirds of this amount was for weapons and other military supplies needed by our allies for their defense forces. The other third—some 200 millions—was for supplies and services needed for our own U.S. troops stationed in Europe.

All of the military equipment portion of the program, as in the previous years' programs, will be turned over to our defense partners to assist in the buildup of their armed forces. This U.S. assistance to our European allies is providing a vastly increased measure of security to all of the free nations of the world by increasing the capabilities of our partners to defend our common freedoms—ours as well as their own.

The 612 millions of dollars' worth of orders placed in the fiscal year 1954 are in addition, of course, to the \$2,660,000,000 in orders similarly placed during the preceding 2 years, from which a steady flow of deliveries is now being received.

Thus, in the past 3 years under the mutual defense program, we have contracted with Western European industry and suppliers for more than three and one-quarter billions of dollars' worth of supplies and equipment—two and one-half billions in defense equipment to strengthen the armed forces of our allies, and three-quarters of a billion in supplies for our own troops, the latter including substantial quantities of foodstuffs for our forces.

Industries in all the NATO countries and several of the non-NATO countries share in these orders in such manner as to spread their benefits into every part of the countries' economic and defense structure. The procurement of agricultural products results in favorable effects on that segment of the European economy. Industries receiving contracts bring literally thousands of other factories and suppliers into the work under subcontracts so that vast numbers of skilled workmen are employed in the manufacturing processes.

And as all of these factories and workmen become skilled in the manufacture of specialized defense items, the defense-production capacity of our partners in the Western alliance is greatly expanded—one of the precise purposes of the American Congress in bringing this program into being.

There is no doubt that these economic and defense benefits are being realized. The steadily in-

creasing flow of deliveries under the contracts placed during the past 3 years provides convincing proof of it.

Of the two and one-half billion dollars of orders we have placed for ammunition, aircraft, ships, electronic equipment, combat vehicles, and other defense materials for our allies since July 1, 1951, we have received delivery on about 617 million dollars' worth—about one-fourth of what we have ordered. We have paid out some 672 millions of dollars—that is, paid outright for everything that has been delivered and in addition have made some progress payments on certain expensive units such as ships, which a contractor himself cannot be expected to finance alone.

This leaves about \$1,880,000,000 worth of military items still to be delivered and paid for. These deliveries and payments, under orders already placed, will be continuing for the next 2 years—and more in some cases.

Right now, our dollar payments for these military-equipment items are running at the rate of about 60 millions of dollars per month. Add to this the 21 millions we are spending each month for supplies for our own troops, and we find that the total dollar payments under this program in all our allied countries of Western Europe are running at the rate of 81 millions of dollars per month. For your convenience, I have had all of these figures prepared on a country-by-country basis. This summary will be available to you when we conclude here.

I am convinced that our offshore procurement program is achieving the purposes for which it was intended.

First, it is supplying essential items for the time-phased defense programs of our allied countries.

Second, it is strengthening the European defense-production facilities and resources with the result of broadening Western Europe's industrial mobilization base—so important to us all.

Third, it is providing dollar exchange to Europe with resultant strengthening of the economies of our allies which is so necessary to the buildup and continuation of their own defense strength.

And finally, it is assuring our allies that the United States, as one of the partners in the great European defense alliance, is working vigorously to further the military, economic, and political objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

STATISTICAL REPORT 2

Offshore procurement contracts totaling \$612,050,000 were awarded in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, by the subordinate commands and agencies of the United States European Command.

Of this total, \$394,950,000 was in the form of 439 contracts for military supplies and equipment under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and \$217,100,000 was in orders for supplies, services, and equipment in support of U.S. troops and installations in Europe.

Of the overall total, the U.S. Army, Europe, headquarters at Heidelberg, Germany, placed orders for \$298,060,000; the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, through its Wiesbaden headquarters, placed orders for \$187,100,000; the U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, with

headquarters at London, placed orders for \$63,580,000; and the Joint Construction Agency, through its Paris headquarters, placed contracts valued at \$63,310,000.

Major items of purchase and their approximate values were:

Ships and equipment-----	\$26,560,000
Ammunition-----	147,000,000
Aircraft and equipment-----	103,000,000
Construction-----	68,000,000
Subsistence-----	43,000,000
Tanks and automotive-----	37,760,000
Electronic, communications equipment--	35,650,000
Maintenance and repair-----	30,720,000
Weapons (arms-artillery)-----	21,650,000
Building supplies-----	7,040,000
Fuels and lubricants-----	4,510,000
Miscellaneous and actions under \$10,000-	60,860,000

The contracts and orders were placed in all of the 11 European NATO countries and in 7 non-NATO countries.

*Released at the Headquarters of the U.S. European Command on Oct. 4.

Country	Total Contracts Awarded (MDAP and Troop Support)	Deliveries (MDAP)	Payments Made (MDAP)	Total U.S. Troop Support Orders Placed	Approximate Current Monthly Rate Payments (MDAP and Troop Support)
NATO					
Belgium-----	\$190,910,000	\$13,410,000	\$13,400,000	\$48,150,000	\$2,337,000
Denmark-----	52,670,000	110,000	2,340,000	36,020,000	1,400,000
France-----	1,335,630,000	357,420,000	389,800,000	295,140,000	42,019,000
Greece-----	35,000,000	4,740,000	4,740,000	None	1,000,000
Italy-----	490,400,000	98,910,000	115,310,000	34,750,000	8,965,000
Luxembourg-----	1,240,000	370,000	370,000	480,000	33,000
Netherlands-----	121,890,000	10,130,000	15,810,000	42,820,000	3,189,000
Norway-----	27,960,000	4,780,000	4,780,000	530,000	1,614,000
Portugal-----	21,890,000	None	460,000	3,620,000	300,000
Turkey-----	9,360,000	None	None	None	500,000
United Kingdom-----	749,570,000	117,300,000	117,990,000	114,350,000	15,176,000
Total-----	\$3,036,520,000	\$607,170,000	\$665,000,000	\$575,860,000	\$76,533,000
Non-NATO					
Germany-----	\$75,910,000	\$6,070,000	\$6,680,000	\$56,810,000	\$2,978,000
Spain-----	13,570,000	None	None	200,000	305,000
Switzerland-----	88,930,000	3,920,000	860,000	45,070,000	4,251,000
Yugoslavia-----	15,810,000	320,000	320,000	320,000	590,000
Austria-----	16,990,000	None	None	16,990,000	471,000
North Africa-----	13,350,000	None	None	13,350,000	471,000
Sweden-----	4,270,000	None	None	4,270,000	118,611
Others-----	7,160,000	None	None	None	None
Total-----	\$235,990,000	\$10,310,000	\$7,860,000	\$137,010,000	\$9,084,000
Total NATO and Non-NATO-----	\$3,272,510,000	\$617,480,000	\$672,860,000	\$712,870,000	\$85,617,000

The orders for the \$394,950,000 in military equipment under MDAP were placed in the several countries as follows:

(In millions of dollars)

<i>NATO countries</i>	<i>Total (MDAP only)</i>
Belgium-----	37. 67
Denmark-----	1. 34
France-----	22. 34
Greece-----	1. 06
Italy-----	93. 18
Netherlands-----	2. 54
Norway-----	4. 93
United Kingdom-----	192. 58
Turkey-----	. 87
Luxembourg-----	. 23
Total-----	356. 74
 <i>Non-NATO countries</i>	 <i>Total (MDAP only)</i>
Germany-----	7. 76
Spain-----	10. 64
Yugoslavia-----	13. 76
Switzerland-----	6. 05
Total-----	38. 21
Grand total: NATO and non-NATO----	394. 95

The fiscal year 1954 contract total of \$612,050,000 brings the total of contracts let under offshore procurement since the beginning of the program in fiscal 1952 to \$3,272,590,000. Of this total, \$2,552,780,000 was for military supplies and equipment for our partners and allies under MDAP and \$719,810,000 was for supplies, equipment, and services in support of U.S. military forces in Europe.

In the MDAP portion of the program, the U.S. has received delivery on \$617,480,000 of the total of \$2,552,780,000 in orders placed and has actually disbursed \$672,860,000 in payment for these items and advances to contractors on goods yet to be delivered.

These payments for MDAP items and for goods and services for U.S. troop support are currently running at the rate of approximately \$85,000,000 per month.

The accompanying table³ gives the total contracts awarded (MDAP and U.S. troop support) by countries for the 3 fiscal years 1952-53-54, totals of deliveries and payments for the period, total U.S. troop-support orders placed, and the current approximate rate of monthly payments by the United States on deliveries, by countries.

³ See preceding page.

Secretary Dulles Reconvenes Public Committee on Personnel

Press release 551 dated October 4

The Department of State announced on October 4 that Secretary Dulles had asked the Public Committee on Personnel to reconvene on October 11.

The purpose of the meeting is to consult with the Secretary on the Department's progress in carrying out recommendations for strengthening the Foreign Service made by the Committee last May. The Secretary announced his action on these recommendations on June 15.¹

Mr. Dulles is taking the unusual step of reconvening the Committee in order that he may receive from its members an evaluation of the actions taken by the Department to date, and also to obtain the benefit of their views about the administrative measures already taken or still necessary to take in launching the program.

The Committee was established March 5 by the Secretary to study and advise him on measures necessary to increase the effectiveness of the career service to meet the vastly increasing responsibilities in the field of foreign policy which have devolved upon the President and the Secretary.

Its members are:

Norman Armour, former Assistant Secretary of State, former United States Ambassador to several countries, and recently appointed Ambassador to Guatemala;

John A. McCone, president, the Joshua Hendy Corporation, Los Angeles;

Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State;

Morehead Patterson, chairman and president, American Machine and Foundry Company, New York, 1954 Chairman of the U.S. Committee for U.N. Day, and recently U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N. Disarmament Commission;

Donald Russell, president of the University of South Carolina and former Assistant Secretary of State;

Charles E. Saltzman, general partner, Henry Sears and Company, New York, on temporary leave of absence while serving as Under Secretary of State for Administration;

John Hay Whitney, senior partner in J. H. Whitney and Company, New York;

Dr. Henry M. Wriston, president of Brown University.

Dr. Wriston serves as Chairman of the Committee. The Vice Chairman is Mr. Whitney.

The plan which they presented to the Secretary

¹ BULLETIN of June 28, 1954, p. 1002.

embodied an immediate program for strengthening the professional service, as well as a long-range method of maintaining a high-caliber Foreign Service. Key recommendations were:

1. Integration of the officers of the Departmental home service and the Foreign Service performing similar foreign affairs duties.

2. The bold and imaginative recruitment and scholarship program whereby the Foreign Service would obtain a constant and adequate flow of qualified young men and women representing the best cross section of American life.

3. Provision for continuity and vigor in the administrative leadership of the Department, thereby to assure the consistency and stability of

personnel policy vital to effective administration.

The majority of the Committee's recommendations are being put into effect under the authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Some aspects of the program require additional legislation, a portion of which was requested from and granted by the 83d Congress.

A complete review of the various steps which have been taken in this integration and recruitment program will be given to the Committee by the Secretary.

Mr. Saltzman, who served on the Committee, was made Under Secretary of State for Administration in June. He has a special responsibility to implement the recommendations of the report.

Problems in the Far East

by Everett F. Drumright

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

Since the days 400 years ago when contacts were first established between the West and the East on a more or less regular basis, the East has been an area of weakness—of weakness, that is, relative to the West. It had lagged behind the West in invention and in material development, especially in weapons and the art of war. Its systems of government were backward by European standards. In modern terms, we should speak of the East of several centuries ago as compounded in part of stagnation and in part of disorder. We should say that it constituted a huge power vacuum. To point this out reflects no discredit upon the Asian peoples. All peoples have their ups and downs. In the past, in the dark ages, Europe had been weak; Asians had poured into Europe from the East, Arabs into Europe from the South.

Sooner or later, power vacuums—like climatic low-pressure areas—become filled from the outside. Following the arrival of the first Europeans

in the East, the history of the East has been, until comparatively recent years, largely a history of the assertion of power in the East by outsiders—Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, British, Russians, and Americans.

If the West took a great deal out of Asia, the West also brought a great deal to Asia. Among other things it brought the Asians a picture of a more rewarding material life than they had ever dreamed of—the life that the West had achieved for itself through scientific and industrial progress. It also brought ideas—ideas about justice and human worth and the idea of nationalism. The West aroused in the East a determination to achieve some things that the West had achieved. Western ascendancy in the East made it inevitable that Western ascendancy would come to an end.

The United States has with consistency given sympathy and tangible assistance to the Asians in their desire to be free of foreign controls and to achieve a more rewarding life. For one thing, we have not forgotten our own colonial background

¹ Made before the Board of Directors of the National Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., on Sept. 17.

and our successful fight for independence. For another, we are believers in progress, in man's ability to achieve mastery of his physical environment. Thirdly, we have not wished to see the Asian countries closed to our missionaries and our traders. Finally, we have recognized from the very beginning of our intercourse with the East that the incorporation of Asia under a hostile imperialism would threaten our security in the Pacific.

It is fair to say that opposition to imperialism has been the foundation stone of our policies in Asia. It is true that we supplanted Spanish rule in the Philippines with American rule, but we employed our privileged position in the islands to prepare the Filipinos for self-government, which we gave them in 1946. Half a century ago we acted to prevent the carving-up of China by the great powers with our enunciation of Hay's "Open Door" policy. Thirteen years ago we found ourselves involved in a life-and-death struggle in the Pacific because we would not acquiesce in the dismemberment of China. That time, the imperialist power was an Asian power—Japan—which had mastered the technology of the West and was determined to use it to supplant Western hegemony in Asia with its own rule. We defeated Japanese imperialism but not before two things had happened that made the restoration of European rule in the former Asian colonies a thankless proposition. First, Asia had been fired by the spectacle of the defeat of Western armies by other Asians. Second, Japanese arms by the hundreds of thousands fell into the hands of the insurrectionists. And, it should be pointed out, the Western powers no longer had much desire to maintain rule by force over embittered and resentful Asian populations.

Rise of Communist Imperialism

The achievement of freedom by nine Asian countries in the postwar years has been one of the great historical phenomena of our lifetime. Unfortunately, it has been accompanied by another phenomenon scarcely less significant with which Asian independence is clearly irreconcilable. This has been the emergence of a new imperialism in Asia. Again, as in the case of the Japanese empire, the weapons of this new imperialism have come from the West and been adopted by an Asian power clique. The literal weapons have come

from arsenals in European Russia. The origin of the ideological weapons may be pinpointed to a bearded habitué of the reading rooms of the British Museum of 100 years ago—Karl Marx. What happened in Russia nearly 40 years ago has within the last few years happened in China—Communists have taken over the country. A centralized and ruthless dictatorship has been imposed upon the Chinese people. The other peoples of Asia have been confronted by the menace of a new imperialism as aggressive as any in the past, and far harsher and more unequivocally totalitarian than any they have ever known. It is an imperialism which is not only strong in its own right by virtue of its ironclad control of more than 400 million Chinese but is dedicated to international communism and thus united with the power of the sprawling Soviet state.

What makes the menace of Communist China, like the menace of Soviet Russia, particularly difficult to deal with is the manifold nature of the threat it presents. On the one hand Communist China and the Soviet Union have the most numerous armed forces in the world with which they can intimidate their neighbors and with which they could unquestionably overrun considerable territories before counteraction could be effective. On the other hand, the Communists have acquired considerable proficiency in gaining their ends by political methods. These methods consist of making common cause in non-Communist countries with important protest groups for the purpose of channelizing behind the Communist Party the various elements of discontent with, and rebellion against, the existing order. This is known as the strategy of the united front.

As between winning other peoples by force and winning them by getting on their good side, there is obviously some contradiction. It is difficult to employ both methods at once with great effect. In actual practice, the Communists are inclined to alternate their methods, shifting from one to the other according to the situation and requirements of the moment. The immediate postwar years were, in the Far East at least, years of the united front. The Communists tried to identify themselves with the most popular causes and movements in Asia. But then in 1948 the decision was handed down by the international Communist leadership to resort to force against the weaker non-Communist regimes in the Far East. Warfare was launched against the governments and anti-

Communist elements of the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, and about a year later, against the Republic of Indonesia. The most daring and cynical employment of force by the Communists came in June 1950 with the overt attack on the Republic of Korea.

The shift in grand strategy, of which I have spoken, did not apply to China and Indochina. There, the Communists seemed to have concluded—not without reason—that they had hit upon a winning formula which did not need to be changed, a combination of political and military methods that promised to pay off.

In China, the disastrous weakening of the control exercised by the National Government and the general impoverishment and despair, basically resulting from the war with Japan, conspired powerfully to the advantage of the Communists. In Indochina, it was the effort of the French to re-impose their rule by force that gave the Communists their opportunity. Achieving a strong political position by seeming to offer a sorely tried people those things which they most desired—peace and stability in one case, relief from foreign rule in the other—the Chinese Communists and Vietnamese Communists were able to amass decisive military forces on their side.

Return to Strategy of United Front

The truce in Korea and the truce in Viet-Nam appear to have signalized another broad change in Communist strategy, the second since World War II. We now appear to be returning to the strategy of the united front, in which military action will be played down and the Communists will seek to pose as the righteous champions of long-suffering peoples everywhere. This does not mean that we can afford to let down our guard in anticipation of a period of peace. The Communists are always capable of quickly reversing their strategy when they perceive that it is to their advantage to do so. At present, however, the Communists appear to be planning their major efforts in the political fields in the Far East with the primary objective of creating disunity among their adversaries, particularly by arousing fear, suspicion, and resentment of the United States, and by playing upon local grievances to achieve this objective. Accordingly, this is what we shall have to expect in the foreseeable future:

1. In Japan, the Communists will attempt to take advantage of the frictions always resulting

from the presence of foreign troops to create and intensify anti-American feelings. They will exploit Japanese fears of being caught in the atomic crossfire of another world war in order to neutralize Japan. They will seek to dominate Japanese labor, utilizing techniques found effective in other industrial countries. They will wait for Japan's economic position to worsen, as it surely will unless wider markets are found for Japanese exports, and if their hopes for Japan's economic collapse prove justified, the Communists will use the situation to discredit the moderate democratic elements and to promote Japanese trade with mainland China as a means of obtaining Japan's economic tie-in with the Moscow-Peiping bloc.

Department Publishes Documents on Korean Problem

The Department of State this month released a 193-page publication entitled *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954*, containing a brief narrative account of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference and texts of the principal statements and proposals made by representatives at the Conference. The major U.N. resolutions relating to Korea also are included. Copies are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. (60 cents).

2. In Korea, the Communists would seem to have eliminated any possibility of posing as friends of the Korean people or of being accepted as champions of any popular Korean causes. We must not be too sure of this, however. When a country has suffered such devastation as that which was brought upon Korea, opportunities for subversion and for proselytizing extremist doctrines are enhanced. Moreover, we must not forget that the Communists have the power to give the Koreans, for a price, what they most desire: unification. We must also not forget that President Rhee virtually is the government of the Republic of Korea. Whether any of his possible successors would have sufficient national stature and support to be able to hold the country together, under circumstances of adversity, we cannot know.

3. In Viet-Nam the danger, of course, stares us in the face. The Viet Minh—the Communist regime administering north Viet-Nam under the Geneva settlement—has an organization tempered in the fires of 8 years of war. It has a record of fanatical opposition to French domination. For

years it was synonymous with national independence in the eyes of large numbers, if not the majority of Vietnamese, south and north. It has its indoctrinated partisans throughout south Viet-Nam. Both as a Vietnamese political force and a Vietnamese military force, it will not be easy for anti-Communist Vietnamese to match.

4. Southeast Asia as a whole offers a varied field for Communist enterprise. Each country has its vulnerabilities. There are subnationalist or regionalist movements, as among the Karens in Burma and the Atjinese in Indonesia, which have led to civil war. There are religious movements to cause disorders such as the Moslem Moros in the Philippines and the Darul Islam which seeks to make a theocratic state of Indonesia. There are deficiencies in government services, resulting from lack of experience, that weaken the government's position and its support and play into the hands of profiteers in popular dissatisfactions. There is lack of capital for economic development that results in economic stagnation and potentially dangerous feelings of frustration, particularly among the educated classes—always the tinder of a revolution. There are the consequences of falling prices of Southeast Asia's chief export products—rubber, tin, rice, vegetable oils. There is the legacy of bitterness toward the West which makes it difficult for former colonial peoples to see Western policy as having any other objective than the economic, if not the political, domination of their countries and which makes it difficult for the West effectively to assist the Southeast Asians in a solution of their problems. There is the natural disposition of peoples whose experience with capitalism, domestic as well as foreign, has not been happy, to look to the doctrines of Marx as the answer to their needs. There is the spectacle of the Soviet Union which—to hear the Communists tell it—rose in a single generation from serfdom and national impotence to a position of first-rate power in the world without the help of the greedy capitalists who now look upon it with as much fear as hatred. There are the Chinese in the Southeast Asian countries, totaling over 10 million, outnumbering the indigenous inhabitants of Singapore and Bangkok—Chinese whose self-interest and sense of race and culture necessarily to some extent tend to turn them toward Peiping as the capital of China proper.

Throughout the Far East—as indeed throughout

the world—there is the passionate desire for peace upon which the Communists can play. Controlling all means of communication within their world, the Communists are able to conduct their own military preparations in the dark while seizing every opportunity to denounce every defense measure on the part of the free nations, and of the United States in particular, as an aggressive act aimed at the destruction of the workers' paradise by the imperialist war-mongers of Wall Street. Manipulating every means of expression in their world, the Communists are able to fill their press with eulogies of peace while castigating, as a demonstration of belligerency and aggressiveness, every just warning of Communist intentions by spokesmen for the free nations—Americans in particular.

That, in brief, is the problem we face in the Far East—that and the enormous mass of infantry on the other side of the iron curtain in China, north Viet-Nam, North Korea, and Soviet Siberia, the thousands of planes in the Communist air forces in the Far East, the large Soviet submarine force based on Vladivostok.

What We Must Do

Because the subject I was given was our problems in the Far East, I have not planned to expatiate upon our policies. I believe it is clear what general line these policies must take. We must match the military strength of the Communists, not necessarily weapon for weapon, but in total effectiveness. By "we" I mean the United States and its allies. We must help the Asian states develop the military power to cope successfully with internal rebellion and to make an aggressor deploy a major force in order to invade successfully—thus creating the basis for international action against him. The first-rate military forces we have helped develop in the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China are examples of what can be done. In addition, I would call your attention to the newly signed Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty.² This treaty, together with the security treaties we have entered into with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea, demonstrates that the Communists cannot expect to pick off the free nations of the Far East singly and with impunity.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

We must help the Asians create societies that function with reasonable efficiency and no dot offer the Communists a vital lodgement from which the whole structure can be subverted. This we are doing through a great variety of technical aid programs and, in the case of Korea and Formosa, through very substantial programs of reconstruction and development. Perhaps the most important thing we can do to create economic health in the Far East is to help remove barriers to trade among the Far Eastern countries—particularly between Japan and Southeast Asia—and between the Far Eastern countries and the rest of the free world. Above all, markets must be developed for greatly increased Japanese exports. This means finding a larger market in the United States as well as in other countries.

We must give the Asians every opportunity to come to a realistic appreciation of the Communist danger and of what the United States stands for and what it is trying to achieve. Our present widespread information programs and the facilities we have offered to enable Asian students and leaders to study and travel in our country are sizable steps in the right direction, but I am not sure that they go far enough.

We must convince the Asians that we are wholly behind them in their desire to achieve and maintain independence. This is not as easy as it sounds when our efforts to make sure that the material aid we give is effectively utilized and our efforts to develop collective resistance to aggression in Asia are both apt to be interpreted as interference in the domestic affairs of Asian countries. It is made more difficult when the exigencies of the cold war sometimes seem to put us in the position of defending colonialism. Nevertheless, our record is a good one and we should be able to build on it with confidence. The Pacific Charter,² which was signed at Manila at the same time as the collective defense pact and which pledges the signa-

tures to uphold the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, is a guaranty to the Asians of our intentions and of those of our French and British allies.

We must make the Asians understand that what we want in the world is very similar to what they want, that in the main their aspirations and ours are not very different, that what we have to offer is something that they can respect, and that our strength means greater security for them. This is something that the American people must accomplish through their agencies of expression—magazines, books, newspapers, motion pictures—and through their unofficial representatives overseas, by whom the United States is more often judged than by its official representatives.

Above all perhaps, the Asians must understand that the objective of our policy and our power is peace. This necessity imposes an obligation upon all of us—the obligation to remain strong and alert as a nation without indulging in the kind of warlike and boastful talk that seems to make it easier for a democracy to accept the sacrifices required for military preparedness.

If I have devoted so much more time to our problems in the Far East than to what we are doing to meet them, it is not because I think our problems are greater than our resources for dealing with them. Quite the contrary. The Communists have enjoyed only two major successes in the Far East: one in China, one in Viet-Nam. In both cases their success arose from the conditions of a foreign occupation and of a long and generally unsuccessful effort on the part of nationalist forces to expel the foreigner. For the rest, the Communists' hopes have been disappointed in one Far Eastern country after another. If the Communists have twice reversed their grand strategy, it is because their grand strategy has not succeeded as they expected. It is well within our power to insure that it never will.

The Concept of Self-Determination in American Thought

by Walworth Barbour

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

This gathering, dedicated to a free life for the peasant farmers of Eastern Europe, is an appropriate one at which to make a few remarks about the principle of freedom, or more particularly of self-determination, in the American approach to world affairs.

In the 18th century the American colonists began a revolution that continues until this day. Its purpose was the winning of freedom and national independence, and its fruit was the shaping of democratic institutions to make that freedom and independence a living reality. Like the French Revolution, the American Revolution belonged to the great democratic movement which has had its local manifestations in the various countries of the free world. You will doubtless agree that this democratic movement, exalting individual rights, human dignity, and national independence, is the true revolution of the modern age—not the Communist-proclaimed revolution, which looks backward to the concepts of the absolute power of the state, the collectivistic organization of society, and the maintenance of imperial dependencies through the Communist mechanism. The democratic revolution will survive, spread, and invigorate the nations of the modern world long after the deadening dogmas underlying the Communist system have passed into limbo.

Whatever the virulent attacks of Communist propaganda may say to the contrary, the furtherance of freedom and self-government has been the central motivating influence in American political behavior both at home and abroad ever since our

birth as a nation. In asserting our independence we affirmed that government derives its just powers from the free consent of the governed. The people of the United States established the Constitution in order, among principal purposes, to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Since that time the American partiality for this phrase is evident in its frequent utterance in public speeches. It never fails to strike a responsive chord in an American audience. The American continues to believe that a test of a good commonwealth is whether it makes possible such blessings for its citizenry.

It was natural that this valuation of freedom should be strongly held during the early years of the Republic, when we were endeavoring to complete the process of securing independence from Europe. As Washington affirmed in his Farewell Address, "Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment." Later this country passed through the ordeal of a long and bitter civil war in which the issues were freedom and self-government as each side conceived them. Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator, guided the course of this conflict in order to preserve a Union based upon government by the people and for the people.

Participation in World Affairs

In the 19th century Americans lived much to themselves within the limits of this continent. When the changing world of the 20th century impelled us to a greater concern with distant neighbors, this devotion to freedom which had so long animated the pursuit of our domestic affairs was

¹Address made before the Fourth Congress of the International Peasant Union at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 3 (press release 546 dated Oct. 2).

carried over into the more active American participation in world affairs. The new order of society envisaged by President Woodrow Wilson as the "new freedom" extended to the international sphere as well as to national problems. He was as ardent a champion of the freedom of nations as he was of social reform at home. He led the American nation in a great war "for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience." The world was not only to be made safe for democracy by the successful termination of the war. The peace that followed was to be "planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." The principle of self-determination was fundamental in the Fourteen Points, and in the final point of this program for the peace he foresaw an association of nations to afford mutual guarantees for the political independence of both small and great states.

In disposing of the wreckage of three empires in Central and Eastern Europe the peacemakers of 1919 concluded in his view "a people's treaty, that accomplishes by a great sweep of political justice, a liberation of men who never could have liberated themselves, and the power of the most powerful nations has been devoted not to their aggrandizement but to the liberation of people." He conceived of article 10, pledging a member of the League of Nations to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of every other member against external aggression, as the heart of the League Covenant. This provision was for him a recognition of the sacredness of the principle of self-determination.

The central theme of freedom in the American approach to the world was reiterated by President Roosevelt in the Four Freedoms speech of 1941. It may be recalled that in this speech devoted to foreign affairs the President was looking forward to a "world" founded upon what he regarded as four essential human freedoms.

The American heritage of freedom has made itself felt more recently in three international charters: the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Charter, and lastly the Pacific Charter proclaimed at Manila by the eight states signing the South-east Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

To turn to the last of these documents, we should bear in mind the extent to which the principle of

self-determination inspired the formulation of the Pacific Charter. The Pacific Charter states:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they [the signatory powers] uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities; Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional procedures.²

The great importance of this document is its application to all areas including underdeveloped or colonial areas. It expresses clearly the American desire to see the principle of self-determination extended throughout the world wherever a people desires and is prepared to assume the responsibilities of an independent national existence. As Secretary Dulles suggested in his address of September 15 on the Manila Conference, "The Pacific Charter, on which the East and the West did meet, may well prove to be the most momentous product of the Conference."³

These examples are sufficient to suggest the cardinal importance of the concept of self-determination in American thought about the relations of the United States with other nations. No one should neglect or minimize the significance of this article of American faith common to both our major political parties and to all representative American bodies. Imperfect as our efforts may occasionally have been as to international developments in relation to this principle, we have nevertheless striven for this goal, and it serves as a touchstone by which we judge the enduring value of international acts.

To proceed to the more practical consequences of this idea, we pursue the principle of self-determination as regards the internal life of nations with a view to the people of each nation having the right to enjoy government and other institutions of their own choosing as soon as they are prepared to conduct such institutions in an orderly, peaceful, and stable manner. We believe that each nation should be free to change its form of government and, in accordance with its law, its current executive and legislative officers whenever the change actually represents the will of the people: that the nation should have the right freely

² BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1954, p. 433.

to establish its own body of law and system of courts. We oppose any system of government or group of rulers imposed on a nation against its will. Each nation should have the freedom to determine its own economic institutions. This does not mean, of course, that we Americans are not firmly convinced as a people that a system of free enterprise offers the best hope of a dynamic economy and widely distributed prosperity. In the social and intellectual sphere the press, educational and cultural institutions, and religious organizations should be free to function in accordance with popular wishes. It should be stressed that this conception of self-determination is not to be confused in any way with what the Soviets under Stalin tried to pass off as self-determination among national minorities—that is, a limited possibility for an ethnic group to express its own cultural interests, as by use of its own language and alphabet for local purposes, while remaining otherwise subject to the centralized, absolute power of Moscow.

Free Society of Nations

The objective of self-determination which we seek in the international field is a free society of nations where each may establish its relations with others on the basis of mutual interest, free consent, and the requirements of international peace. This implies that all nations should have the right to enter into such local, regional, and wider international arrangements and associations as will promote their mutual welfare without endangering that of nonmember nations. It presumes that all such arrangements and associations will of necessity be in accordance with the provisions of the U. N. Charter.

On the other and negative side, the United States can never concede that any state should be free to force on the people and territory of another state its political dominion, its occupying forces, or its control over the national economic and intellectual life. Where self-determination fully governs the relations of nations there can be no room for one state to bring about the subversion, subjection, and exploitation of another, whatever concealed instrumentalities may be utilized for this purpose. The United States is dedicated to working toward the creation of a world where the ex-

tension and maintenance of such dominion is impossible.

I know you members of the agrarian parties from Central and Eastern Europe are more immediately interested in how we Americans see the application of this principle of self-determination to your homelands. It is clear to the world that the present regimes in your countries are imposed by a foreign power against the opposition of the overwhelming mass of the population in each state. There can be no doubt that if Soviet military and police power—and the Communist terror supported thereby—could be rolled back, these regimes would quickly fall. Since we are devoted to the principle of self-determination, we cannot be reconciled to the regimes in your countries. We cannot adjust to their totalitarian practices and their denial of human rights. We cannot grow accustomed to their willingness to make their countries the subservient tools of a foreign power.

We know that these regimes cannot last, for the freedom they lack is inherent in the human spirit. Sooner or later they must change or fall. These alien, hated tyrannies cannot endure as they are; they cannot solve the problems confronting them; they cannot satisfy the needs of the people; they cannot make for a stable Europe or a tranquil world. They proclaim new courses which are only gestures, tactics, or ill-starred efforts to surmount rising difficulties. The fate of the peoples ruled by them is not finally determined.

It is our firm conviction that these Soviet colonies under totalitarian oppression are an historical anachronism in contemporary Europe. While they last, they cause misery to the captive peoples and by dividing Europe bring burdens and unsettlement to all of it. But the European community of free peoples will eventually triumph and absorb them. The logic of history is on the side of freedom and not on the side of the Communists. If there is any historical inevitability, it is that the Europe of self-determination will prevail over the Europe of historical materialism.

It is perhaps another inevitability in view of the basic trend of our history that when the United States looks to Europe its policy is to assist the progress of freedom. Believing that a union of self-governing nations will extend and secure freedom in Europe, our purpose, despite any temporary setback in a single field, is to cooperate with all the free nations of Europe in advancing

European integration in every way we can. We see the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe as belonging to this unity. They belong now in spirit and to the extent possible through their free spokesmen in exile; eventually they will

come into their rightful place as equal members in the free community of Europe. Toward this full reunion of your countries with free Europe the United States is working constantly in every possible concrete way.

Presentation of Claim Against Soviet Government for Destruction of B-29 off Hokkaido in 1952

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 527 dated September 25

Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office at Moscow on September 25 a note from the U.S. Government to the Soviet Government preferring a formal diplomatic claim against the Soviet Government on account of the destruction by Soviet aircraft of a U.S. Air Force B-29 aircraft off Hokkaido, Japan, on October 7, 1952.¹ The note demands that the Soviet Government pay damages in the sum of \$1,620,295.01 and invites the Soviet Government, in the event that the Soviet Government denies liability, to join in submitting this dispute to the International Court of Justice.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., was instructed to request the President of the U.N. Security Council to circulate the text of this note to the members of the Council. In a recent proceeding the Security Council considered another Soviet attack against a U.S. aircraft committed on September 4, 1954.²

In earlier interchanges of notes on the B-29 incident the Soviet Government contended that the incident took place near the Island of Yuri, which the Soviet Government claims had become Soviet territory by virtue of the Yalta Agreement regarding Japan of February 11, 1945.³ In the note

delivered today the U. S. Government repudiates the Soviet Government's construction of the Yalta Agreement regarding Japan and rejects the Soviet claim to any lawful territorial right to the Island of Yuri or to the Habomai Islands, of which the Island of Yuri is a component.

The note follows a thorough investigation, since the date of the incident, into the circumstances of the shooting and into the possibility that crew members survived and came into the custody of the Soviet Government.

The present note, based on the investigation, charges that the B-29 was shot down without warning over territory rightfully belonging to Japan and in which the U.S. aircraft were entitled to fly by the terms of the Security Treaty with Japan which came into effect April 28, 1952.⁴ It demands that the Soviet Government provide information with respect to the whereabouts and welfare of any surviving crew members and make provision for the prompt return of any survivors whom the Soviet Government may still be holding or of whose whereabouts the Soviet Government may be informed.

TEXT OF NOTE

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to transmit to you herewith, upon the instruction of my Government, the following communication:

The Government of the United States of America makes reference to the destruction on October 7, 1952, by fighter

¹ For the Soviet note of Oct. 12, 1952, regarding the incident and the U. S. reply of Oct. 17, 1952, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 649.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 417.

³ *A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1941-49*, S. Doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 33.

⁴ BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464.

aircraft of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of a United States Air Force B-29 airplane near the Japanese Island of Hokkaido. It will be recalled that by notes dated October 17, 1952 and December 16, 1952,⁵ the United States Government, protesting the actions of the Soviet aircraft, requested the Soviet Government to make payment for the destroyed airplane and for the lives of any of the crew who might have perished, and further requested the Soviet Government to provide information on the whereabouts and welfare of any of the crew members who might have survived, with a view to their return to the United States.

The Soviet Government has not, in the period which has elapsed since December 16, 1952 when the last United States note was delivered to it, given any indication of the fate of the crew members of the B-29 shot down by the Soviet aircraft. As the United States Government reminded the Soviet Government in the note of October 17, 1952, witnesses actually observed a Soviet Government patrol boat leave Suisho Island, a point close to the spot where the B-29 was seen to go down, immediately after the shooting and proceed to the spot where the B-29 had hit the water, and some time later saw the boat return. The spot, the Soviet Government is further reminded, was in an area then and since freely accessible to Soviet Government personnel and in the vicinity of the area of Yuri Island which the Soviet Government in its own account of the episode, in its notes of October 12, 1952 and November 24, 1952, fixes as the area in which the episode took place. Therefore the United States Government could not, and cannot, accept either the Soviet Government's statement, in its note of November 24, 1952, that it possessed no information regarding the whereabouts of the members of the crew of the B-29 airplane or the Soviet Government's continued silence in regard to whether the Soviet Government has any information concerning the fate of any of the crew members, whether any are alive, and whether the Soviet Government proposes to make arrangements for their return. Nor can the United States Government acquiesce in the continued failure of the Soviet Government to give any indication of willingness to make amends for the damage it caused and for which it is responsible, in spite of the requests therefor in the United States Government's notes above described.

The purpose of the present communication is, in view of the foregoing, to place solemnly upon the record all the facts which the United States Government has been able to gather on the subject and based thereon to prefer against the Soviet Government a formal international diplomatic claim as set forth below.

I

The United States Government charges, and is prepared to prove by evidence in an appropriate forum, the following:

1. In the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan signed in the City of San Francisco September

⁵ For the Soviet note of Nov. 24, 1952, and the U. S. reply of Dec. 16, 1952, see *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 11.

8, 1951,⁶ provision was duly made, in Article 6 thereof, for the stationing and retention, under or in consequence of bilateral or multilateral agreements between Japan and any of the Allied Powers, of armed forces in Japanese territory following the termination of the occupation of Japan by occupation forces of the Allied Powers. On the same date the United States of America, as one of the Allied Powers to whom reference is made in the Treaty of Peace, entered into a Security Treaty with Japan by which Japan granted, and the United States of America accepted, the right to dispose land, air and sea forces of the United States in and about Japan upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

The Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers and the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan came into force April 28, 1952, and thereupon the state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers terminated and the full sovereignty of the Japanese over Japan and its territorial waters was duly reestablished.

In pursuance of the Security Treaty and with the consent of the Government of Japan, the United States Government after April 28, 1952, maintained air forces and aircraft in and about Japan which engaged and continued to engage in such activities as were proper and necessary to provide for the defense of Japan and of the United States' forces maintained therein against aggression, and for the purpose of deterring armed attack upon them.

Before and on October 7, 1952, pursuant to the Security Treaty and agreements thereunder between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States, regulations were in effect for Japan governing civil and military air traffic control and communications systems. To enforce these regulations and to maintain orderly traffic control over overflying aircraft, civil and military, appropriate United States authorities within Japan were, by the United States Government and with the consent of the Government of Japan, duly charged with the major responsibilities for the operation of the air traffic control system respecting civil and military aircraft and with the enforcement thereof. As was at all times well known to the Soviet Government, the applicable regulations required that all aircraft proposing to fly into the air space of Japan should make prior notification to appropriate air traffic authorities within Japan and particularly that any military aircraft proposing to fly into the air space of Japan should make prior application to appropriate control authorities within Japan and receive prior authorization for such flight.

2. In the morning of October 7, 1952, an unarmed United States Air Force B-29 airplane, No. 44-61815, bearing the identification call sign "Sunbonnet King", was duly dispatched from its base in the Island of Honshu in Japan, to perform a duly authorized flight mission over the Island of Hokkaido, Japan, and upon completion to return to its base. The dispatching of the B-29, its mission, and its activities thereafter were all in the pursuance of the duties and functions of the United States

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1951, p. 349.

Government and the United States Air Force under the Treaty of Peace and the Security Treaty described above. Neither the dispatching nor the mission was intended or calculated to be, nor were the activities thereafter performed by the aircraft, in any way hostile to the Soviet Government or any other government, or directed against Soviet installations or personnel of the Soviet Government or any other government in any place.

The aircraft was manned by a crew of eight, all of them members of the United States Air Force and citizens and nationals of the United States of America. The aircraft commander was Captain Eugene Minot English, Serial No. AO 768042. The co-pilot was Second Lieutenant Paul Eugene Brock, Serial No. AO 2221927. The navigator was First Lieutenant John Robertson Dunham, Serial No. 20173 A. The other crew members were Staff Sergeant Samuel Albion Colgan, Serial No. AF 31379760; Staff Sergeant John Arthur Hirsch, Serial No. AF 19329704; Airman First Class Thomas Gerald Shipp, Serial No. AF 18365941; Airman Second Class Fred Grady Kendrick, Serial No. AF 14347294; and Airman Second Class Frank Eugene Neall, Serial No. 13394257.

3. Acting in compliance with their flight mission instructions, Captain English and his crew in the B-29 aircraft, "Sunbonnet King", after leaving the Island of Honshu, duly commenced flying over the Island of Hokkaido, beginning approximately 11 o'clock in the morning local time. At approximately 2 o'clock in the afternoon local time, while the B-29 was over the mainland of Hokkaido, flying at approximately 15,500 feet altitude, Soviet Government authorities having become aware of these facts deliberately dispatched two fighter aircraft to intercept the B-29 over Japanese territory, and continuing under the control of Soviet Government authorities, the two Soviet fighter aircraft thereupon deliberately flew in a course calculated to converge with the course of the B-29 and to intercept it. The two Soviet fighter aircraft were not notified in advance by Soviet authorities to the traffic control authorities in Japan, and they were without any license or authority whatsoever to overfly the territory of Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities then controlling the actions of the aircraft, and the Soviet pilots flying the aircraft, deliberately and willfully, unbeknown to the crew of the B-29 and with a calculated disregard of the sovereignty of Japan, of the position of the United States in Japan, and of the United States defense of Japan, and in violation of the air traffic control regulations lawfully in effect in and over Japan respecting overflight of the territory of Japan, directed the Soviet aircraft westward as described. At 2:15 p. m. local time the two Soviet fighter aircraft, so directed, reached a position in the air space of Hokkaido approximately thirty-two miles west from Yuri Island and six miles north of Nemuro Peninsula over the territorial waters of the Island of Hokkaido, substantially directly above the B-29's position, flying and continuing to fly at a height at which the crew of the B-29 could not then or thereafter observe the presence of the Soviet aircraft but at which the B-29 could be and was continuously observed by the pilots of the Soviet fighter aircraft and undoubtedly by the Soviet authorities controlling the pilots. Then the Soviet fighter aircraft, continuing to act under the direc-

tion and control of the Soviet authorities, proceeded to pace the flight of the B-29 from 2:15 p. m. local time to 2:31 p. m. local time, continuously hovering over the B-29, while the B-29 was engaged in innocent flight over the Island and adjacent waters of Hokkaido within Japan.

At approximately 2:29 p. m. local time the B-29, passing at the end of Nemuro Peninsula of the Island of Hokkaido, was in the process of effecting a normal turn for B-29 type aircraft, in order to enable the B-29 to fly westward and farther into the mainland of Hokkaido; in so doing it came over the water area adjacent to the tip of the Nemuro Peninsula close to the Nosappu Lighthouse there when, undoubtedly upon instructions from the Soviet controlling authorities, the pacing Soviet fighter aircraft dived from their high altitude, behind and unbeknown to the B-29 and its crew, and without any warning whatsoever opened fire on the B-29, with several deliberate and successive bursts. Simultaneously, likewise upon the orders of the competent Soviet authorities, in concert with the pilots in the fighter aircraft, Soviet personnel then stationed on the Island of Yuri east of the Nemuro Peninsula, opened fire upon the B-29 from the ground.

The B-29 was struck by the fire from the fighter aircraft, and by ground fire, was disabled and plunged into the sea, hitting the water at a point between Yuri Island and Akiyuri Island, southwest of Harukarimoshiri Island, all in territory rightfully belonging to Japan. The aircraft, broken up in several parts, exploded as the water was hit and floated as wreckage upon the surface of the water.

Shocked and unable to control the aircraft, the crew of the B-29 called out on voice radio on an international emergency channel that they were in extreme distress, and attempted to abandon the plane in the air. The United States Government has concluded, and charges, that some or all of the crew of the B-29 successfully parachuted to the sea at approximately the position where the aircraft hit the water.

Within a few minutes thereafter, and while the wrecked aircraft and its crew were still on the surface of the sea, a patrol boat belonging to the Soviet Government, upon orders of competent Soviet authorities, left the Island of Suisho, east of the Nosappu Lighthouse and northwest of the position where the B-29 was shot and came down, and proceeded to the scene of the wreckage. The United States Government concludes, and therefore charges, that this was for the purpose of picking up survivors and objects in the debris of the aircraft of possible interest to the Soviet Government. Undoubtedly having accomplished its mission the patrol boat then returned to Suisho Island. The United States Government concludes, and charges, that the Soviet Government's patrol boat did pick up items of interest to the Soviet Government as well as survivors still alive and bodies of other crew members, if dead. Undoubtedly the competent Soviet authorities in the area had and prepared a complete report which was thereafter undoubtedly duly submitted to the appropriate responsible authorities of the Soviet Government. The pilots of the Soviet aircraft involved in the pacing and shooting of the B-29 were, after effecting the destruction of the B-29 as above noted, the United States Government

concludes, and charges, undoubtedly recalled immediately by Soviet ground authorities to base, and thereupon undoubtedly submitted in due course to their superiors in the Soviet Government their reports of their conduct, and such reports, together with all additional reports from informed Soviet authorities in the area, were undoubtedly duly submitted to the appropriate authorities of the Soviet Government.

II

The Soviet Government in its note of October 12, 1952, and in its note of November 24, 1952, replying to the United States Government's note of October 17, 1952, willfully and knowingly made material misstatements of fact with the purpose of creating an untrue record and of misleading the United States Government. Among these misstatements are the following:

A. With respect to the note of October 12, 1952. The United States Government has already pointed out in its reply of October 17, 1952, respects in which the Soviet Government note of October 12 was false and misleading. The United States Government is prepared to prove by evidence in an appropriate forum in particular the following:

1. The note states that the "B-29 bomber violated the state frontier of the USSR in the area of Yuri Island". As the United States Government has frequently and consistently declared, the Soviet Government does not lawfully have a state frontier in the area of Yuri Island. The United States declares again that the territorial rights and sovereignty of Japan before, on and after October 7, 1952, extended and now extend north and east of the mainland of Hokkaido to include the island and area of Yuri and all of the Habomai Islands, up to and including the Island of Shikotan, and their territorial waters.

2. The statement that two Soviet fighters "demanded that the American bomber follow them for a landing to the nearest airdrome" is false and misleading and was known by the Soviet Government to be false and misleading when made. As above set forth, two Soviet fighters were directed to fly and had flown over the Hokkaido territorial waters to a point within the air space of Hokkaido more than twenty-five miles west of the tip of Nemuro Peninsula and deep within Japanese territory; had intercepted the flight path of the B-29, unbeknown to the B-29 crew, and hovering over it followed it around within Japanese territory for at least sixteen minutes, as above noted, knowingly traversing the land mass and adjacent territorial waters of the Nemuro Peninsula of Hokkaido. It is completely false that any communication was sent from the Soviet fighters or other Soviet source to the B-29 on any subject, and it is particularly false that the fighters or any other Soviet source made any requests or demand that the B-29 follow the fighters or that it land at any place, and no airdrome or landing place was ever pointed out to the B-29 by anybody. In fact, as described above, the Soviet fighters deliberately and unlawfully paced the B-29 within the Japanese air space of Hokkaido and then shot at it without any warning whatever and without even first making their presence known to the crew of the B-29.

3. The statement that the B-29 opened fire on the Soviet fighters is completely false and was known by the Soviet Government to be false when made. The only aerial firing which was done in the course of the incident was done by the Soviet fighters, which came out of their concealed positions and attacked and hit the B-29, still innocent of their presence or purposes; and in so emerging from the rear, the Soviet pilots contrived and calculated that the B-29 would have no opportunity for self-defense, even if its crew, contrary to the fact, were able to open defensive fire. Furthermore, the B-29 airplane had, prior to its departure from its base that morning, and in accordance with standard operating procedures, been rendered powerless to engage in effective combat by United States Air Force armorers at the base, and the aircraft remained thereafter continuously so powerless, for the mission of the aircraft was to be performed entirely within the territory of Japan with no reasonable ground for anticipation of meeting hostile or aggressive conditions.

4. The statement that the Soviet fighters engaged in "return fire" is false, and was known by the Soviet Government to be false when made. The only firing which was done was that of the Soviet fighters themselves, aided by a Soviet ground battery, and was all directed against the B-29.

5. The statement that the B-29 after being fired upon, "went off into the direction of the sea" is, except in the respect that the B-29 upon being shot down by Soviet fire fell into the sea at the position above noted, particularly false and was known by the Soviet Government to be false when made. The implication that the Soviet Government was unable to state what happened to the B-29 after it was hit by attacking fire is the more culpable in view of the fact that the destruction of the B-29 took place within the personal view of observing Soviet officials, and the wreckage was immediately visited and examined by the Soviet officials who were on board the patrol boat dispatched from Suisho Island to the scene of the crash, as above described.

B. With respect to the note of November 24, 1952. The United States Government has already in its reply of December 16, 1952, pointed out respects in which the allegations of this note were false. The United States Government is, in particular, prepared to prove by evidence in an appropriate forum the following:

1. The statement that the United States Government acknowledged in the note of October 17 that the B-29 was armed is false. The B-29 was at all relevant times unarmed, its guns having been rendered inoperative by its armorers, as stated above.

2. All the other statements which reiterate the false and misleading averments contained in the Soviet Government's note of October 12, are equally false and misleading, as noted above.

3. The statement that the Soviet Government is not in possession of any information regarding the whereabouts of the crew of the B-29 is false and known by the Soviet Government to be false. Apart from the observations of personnel whom the Soviet Government maintained, unlawfully, on Yuri Island and in that area, the

observations of the Soviet Government personnel on the patrol boat dispatched from Suisho Island, which the United States Government is prepared to prove by evidence as above noted, clearly gave the Soviet Government complete information on these subjects.

III

The United States Government finds, and charges, that the Soviet Government in the foregoing facts was guilty of deliberate and willful violations of international law on account of which it has become liable to the United States Government for damages and other amends:

1. It was unlawful for the Soviet authorities to have dispatched aircraft with intention and instruction to overfly the territory of Japan at any point without first notifying the competent authorities of the United States and receiving permission therefor, as required by regulations and international law.

2. It was unlawful for the Soviet military aircraft to overfly the territory of Hokkaido and to have tarried there, and in the circumstances particularly reprehensible and immoral for the Soviet authorities to conceal from the B-29 aircraft the presence of the two Soviet fighter aircraft over the territory of Japan and to intercept and to pace its flight over the territory of Japan, these being hostile and belligerent acts under international law.

3. It was specifically unlawful for Soviet authorities to have intercepted the B-29 aircraft in the course of the flight at any point, to have attempted to bring it down at any such point, even at the point claimed by Soviet authorities as "the region of Yuri Island".

4. Assuming, contrary to the fact, that the Soviet authorities had any legal justification for seeking to bring the B-29 down to land, these authorities willfully violated all applicable rules of international law, first, in that they failed to give to the B-29 and its crew any prior warning or any prior direction or request to land; secondly, in that they did not lead the B-29 or its crew to an appropriate landing field or point out such a landing field to them; thirdly, in that they did not in the circumstances described give the B-29 or its crew prior warning of intention to fire.

5. It was unlawful, regardless of prior warning or direction to land, for the Soviet authorities either in the air or on the ground to fire on the B-29 under the circumstances mentioned and in the area above mentioned.

6. It was unlawful for the Soviet authorities to have failed to respond truthfully to the United States Government's request of October 17, 1952 with respect to survivors; in particular it was the duty of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government of the findings of fact reported or made by the patrol boat officers and by other local Soviet authorities. To the extent that it was determined by Soviet authorities that members of the crew were alive, it was the duty of the Soviet Government so to inform the United States Government and make arrangements for their return. On the other hand if any crew members were found to be dead it was the duty of the Soviet Government so to inform the United States Government and to make arrangements to make return of the bodies. It is still, and has continuously been,

the duty of the Soviet Government to keep the United States Government currently informed of all facts in Soviet possession concerning the crew members, to facilitate access to them by appropriate representatives of the United States Government, to arrange for their return and to provide them with the maximum degree of care and comfort in the interim.

7. It was unlawful for the Soviet Government to have retained any portion of the aircraft or the equipment thereon without the consent and agreement of the United States Government; and since no such consent or agreement has been granted by the United States Government it is the duty of the Soviet Government to return to the United States Government any portions of the aircraft or equipment thereon which were salvaged by the Soviet authorities. The United States Government demands that this return be made forthwith.

For all these violations of international law the Soviet Government is liable to the United States as set forth herein.

IV

The Soviet Government in its notes of October 12 and November 24, 1952 has made certain assertions with regard to an alleged state frontier of the Soviet Union in the area where the B-29 was shot down. The United States Government denies that these assertions are valid, and the United States Government is prepared to demonstrate the validity of its position by evidence and by considerations of international law in any appropriate forum.

In its note of November 24, 1952, the Soviet Government particularly states that the United States position that Yuri Island, at or east of which the Soviet Government apparently claims a state frontier of the Soviet Union, is not lawfully Soviet territory is "in crude contradiction with the provisions of the Yalta agreement concerning the Kurile Islands which was signed by the Government of the United States of America." The United States Government, reiterating its denial of validity to the Soviet Government statement, takes this opportunity to declare the following:

The United States Government is aware that military forces of the Soviet Government were physically present, together with their military equipment, on or near Yuri Island and in adjacent positions among the Habomai Islands on October 7, 1952, and prior thereto following the surrender of the Japanese Government to the Allied Powers. But this presence, in its origination and its continuance, and particularly after the effective date of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan, April 28, 1952, was without any justification in international law or in morals, was in deliberate violation of the terms of the Japanese Surrender and of the agreement regarding surrender and occupation of Japan between the Soviet Government and the Allied Powers, gave the Soviet Government no legal right, title or interest in this area and provided the Soviet Government with no privilege or justification for the actions taken by it on October 7, 1952, against the B-29 and its crew, as described above.

More particularly, the United States Government states, in reply to the Soviet Government's assertions:

1. No disposition having the legal force and effect of alienating from Japan the Habomai Islands, including the area in which occurred the wrongful actions of the Soviet Government on October 7, 1952, as above detailed, has ever taken place. Such disposition could be made only by or with the consent of the Japanese Government, and no such consent has ever been given. The only renunciation by the Japanese Government of territory north of Hokkaido was by the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Allied Powers of September 8, 1951, and in this document the Government of Japan did not relinquish Japanese sovereignty over the area involved in the acts of the Soviet Government complained of herein, nor does it confer or recognize any right in the Soviet Government with respect thereto.

The United States Government both on the occasion of the signing of the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty and on the occasion of the consent by the United States Senate to their ratification by the President of the United States, as required by the Constitution of the United States of America, and the President by his ratification, made clear that the Habomai Islands were to be considered as continuing to belong to Japanese sovereignty. The United States Senate declared:

"As part of such advice and consent the Senate states that nothing the treaty contains is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the Allied Powers as defined in said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the Island of Shikotan, or any other territory, rights, or interests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941, or to confer any right, title or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union."

The Government of Japan has likewise officially characterized the Habomai Islands and Shikotan as remaining under Japanese sovereignty and as not included in the phrase "Kurile Islands" as used in the Treaty of Peace.

No other action or conduct by the Government of Japan, or by the United States Government or by the Allied Powers signatory to the Peace Treaty, has been taken which has the legal effect of transferring or consenting to the transfer of sovereignty over the area of Yuri Island and other Habomai Islands, or of Shikotan, to the Soviet Government.

2. The statement of the Soviet Government that the United States position that Yuri Island is not lawfully part of Soviet state territory is in "contradiction" with the "Yalta agreement concerning the Kurile Islands, which was signed by the Government of the United States of America" is untrue.

(a) The geographical name "Kurile Islands", in the context of the Treaty of Peace and in the context of the Yalta Agreement to which the Soviet Government refers, does not include and it was not intended by the parties thereto to include, the Island of Yuri, which is a part of the Habomai Islands, all of which were and are separate and apart from the Kurile Islands.

(b) The Yalta Agreement regarding Japan of February 11, 1945 was not intended to and did not contain any provision by which the Soviet Government became entitled unilaterally to seize, occupy, or exercise sovereignty over, or to become entitled to possess, any Japanese territory

whatever, neither the Kurile Islands, nor the Habomai Islands nor any other area, and in particular not that area of the sea, land and air space of Japan in which the United States B-29 aircraft was intercepted, tracked and shot down by Soviet fighter aircraft, as recited above.

The Yalta Agreement was, as the Soviet Government has at all times well known, a memorandum expressing the views of the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each acting within his Government's constitutional powers and limitations, respecting a proposal by the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that in the event of the Soviet Government's entrance to the war against Japan, jointly with the other Allied Powers, the Soviet Government should, in the final peace settlement terminating the war, be supported in a claim for the return to the Soviet Government of certain Japanese territory formerly owned by the Czarist Government of Russia. Provisions of the memorandum were subsequently reflected in the terms of surrender proclaimed by the Allied Powers, with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet Government and its subsequent adherence, to the Government and people of Japan, accepted by the Government of Japan in the document of surrender. The Treaty of Peace with Japan duly and solemnly signed and ratified by the parties thereto was intended to constitute the final peace settlement envisaged by the parties to the Yalta Agreement on Japan of February 11, 1945; and so far as concerns any relevant undertakings which the United States Government may have made under that Agreement the Treaty of Peace with Japan constitutes the full performance of such undertakings.

(c) The provisions of the Yalta Agreement and the intentions of the parties thereto were made clear not only in the Treaty of Peace but in the intermediate proclamations of policy by the Allied Powers.

These documents provided that in the event of Japanese surrender "Japan would not lose access to raw material areas", Japan would be stripped only of the Islands "which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914", and "be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed", and the Allies proclaimed that they "covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion".

The Island of Yuri and its territorial waters, as well as all the Habomai Islands and the Island of Shikotan and their territorial waters, including all the area in which the wrongful actions of the Soviet Government on October 7, 1952, as above detailed, took place, did not and were not intended to fall within territory to be detached from Japanese sovereignty by the Treaty of Peace, by the Yalta Agreement or any other policy formulation of the Allied Powers for the reasons that;

(i) The Habomai and Shikotan Islands were at no time within the sovereignty of the Czarist Government of Russia or of the Soviet Government, or ever claimed by them at any time prior to the unlawful unilateral seizure of them by the Soviet Government. On the contrary, they were from ancient times territory of Japan, never

taken by violence or greed, always occupied by Japanese people, an integral portion of the Japanese patrimony, and were so recognized by the Soviet Government and its predecessor governments at all relevant times prior to the unlawful unilateral seizure above described;

(li) The Islands and waters in the area described constituted, and of necessity still constitute, an integral portion of the economic resources of the Japanese people, containing traditional domestic fisheries from which the Japanese people have derived their economic subsistence and they constitute, and have from ancient times constituted, normal sea routes for the internal commerce of Japan.

3. The United States Government declares that the unilateral seizure and continued occupation of the Habomai Islands and Shikotan, and the area adjacent thereto, by forces of the Soviet Government, and the government thereof as if they were within the sovereignty of the Soviet Union and removed from the sovereignty of Japan, constitute flagrant violations by the Soviet Government of the terms of the Yalta Agreement regarding Japan of February 11, 1945, mentioned above; of the terms of the Cairo Declaration of the Allied Powers of December 1, 1943, and of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, setting forth the terms of surrender offered to the Government of Japan to all three of which the Soviet Government adhered by its declaration of August 9, 1945; and of the Soviet Government's Declaration of War against Japan of August 9, 1945, and of the terms of acceptance of the Allied Surrender Terms by the Japanese Government of August 14, 1945. The United States Government declares that the Soviet Government, by its foregoing commitments, solemnly pledged that no territory would be taken from Japan except in the diplomatic process of a treaty of peace with all the Allied Powers, that the Soviet Government did not covet any gain for itself and had no thought of territorial expansion and would not claim or take from Japan any territory which Japan had not taken by violence and greed.

The United States Government further declares that regardless of the rights, if any, which the Soviet Government might claim with respect to the Kurile Islands, it had and has no valid claim whatever by virtue of the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945, or otherwise, to the Habomai Islands, including Yuri Island and Shikotan and their territorial waters, and the area in which the unlawful actions took place on October 7, 1952, as above described, were committed by the Soviet Government; but it was the affirmative duty, for the violation of which it is legally liable to the United States, as well as to Japan, not to attack, obstruct or interfere with the performance by the United States Government of its functions under the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement thereto.

The United States Government does not deem it necessary to dwell at this time upon the various aspects in which the Soviet Government has further callously violated the various obligations assumed by it in the course of the discussions by the heads of state at the Yalta Conference reflected in the Yalta Agreement, and particularly

the terms expressed and implied as to the Soviet Government's association with the Allied Powers in the war against Japan, its adherence to the Allied Surrender Terms, the character of its participation in the occupation of Japan following the surrender, and its adherence to the final Treaty of Peace, and the fact that by virtue of its reprehensible conduct in these regards the Soviet Government would in any event disentitle itself to any territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Japan and the Japanese people.

4. The United States further declares that the unilateral seizure and continued occupation and exercise of sovereignty over the Habomai Islands and the area adjacent thereto by the Soviet forces, and the actions of October 7, 1952, described above, were and have been carried out by the Soviet Government with the purpose and effect of harrying the Japanese people; of hampering their opportunities to make a living from their traditional fisheries in the sea as has been their ancient and inalienable right; of preventing normal commerce with and within Japan; of hampering domestic police activities necessary for the exercise of full responsibility and sovereignty over the Islands of Japan by the Japanese Government as well as the defense thereof with the assistance of the United States Government; and of intimidating the Government and people of Japan. Neither the United States Government nor any authorized representative thereto, in the Yalta Agreement or otherwise, has ever consented directly or indirectly to this immoral and unlawful deprivation of the Japanese people by a foreign power.

5. The United States Government further declares that nothing in the Treaty of Peace, the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945, or any other valid international act, document or disposition, provided any justification for the actions taken by the Soviet Government with respect to the B-29 aircraft described above, including the refusal of the Soviet Government to provide the United States with true information concerning the incident and the fate of the crew, as described above.

V

The United States has suffered the following items of damage in direct consequence of the foregoing illegal acts and violations of duty for which the Soviet Government is responsible, and the United States Government demands that the Soviet Government pay to it the following sums on account thereof:

1. The United States Air Force airplane B-29, No. 44-61815, and its contents at the time of its destruction on October 7, 1952, valued in total at \$919,984.01.

2. Damages to the United States by the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government, \$300,311.

3. Damages to the next of kin, nationals of the United States, for the deaths of the crew members resulting from the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government or for the willful and unlawful withholding by the Soviet Government of such members of the crew as survived, \$400,000.

TOTAL \$1,620,295.01

The United States Government declares that its demand for compensation on account of the members of the crew

who survived does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the withholding of those crew members from return to the United States Government, or the suppression by the Soviet Government of information regarding their whereabouts or welfare or the making of false statements by the Soviet Government with respect thereto; and the United States takes this opportunity again to demand that the Soviet Government forthwith provide the information in this regard which has been requested by the United States Government, and make provision for the prompt return of any crew members whom it may still be holding or of whose whereabouts it is informed, and in the interim to provide them with the maximum degree of care and comfort and facilitate access to them by appropriate representatives of the United States Government. The United States Government further reserves the right to make additional demand upon the Soviet Government for amends and other actions on account of its conduct on or since October 7, 1952, with respect to such survivors.

Furthermore, the United States has not included in its demand for damages, specified above, any sum on account of the items of intangible injury deliberately and intentionally caused to the United States Government and the American people, and to the Government of Japan and the Japanese people, by the wrongful actions of the Soviet Government. The United States Government in this regard has determined to defer to a future date the formulation of the kind and measure of redress or other action which the Soviet Government should take which would be appropriate in international law and practice to confirm the illegality of the actions directed by the Soviet Government against the United States Government and the American people, and to defer to the Government of Japan the matter of the liability of the Soviet Government for actions directed by the Soviet Government against the Government of Japan and the Japanese people.

The Government of the United States calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly to make its detailed answer to the allegations and demands made in this communication. Should the Soviet Government in its answer acknowledge its indebtedness to the United States on account of the foregoing and agree to pay the damages suffered and to comply with the demands as above set forth, the United States Government is prepared, if requested, to present detailed evidence in support of its calculations of damages suffered and alleged. If, however, the Soviet Government contests liability, it is requested so to state in its answer. In the latter event, the Soviet Government is hereby notified that the United States Government deems an international dispute to exist falling within the competence of the International Court of Justice and that the United States Government proposes that that dispute be presented for hearing and decision in the International Court of Justice. Since it appears that the Soviet Government has thus far not filed with that Court any declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the United States Government invites the Soviet Government to file an appropriate declaration with the Court, or to enter into a Special Agreement, by which the Court may be empowered in accordance with its Statute and Rules to deter-

mine the issues of fact and law which have been set forth herein; and the Soviet Government is requested to inform the United States Government in its reply to the present note of its intentions with respect to such a declaration or Special Agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

U.S. Requests Repatriation of Noel, Herta, and Hermann Field

NOTE TO HUNGARY

Press release 535 dated September 28

Following is the text of a note delivered on September 28 to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Legation at Budapest concerning the arrest and imprisonment of Noel and Herta Field:

The Legation of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on instructions of the United States Government has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note of December 7, 1949 alleging that none of the American citizens Noel, Herta and Hermann Field had been in Hungary since the preceding May. In this connection the United States Government wishes to inform the Hungarian Government that the former Deputy Chief of Department Ten of the Polish Ministry of Public Security (MBP), Jozef Swiatlo has revealed the following information:

Prior to the Rajk trial, General Roman Romkowski and Swiatlo traveled from Warsaw to Budapest in an effort to gather evidence against certain Polish nationals who were thought to have been involved in the Rajk "affair" and to be associated with the Noel Field whom the Hungarians were linking with the Rajk "conspiracy". In Budapest Romkowski and Swiatlo were introduced to Gabor Peter (then head of the Hungarian Police) and his assistant, Colonel Istvan Szues. The case was discussed with Szues and it was decided which of the witnesses would be interrogated.

Swiatlo remained in Budapest twelve days. During this time it was learned how the Hungarian authorities had brought Noel and Herta Field

under custody to Budapest when they disappeared in the summer of 1949. In addition to other witnesses, the Hungarian authorities made the Fields available to Romkowski and Swiatlo for interrogation. Noel and Herta Field were interrogated separately by Swiatlo at the AVH (State Security Authority) Building in Budapest where the Fields were imprisoned. Noel Field stated to Swiatlo that he had not engaged in espionage but was gathering information for a book about the countries of the so-called People's Democracy.

In view of this information that Noel and Herta Field were imprisoned and interrogated in Hungary the United States Government requests immediate consular access to these American citizens and the conclusion of arrangements for their repatriation at the earliest possible date.

NOTE TO POLAND

Press release 536 dated September 28

Following is the text of a note delivered on September 28 to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Warsaw concerning the arrest and imprisonment of the American citizen, Hermann Field:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on instructions of the United States Government has the honor to refer to the Embassy's repeated communications to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the welfare and whereabouts of the American citizen, Hermann Field, who disappeared after entering the Warsaw airport on August 22, 1949. Bearing in mind that the Ministry has never given a satisfactory reply to the Embassy's numerous representations in this matter, the United States Government wishes to inform the Polish Government that the former Deputy Chief of Department Ten of the Polish Ministry of Public Security (MBP), Jozef Swiatlo has revealed the following information:

While Hermann Field was in Prague in August 1949 he called Helena Syrkus, a well-known Polish architect, and Mela Granowska, a branch chief in the Personnel Section of the Ministry of Energy, at Warsaw and asked them to assist him in obtaining a visa for entry into Poland. These calls were reported to the Ministry of Public Security whose

head, General Stanislaw Radkiewicz, knew that the Hungarians were preparing the Rajk trial and that Noel Field would be implicated in this trial. It was decided that Hermann Field should be permitted to come to Poland in order that he might be exploited in this connection. After President Boleslaw Bierut had approved, Granowska telephoned Hermann Field at Prague and told him that she would try to obtain a visa for him. Granowska also said that he should plan to stay with her while he was in Poland. Hermann Field then arrived at Warsaw and was escorted by Granowska to visit Helena Syrkus and Colonel Leon Gecow.

Preparations were made to arrest Hermann Field when he went to the Warsaw airport to take a plane for Prague. Swiatlo was told by General Roman Romkowski, Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Public Security, that President Bierut himself issued instructions for the arrest. The Chief of Intelligence of the Border Control Organization (WOP) and the WOP officer in charge of the Warsaw airport were informed of the event to take place.

Hermann Field was escorted to the airport by Helena Syrkus and Mela Granowska. Helena Syrkus left the airport first, followed by Granowska, and after the latter's departure Hermann Field passed through customs. He then entered the waiting room where those about to leave are obliged to remain until the departure of their plane. At this point he was called from the waiting room into the WOP office and arrested. The Ministry of Public Security had waited until this moment in order to permit Hermann Field officially to pass through customs and officially be listed as a passenger on the Czechoslovak Airlines plane bound for Prague.

The arrest was made by Swiatlo, who invited Hermann Field to accompany him to a waiting car held in readiness by an assistant and a chauffeur. Hermann Field went with Swiatlo to the automobile and, together with the assistant and chauffeur, they drove to a place of detention at Miedzeszyn maintained by Department Ten of the Ministry of Public Security.

It is known that Lieutenant Colonel Piasecki of that Department conducted a thorough interrogation of Hermann Field. Officials of the Ministry of Public Security recognized that no evidence was uncovered that he was a spy or had conducted

espionage on behalf of the American Government and concluded that he should be considered innocent and be protected. It is further known that Hermann Field continues to be in prison at Miedzeszyn, Poland.

In view of the foregoing information the United States Government requests immediate consular access to this American citizen and the conclusion of arrangements for his repatriation at the earliest possible date.

Agreement on Payment of Costs for Works at Niagara Falls

Following are the texts of notes exchanged with Canada on September 13 constituting an agreement for establishing procedures for the payment of expenditures on remedial works at Niagara Falls.¹

TEXT OF CANADIAN NOTE

No. X-233

OTTAWA, September 13, 1954,

SIR: I have the honour to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our two Governments with respect to the construction of remedial works at Niagara Falls. As Article II of the Convention between the United States and Canada signed on February 27, 1950, concerning uses of the waters of the Niagara River provides that "the total cost of the works shall be divided equally between the United States of America and Canada", the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States consider it desirable that 50 per cent of the cost of the remedial works at Niagara Falls completed by or on behalf of the other Government shall be paid by or on behalf of such other Government as work progresses.

I have the honour to propose, therefore, that our two Governments agree as follows:

(a) The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States shall each bear 50 per cent of the cost of the remedial works at Niagara Falls done by or on behalf of the other Government as work progresses. Monthly statements

of expenditures and payments to cover them in the funds of the country performing the work shall be exchanged between the agents of the two countries as indicated below. Adjustments will be made from time to time as required.

(b) In order to facilitate administration, payments by the United States Government shall be made directly to The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, through the office of the Project Manager, Sir Adam Beck-Niagara Generating Station No. 2, Niagara Falls, Ontario, acting on behalf of the Government of the Province of Ontario, which, under an Agreement dated March 27, 1950, made between the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario, has assumed the obligations of the Government of Canada in respect of the Canadian share of the cost of the remedial works to be constructed pursuant to Article II of the Niagara Treaty. Payments to the United States Government by The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario shall be made to "The Treasurer of the United States" and be forwarded to the District Engineer, Buffalo, New York, District of the Corps of Engineers. In order to comply with the provisions of Article II of the Niagara Treaty, the receipts to be given for each payment made by The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario to the United States Corps of Engineers, and *vice versa*, shall constitute a full and sufficient discharge of the financial obligations of the two Governments under the Treaty in respect of each such payment. In addition a final discharge of financial obligations shall be made between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States when payments for all costs of the remedial works have been completed.

(c) Data in support of claims for reimbursements incurred for the period covered shall be made available by the Government of the United States through the District Office of the United States Corps of Engineers in Buffalo, New York, and by the Government of Canada through The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, Office of the Project Manager, Sir Adam Beck-Niagara Generating Station No. 2, Niagara Falls, Ontario.

(d) This arrangement shall remain in force until all payments have been completed and the final discharge of financial obligations referred to above has been made by an exchange of notes. It is understood that the arrangements herein set forth for the procedure respecting payment of amounts due Canada are subject to the appropriation by the Congress of the funds required to pay such disbursements.

If the Government of the United States is agreeable to the foregoing proposals, I suggest that the present Note and your reply to that effect should

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 1, 1953, p. 783; Aug. 10, 1953, p. 184; and June 21, 1954, p. 954.

constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall take effect this day.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

L. B. PEARSON
*Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

DON C. BLISS, Esq.,
*Chargé d'Affaires a. i.,
Embassy of the United States
of America,
Ottawa.*

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

UNITED STATES EMBASSY,
Ottawa, September 13, 1954.

No. 48

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note No. X-233 of September 13, 1954, in which you make proposals concerning the procedure to be followed in the payment of expenditures incurred by or on behalf of the respective Governments for work performed at Niagara Falls pursuant to Article II of the convention between the United States and Canada signed on February 27, 1950 concerning the uses of the waters of the Niagara River.

I have the honor to state that the Government of the United States concurs in these proposals and agrees that your note and the present reply shall constitute an agreement between our Governments establishing procedures to be followed with respect to disbursement of funds in payment for expenditures on construction of remedial works at Niagara Falls.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DON C. BLISS

The Honorable

LESTER B. PEARSON,
*Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.*

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Conference on Education and Farming

The Department of State announced on October 4 (press release 552) that the U.S. Government would be represented at the Technical Conference

on Education and Small Scale Farming in Relation to Community Development, to be held at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, October 6-15, 1954, by the following delegation:

Delegates

Jane Franseth, Specialist for Rural Schools, Division of State and Local School Systems, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Luis A. Suarez, Leader of the Agricultural Economics and Cooperative Project, Federal Extension Service, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, P. R.

Adviser

Theo Lafayette Vaughan, Community Development Adviser, U.S.-Foa Mission to British Guiana, Georgetown, British Guiana

This Conference is being held under the joint sponsorship of the Caribbean Commission and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and has been called as a result of a recommendation by the Fifth Session of the West Indian Conference (Jamaica 1952). Its conclusions will form the basis for the documentation for the Sixth Session of the West Indian Conference (San Juan, May 1955).

The interrelationship between the problems of small-scale farming and education will be dealt with in the following subjects: (a) the social and economic background of the problems; (b) the school in its relation to the community; (c) problems of small-scale farming; and (d) education for community development. Field trips will be arranged by the Secretariat of the Caribbean Commission in consultation with the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, and evening seminars will be held on questions relating to agriculture and education.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Commodities—Wheat

Agreement revising and renewing the international wheat agreement of 1949 (TIAS 1957). Dated at Washington April 13, 1953. Entered into force July 15, 1953 with respect to Parts 1, 3, 4, and 5; and August 1, 1953 with respect to Part 2. TIAS 2799.

Acceptance deposited: Brazil, September 13, 1954.

Cultural Institutions and Objects

Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and Regulations of Execution. Concluded at The Hague May 14, 1954; open for signa-

ture until December 31, 1954. Enters into force three months after deposit of five instruments of ratification. Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Concluded at The Hague May 14, 1954; open for signature until December 31, 1954. Enters into force three months after deposit of five instruments of ratification.

Signatures to convention:

United States	Italy ¹
Andorra	Libya ¹
Australia	Luxembourg ¹
Belgium (ad referendum) ¹	Monaco ¹
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	Netherlands ¹
China ¹	Nicaragua ¹
Cuba	Norway (ad referendum) ¹
Czechoslovakia	Philippines
Ecuador ¹	Poland
El Salvador ¹	Portugal
France ¹	Rumania
Federal Republic of Germany ¹	San Marino ¹
Greece ¹	Spain
Hungary	Syria ¹
India ¹	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Iran (ad referendum) ¹	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Iraq ¹	Uruguay ¹
Ireland	Yugoslavia ¹
Israel	

Labor

Convention (No. 74) concerning the certification of able seamen. Adopted at Seattle June 29, 1946. Entered into force July 14, 1951; for the United States April 9, 1954. TIAS 2949.

Ratification registered: Poland, April 13, 1954.

Peace Treaties

Treaty of peace with Japan. Signed at San Francisco September 8, 1951. Entered into force April 28, 1952. TIAS 2490.

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, September 23, 1954.

Postal Matters

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, provisions regarding airmail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.

Ratification deposited: Hungary, September 3, 1954.²

Trieste

Memorandum of understanding between the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia regarding the Free Territory of Trieste,

¹ Also signed protocol.

² Ratification confirmed statement made at time of signature of Final Protocol.

with two annexes. Initialed at London October 5, 1954. Entered into force October 5, 1954.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950.³

Adherence deposited: Germany, September 3, 1954.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement relating to the payment of costs of remedial work at Niagara Falls pursuant to Article II of the treaty of February 27, 1950 (TIAS 2130) relating to uses of waters of the Niagara River. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa September 13, 1954. Entered into force September 13, 1954.

El Salvador

Agreement providing for a United States Army Mission to El Salvador. Signed at San Salvador September 23, 1954. Will enter into force on date the United States receives written notification that the agreement is approved by El Salvador.

Mexico

Agreement approving memoranda of understanding by the Mexico-United States Commission for prevention of foot-and-mouth disease to provide financing for Commission operations. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 12, 1953 and July 30, 1954. Entered into force July 30, 1954.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of November 18 and December 13, 1952 (TIAS 2331), as amended, relating to the recruitment of Philippine citizens for voluntary enlistment into the United States Navy. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila September 2, 1954. Entered into force September 2, 1954.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to claims for compensation arising from the use of the practice bombing range near Cuxhaven, Germany. Exchange of letters at Bonn July 15 and 21, 1954. Entered into force July 21, 1954.

³ Not in force for the United States.

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No.	Date	Subject
547	10/4	Dulles: Return from London Conference. (See BULLETIN of Oct. 11.)
*548	10/4	Hoover sworn in as Under Secretary.
549	10/4	Hoover statement.
*550	10/4	Wales: Swearing-in ceremony.
551	10/4	Wriston Committee reconvened.
552	10/4	U.S. delegation to farming conference.
553	10/5	Dulles: Statement on Trieste agreement.
554	10/5	Agreement on Trieste.
*555	10/5	Hill: Swearing-in ceremony.
556	10/6	Dulles: Message to Martino.
557	10/6	Dulles: Message to Popovic.
*558	10/6	Program for MacDonald visit.
†559	10/6	U.S. delegation to Pan American Sanitary Conference.
*560	10/6	Robertson: Death of Ozaki.
†561	10/7	Cale: Economic situation in Latin America.
*562	10/8	Foreign Service memorial to be rededicated.
†563	10/8	Key: World security and Wno.
*564	10/8	Gallman: Swearing-in ceremony.
†566	10/9	Claim against U.S.S.R. for B-50.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala

Publication 5556

35 cents

Nearly 100 pages of official statements and documents tell the story of the recent intervention of the international Communist movement in Guatemala.

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Part Two represents a case history of a bold attempt on the part of international communism to get a foothold in the Western Hemisphere by gaining control of the political institutions of an American Republic. The situation in Guatemala has changed since this document was prepared. Nevertheless, it is the view of the Government of the United States that the facts in this document constitute a grim lesson to all nations and peoples which desire to maintain their independence.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 800

October 25, 1954



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NOV 24 1954



The Department of State bulletin

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October 25, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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The Common Destiny of the Americas

by John C. Dreier

U.S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States¹

It is particularly suitable that the Miami celebration of Columbus Day pay special attention to the common bond which the United States shares with the peoples of the other American Republics on this "birthday" of our continent.

San Salvador, or Watlings Island—the first piece of land touched by the discoverer early in the moonlit morning hours of October 12, 1492—lies some 400 miles to the southeast of here. Had it not been for a flock of birds, Columbus' course might have led him ultimately to the shores of Florida. We might then be celebrating this evening on the spot which the Admiral of the Ocean Seas had touched himself.

A few days before the discovery—up to October 7, to be exact—Columbus was following a westward course, which in fact aimed almost directly at Miami. The records tell us that on that date he saw a great flight of birds heading toward the southwest—no doubt one of the great annual fall migrations with which we are familiar today. Columbus shifted his course halfway to the southwest on the theory that the birds must be headed for land. If he had not done so, at least one historian who is also a mariner of note maintains, Columbus would probably have passed through the northern Bahamas, entered the Gulf Stream, and been carried up the Florida east coast.

Had Columbus' powerful imagination and vision extended to a comprehension of the charms of this part of the world, I am sure he would have disregarded the sign of the flying birds. However, as thankful citizens of this New World,

we may forgive this lapse in his otherwise masterful genius and celebrate his coming as though he had in fact set foot on these golden shores.

This little incident of the birds and its possible effect upon history is not only an amusing tale. It seems to me also to represent the many vagaries, uncertainties, errors, arguments, and difficulties with which Columbus and his venture were surrounded.

Over the years, as he sailed the seas of the eastern Atlantic and studied the calculations of the leading geographers of his own time and of centuries past, Columbus formulated a great plan which he called the "Enterprise of the Indies." Popular belief to the contrary, educated men in Columbus' day recognized that the world was round. But, while to others this was largely a matter for academic discussion, to Columbus it became a challenge to action. Why not take advantage of this fact, he argued, and sail across the sea to the other side of the world where inevitably one would come upon Cipangu (Japan) and the territories of the Great Khan? Thus would be opened up a new trade route to the riches of the Indies, as the whole of Asia was at that time called. And in the process of sailing this hitherto unknown portion of the sea, who knows, he asked, whether one might not encounter an island or two which would make a convenient stopping place before the Indies were reached, and of which one would, of course, become the royal governor?

Like many another man with a project to put over, Columbus first had to overcome the experts. For years the eminent scholars whose advice was sought by the Spanish crown declared that the Enterprise of the Indies was impractical and based upon false calculations. And the strange thing

¹Address made before the Miami Citizens Committee for the Inter-American Observance of Columbus Day, at Miami, Fla., on Oct. 11 (press release 565).

about it is that they apparently were right—or at least less incorrect than Columbus. They declared his idea of a narrow sea between Spain and China or Japan was an underestimation; that the ocean was really much greater than Columbus figured; and that the opposite shore was beyond the range of contemporary sailing vessels. Little did they know how right they were—but, of course, what neither they nor Columbus suspected was that America lay on the way.

Columbus finally appeared to have won the acquiescence if not the support of the experts and then had to wrestle with politics. After years of waiting, much of it spent in conditions of great poverty, he received his hearing before Queen Isabella and was turned down. Then there intervened one of those turns of fate of which we have no explainable cause. On his way from the Spanish court toward France, where he hoped to receive a better response, he was overtaken and ordered back. The Queen had changed her mind and determined to set the *Enterprise* of the Indies afloat.

Then, the ships made ready, came the voyage itself. Farther west sailed the caravels than any man had ever sailed before; mythical islands appeared and disappeared as false landfalls were made. Having gone far beyond his estimated distance, Columbus himself believed he had missed Japan.

Then came the increasing impatience of the men cooped up on these tiny vessels—more false landfalls—the command “*Adelante—sail on!*”—the final promise to turn back in three days more if no land were sighted; and that night the glimpse of a light (was it real, or merely the last false illusion of success?) and then at 2:00 a. m. on October 12 the cry of “*tierra! tierra!*,” when not a new route to Asia but a New World came into being.

Through all these incidents reflecting the limitations of human mind and body there emerges as the responsible factor of success the great personality and character of Columbus. Fired with a vision, deep in the faith that he would succeed, his inspired pursuit of a grandly conceived, though not entirely accurate, goal led to a triumphant and world-shaking reality.

And so today we celebrate the 462d anniversary of the discovery. We honor Columbus, the man, whose faith and courage brought into being a

New World and whose personal triumph provided a bridge from the dying Middle Ages to the new era of hope, discovery, and enlightenment which followed thereafter.

The discovery is, of course, the first great historical fact which all the peoples of North and South America share in common. Through it, all of America is linked to the motherland of Western Europe and its civilization.

Following Columbus, as decades and centuries passed, a great wave of population moved in increasing numbers across the Atlantic. Like Columbus himself, the settlers of America were motivated by a number of different impulses—religious faith and ambition for material gain being prominent among them. But of increasing importance to those who came to the New World was a desire for freedom to work out a way of life of their own choosing.

Continental Unity

Thus, after some three centuries of colonization, America began to become conscious of a character of its own. Whereas it had been—except for conquered native populations—dependent upon Europe culturally, economically, and politically, by the end of the 18th and early 19th centuries America became conscious of its differences from Europe. This sense of difference was soon translated into political independence.

The second great historical bond that unites the Americas is, therefore, the achievement of their independence. Through this act the European settlements of colonial times became in fact the New World of modern times.

The consciousness of a common destiny as nations of a New World has been for 150 years one of the main ingredients of the mortar which has bound our countries together. Americans of all nations have shared the opportunity which the New World has been given to get rid of the rivalries and enmities which had led European countries to repeated warfare and to establish on this continent a community of nations that could live in peaceful cooperation with each other.

Americans, North and South, have sought their destiny in creating a society of free men, based upon the recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual human being, casting off the rigid class distinctions and hampering traditions which characterized Old World society. A richer life,

measured not only in material but in cultural and spiritual terms, became the goal which Americans have by common consent set themselves to achieve.

It was this spirit of Americanism which led to the gradual development of what we have called the inter-American system and its instrument, the Organization of American States. It was a sense of relationship with Latin America, as part of a greater America, that led to the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. A similar continental concept inspired the ambitions of the great liberators of Latin America. Simon Bolívar, when he called a conference in Panama in 1826, envisaged a federation of Latin American countries as a step toward a united continent including the United States.

Again in 1889 it was a sense of continental unity which led the Government of the United States to call the first Pan American Conference, thus setting in motion the uninterrupted series of conferences which form the main consultative body of the Organization of American States, the tenth of which was held this year in Caracas, Venezuela.

When the Ninth Inter-American Conference met in Bogotá in 1948 to draft a new constitutional document, the representatives of the 21 Republics set forth the purposes and principles of the Organization. These purposes may be summarized under two main headings: first, the maintenance of the peace and security of the Americas to prevent aggression from any source and protect the freedom and sovereignty of every member state; and second, cooperation in working out common problems in order to promote the economic, social, and cultural welfare of all peoples of these 21 countries.

"Enterprise of the Americas"

Paraphrasing Columbus' original proposal, we may call this common effort of American nations the "Enterprise of the Americas."

We can point with pride to past achievements in regard to both the great purposes to which our enterprise is dedicated. But, like the Enterprise of the Indies, our Enterprise of the Americas has encountered many difficulties and still faces problems of a future not yet clear.

In the field of peace and security we can take justifiable pride in the growing sense of mutual responsibility that has developed over the past 100 years. When the United States issued the Monroe

Doctrine in 1823, we expressed our unilateral concern over any possible efforts to reestablish colonies or to reintroduce European political systems on this continent. By the early part of this century we had declared our intention to act in situations where intervention by a non-American power in the affairs of other American countries was threatened in order to forestall such intervention. But gradually this assumption by one country of a unilateral responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security was converted into an assumption by all 21 countries of a common responsibility. This great development was reflected in the principle adopted at the Conference of Chapultepec in Mexico in 1945, that an attack against one American State would be considered an attack against all.

This principle was incorporated in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, which provides for mutual assistance among the American States in the event of an armed attack and consultation in regard to any other form of aggression. The success of the regional machinery established in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro for the prevention of aggression has been demonstrated on more than one occasion. As a companion piece to this treaty, there has also been drafted another agreement setting forth methods for the peaceful solution of international disputes among the American States. Although this second treaty has not yet reached the point of approval by a majority of the American Republics, consideration is now being given to the desirability of revising the treaty to remove some of the obstacles which have impeded ratification. In any event the principles, procedures, and practice of peaceful settlement are so firmly established among the American States that they constitute one of the basic assumptions of our international code of conduct.

Yet we cannot by any means view with complete equanimity the present situation in this continent with respect to the maintenance of peace and security. For the main danger which America faces today is, as dangers so often are, of a new sort—the danger of aggression by subversion of political institutions in the interests of a foreign power. We have a new kind of foe to cope with, and new and more effective means of defense must be found.

Caracas Conference

An important beginning to devise a stronger system of peace and security in the face of this

danger was made at the Caracas Conference held last March. There, interpreting the principle of unity in defense against aggression, the American States declared that the domination or control of political institutions of an American State by the international Communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of the Americas, and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider appropriate action.² It was on the basis of this principle that the American States last June, following some sensational developments in the Republic of Guatemala, called for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the situation created by Communist infiltration in that country. The Foreign Ministers were about to meet when a successful revolution in Guatemala overthrew the Communist-penetrated government there.

The outcome of the Guatemalan case should not, however, lead us to think either that the general problem has been eliminated from the Americas or that the means of protecting American political institutions have been clearly developed. More constructive thought is needed to understand the nature of the Communist threat to America and methods whereby unity of America may be evoked in defense against it. Certainly vigilance and a readiness to expose and control subversive activities are required. The role of international organizations in this respect must be more clearly thought out.

Moreover, no one viewing the tradition of America can feel satisfied with negative measures alone. If we wish to strengthen our continent against the violence and bloodshed which in recent years have brought misery and subjection to other parts of the world, we must build in the hearts of men. And that requires the clarification and dramatization of positive American goals that will respond to the political, economic, and cultural aspirations of the peoples of America. No program for the security of our American nations can succeed unless the peoples of America are given at least a moderate assurance that through inter-American unity and cooperation, constructive and positive gains will be made in improving the life of the common man.

That brings us to the other great purpose of our Enterprise of the Americas—the promotion of the economic, social, and cultural welfare of our people. Here too we may point with pride to important developments in which the cooperation of American peoples has played a vital role.

Our trade relations reflect the growing unity in inter-American affairs. United States trade with Latin America has increased from \$1.7 billion in 1938 to almost \$7 billion in 1952. Today Latin America provides about one-third of our total imports and takes from a fourth to a fifth of our exports. Latin American countries increasingly look to the United States as a market for their raw materials and as a source of manufactured goods and capital equipment. The Latin American area is the largest single area of United States foreign investments.

Moreover, progress in economic and social lines in Latin America has been outstanding, showing rates of growth which compare favorably with economically more advanced areas.

For this progress, inter-American cooperation may take a considerable share of the credit. The program of reciprocal trade agreements, whereby since the 1930's tariffs have been reduced as a measure of promoting international trade, has been of great benefit to inter-American trade. Private investments which have formed the basis of most economic development in Latin America have been supplemented by special intergovernmental arrangements. Through the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, loans to Latin America since World War II have been made at a rate of about \$100 million per year. The fact that these loans have been made for sound economic projects is evidenced by the satisfactory rate of repayment.

Technical Assistance Program

Finally, a remarkable and interesting technical assistance program has been developed among the American Republics which is contributing to the economic and social development of the entire area. In the fields of agriculture, health and sanitation, education, and housing, a wide interchange of technical knowledge is being promoted. Projects are being undertaken to apply this technical know-how to the solution of specific problems in individual countries. These activities are being

² BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1954, p. 638.

carried out not only through bilateral arrangements between the United States and other American countries but also through the agency of the Organization of American States.

For example, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the oldest international health organization in the world, is carrying on a continent-wide campaign to exterminate the carrier of yellow fever in settled areas, as well as conducting a number of other dramatic and significant health programs in cooperation with national health agencies. The Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences is developing basic scientific and sociological information which can increasingly contribute to the improvement of problems of agriculture and rural life throughout Central and South America.

Thus again we may point with pride to achievement in this field, and yet at the same time we must also look ahead to the existence of great and unsolved problems which challenge the future of inter-American unity and cooperation. For great as is the progress in social and economic fields in Latin America, the demand for progress is increasing at an equal if not a faster rate. When people can see, as a result of motion pictures, travel, and other media of mass information, the higher standards of living to which modern technology gives access, they become impatient to get there. The long, slow process through which our own country went in the 19th century no longer satisfies the urgent demands of peoples who are just now starting that long climb to a better way of life.

Moreover, as modern technology has altered the economic basis of life, taking people away from the traditional rural society and developing the proletarian life of the cities, people have become more dependent upon the course of worldwide economic events. The outbreak of fighting in Korea, for example, had an immediate and direct effect upon the life of the Indian miner on the Bolivian Altiplano. The suddenly increased demand for tin sent prices skyrocketing. Then, a few years later, the demand fell, and down crashed prices too, thus knocking to pieces the inflated economic structure which had been created 2 or 3 years before.

It is no wonder that a principal goal which the Latin American countries are now seeking in the field of economic relations is for a greater stability in their trade with us—particularly in their

ability to sell their copper, tin, coffee, petroleum, and other essential goods to us at what they would consider a fair rate of return.

This is but one example illustrating the fact that now more than ever the basic problems of this continent require international solutions. By this I do not in any way mean to disregard the equally powerful fact that international cooperation can help only those nations that begin by doing all within their power to help themselves.

The ultimate fact, underlining the need for international action in regard to these problems that so directly affect human life in this continent, is that a failure to solve them cannot avoid international repercussions. If the people of any American country is delivered into the hands of destructive demagogues and extremists, we shall all be the losers. If either communism on the one hand or fanatic nationalism on the other—or the two working together—should ever capture any considerable portion of the population of this continent, the possibility of our ever achieving the high purposes of inter-American cooperation would indeed be dim. For in this age of explosive forces we can hope to maintain our freedom and civilization only if rational courses of human conduct win out. All of us—North Americans and Latin Americans—have a stake, therefore, in making our Enterprise of the Americas work. This means enlarging the area of common thought and effort towards achieving on this continent a greater measure of freedom, security, and well-being.

Belief in the Future

With respect to all the problems which face us in inter-American cooperation today, perhaps what is needed as much as anything is a rededication to that great American spirit which came into being 150 years ago with the achievement of independence and which inspired men to a faith in their destiny as inhabitants of a new world endowed with a new hope.

For a century and a half we have gone forward with a firm belief in our future and in our capacity to create in this New World a better life for humanity. Great things have been done. A great deal remains to be done if we want to have on this continent a strong, united, and confident America. There are too many signs today that that great belief in our future has been shaken, and that con-

fidence in ourselves and in our fellow Americans has been soured with suspicion. Fear and hatred have made inroads where courage and good will should prevail.

Too often we hear it suggested that we have gone as far as we can go in international cooperation; that we should even turn back from our efforts to seek a greater unity among nations. Perhaps, after all, our Enterprise of the Americas is just another crackpot idea.

Surely we cannot lend ourselves to such counsels. They reflect the same atmosphere of cynicism and doubt that characterized the end of the 15th century when Columbus formulated his Enterprise of the Indies. It is refreshing to recall that among various other negative arguments advanced by the

most learned scholars of that time, in response to Columbus' proposals, was the observation that in that advanced era of civilization, so long after the creation of the world, it was unlikely that there were anywhere any more lands of any value to be discovered!

Two years later, driven by his inspired faith and determination, Columbus came upon a New World.

As we, the beneficiaries of his greatness, look forward to the possibilities of building a stronger and more vigorous America, let us recall as most applicable to our own times the words of Columbus in his letter reporting the discovery: "The eternal Almighty God, our Lord, it is Who gives to all who walk in His way victory over things apparently impossible."

Some Aspects of the Present Economic Situation in Latin America

by Edward G. Cale

Director, Office of Regional American Affairs¹

I come to speak to you on the subject of some aspects of the present economic situation in Latin America with a very great appreciation of the complexity of the subject matter and of my own limitations for dealing with them.

In fact, it is difficult and sometimes erroneous to think in terms of Latin America as a unit, since there is great diversity among the countries of this area, which occupies almost one-fifth of the world's land area. For example, the countries vary greatly in size, ranging from Brazil, which is about as large as the United States plus an additional Texas, to Haiti, which is about the size of the State of Maryland. Differences in race between the various countries are also often very marked. In some countries, such as Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia, Indian blood pre-

dominates; in others, such as Argentina and Uruguay, the population is largely of European origin. In certain regions, such as northeastern Brazil and the coastal fringes of the Caribbean, considerable Negro blood is to be found. There are also great differences between many of the countries, economically. For example, there are many ways in which economic conditions in such countries as Argentina, Chile, and Cuba are more nearly like those in the United States than those in such other Latin American countries as Haiti, Bolivia, and Paraguay. Economic conditions between different social or economic classes within a given country vary even more widely. An accurate description of Latin America is possible only when these differences are all included. There is not time in a limited discussion to do this, but I hope that you will remember that there are many exceptions to the generalizations that I will have to make in order to cover the topic with which I am dealing.

¹ Address made at a conference on "Latin America and Inter-American Relations" at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., on Oct. 7 (press release 561).

The generalization with which I shall begin is that Latin America is an area of large unutilized natural resources. In general, the countries of the area have the potential in terms of natural resources both to build a prosperous home industry and agriculture and to expand foreign trade. Some of the countries are exceedingly well endowed. For example, Venezuela has large deposits of petroleum and iron; Colombia has rich reserves of coal and iron; Peru has a wide variety of minerals; Brazil has a very wide range of natural resources generally, although explorations so far made have not disclosed the existence of large deposits of coal or petroleum; and Argentina has an abundance of some of the finest agricultural lands in the world. Exploration has so far not been carried far enough fully to indicate the extent of the area's natural wealth.

Despite an abundance of natural wealth in most of the countries of the area, especially in relation to present population, there are a number of handicaps that must be overcome in developing them. In terms of present technology and on the basis of presently known resources, Latin America is not as well endowed as the United States to meet the basic needs of an industrial society.

To a large extent, the physical environment of Latin America is difficult and offers obstacles to economic development. For example, the Andean mountain range, which lies athwart the western part of South America, constitutes a formidable barrier to transportation and communication. Heat and humidity in large portions of the area are also unfavorable to optimum production. Land and mineral resources in a considerable number of the countries are limited. Given its vast area, however, which is some two and one-half times that of the United States and its known resources, it should be able to afford its present population a much higher standard of living than it now enjoys. However, since it also has one of the most rapidly increasing populations of any major area of the world, it faces a serious problem in increasing production rapidly enough to increase per capita income. For example, it is estimated, on the basis of present trends, that the population of Latin America will be around 500 million by the year 2,000. At present, its population is slightly in excess of that of the United States. If these

estimates and similar estimates for the United States and Canada should prove correct, however, the population of Latin America will be more than twice that of the United States and Canada combined by the close of the present century.

Increased Output

A second generalization that may be made regarding Latin America is that during the past decade and a half it has increased its economic productivity at a considerably more rapid rate than the rate at which its population has been increasing. The following data, which are largely taken from a recent report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, are indicative of the really remarkable progress which Latin America has made since the Second World War: Population is increasing in Latin America, on the average, at a rate of from 2 to 2½ percent per annum. But output of goods and services has been substantially in excess of population growth. The per capita rate of increase in the volume of goods and services available to Latin America since the war has been around 3½ percent per year. Living standards have been raised appreciably as a result, but not all of the increased output has gone into increased consumption.

Economic development requires that capital be accumulated; and capital accumulation in Latin America since the close of the Second World War has been exceptionally intense, the investment rate approximating 16 percent of total national income. This compares favorably with the record of even highly industrialized countries. It has been estimated that more than 90 percent of the capital accumulated during the period was supplied from Latin America's own savings. The stock of capital per worker has increased on the average from \$1,177 in 1945 to \$1,409 in 1952, an increase of more than 25 percent. The outstanding feature of this development has been the expansion in manufactures. The value of manufactures increased from \$6.8 billion in 1945 to \$11.4 billion in 1952. This is an increase of better than 70 percent in 7 years. The value of manufactures surpassed the value of agricultural output in Latin America in 1947 for the first time and has outranked it ever since.

Notwithstanding this rapid rate of progress, there is still a great deal of popular dissatisfaction

with their present economic conditions among the governments and people of Latin America. Furthermore, it appears that the amount of this dissatisfaction is at least as great, if not greater, in those areas where there has been the greatest economic and social change. There are apparently many factors which help to account for this situation. First, average per capita income in Latin America is still very low in comparison with that of the more highly industrialized countries. The situation varies greatly as between countries; but, in all, the lot of the major part of the population is poor. In Latin America as a whole, per capita income is probably not more than $\frac{1}{3}$ of per capita income in the United States. Health conditions in many areas may be considered poor by accepted standards. For example, it is estimated that the death rate in most of the Latin American countries is in excess of 100 per 1,000 live births. The comparative figure for the United States is 28 or 29 per 1,000. The average diet in a number of the countries is less than the diet which has generally been considered by nutritional experts as the minimum necessary to maintain health and efficiency.

The need for improved education in Latin America is also great. Many of the countries have illiteracy rates exceeding 50 percent, and few of them have effectively orientated their educational systems to the requirements of a modern industrial civilization.

Transportation facilities are also inadequate. Latin America has about $\frac{1}{3}$ the railroad mileage of the United States and fewer motor vehicles than the State of New Jersey. Lack of farm-to-market roads handicaps the movement of food and other agricultural products.

Notwithstanding the low average level of income in Latin America and the unsatisfactory health, educational, and other conditions that go with it, there are in virtually all of the Latin American countries a limited group of very well-to-do people. Their standards of living, health, and comfort are as good as those enjoyed by our wealthier citizens. The contrast between the condition of the few and that of the masses of the people is accordingly very marked. Part of the dissatisfaction with economic conditions is therefore undoubtedly the result of the fact that the major portion of the population has not come anywhere near achieving the average standard of

living of the more highly industrialized countries or of their own well-to-do classes. It is only natural for them to wish to achieve a greater rate of progress.

Furthermore, Latin American officials fear that the outlook for maintaining even the present rate of progress is not especially good, owing to a decline in the demand for, and falling prices of, a considerable number of their export products, such as tin, copper, and lead and zinc during the past 2 years. Our Latin American neighbors are understandably concerned over the situation.

Inflation

There are other reasons, however, why there is dissatisfaction among the masses of the people. One is that inflation in many countries is rampant and that it is hard to keep real incomes from falling, under such conditions. For example, the cost of living in São Paulo, Brazil, is reported to have risen from an index of 100 in 1948 to an index of 162 in 1953, and in Santiago, Chile, from 100 in 1948 to 256 in 1953. The cost of living in the United States during the same period rose from 100 in 1948 to 111 in 1953.

Although there has been a widespread increase in government assistance to labor in the field of social security in Latin America during the past 15 years, this in many cases has been financed through inflation and a system of taxation which have placed the bulk of the burden back on the workers. Furthermore, a considerable number of Latin American countries do not have inheritance taxes and progressive income taxes. Even where such taxes exist the rates are low and collection is often not fully effective.

An additional reason why there is not greater popular satisfaction with the rate of economic progress made in Latin America in recent years is the fact that, even though average per capita income has increased, there are large segments of the population which apparently have not benefited. In this connection the Mexican experience is enlightening. Mexico is among the Latin American countries that have done most to keep inflation in check. Furthermore, few Latin American countries have done more than Mexico to develop a middle class or to lessen the extremes of income between its poorer and wealthier classes. Its rate of economic progress from 1939 to 1950 was truly remarkable. Capital accumu-

lation during this period was unprecedented. There was a great increase in real income which permitted a considerable rise in total consumption. The following information, which is taken from the Report of the Combined Mexican Working Party entitled "The Economic Development of Mexico," indicates, however that the increased income has not been evenly distributed. There has been a shift in favor of profits, and against wages and salaries. As a result, a large part of the increase in consumption during the period 1939-50 was enjoyed by a small part of the population. About $\frac{1}{2}$ of the national income was paid in the form of profits, rents, and interests to a relatively small part of the total population. On the other hand, large numbers of persons received low incomes.

Furthermore, workers in different regions of the country were affected differently by the increase in average real income. The standards of living for industrial workers and for agricultural workers in the new agricultural regions were above those in the older unimproved farming areas, and no significant improvement was discernible in the real income of farmers in the old areas or in the real income of industrial workers as a group. The position of a large number of individuals during this period was nevertheless improved, since they shifted from other types of activity to industry where wages were generally higher.

In one very real sense the rate of progress made in Latin America during the period in question was to a large extent the result of a situation which cannot be relied upon for continued progress. The principal reason for the progress was an improvement in Latin America's terms of trade, i.e. an increase in the prices of their exports in relation to the prices of their imports. There has not been the increase in economic productivity, especially in the export industries, that will be required if Latin America is to continue to increase its per capita national income. It appears that there has actually been no increase in the physical volume of Latin American exports since 1948.

Attitudes of Labor and Management

The working class has had its desires for high standards of living greatly stimulated. By defi-

nition, the raising of living standards would require a great increase in production. However, the workers often do not wish to increase their hours of work per day or week, which are often small (the necessity for choosing between leisure and greater income has not been appreciated), or to cooperate with management in raising productivity. The reluctance to increase their own productivity is based in part on suspicion of their employers and fear that increased productivity will only lead to more unemployment, or underemployment, of which there is now admittedly too much. In part this suspicion is warranted, because the management and the owners have often not yet adopted or approved the system of large-scale production and small unit profits. With some exceptions, both labor and management in Latin America will have to change their attitudes before there is to be a significant increase in productivity. There are encouraging signs in some countries that this is being done.

The Communists of the area and other anti-United States elements find the conditions which I am describing tailor-made to their purpose of fomenting local discontent and antagonism against the United States and United States companies operating in Latin America. For example, one of the standard arguments of the Communists is that the United States is trying to exploit the Latin American countries through private United States companies. Actually, insofar as productivity has been improved in Latin America, the United States-owned enterprises have made an important contribution. Furthermore, the import of capital which is put to productive uses can and does make it possible for capital-scarce countries to maintain a higher level of consumption than if they had to reduce consumption to the extent necessary to provide all the capital that they use out of domestic savings. The Communists and their associates, nevertheless, continue to urge that foreign-owned enterprises be nationalized and that further foreign capital not be allowed to enter the country. Fortunately, there appears to be a slowly growing recognition of the importance of productivity and capital in some labor circles.

The efforts of the Communists to sow discontent and discord are often made easier by other Latin American citizens, sometimes people in official positions, who increase misunderstanding by speaking and acting as though there were simple

solutions to Latin America's problems. For example, the view is often expressed that Latin America's failure to make greater progress is the result of the fact that the more highly industrialized countries pay Latin America too little for its raw materials and charge it too much for industrial products. Often these same individuals argue, apparently without considering that there is any inconsistency between the two positions, that Latin America should increase its duties against imported industrial products because they are so efficiently produced that the Latin American countries cannot compete with them without substantially increased tariff protection. It may be noted, furthermore, that it is common for the United States not to impose any duty on imports of most raw materials from Latin America, whereas it is rather general for the Latin American governments to tax the production or export of such materials, sometimes to the point of virtual confiscation. Should they choose to do so, the Latin American countries are, accordingly, often in the position both to reduce the price to their consumers of imported industrial products and to increase the returns to their producers of raw materials.

The contention is also often made by Latin American representatives that the more highly industrialized countries should assure their economic progress by undertaking to stabilize the prices of their raw materials in terms of the prices of industrial products.

Terms of Trade

Actually, as has been suggested earlier and as a recent study made by the Pan American Union indicates, from the outbreak of the Second World War to the present time the terms of trade of the Latin American countries as a whole, of the majority of the individual countries, and of most individual Latin American commodities have been very favorable. In recent years they have been at approximately the same level as at the beginning of the century. From 1937 to 1953 they became increasingly favorable to Latin America. As has also been suggested earlier, the experience of the Latin American countries during this period is an indication of the fact that high prices for their products have not been a panacea.

The terms of trade are, in fact, only one of the many factors which may influence the welfare of

a country. For example, the terms of trade do not give sufficient weight to volume, which in the case of many products has often been a dominating element in the determination of international prices. The terms of trade also do not include any consideration of improvement in quality, which customarily occurs over any extended period of time, especially in the case of industrial products. The terms of trade may not, therefore, reflect the real prosperity of a country and they are likely to be even less of an indication of the prosperity of individual economic classes within a country. Venezuela and Brazil might be taken as random examples. The new President of Brazil, in a radio address last month, described the precarious economic situation existing in his country. This situation developed although the terms of trade were twice as favorable in 1952 as in the period 1935-39, and although it appears, even though complete statistics are not yet available, that its terms of trade for 1953 were at least as favorable as for 1952. On the other hand, Venezuela's progress and present prosperity are well-known to all observers of the Latin American situation, even though the terms of trade of her chief export product, petroleum, which constitutes regularly over 90 percent of her total exports, improved by less than 30 percent between the period 1935-39 and 1953.

Coffee Prices

The fact that high prices are not necessarily beneficial to the producers of a product might be illustrated with particular reference to coffee. There was an increase of more than 10-fold in the price of coffee in Brazil between 1937 and November 1953, before the price increase last winter. This increase was largely the result of the fact that Brazil, the world's largest producer of coffee, is now producing considerably less coffee than in the period before the Second World War, while world consumption of coffee is, of course, much higher. The price increase was not, however, an unmixed blessing, especially to the coffee growers and more particularly to the workers. The exchange earned from coffee was one of the important factors which accounted for an expansion of the currency in the coffee-producing countries, and this and other factors brought about the inflation that I have referred to earlier. During the period 1937-53 the cost-of-living index in

São Paulo, the principal coffee-producing region of Brazil, increased from 22 to 166, more than seven-fold. Considerably more than half of the increased return was, therefore, required to pay increased costs of living. Furthermore, as a result of governmental policy in many of the coffee-producing countries, including Brazil, the exporter was required to convert his exchange in a controlled market under such terms that the coffee industry was forced to subsidize other activities. The result was that the benefit of the increased coffee prices went only to a limited extent to those who worked coffee lands, especially the laborers.

What I have said about coffee and about dissatisfaction in Latin America with its economic conditions suggests that high prices, or even economic development itself, alone, may not be enough to meet the needs of the people, especially the poorer classes.

This leads me to a further generalization about Latin America, namely, that it is an area likely to be faced by increasingly complex problems which have no short-term solution, for which it must continue, as in the past, to find answers largely on the basis of its own resources, industry, and genius. In order to provide increased standards of living for its people it must use its resources wisely. It must increase its economic productivity not only by the application of improved techniques of production but through the industriousness of its people.

It must find a proper balance between the various segments of its economy. Agriculture, industry, and transportation must be developed in harmony. In some of the Latin American countries this will require increased attention to agriculture, where per capita output is now less than it was before the Second World War. For example, considering 1948-49 as 100, per capita agricultural output in Latin America in the period 1934-38 was 107, and in 1952-53 it was 101. This means that the area is now less able to feed itself than it was prior to the beginning of the Second World War. Comparable figures for the United States are 84 in the 1934-38 period and 112 in the 1952-53 period.

Specialization vs. Diversification

Another problem faced by Latin American countries in increasing average living standards will be to strike a proper balance between spe-

cialization and diversification of industry. At the present time most of the Latin American countries are heavily dependent on one, or at best three or four, raw materials and foodstuffs. For example, tin is the bellwether in Bolivia; nitrates and copper in Chile; sugar in Cuba; coffee in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala; meat and wool in Uruguay; petroleum in Venezuela; and lead and zinc in Mexico. The principal reason for this situation is probably the fact that the Latin American countries can purchase a greater volume of foreign goods through specializing in these commodities than by producing other commodities. They rely upon the foreign exchange received from the export of these commodities to pay for most of their imports of consumer goods and of capital goods needed for economic development and for servicing foreign investments. If the countries continue, as will apparently be necessary, to rely on foreign imports and on foreign investment, they must maintain healthy conditions in these basic export industries. On the other hand, so long as they are heavily dependent on these industries, their economies are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in the world prices of the commodities in question.

Another problem faced by the Latin American countries is to reach the proper balance between encouraging savings and investment, on the one hand, and permitting consumption levels to rise, on the other. If income were equally distributed in Latin America, it is probable that the rate of savings would be less than at present, since the small amount of increase in income that the average citizen might receive initially would be much more likely to be spent to satisfy consumption needs than to be saved. It would be helpful to the masses in Latin America, however, if some way could be found of inducing the well-to-do to put a larger portion of their savings into productive undertakings. At present inflation and other conditions often lead them to invest in real estate or in foreign countries, rather than in productive enterprises at home.

Another very difficult problem for the Latin Americans is to determine the extent to which their development will be financed by local savings and by foreign investment. The most readily expandable source of economic development funds is undoubtedly private foreign capital. The economic development process could undoubtedly be

speeded up if local conditions were made attractive to such capital. On the other hand, this may involve the problem of absentee ownership and may run counter to nationalistic desires for local ownership and operation of industry.

Just one final generalization. Latin America is an area in which we have many vital interests and with which we should accordingly cooperate to the extent that we and our Latin American neighbors can find mutually desirable programs. Except for Canada, many of the countries of the area are our closest neighbors. It contains regions of great strategic importance from the viewpoint of the United States and Western Hemisphere defense. It produces many raw materials that are important to us in peace and war. From the standpoint of military defense of the hemisphere our role is, of course, of crucial importance to the Latin American countries. Commercially, they are dependent upon us as a market for about half of their exports. In the case of the countries which are geographically closer to us and in the case of some commodities such as coffee, we purchase a much larger portion of their exports—our exports to Latin America are equivalent to about 20 percent of our total exports. We have always been closely bound together with them and they and we have generally cooperated effectively together. I am sure that close cooperation between ourselves and them will continue, notwithstanding many differences of opinion, because it will continue to be in our mutual interest to cooperate and to resolve our differences in a spirit of understanding and accommodation.

Arrival of Pakistan Prime Minister

*Remarks by Acting Secretary Hoover*¹

May I express my deep pleasure at the opportunity afforded me personally and on behalf of Secretary Dulles to welcome you on your return to Washington. We in the United States are particularly proud of the many bonds of friendship which link the peoples of Pakistan and the United States. Your previous residence here as Ambas-

sador of your great country has made you well known to Americans of many walks of life. Thus it is with a sense of greeting old friends that we who are gathered here welcome you. May your visit be a most pleasant one for you both.

National Olympic Day, 1954

Proclamation 3069¹

WHEREAS the XVth Olympic Games of the modern era will be held at Melbourne, Australia, November 22 to December 8, 1956, with Winter Games to be held at Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy, January 26 to February 5, 1956, and the Pan American Games will be held at Mexico City in March 1955; and


WHEREAS by a joint resolution approved April 22, 1954 (68 Stat. 58), the Congress has declared that these games will afford an opportunity of bringing together young men and women representing more than seventy nations, of many races, creeds, and stations in life and possessing various habits and customs, all bound together by the universal appeal of friendly athletic competition; and

WHEREAS the said joint resolution calls attention to the fact that the United States Olympic Association is presently engaged in assuring maximum support for the teams representing the United States in these athletic contests, and requests the President to issue a proclamation designating the sixteenth day of October 1954 as National Olympic Day:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Saturday, October 16, 1954, as National Olympic Day, and I urge all citizens of our country to do all in their power to support the XVth Olympic Games, the Winter Games, and the Pan American Games so as to insure that the United States will be fully and adequately represented in these games.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this second day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-ninth.



By the President:

WALTER B. SMITH

Acting Secretary of State.

¹ Made at Washington National Airport on Oct. 14 on the arrival of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali and Begum Ali (press release 578).

¹ 19 Fed. Reg. 6469.

Nuclear Physics, A Triumph of Man's Mind

by James B. Conant

U.S. High Commissioner for Germany¹

When I lay in the sand of Alamogordo on July 16, 1945, waiting for the first atomic explosion in the history of mankind, I would never have thought that one day I would open in Berlin an American exhibit devoted to the peaceful and constructive applications of atomic energy. While I was waiting in the dawn of that summer day, I discussed with some of the nuclear physicists present the probabilities as to the successful outcome of the experiment. For, as everyone now knows, we could not be then certain that an atomic explosion was possible.

In the course of our discussion someone mentioned the fact that we had once feared that, if an atomic explosion occurred, this would set off an uncontrolled chain reaction of the nitrogen in the atmosphere and the world would go up in flames. Exact calculation had already proved conclusively that such fears were pure nonsense: A nitrogen chain reaction could not occur under any circumstances. Nevertheless, this idea of an uncontrolled chain reaction was evidently still in my subconscious mind. When the incredibly powerful light of the first atomic explosion appeared, the irrational thought hit me: The whole world has gone up in flames. Such was the deep impression made on me by the first atomic explosion in the history of man.

The tremendous sound of the explosion 10 miles away reached us only after what seemed like an interminable minute. But long before I heard the explosion, the devastating picture which my fan-

tasy had momentarily conjured up had disappeared and I was face to face with reality—a reality which was terrible enough. Mankind is faced with great and difficult problems—that much is certain—but on the other hand we do not have to reckon with the fear of a world explosion, nor indeed with the fear of the radioactive poisoning of the entire atmosphere of this globe.

Tonight, however, I do not propose to talk about the military applications of atomic energy nor the political problem which the release of atomic energy has brought with it. For the exhibition which we have prepared here in Berlin deals with quite different aspects of atomic energy.

Tonight, rather, I want to devote my lecture to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is an interesting fact that in America we knew soon after the wartime development had begun that a controlled chain reaction was possible, but none of us could be sure whether an explosive chain reaction could be brought about. Only the laws of nuclear physics could give an answer to that question, and they were then still partially unexplored.

Controlled Chain Reaction

Let me say a few words about the controlled chain reaction. In this connection I would like to tell another personal story, if I may be permitted. Some of you may already have read it in the two articles which Mrs. Fermi, the wife of the great Italian-American physicist who played such a decisive role in the release of atomic energy, has published in the *New Yorker* magazine.

It was he who brought about the first controlled chain reaction toward the end of 1942 under the grandstands of the football field at Chicago University. As soon as the remarkable experiment

¹Address made on Sept. 24 at the Berlin Technical University on the occasion of the opening of the U.S. exhibition "The Atom" in the 1954 German Industrial Exhibition (Hiroc press release).

had been successfully carried out, I received a long-distance call from Dr. Arthur Compton, the director of the Chicago atomic research project. In this telephone conversation he said, in accordance with a prearranged code, "The Italian navigator has reached the new world."

"And what is the attitude of the natives?" I asked excitedly. "Extremely friendly," replied Compton.

It was thus I knew the first controlled chain reaction had succeeded.

Some of you may ask: "What exactly is a controlled chain reaction?" That is exactly what our exhibit will explain. In fact, we have constructed there an apparatus which does not differ very much from the first atomic pile which Fermi put in operation at Chicago University in December 1942.

I am not going to try to outline tonight those portions of theoretical physics which you will find explained repeatedly in our exhibition. Such an exposition might be considered presumptuous on the part of an organic chemist. For there is a certain rivalry between chemists and physicists, one that, I hope, is always friendly. But physicists do not relish having a chemist venture into a field which is their own. But now back to my subject.

Those of you who know the theory may chiefly be interested in the models, instruments, and equipment displayed at our exhibition. For the others I hope that our exhibition may be an instructive introduction into the new science of nuclear physics.

Surely one must admire the intelligence of man which has enabled him to produce a controlled chain reaction. But what is the controlled chain reaction good for? May I emphasize again that I am not talking about the explosive chain reaction nor about the political problems which it has created. The controlled chain reaction in a nuclear reactor produces energy in form of heat on the one hand and chemical elements with strong radioactivity on the other. These may be produced either as byproducts of nuclear fission or by subjecting elements to neutron bombardment within the reactor.

Atomic Power for Industry

I have just mentioned that a nuclear reactor can produce energy which can be used to run steam engines or to produce electric power. I feel that

so much has already been written in the newspapers about the atom as a source of energy that I need not dwell on this subject, nor shall I discuss the economic feasibility of using atomic power for industrial purposes. But I do want to emphasize one point. The basic technical problems have long since been solved. It is the economic application of atomic energy for industry which must still be developed. As you know, I am sure, President Eisenhower gave the signal on September 6 which started the construction of the first American atomic power plant.² Four more experimental plants will be built soon, and these five power plants are destined to help solve the problems connected with the economic production and use of atomic energy.

The reactor as a source of industrial energy still lies in the future. But the use of radioactive products, on the other hand, is already a matter of great importance, for they have become invaluable tools of scientific research. Today they may be regarded as the most important result of the entire reactor program. In America radioactive materials have been produced for several years in commercial quantities, and they are shipped to more than 50 foreign countries. In England, particularly at Harwell, similar programs have been developed. For substances whose radioactivity is short-lived, England naturally remains the principal supplier for Europe.

In order to give you an idea of the quantities of radioactive materials produced, I would like to refer to a single experiment being carried out at Brookhaven. This is the so-called Gamma Field, where the effect of such radiation on plants is studied. The source of radiation used there, a small block of radioactive cobalt, is only one of many similar sources used in numerous American laboratories and research institutes. But this one source has a radiation power of 1,800 Curies, the equivalent, that is, of 1,800 grams of radium. This may not impress you unless I tell you that there are only 1,500 grams of radium available in the world today.

I have so far spoken of only one of the applications of radioactive materials. Several of the other applications, because of their particular type of radiation, are an extremely practical and cheap substitute for X-ray machines. Many have

² BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 396.

greater intensity of radiation than radium. This tremendous power of radiation makes artificially produced radioactive materials extremely dangerous for human beings. It is no exaggeration to say that the protective techniques which have made the handling of such materials possible constitute a veritable triumph of human ingenuity.

When you go to the exhibit, you will find in the center of the main hall the actual apparatus which has been constructed to enable a person to carry out experiments behind a protective wall. The magic hands which are thus operated from a distance are almost as skillful as the human hand itself. But I must give a word of caution, not to warn you against possible dangers of the terrific radiation or poisoning—which, in fact, is present when this apparatus is used. This warning does not concern any possible dangers from radioactivity or poisoning. Quite the contrary. I must warn you that what you will see are harmless models.

I have spoken of the use of some of the radioactive products of an atom pile as a substitute for a Roentgen tube. Let me remind this audience of the significance of the great discovery made by Roentgen when he was professor at Würzburg in the last part of the 19th century. The news of this great discovery was soon broadcast to the world, and rapidly physicians realized that the medical profession had been given a most valuable tool. This was followed by the discovery of radium, which is used for very special purposes, particularly in the therapy of cancer. Today the reactor has given us a whole series of radioactive elements which, even in small quantities, are more than a complete substitute for Roentgen and radium radiations. When you visit our exhibition, you will find interesting displays showing the use of radioactive iodine in the diagnosis of thyroid cancer and its metastases as well as in the localization and therapy of brain tumors.

Radioactive Materials in Research

Radioactive materials open new possibilities not only for the physician but also for the scientific researcher which are not as striking but may be just as important. The use of radioactive materials in scientific research is difficult to explain in nontechnical words. Some of these materials are called tracers because they enable the scientist to follow complicated chemical reactions with

great precision. In fact, one can follow these processes with the Geiger counter very much the way a dog follows the trace of a rabbit with his nose. This comparison may be made clearer by two specific examples. Both cases show how a radioactive element, the radioactive form of carbon, has been involved in the solving of secrets of nature.

I have a personal interest in the first case, as one set of experiments in this field was described in a paper published in 1941 which carried my name among others, although my own contribution to this work was small. In those days radioactive carbon could be made only in very small quantities and with great difficulties in the laboratories. Today it is produced in relatively large quantities like many other radioactive materials, and production costs are considerably lower. In this initial experiment carbon dioxide was used which contained radioactive carbon and was therefore radioactive itself. In experiments with living animal tissue a very surprising discovery was made: Some of the carbon dioxide was absorbed by this tissue and converted into sugar-like carbohydrates. Many of you will think that this was hardly a revolutionary discovery. In fact, this observation was so unexpected that the experimenters felt at first they must have made an error; for according to one of the basic postulates of biochemistry, animal tissue could not assimilate carbon dioxide but rather produce it by the oxidation of carbohydrates. It was another accepted postulate that assimilation of carbon dioxide by a living cell and its conversion to a carbohydrate only took place in green plants under the influence of light.

These postulates have now been shown to be completely false. Many animal and plant cells convert carbon dioxide into sugar, and each step in this process has been followed in considerable detail by following the trace of the radioactive carbon. I regret that I cannot give you more of the details, fascinating as these details and their consequences are for the scientist. Let me just give you the conclusion reached on the basis of these experiments: Green plants convert carbon dioxide into carbohydrates under the influence of light; many animal tissues are able to accomplish the same transformation, the required energy provided by the oxidation of some other sugars to carbon dioxide.

Now let me jump from biochemistry to archeology. One of the most difficult problems which often faces the archeologist is the dating of ancient discoveries. The second example I want to describe to you illustrates one of the most interesting and most recent applications of radioactivity. Here, however, we are not concerned with an artificially produced radioactive material but rather with one that is found in nature. This method was developed by an American physical chemist, Willard F. Libby, of Chicago University.

In the upper atmosphere a small percentage of nitrogen is constantly being transmuted into radiocarbon through the bombardment with cosmic rays. The percentage of this radiocarbon in the atmosphere is unbelievably small and at the same time constant: one atom of radioactive carbon to 1,000 billion atoms of ordinary carbon. The radiocarbon is oxidized to carbon dioxide, which is absorbed by plants together with ordinary, non-radioactive carbon dioxide. Thus, radioactive carbon gets into the tissues of all living organisms in the same relative quantities as mentioned before: one atom of radioactive carbon to 1,000 billion atoms of ordinary carbon dioxide.

Thus, when a plant or animal dies, the amount of radioactivity in its tissues, which is extremely small, corresponds to that in the atmosphere. After about 5,500 years—the so-called half life of radioactive carbon dioxide—half of the carbon 14 has undergone decomposition and its radioactivity is thus only half of what it was initially. After about 11,000 years it is only one-quarter, and so on. Accordingly, by determining the radioactivity of any matter containing carbon dioxide, one can determine how many years ago it acquired the carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

I must point out that these measurements are extremely difficult and can only be carried out with instruments of the utmost sensitivity. Nonetheless, it is possible to date archeological discoveries that are from 1,000 to 20,000 years old with an accuracy of about 200 years.

The accuracy of this method of radiocarbon dating was checked by measuring the radioactivity of a piece of wood taken from the inside of one of our giant California sequoia trees. The age of this tree was known accurately through the number of its annual rings.

One of the interesting conclusions that have been

reached is that the last glaciation of the Northern Hemisphere occurred about 11,000 years ago and that the famous cave paintings in the Lascaux cave near Montignac in France are about 15,000 years old. Linen wrappings from the Dead Sea scrolls of the Book of Isaiah, which were recently found in Israel, were determined to be about 1,900 years old.

If you have understood my explanations, you will have noticed that the two examples that I gave you are actually closely connected. Both have in common the assimilation of carbon dioxide by organic tissue. As a former professor I have a weakness for practical illustration. We have here a Geiger counter. I do not want to describe this instrument in detail. Suffice it to say that it reveals the presence of radioactive radiation. If this rose had been grown in an atmosphere containing radioactive carbon dioxide or with the use of radioactive fertilizer, it would itself radiate and affect a Geiger counter.

Unfortunately, it would take too long for a plant to absorb carbon dioxide for anyone to demonstrate such a transformation in the course of a single lecture, but I am going to place this rose in water containing a radioactive phosphorus compound. Perhaps later I shall see whether or not I can convince you that there has been any assimilation of the radioactive material. Long ago I learned to be cautious about doing experiments before audiences. In the days when I was a chemistry professor, I had more than one failure in such attempts. What I predicted sometimes did not come to pass. On one such occasion an elderly visitor to my lectures came up afterward and said, "Young man, you would do better as a lecture demonstrator if you spoke after the event as an historian and not before the event as a prophet"—a piece of advice which I must say has stood me in good turn in my new profession. But of political matters I do not propose to speak tonight.

The United States Government is contributing the exhibit entitled "The Atom" to the annual Berlin Industrial Fair because in the United States there were brought to a focus the results of what may be thought of as a great international undertaking. One may well consider the results achieved in the last 15 years as a great accomplishment of the creative human spirit. As an American I am proud of the part American scientists have played. And it is highly satisfactory to re-

member that in this endeavor they worked closely with certain great scientists who were refugees from the totalitarian regimes of Europe and who found asylum in America. Let me name here Szilard, Wigner, Teller, Weisskopf, and Fermi.

History of Atomic Physics

At this point may I remind you of some of the more important steps in the history of atomic physics in this century. Radioactivity was discovered by the Frenchman Becquerel in 1896 and studied thoroughly by Pierre and Marie Curie who, 2 years later, discovered and isolated radium. In 1919 the English physicist Rutherford transformed an atomic nucleus for the first time. By bombarding a few atoms of nitrogen with alpha particles—that is, nuclei of the element helium—he succeeded in transforming them into oxygen. The next decisive step was the discovery of neutrons, this electrically neutral particle which alone makes possible the release of atomic energy through a controlled chain reaction. On the basis of experiments made by Booth and Becker in Germany in 1930 and Irene Curie and Frederic Joliot in France in 1932, and on the basis of his own calculations, the Englishman Chadwick predicted the existence of neutrons and then proved this experimentally.

The discovery of the neutron opened a new chapter in experimental physics. It is hard to overestimate the importance of the new methods which were developed in a field which we have already learned to call neutron physics. The bombardment of elements with neutrons provided a way of carrying out many transmutations. The bombardment of the element with the greatest atomic weight, namely uranium, produced some strange effects which were at first misinterpreted. In January 1939, Professor Otto Hahn together with Fritz Strassmann made the remarkable discovery that in the process of the bombardment of uranium with neutrons there appeared elements of about half the atomic weight of the original uranium. This discovery was made here in Berlin, and I am delighted that Professor Hahn is with us here in this city tonight.

This discovery of Hahn and Strassmann was quickly made known to the scientific world and set up an intellectual chain reaction in which the names of Frisch, Meitner, Bohr, and Fermi are particularly connected. In the United States the

news spread by word of mouth that in all probability what was at hand was an atomic fission. This was soon verified by experiments in many laboratories. Within a year more than a hundred experimental papers had been published. By the beginning of 1940 it was clear that one of the uranium isotopes would undergo atomic fission when bombarded with neutrons and in the process liberate more neutrons. Thus, the possibility of a chain reaction on a large scale had to be considered. It seemed that man was on the verge of demonstrating what Einstein had predicted more than 35 years before—namely, that matter could be converted into energy.

In the meantime Europe had gone to war. American, English, and Canadian scientists—with generous assistance of American industry—began to work feverishly, mostly on American soil, to solve the problem of how to release atomic energy on a large scale. What these scientists accomplished can truly be called a miracle of research. Once again, I am not referring to the atomic bomb but to the enormous collective scientific achievement that the solution of the thousandfold problems of releasing atomic energy on a large scale required. On the basis of experiments with matter available only in such minuscule quantities that they could not be made visible even with the best of microscopes, computations were made with the aid of extrapolation leading up to the construction of an atomic pile. The enlargement factor involved amounted to about 10 billion.

As an organic chemist dealing with the reactions of molecules I must confess that I was highly skeptical when my friends the physicists first told me of their plans. They proposed to release atomic energy by the fission of a kind of uranium which constitutes only approximately one-half of one percent of natural uranium. This isotope known as U-235 they considered to be the best fuel for a controlled chain reaction. In order to raise the probability of the fission of this isotope they proposed to reduce the speed of the liberated neutrons by having the equivalent of a break. According to the physicists' calculations it would be possible to control a chain reaction if uranium and a so-called moderator designed to slow down the fast neutron were piled up in layers. Such a construction came to be known as an atomic pile. According to theory it seemed certain a minimum mass of uranium—the critical mass—would be

needed before the chain reaction became self-sustaining, but the exact size of this critical mass could not then be calculated accurately. And when plans for an atomic pile were first drawn up in 1942, one did not know whether it would have to be the size of a table or as large as a football stadium. In our exhibition you will find a full-size replica of a typical so-called graphite reactor not unlike the first one built in Chicago.

A Triumph of Man's Mind

I am very much tempted at this time to speak in more detail not only of the model of the reactor which you will see but of the other models which are shown in our exhibition. But since you will all have an opportunity of seeing these things for yourself, I shall not speak further about the exhibition. Rather let me, in conclusion, return to the title I have given to this lecture, namely "Nuclear Physics, A Triumph of Man's Mind." In so doing, I am clearly drawing your attention to the pure scientific aspects of the whole undertaking, and in this connection an old story comes to mind. A distinguished German theoretical physicist was once asked to give a lecture on the relation between pure and applied physics. His speech was very brief. He said: "The relation is very simple—the two have nothing whatever to do with each other."

That he had slightly oversimplified the situation, I hardly need to point out this evening. Nevertheless, the story has point here tonight, for some of my listeners may have forgotten, as they have listened to the mass of technical details I have expounded, the exciting development of the basic scientific ideas. For I have dwelt at some length this evening on the significance of the new discoveries in the field of nuclear physics for everyday life. When you visit our exhibition you will see for yourselves the benefits that have arisen for mankind out of the scientific developments of the last 20 years. Artificially radioactive materials are used today, and will be used even more in the future, in medicine, in agriculture, and in innumerable other scientific fields. I need not delve into the immense possibilities arising out of the production of energy and heat by controlled chain reaction. But let us forget the practical uses of atomic energy. Let us look at the history of the development of nuclear physics in the same spirit

as we would listen to a symphony or an opera, or gaze at an architectural monument, or look at a painting.

It is often difficult for the layman to realize to what extent the entire history of nuclear physics has been the result of the amalgamation of the intellectual powers of many men from many nations and through many periods of history. I am not referring primarily to the fact that after 1940 a large group of scientists worked together day by day. I am thinking rather of what may be called the unconscious intellectual collaboration of scientists who worked independently over many years. The people I have referred to in this lecture must be regarded as forming only the last link in a great chain of scientists who have been concerned with the structure of matter and the relation of matter and energy. It is the work of this whole host of scientists who have developed new concepts and tested them by experiment that has laid the solid foundations, the results of which have come to a climax in our controlled release of atomic energy.

The nonscientist often believes erroneously that such material achievements as the release of atomic energy are the results solely of experimental work and of engineering skill. He sometimes imagines that the experimenters pursue their goal by a mere trial and error method. Such an idea is completely false. The example of Einstein's famous formula relating energy and matter serves to show the significance of new ideas of a highly theoretical nature. Indeed, new concepts are often considerably more important than the results of experiments, and in fact many important discoveries of an experimental nature are the result of new conceptual developments. Scientific theories are best regarded as guiding lines which indicate to the scientist a fruitful line of experimentation. In the extraordinary and totally unexpected developments of nuclear physics, mathematics has played a decisive role, for example.

I have used the word unexpected in the preceding sentence advisedly. For one of the most fascinating aspects of the history of the development of atomic energy comes to light when one remembers what was said a short time ago by the best informed scientists about the nature of the universe. You will find on the exhibition wall a definition of an atom which goes back to the early Greeks and which would have been subscribed to

by all scientists as late as the beginning of this century. This is the definition that the atom is a particle which cannot be split any further. Now we accept as a matter of course the illogical statement that nuclear physicists are concerned, among other things, with the splitting of something that cannot be further divided—namely, an atom.

Today, most of us take for granted that a chain reaction involving uranium can bring about the liberation of energy by the conversion of matter into energy, and we glibly say that this is but a demonstration of the truth of Einstein's famous formula, "Energy equals mass times the square of the speed of light." Indeed, the repetition of this formula even in the daily press has made it almost a household word. But let me remind you of what an outstanding physicist of two generations ago said about the same subject. I quote from a lecture of Professor Tate in 1876: "The grand test of the reality of what we call matter—the proof that it has an objective existence—is its indestructibility and uncreatability, if the term may be used, by any process at the command of man." And describing how the chemist can count on exactly the same amount of matter at the end of a series of chemical transformations as at the beginning, the lecture concluded: "This, then, is to be looked upon as the great test of the objective reality of matter."

I should be trespassing far beyond the limits of this lecture if I attempted to discuss the impact of the developments of the new physics on the basic postulates of the philosopher. I would like only to point out the revolutionary effects of the whirlwind development of nuclear physics on some of the basic premises of our thinking, and I am using revolutionary not in the sense of a rebellion against the past but in order to emphasize the breathtaking speed with which the human spirit has been able to pile one new thought and one new discovery upon the other.

It is therefore with a feeling of reverence and awe for what the human spirit can accomplish that I ask you to enter the doors of the American exhibit on the atom.

The history of the last 300 years is a proud record of what human beings can accomplish through the manipulation of ideas. It is a story of the flowering of the creative powers of the human intellect. In this troubled period of history under the shadow of fusion and fission bombs, we do

well to stress this phase of modern life. To have constructed a great fabric of new concepts and conceptual schemes, arising from experimental observation and fruitful beyond measure of new experiments, is an achievement which, as long as there is recorded history, must be regarded with the greatest admiration. Like the Parthenon and the cathedrals of the Middle Ages, the scientific theories of the 19th and 20th centuries stand as witnesses to what the human spirit can accomplish. With such thoughts in mind, I now declare the American portion of the Berlin Industrial Fair open, since I shall not have the privilege of participating in the official opening tomorrow at the appointed time.

Exchange of Messages on Trieste Accord

On October 5 President Eisenhower sent messages of congratulations on the Trieste accord to Luigi Einaudi, President of the Republic of Italy, and Marshal Josip Broz-Tito, President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. On October 9 the President received replies to these messages. Texts of the four messages follow:

President Eisenhower to President Einaudi

I wish to convey to you my profound gratification and that of the American people at the achievement of an agreement on the delicate Trieste problem. This agreement, worked out through long months of difficult but friendly and constructive endeavor, gives testimony to the far-sighted statesmanship and good will of the government of Italy. It is my earnest hope and expectation that this arrangement will usher in a new era of fruitful collaboration that will contribute to the prosperity and security not only of Italy and Yugoslavia but of all the free nations of Europe. We agree, I am sure, that this fine example of the ability of neighbor nations amiably to settle extremely difficult questions will be highly reassuring to our own peoples and those of friendly nations throughout the world.

Please accept, Mr. President, my heartfelt congratulations at the efforts which you and the members of the Italian government have exerted

to make possible this agreement which has so materially contributed to the possibility of maintaining peace in the world.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

President Einaudi to President Eisenhower

Mr. President, Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce has personally delivered the message you have addressed to me at the moment of the conclusion of the agreement on the problem of Trieste and I wish not to delay in telling you how gratifying is for me this most valuable evidence of the satisfaction with which the American people and their President have welcomed the event.

You have stressed the farsighted and constructive spirit that has animated the Italian Government during this arduous diplomatic issue and have availed yourself of the understanding reached between Italy and Yugoslavia to reaffirm your confidence in a fruitful cooperation of the two bordering nations and in the help that the mutual relations among all peoples will derive from it.

The agreement arrived at by my country will not fail, as you say, to have profound and favorable repercussions on the happier future of a peaceful and strongly united Europe.

In assuring you that Italy is well aware of the friendly contribution brought by the United States of America to the settlement of the question of Trieste, I thank you, Mr. President, in the name also of the Italian Government, for the noble expressions contained in your message, while I beg you to believe me,

Sincerely yours,

LUIGI EINAUDI

President Eisenhower to Marshal Tito

Permit me on behalf of the American people personally to extend my warm congratulations to you and to the other members of your government at the achievement of an agreement on the Trieste problem. This agreement, worked out with good will, patience and unremitting endeavor, reflects honor upon your government, for the broad, farsighted statesmanship which has made this agreement possible.

I am sure that you share with me the sense of optimism engendered by the agreement. All of

the peoples of the free nations of Europe, as well as the American people, will now be encouraged by this arrangement which opens the way to greater security in Southeastern Europe against any possible encroachment and fosters the hope that improved relations between Yugoslavia and Italy will enhance the general welfare and peace in Europe.

I wish to convey to you my deep gratification at this accord which I am convinced will materially contribute to that which is closest to our hearts, the maintenance of peace, of security and of prosperity in the world.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Marshal Tito to President Eisenhower

Permit me to thank you most cordially on my behalf as well as on behalf of the members of the Yugoslav Government for the extremely warm congratulation you were kind enough to extend to me on the occasion of the agreement achieved on the Trieste problem.

I avail myself of this opportunity to thank you for your great efforts in this matter which came particularly to expression in your message sent through Mr. Murphy and which greatly contributed to the overcoming of the last obstacles and to the reaching of an agreement. I fully share with you the sense of optimism that this agreement will have great significance both for the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Italy and for the strengthening of peace and security, not only here but generally in Europe.

I wish to convince you that, regardless of the sacrifices Yugoslavia has made for this agreement, I as well as the other members of the Yugoslav Government feel a satisfaction that in this part of Europe a problem has been settled which had worried the world.

Assistant Secretary Robertson Visits Formosa

Press release 569 dated October 11

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson left on October 9 for Taipei, Formosa, where he will confer with Chinese Government officials on current and prospective U.S. aid programs.

Mr. Robertson was accompanied by Walter P. McCaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, and by Frank L. Turner, who is in charge of Chinese aid programs for the Foreign Operations Administration.

American Ambassador to Cambodia Presents Credentials

White House press release dated October 2

White House Announcement

Robert M. McClintock presented his credentials as American Ambassador to Cambodia on October 2. Mr. McClintock, who arrived in Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, on September 30, is the first resident American Ambassador to that country. The United States, which has recognized Cambodia as an independent country since 1950, has until now been represented by an Ambassador resident at Saigon, Viet-Nam, who served concurrently as Ambassador to Viet-Nam and Cambodia and Minister to Laos. A chargé d'affaires has heretofore been resident at the American Embassy at Phnom Penh.

The assignment of a resident Ambassador at Phnom Penh constitutes further recognition by the United States of the completion of Cambodian independence through the full assumption by Cambodia of the powers of self-government.

In a joint communique issued at Washington on September 29 at the end of the United States-French talks on Indochina,¹ it was announced that the channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam would be direct to each state, and that the United States representatives would begin discussions soon with the respective governments of the three states regarding direct aid.

United States economic assistance to Cambodia, as well as to Viet-Nam and Laos, has been provided directly for some time. United States budgetary support for the Cambodian armed forces has until now been provided through the French Government. As soon as arrangements can be made, budgetary support will henceforth be provided directly to the Government of Cam-

bodia. The Cambodian Government is in full accord with this decision to provide assistance through direct channels.

President's Message

When he presented his credentials, Ambassador McClintock delivered the following message from President Eisenhower to Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia.

YOUR MAJESTY: The people of the United States have watched with concern and admiration the struggle of Cambodia against unwarranted Communist aggression. The United States is happy that Cambodia has reaffirmed its independence and that your Kingdom is in a position now to undertake a course which will secure that sovereign freedom for which your people fought.

At this time when Cambodia has so convincingly demonstrated its independence and its stern determination to maintain that independence, I desire Your Majesty to know that my Government will be pleased to consider ways in which our two countries can more effectively cooperate in the joint task of stemming the threats facing your territories and maintaining peace and prosperity in your Kingdom.

With assurances of my personal esteem and high regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

FOA Sends Flood Relief to Nepal

The Foreign Operations Administration on September 27 announced a program to alleviate suffering among the stricken people of Nepal, where recent floods combined with an earthquake have left approximately 1,000 dead and more than 132,000 homeless.

Dr. Alexander Langmuir, Chief, Epidemic Control Programs, U.S. Public Health Service, is now in Nepal making an on-the-spot survey to determine the full extent of the assistance needed. Because of the lack of communication facilities in the country, air reconnaissance of the disaster areas has been authorized.

Meantime, Foa has authorized an emergency expenditure of \$75,000 for the purchase of such badly needed supplies as vaccines and antibiotics, particularly for waterborne diseases.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 534.

World Security and the World Health Organization

by David McK. Key

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

President Eisenhower in his State of the Union Message this year affirmed that "In the world as a whole, the United Nations, admittedly still in a state of evolution, means much to the United States. It has given uniquely valuable services in many places where violence threatened. It is the only real world forum where we have the opportunity for international presentation and rebuttal."

At times, nations may seem to use this international forum of the United Nations to stress disagreements. Differences of viewpoint are sometimes expressed in harsh terms which are dramatic and make the headlines. Yet the function of the United Nations as a forum is of great value. It has been likened to that of a safety valve which serves to reduce pressures. The airing of disputes through debate often reduces the risk of resort to force. Moreover, a basic principle familiar to democratic countries is that in the long run free debate exposes falsehoods. The discussions in the General Assembly last November were invaluable in demonstrating the falsity of Communist charges that the United States Air Force had employed germ warfare in Korea. A distinguished representative of the medical profession, Dr. Charles W. Mayo, outlined with great skill how the Communists have perverted the use of the "conditioned reflex" technique to obtain false testimony from prisoners.² The General Assembly, representing world opinion and recognizing the emptiness of the Communist allegations, strongly condemned the charges.

However, the United Nations is far more than an effective and unique world forum. It is, in the words of the President, "sheer necessity" and "a place where the nations of the world can, if they have the will, take collective action for peace and justice."

Before the Minnesota Medical Association last June, I had the privilege of reviewing at length the accomplishments of the United Nations in opposing aggression, in peaceful settlements of disputes, and in setting up machinery which helps to secure and maintain the peace.³ At that time, I also referred briefly to the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the social and economic fields. Since World War II, the United States and other peace-loving nations have taken the lead in developing a number of specialized technical agencies within the United Nations system. The work of these specialized agencies makes headlines only infrequently; yet it is as truly a part of cooperative international action for peace as are the activities of the United Nations itself to which I have already briefly referred. In the longer term, these agencies—the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and others—may perform work of great importance in removing the root-causes of war.

The Vicious Cycle

Throughout history, most of mankind has been diseased, hungry, and poorly housed. For 6 out of 10 human beings—for 9 out of 10 in many eco-

¹ Address made before the American Public Health Association at Buffalo, N. Y., on Oct. 11 (press release 563 dated Oct. 8).

² BULLETIN of Nov. 9, 1953, p. 641.

³ *Ibid.*, June 28, 1954, p. 976.

economically underdeveloped areas—these remain the normal conditions of life today. As a result, the stability of half the world is menaced by a vicious social and economic cycle. Poor health means lower productivity; lower productivity means a lower standard of living; a lower standard of living means less food, education, and poorer living conditions; these, in turn, mean poor health. Thus the cycle of misery is completed.

The peoples to whom these conditions are a grim reality are ever more aware that modern technology in economically advanced countries provides a healthier and vastly more abundant life. Communist propagandists are, of course, exploiting this situation by claiming that communism alone provides the solution. Unless this destructive cycle in economically underdeveloped areas is broken, mounting tensions may rend the world in conflict.

This situation gives an immediate urgency to article 55 of the United Nations Charter, under which member states agree to take joint and separate action to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress. The specialized agencies are a major means by which nations are acting jointly to these ends. You, as experts in public health, are aware that the World Health Organization is among the foremost in contributing toward breaking the vicious circle I have described and thus helping to eradicate the social and economic causes of war.

The continuing achievements of WHO can be evaluated in either economic and material or in psychological and spiritual terms. I shall refer only briefly to the former aspect, but I should like to discuss more fully the psychological aspect.

Since the creation of WHO, there have been many favorable references to its accomplishments measured in terms of material or economic gain. A recent example is contained in the current WHO *Newsletter* (October-November 1954). Afghanistan, with WHO assistance, is now well on the way to nationwide control of malaria, a disease which each year has sapped the health and economic productivity of one-quarter of its population. By next year, Afghan nationals, trained by the WHO team, will be able to continue their national malaria-control campaign without further aid from international workers. For one-quarter of the population of that country, a crushing burden on productivity will be lifted for the first time.

What this may mean economically can be seen from the results of malaria-control campaigns in nearby countries where, in some areas, crop productivity has increased by one-third.

These material results, multiplied many times over in the many countries which WHO is assisting with a wide range of health activities, are already helping impressively to break the destructive cycle of disease and poverty.

Psychological Contributions of WHO

The psychological or spiritual contributions of WHO to world peace are less tangible than the economic contributions and so far have received far less attention. I am convinced, however, that in the long run they are more fundamental, for they deal with men's minds. WHO, like other specialized agencies, is promoting democratic and not totalitarian ways of life. It is promoting self-respect, self-reliance, and freedom for the individual.

Dr. Leonard Scheele, the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, in a notable address last June at the Midwest Conference on World Health sponsored by the National Citizens' Committee, emphasized the importance of WHO as "an application of democratic principles." From my own observations of the work of WHO, I heartily endorse this view. It is significant that the Seventh World Health Assembly meeting in May of this year elected as its president an African, Dr. Togba of Liberia. Dr. Togba in his presidential address pointed out that in WHO "the concept of democracy is being translated into action without regard to size or development of a country, race, culture, or creed."

The structure of WHO reflects democratic principles of organization. Membership is open to all states on an equal basis. All, large and small, may participate with equal voting rights in the annual World Health Assemblies. Moreover, the decentralized regional structure of WHO has enabled the organization to be even more responsive to the wishes and needs of member states. WHO is unique among international agencies in the extent to which it makes use of regional offices and committees. Nations discuss with the regional office staffs their needs for various types of WHO assistance. The regional committees then enable nations and territories to meet on an area basis to discuss their health needs and to review a regional health

program and budget. Only after this regional review are these programs submitted to WHO headquarters for integration into an overall annual program and budget and for final approval or modification by the World Health Assembly. In this way, nations participate at several stages in the determination of WHO programs—individually, at the regional level, and on a world scale.

WHO is implementing the principles of democracy not only in its organization structure, to which I have just referred, but likewise in its activities and programs. WHO activities are helping to build effective communication between the peoples of the world. By "communication" I mean not merely the modern technological means of communication, such as the radio and airplane, but the man-to-man exchange of ideas and accommodation of differences which are the basis of understanding. Through this process the WHO activities are doing something to surmount the many barriers—cultural, political, and ideological—which still separate nations and peoples. Many WHO projects illustrate this.

Take as a typical example the WHO malaria-control team in Formosa. In addition to an American entomologist, there are on that team a malariologist from Greece and a sanitary engineer from the Philippines. Operating as a team, these technicians are performing outstanding work in helping the people and government of Nationalist China to control the menace of malaria. More than that, they are demonstrating together that democracy in action translates itself into better understanding, education, and improved health and living conditions.

Altogether, the WHO staff is composed of 700 health experts from 50 countries, including about 100 from the United States. They are sharing common tasks and common interests and are working toward common objectives. They are learning to understand each other's viewpoints and to live harmoniously in a world which technology has shrunk so that we are all neighbors.

WHO technicians, whether at headquarters or on field projects, are likewise becoming acquainted with the peoples they are helping and are identifying themselves with the needs of these peoples. But this is, of course, a two-way process. On the other hand, throughout the economically underdeveloped areas of the world, the villager, the farmer, and the artisan are discovering that co-

operative international action can achieve tangible benefits for them in their own lives.

"Mr. Who"

In this connection I cannot resist retelling an amusing but pertinent story about the World Health Organization, which is known in many parts of the world as "WHO." An Indian doctor working on malaria control in a remote village in Northern Thailand asked the local head man a few questions: Had he heard of Mr. Nehru? "No." Had he heard of President Eisenhower? "No." Had he heard of the U. N.? "No." Had he heard of WHO? "Oh, yes. Mr. Who is the man who sprayed my house, and we have had no more sick babies—very good man."

This incident, which has been multiplied many times over, illustrates how the work of WHO and other specialized agencies gets to the grass roots and effectively helps the common man. Moreover, the peoples of underdeveloped areas are discovering, sometimes for the first time, that they, themselves, can actively participate in measures to improve their conditions of life. A mother taking her child to a rural health center, where she will learn the elements of child hygiene; or a village population voluntarily pooling their labor to help build a sanitary well—these apparently insignificant events actually often represent a new awakening of individual and community initiative.

Such, then, are some of the intangible accomplishments of WHO. They are found in the nature of the organization; in the bringing together of technicians from many countries to work with the people of many countries; in the stimulation of local and national initiative. They add up to the promotion of democratic rather than totalitarian attitudes and processes. They are helping to make possible effective communication, a genuine meeting of minds. In this respect, just as surely as in terms of economic gains, WHO is helping gradually to reduce tensions which could explode into war. It is not a rapid process, but it is in the right direction—and it is of importance for the security of the free world and of the United States.

Today I have dealt mainly with WHO and its achievements, which illustrate how the specialized agencies of the United Nations system play an important part in removing the root causes of war. This work, of course, must be coordinated. It is evident that WHO is alive to the need for continued

improvements in coordination, as shown by the words of the Director-General, Dr. Candau, in his annual report on the work of WHO for 1953.⁴ He refers to "a growing awareness in all of us of the need to plan WHO's role in promoting world health as comprising only one part—although admittedly a vital and central one—of the general framework of all national and international efforts to improve social and economic conditions throughout the world."

Support for and strengthening of all activities of the United Nations system and strengthening

⁴ U. N. doc. E/2592 dated May 4, 1954.

of the free world are integral parts of United States foreign policy. Addressing the ninth session of the General Assembly only last month, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles underlined the wholehearted belief of the American people in the United Nations Charter.⁵ This charter, he said, "recognizes that peace is not a passive concept but a call to action." The United Nations system is meeting this call to action for peace, and not least through the World Health Organization, which is mobilizing resources to promote the conditions of peace.

⁵ BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 471.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Views on Soviet Disarmament Proposal

Speaking before the General Assembly on September 30, the Soviet Representative, Andrei Vyshinsky, introduced a disarmament proposal which he requested the Assembly to add to its agenda. On October 6 the Assembly voted unanimously to include the item, and on October 11 Committee I (Political and Security) began debate on the Soviet proposal. Following are a statement released to the press by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, following Mr. Vyshinsky's speech before the Assembly; two statements in Committee I by U.S. Representative James J. Wadsworth; and the text of the Soviet draft resolution.

STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE

U.S. delegation press release 1965 dated September 30

The bulk of the Vyshinsky speech was a violent attack, filled with wild inaccuracies, on the United States in an effort to smear us as plotters of a preventive war. It was as reckless as Secretary Dulles' speech was moderate.¹ The world knows President Eisenhower and how utterly he is op-

posed to a preventive war. The world will therefore repudiate and deplore this particularly unsavory bit of Soviet mudslinging.

The Vyshinsky proposal on disarmament will, of course, receive our careful and earnest consideration. We are glad to see that the proposal seems to denote something of a change in the attitude of the U.S.S.R. toward two of the important principles which the United States has been trying for years to get the Soviets to accept. These are, first, that nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and conventional armaments and armed forces, on the other, are all related parts of the total picture and must be dealt with in a balanced fashion; second, disarmament must be subject to effective inspection and control which will protect the security of all states.

At any rate, Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal appears to offer more hope than the Soviet attitude expressed by Mr. Malik in London just this past summer when he rejected out of hand the British-French memorandum,² which included the two important principles I have just mentioned.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 471.

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 182.

Of course, the decisive test is how far the Soviet Union has really moved from its previous rigid position on disarmament. We shall get the answer to this question when Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal is studied and discussed in detail. Meantime, I wish to emphasize that the United States will consider this proposal objectively and with the sincere hope that it will prove to be a real step toward a comprehensive, effective, and workable disarmament.

STATEMENTS BY MR. WADSWORTH

U.S. delegation press release 1973 dated October 12

The First Committee of the General Assembly is entering its ninth year of activity—and its ninth year of hard work on the stubborn problem of disarmament. All these years of discussion have not brought forth a single agreement to scrap one gun or tank or bomb or to discharge one soldier.

People all over the world, who know little of world politics, know this disheartening fact, yet it is in response to their will to peace that we continue to seek a solution. Our failure in the past is due mainly to the unhappy fact that we chose to tackle the problem of armaments in a period torn with conflict. The two sides locked in this conflict have not been disposed to trust each other. Least of all has it seemed wise to trust the side whose extreme secretiveness is a part of its way of life.

How can we establish the mutual trust on which disarmament should rest?

We submit that we cannot establish trust on either side by demanding and repeating "I promise—trust me." Trust is a most delicate quality, and it cannot be shouted into existence. In a matter as vital as armaments we can establish it only if both sides first agree on a fair plan of action and then carry out each step of that plan on schedule and in plain sight of each other.

It is a most difficult task, but it is possible. If it is carried out in good faith, one of its chief results will be the growth of the very quality of trust whose absence has paralyzed our efforts up to now.

The Basic United States Position

There are four basic ideas which have animated the United States from the very beginning of the disarmament discussions in the United Nations.

First, the United States wants disarmament.

The United States was one of the countries which proposed article 26 of the United Nations Charter, calling for "the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources." We want disarmament that will disarm. We want more than a mere toast where states clink their glasses and drink to the health of disarmament. We want disarmament that will work.

Second, we believe that there is more than one path by which the world can progress toward disarmament. Over the years we have marked out a number of paths on any or all of which we could make a start toward disarmament: controlling atomic energy; limiting the size of the armed forces of the Great Powers; a system of disclosure of all armed forces and all armaments with verification by an international organ. We have always recognized that it is impossible to solve this problem unless *all* the Great Powers agree on the solution. That is why we have suggested many avenues of discussion in the hope that, even if we could not reach full agreement with the Soviet Union, at least we could narrow the differences that separate us. That has been our approach in the past, and it is still our approach.

Third, we want the world to be rid of nuclear weapons. The world will not be rid of nuclear weapons by merely shouting from the roof tops that they are prohibited or that they will not be used while one nation behind its Iron Curtain continues to stockpile them. The United States is not going to use atomic weapons or any other weapons in violation of the United Nations Charter. The United States is not going to use atomic weapons or any other weapons except in defense against aggression. That is our pledge, and it is also the pledge of every member of the United Nations including the U. S. S. R. That pledge, however, gives security to no one so long as one of the chief countries making the pledge has its Iron Curtain behind which it can prepare to violate its pledge without fear of detection.

Fourth, we want world peace. We know that another war would be a catastrophe. We recognize that in the past arms races have preceded armed attack by aggressor nations. At the same time we cannot stop an arms race unless all the racers stop running, and we cannot know whether all the racers have stopped running if one of them

insists on running on a concealed track. For the free world to stop arming while the Soviet Union keeps on increasing its strength would be an invitation to the very war we seek to avoid and to the destruction of freedom.

These are the lessons of hard experience. We think of them as we continue our search for a disarmament that gives security to all. Thinking of these lessons, we hold that secure disarmament in a world without trust requires two things above all.

First, it must cover all armaments in a single plan—for bayonets and high explosives are still deadly in this atomic age.

Second, it must contain safeguards so that each side actually disarms in plain sight of the other, with the firm certainty that all pledges are being carried out every step of the way.

We believe that all states will agree generally with these principles. Why is it that we have been unable to translate these principles into a workable disarmament program? The record of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee reveals a great deal on this subject. Let us now discuss it.

The Record in the Disarmament Commission in 1954

We agree with the Soviet suggestion that as far as possible we should forget the past, and we shall therefore devote far less time to the past than did the Soviet representative.

The disarmament resolution passed by the Eighth General Assembly was notable for its sixth paragraph, which suggested that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a Subcommittee consisting of the representatives of the powers principally involved to seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission.³

Last April the Disarmament Commission, in conformity with this resolution, set up such a Subcommittee consisting of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the United States. This Subcommittee met in London, in private and as we hoped, free from the temptations of propaganda. Then the Subcommittee made a report to the Disarmament Commission.⁴ As a part of its report, the Subcommittee made

public the entire records of the London meetings. The world is now in a position to judge the progress or lack of progress at these private meetings and to determine the responsibility for their success or failure.

The plain motive of the Eighth General Assembly in suggesting once again private meetings of a few powers was to produce new approaches to disarmament—approaches which would have at least some hope of narrowing the differences that have separated the Soviet Union from the free world. Let us examine the record of the Subcommittee of Five to see to what extent these hopes were fulfilled.

At the very first meeting the Soviet Union submitted a disarmament proposal, but it was not a new proposal. It was, word for word, the proposal which the Soviet Union had submitted to the Eighth General Assembly and which the Assembly had found unacceptable. This was certainly a discouraging start, and the same pattern prevailed throughout the discussions. The representative of New Zealand, in the Disarmament Commission discussions in July, aptly characterized the Soviet attitude as one of “stony immobility.”

In contrast, the other members of the Subcommittee tried to explore two avenues of approach to disarmament which had never before received any thorough treatment in the United Nations. The United States submitted a working paper on the establishment of an international control organ with appropriate rights, powers, and functions. In presenting this paper we stressed that we were not putting forward a rigid position with the thought that all other states “should either take it or leave it.” The United States representative said: “Let us think of this paper merely as one approach in an attempt to come to grips with basic issues of substance. From the discussions of specific problems we hope to narrow the difference between us and perhaps arrive at a position which all of us can approve.” Furthermore we pointed out that the control organ, as we drew it up, would be as applicable to a program based upon Soviet concepts sketched over the past several years as it was to the U.S. program.

Despite our efforts, the Soviet representative refused all serious discussions of our paper. As a matter of fact, he never got any further than the first paragraph, which referred to the General

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1953, p. 838.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 177.

Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, which the U.S.S.R. had opposed.

The second new avenue of approach was contained in the British-French memorandum of June 11 which has been so much in the news in recent weeks. This dealt with the phasing and timing of the chief elements of a disarmament program. The representatives of the United Kingdom and France have fully explained these proposals, and I shall not repeat their explanations. The United States supported and still supports the proposals.

In London the Soviet Union refused to discuss the British-French proposals and, as in the case of the U.S. suggestion, never got beyond the first paragraph. This was one of the comments by the Soviet representative: "It is perfectly obvious that the proposal of the United Kingdom and France and supported by the United States does not provide at all for the prohibition of atomic weapons but is designed to justify their use. The adoption of such a proposal would in no way contribute to a slackening of international tensions or to the removal of the dangers of an atomic war. What is more it could lull the vigilance of the peoples toward this danger."

Now, after all, the Soviet representative at this General Assembly has introduced a resolution suggesting that these proposals of France and the United Kingdom be used as a basis for an international disarmament treaty.

We are indeed gratified that the Soviet Union has apparently changed its views and now recognizes the genuine value of the British-French proposals as a fresh approach to this great problem. But the change in position—and we hope it is a change—did not manifest itself until September 30.

The Soviet Proposal

The first ray of hope that we have received in many years from the Soviet Union was the proposal made by the Soviet representative to this Assembly on that date. That ray was considerably dimmed, though not extinguished, by Mr. Vyshinsky's statement yesterday. We have studied the proposal carefully and, we believe, objectively. What I am going to say now reflects our initial impressions of a proposal which at several key points has been and remains obscure in its meaning. Our impression may readily be altered as a

result of the discussions in this committee and later in the Disarmament Commission.

First, we recognize that on one and only one important matter the Soviet has taken a clear and unambiguous stand which somewhat narrows the differences which have separated the Soviet Union from the free world. The Soviet Union now concedes that 50 percent of the agreed reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments may take place before any action to prohibit nuclear weapons. This is paragraph I (2) (a) of the Soviet proposal.

Second, in paragraph I (2) (c) the Soviet Union calls for "inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all states." This is one of the obscure points on which further discussion is required. It could be a great improvement over the 1952 Soviet formula for an international control organ that "shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of states."

Any control organ with powers "to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention" must clearly have the full run of a country. Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that during the war button factories in the Soviet Union manufactured munitions. The International Control Commission must therefore have the right to inspect button factories in order to determine whether or not they are manufacturing munitions. This is precisely what the Soviet delegate denied to us during the London talks. We had hoped that this resolution indicated a change in position. However, if we interpret correctly Mr. Vyshinsky's statement of yesterday, any country can frustrate the inspectors simply by posting on a munitions factory a sign reading "Keep out—this factory makes buttons."

Third, a commission with adequate powers would of necessity also have the authority to take effective action whenever it found a violation. We do not infer by this that the commission would have its own army which could be used to punish a violator. It would, however, have certain powers, some of which we enumerated in our paper on the international control organ which we submitted to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission in London. These powers included the right to suspend allocations of fissionable materials to an offending country and to close down

factories utilizing fissionable materials in that country.

The Soviet representative in London stated categorically that the control commission could do nothing beyond referring the violations to the Security Council, where each of the permanent members is in a position to veto all action. We hoped that the new Soviet proposals, with their language about full powers to ensure implementation of the treaty, might represent a change in Soviet position. Mr. Vyshinsky yesterday very thoroughly dispelled that hope. He made it clear that the control organ, where there is no veto, could do nothing to punish violations. No violations can be punished except with the consent of the Soviet Union, armed with its veto power.

Fourth, there was one issue in London which perhaps received more extended discussion than any other—the issue of the relationship in time between the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the institution of international control. The Soviet Union in London took their traditional line that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of controls should be simultaneous. “Simultaneous” is a pretty word, but, as we have pointed out on many occasions, in this context it is literally meaningless.

The prohibition of atomic weapons is a single act. On the other hand the institution of controls is a long series of acts. The real question is this: At what point during the development of the control organ would prohibition of atomic weapons take place?

The United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada all took the position at London which was set forth in the British-French memorandum: that the prohibition of nuclear weapons would take place as soon as but no sooner than when the control organ was in a position to assure that the prohibition would actually prohibit. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, took the position that in fact the prohibition should take place as soon as there was agreement that there should be a control organ. This is like saying: “Since we now agree to build a house, let’s move in right away.” An agreement will not keep the rain out.

Mr. Vyshinsky, in his statement yesterday, gave a new meaning to the word “simultaneous.” He said that the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the institution of international controls must be completed within the same period. In other

words, we must simultaneously complete building the house and moving into it. This, of course, is an improvement on moving into the house before it is built. But it raises some questions. What if we agree to move in and the house never gets built? What if the time limit for building expires, and the house is unfinished—do we have to move in anyway? In short, just how much of an improvement the new position is depends upon the detailed schedules of building and of moving in. Mr. Vyshinsky has substituted for his old formula which was impossible a new formula which is merely vague and requires further study.

Fifth, another example of this need for study is paragraph I (1) (a), which speaks of agreed levels and reduction of armaments from the level of December 31, 1953. We studied this provision carefully in the English and French translations. Frankly, it has no meaning whatever. I am not sure that I understood Mr. Vyshinsky’s explanation of this paragraph. As Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out when we listened to the translations, conditions are far from the optimum. However, if I understood correctly, it is now fairly apparent that the Soviet Union proposes that the reductions start from December 31, 1953, levels and take place in two stages, 50 percent of the reductions to be in each stage. We are still unclear as to where the process ends. How do we determine the levels to which the armed forces and armaments are to be reduced? We still do not know whether the Soviet Union continues to insist upon flat percentage reductions from December 31, 1953, levels. Mr. Vyshinsky said that he was not pressing for percentage reductions at this time. He did not indicate that he had abandoned his previous requests or that he was accepting any alternative formula.

We are still hopeful that these Soviet proposals represent an important step in the direction of an agreed disarmament program. They must, however, be clarified and elaborated. Large segments of the disarmament program are not touched at all in these proposals. This was clearly pointed out by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France. There is a tremendous amount of hard labor ahead of us before we can turn any of the proposals now before the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission into a practical disarmament program.

This is a technical subject. We do not believe

that the General Assembly is the forum for going into the technical details. We believe that the very fact that the Soviet Union has seen fit to present these new proposals underlines the wisdom of the Eighth General Assembly in suggesting private discussions by the powers principally involved. We would support the reactivation of the Subcommittee to deal with these Soviet proposals and the other disarmament proposals which are before the Disarmament Commission. In short, we believe that the Soviet proposals should be studied in the hope that many of them in some form will be embodied in a disarmament treaty. We definitely do not reject them.

The Outlook

During the Subcommittee meetings in London and again during the disarmament discussions in New York, we pointed out that the Soviet approach to disarmament had three main features which not only prevented agreement but also destroyed the possibility of genuine negotiation. Let us review those features and consider to what extent they are applicable to the new Soviet proposals. In the *first* place, the Soviet Union in the past has confined itself to proposals too vague to have any meaning. Ambassador [Morehead] Patterson in the Disarmament Subcommittee aptly likened the Soviet proposals to a book with a table of contents followed by nothing but blank pages. We are sorry to say that the current Soviet proposal fits this description. It will require much elaboration before it will be really meaningful.

Second, the Soviet proposals in the past have been long on pledges and short on safeguards to insure that the Soviet Union would observe its pledges. It has refused any type of international control which would result in a genuine lifting of the Iron Curtain. The present proposals use language sufficiently broad so that it would be possible for the Soviet Union, under this proposal, to agree to genuine and effective safeguards. Whether it in fact is prepared to take such a step will probably be determined only after we get down to detailed discussions.

Third, even if we assume full Soviet observance of pledges, the past program would have had as its result the disarmament of the free world without disarming the Soviet Union. Thus under their previous plans the most important elements of

strength of the free world—its nuclear weapons and its bases—would be eliminated. On the other hand, the most important features of Soviet strength—its vast armies and its conventional weapons—would be merely reduced by one-third. From this standpoint, the present proposal is a distinct improvement on previous proposals. It is entirely possible that when it is elaborated it would be consistent with the security of other states. Again, we cannot tell this until we can find out what it means.

If the Soviet Union has really abandoned its policy of disarming the free world without disarming the Soviet bloc, this is indeed a change in policy. The previous policy, as we pointed out in the Disarmament Commission, was far older than the Disarmament Commission or than the United Nations. In fact it was a Communist policy even before there was a Soviet Union. We can find it in the writings of Lenin as early as 1916 when he said:

Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without destroying its world historical mission, to throw all armament on the scrap heap; the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before.

Until the Soviet Union shows some regard for the security of other states, until the Soviet Union looks on disarmament as a method of avoiding war and of improving living conditions of mankind rather than as a steppingstone to strategic advantages for itself, there can be no progress toward disarmament. The United States is willing and indeed eager in the light of the developments of the past week to engage in further talks and negotiations which may give promise of progress toward the goal of world peace. We hope that the world will view realistically any further negotiations and discussions and will not seek prematurely to paint a bright picture of progress which might turn out to be a mirage.

Conclusions

In conclusion let me reaffirm our wish to explore all avenues where there is a genuine prospect of progress toward disarmament that will really disarm. The President of the United States, in his inaugural address, stated certain fixed principles which would guide him in pleading our just cause before the bar of history and in pressing our labor for world peace. The very first of these principles contains the following language:

We stand ready to engage with any and all others in joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations and so to make possible drastic reduction of armaments. The sole requisites for undertaking such effort are that, in their purpose, they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all; and that, in their result, they provide methods by which every participating nation will prove good faith in carrying out its pledge.

The present Soviet proposals do appear to open an avenue for further discussion. It must be emphasized, however, that these proposals, like past Soviet proposals, are merely a beginning. There are many important parts of a disarmament program which these proposals do not touch at all, and even where the Soviet proposals suggest a solution in most instances that solution is too vague and ambiguous for the world to judge its merits. We hope there has been a real change in the Soviet outlook, a change that will make possible measurable progress toward the goal for which everyone must strive—a genuine and lasting peace.

U.S. delegation press release 1976 dated October 12

Just a very brief statement on the rather remarkable statement we have just heard from the distinguished delegate from the Soviet Union.

He started out by talking about inaccuracies in my own statement and wound up by talking about a great many things on which I never had anything to say. However, I think that all through my prepared remarks the delegate of the Soviet Union will find that, due to the shortness of the time since he completed his speech of yesterday, I said perhaps I misjudged him, perhaps I misunderstood him, if I understood him correctly. In those places where he has actually corrected me, I think that I should thank him for this correction. The interpretations, however, which one places upon the English language as it comes through the earphones is one thing as opposed to the corrected verbatim report which we will, of course, get later on. However, there are one or two points which Mr. Vyshinsky made which I feel might be worthy of very brief comment because I feel that we should not keep the committee sitting too long over this sort of an altercation.

In the first place, in attempting to deny some of the things I have said, Mr. Vyshinsky did confirm two of the things I said. First, that any action to deal with violations of a disarmament plan must be subject to the Security Council and its veto; second, he confirmed my contention that

he had not completely abandoned his previous demands for a flat percentage reduction. Perhaps Mr. Vyshinsky's translation when I was talking on that particular line might have been subject to misinterpretation, but my recollection is that I said that he did not press for his reduction plan at this time—and I think that that was an accurate statement.

I would also agree very thoroughly with my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union that there is a vast amount of difference between opposition and discussion on the one hand and rejection on the other. I stand, however, by my statement made in my prepared remarks and would ask the members of this committee to read the record of the London meetings in which Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union did in fact categorically reject the points that were made by the United States in its working paper on a control organ and by the Franco-British proposal.

Finally, I believe with Mr. Vyshinsky that it might be of considerable value to all the members of this committee to read the entire text of Mr. Lenin's article on disarmament from which I quoted. At least I have avoided the accusation that the quote was incorrect; according to Mr. Vyshinsky it was taken out of context. But at the same time I feel that it is a revealing quote, and it is something which has been held fast to on the part of the Soviet Union in disarmament talks throughout most of our past several years.

Altogether I believe that colloquies of this type are extremely valuable to the members of the committee. It is, of course, possible to attempt to confuse and befog the issue by talking about matters having nothing to do with the points at issue. However, at the same time, that also reveals the weakness of the argument of the person doing it.

SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION

Following is the text of the disarmament proposal which the Soviet representative, Andrei Vyshinsky, introduced in a speech to the General Assembly on September 30 and which he requested the Assembly to add to its agenda. On October 6 the Assembly voted unanimously to include the item.

U.N. doc. A/2742 dated September 30

I. The General Assembly instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit for con-

firmation by the Security Council a draft international convention (treaty) designed to strengthen peace and increase international security and providing for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and their elimination from the armaments of States, a substantial reduction in armaments and the establishment of international control over the implementation of these decisions on the basis of the French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954.

Accordingly, the convention (treaty) should contain the following basic provisions:

(1) The following measures shall be taken simultaneously:

(a) In the course of six months (or one year), States shall reduce their armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels. Armaments and armed forces shall be reduced from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 31 December 1953, and appropriations shall be reduced from the amount of actual expenditure on military requirements during the year ending 31 December 1953.

(b) For the purposes of supervising the fulfilment by States of the obligations in connexion with the reduction of armaments and armed forces provided for in sub-paragraph (a), a temporary international control commission shall be established under the Security Council with the right to require States to provide the necessary information on the measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces. The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements. States shall periodically supply the commission at established intervals with information concerning the implementation of the measures provided for in the convention.

(2) On completion of the measures referred to in paragraph (1), the following measures shall be taken simultaneously:

(a) In the course of six months (or one year), States shall reduce their armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed levels from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 31 December 1953, and shall reduce their appropriations from the amount of actual expenditure on military requirements during the year 31 December 1953.

(b) A complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction shall be carried into effect, the production of such weapons shall be discontinued and they shall be entirely eliminated from the armaments of States; all existing atomic materials shall be used only for peaceful purposes.

The carrying out of these measures must be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures taken for the reduction of armaments and armed forces referred to in paragraph (2) (a), and the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall cease immediately, as soon as a start is made with the reduction of armaments, armed

forces and appropriations for military requirements in respect of the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed standards.

(c) States shall institute a standing international organ for the supervision of the implementation of the convention (treaty) on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuance of the production of these weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States and the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements.

This international organ shall have full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States.

II. In connexion with the proposal concerning the prohibition of the "use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression" in the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954, the General Assembly instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to study and clarify this question and submit its recommendations.

International Financing of Economic Development

*Statement by Roger W. Straus
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

Allow me to take this opportunity to acknowledge my great appreciation to be associated in the work of this Committee with the distinguished men and women constituting its membership. I come here not as a trained economist, not as a government official. I come as a businessman, who, for the last 40 years, has been associated with a business organization that has operated in many parts of the world. It has contributed markedly to the economic development of some. Through this experience I have had firsthand opportunity to observe some of the opportunities, needs, and problems which will be the subject of our discussions in this Committee.

In his address before the 10th Inter-American Conference at Caracas early this year,² our Secretary of State pointed out that, in today's interrelated world, "No government adequately serves its own people unless it also is concerned with well-being in other countries." Obviously, no country can divorce itself from the problem presented by

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Oct. 8 (U.S. delegation press release 1972).

² BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1954, p. 379.

the existence of extremely low standards of living in large areas of the world. The postwar years have witnessed a growing realization that the attack on poverty, disease, and ignorance calls for cooperative effort on the part of all of us. This realization is a new and vital force in international relations.

All of us must join in every practical way to bring our knowledge, our science, and our tools to bear upon this problem. Nevertheless, since economic and social progress depends primarily on the efforts of the people concerned, each country must decide for itself what it is prepared to do about its own economic development. Each country must decide for itself what institutions it will encourage to bring about the production of the things its people want. Each country must itself determine what steps it is prepared to take to attract outside capital to help with the job.

In my own country, our traditional policy has been to develop our economy through private enterprise. This emphasis on individual freedom and on the constructive force of individual initiative is a basic part of our philosophy. It is this system which has generated the economic vitality which has been a mainspring of our economic development.

While we are convinced that the fullest possible exercise of private initiative is the basis of sound economic development, we are, at the same time, aware that it cannot be offered as a panacea for all economic ills.

In many underdeveloped countries, the first need is for basic development in such fields as transport, power, communications, education, and public health.

To provide the economy with this so-called "overhead capital" often involves large-scale investment in projects which, at least in their working stages, are not self-liquidating. The fields of education and public health have been traditionally regarded as largely the responsibility of government. In other fields, such as transport, power, and communications, investment can often be provided by the joint effort of government and private enterprise when, for one reason or another, private capital is not available in sufficient quantities. In other instances, the Government will find it advisable to assume the entire responsibility. Clearly, so long as the problem of building essential basic facilities in underdeveloped areas re-

mains so important, we must continue to be concerned with the problems of public financing.

Mr. Chairman, we shall later in our discussions be considering various specific ways and means of assisting the economic development of underdeveloped countries. At this time, I should like only to touch upon some general aspects of the problem without going into those matters with which we shall be dealing in detail later on.

It has often been argued that the financial needs of economic development have outrun the capital available to underdeveloped countries; that the lack of funds is, if not the most important, one of the important limits on the rate of economic development. I do not intend at this time to analyze the accuracy of this generalization. Later in our deliberations, I hope to have an opportunity to discuss the prospects for the international flow of capital if appropriate opportunities are available. But I would, in this connection, like to quote from a statement made by the Governor from Cuba at the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank in Washington last month. The Governor from Cuba said:

I can say without hesitation that there is more money ready to be lent by the Bank than there are projects ready to receive loans from the Bank. Our main difficulty has been not the question of raising sufficient money for financing development projects but the problem of having countries submit for our consideration good, worthwhile, bankable projects. The Bank is fully aware of this bottleneck, and tries to help in every possible way the less developed countries to get proper technical and financial assistance for the preparation and presentation of good projects. But I can say that no project has failed to obtain from the Bank the necessary financial assistance for lack of funds.

Expanding Activities of International Bank

The Annual Report of the International Bank issued just a few weeks ago tells an encouraging story of expanding bank activity which is reflected in the economic and social growth of its member countries. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, the bank made 26 loans, equivalent to about \$325 million. These were more loans, and a greater amount of lending, than in any previous year of the bank's existence. Moreover, thus far in the present fiscal year, the rate of lending has kept pace with this new record, and the total of loans made by the bank has now passed the \$2 billion mark, with almost three-quarters of the last billion going to underdeveloped areas.

These loans have been made to 34 member countries.

There is another development which, I think, has significant implications for the future financing of economic development. In the years following the war, the demands of reconstruction and investment at home prevented Western Europe from playing its traditional role as an exporter of capital, except in very limited fashion. This situation, together with Western Europe's own need for assistance, was one of the important factors hampering the growth of the world economy in the postwar years.

There are signs that this condition is rapidly changing. For example, between June 1953 and June 1954, Western European currencies to the equivalent of some \$110 million became available in one form or another for lending by the International Bank.

In fact, what might be called the greater internationalization of the financial resources available to assist in economic development is becoming quite evident. During the past fiscal year, lendable funds available to the International Bank increased by \$310 million. Of this amount, almost \$190 million, or 61 percent, came from sources outside the United States. The last bond issue of the International Bank of \$50 million was oversubscribed by \$28 million and had to be allocated among bidders from 23 countries. For the first time in the history of the financial world, a dollar issue has been sold entirely outside the United States. This is indeed a hopeful augury for international financing of economic development.

The contribution of the International Bank to the financing of the economic development of underdeveloped countries, substantial though it may be, is but a part of the story of the cooperative effort of the free world in this direction. We shall undoubtedly be hearing from the representatives of other countries about the contributions they have found it possible to make to assist the underdeveloped areas. The efforts and contributions of my own country have often been indicated in this and other forums of the United Nations.

For this fiscal year, the Congress has authorized \$300 million for economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. This amount will raise the total of assistance extended to the underdeveloped areas by the American people since World War II to about \$6½ billion.

During the deliberations of this Committee last year there was some speculation as to the future role of the Export-Import Bank in the field of economic development. In this connection, I should like to recall one of the statements contained in the message of President Eisenhower to the Congress on March 30, 1954.³ In this message the President, referring to the Export-Import Bank, stated that the bank will consider on their merits applications for development projects which are not being made by the International Bank and which meet the usual requirements of export-import lending. I think the statement indicates that the Export-Import Bank will be in a position to continue to play an active role in the development field. In this connection, some of you may be aware that the Congress recently authorized an increase of half a billion dollars in the lending authority of the bank. This action raised the bank's total lending authority to \$5 billion. This same legislation also provided for a reorganization of the bank designed to make it a more effective operating instrument.

Agricultural Trade Act

I should like to mention one other way in which the United States can now help provide additional assistance for economic development.

Underdeveloped countries wishing to carry out ambitious development projects are often faced with the problem of providing at the same time an increased supply of consumer goods to their populations. Unless they can do so, inflation may well result, with all its pernicious effects on the very process of economic development itself. To illustrate, some countries in South and Southeast Asia, where the problem of surplus labor is acute, have been deterred from expanding their investment programs and putting this labor to work because they were not able to provide additional amounts of consumer goods.

In general, the International Bank and our own Export-Import Bank have been prepared only to finance the cost of imported capital goods and industrial supplies. They have not, as a rule, been prepared to provide long-term loans for imports of consumer goods.

As many of you are aware, our Congress has recently enacted the Agricultural Trade and De-

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 19, 1954, p. 602.

velopment Act. The purpose of this act is to enable the Government to use our agricultural commodities to expand world trade. We believe that one of the truly constructive purposes for which our surplus commodities can now be used is to help to promote economic development. We are prepared to make these commodities available to underdeveloped countries to help meet increased consumption demands arising from their development programs. I should like to take a moment to indicate how this can be done.

Under the provisions of the law, the United States Government is now authorized to sell its stocks of agricultural commodities for the local currency of the recipient country. Furthermore, the U.S. Government is authorized to lend back to the buying country a substantial part of all such local currency received. In other words, underdeveloped countries can now secure assistance in importing increased supplies of such consumer goods as wheat, corn, cotton, fats, and oils, which they may need to procure to meet the increased demands for consumer goods arising from accelerated development operation.

Such transactions envisaged in the Agricultural Trade and Development Act can be mutually beneficial. Since development programs may be expected to lead to increased consumption, holdings of agricultural commodities now overhanging the market can be moved without disrupting normal markets or depressing world prices. Countries which, in other respects, are in a position to undertake new development projects and to put unemployed labor into productive employment can do so without suffering the ill effects of inflation. Labor-using projects that may have been postponed because they could not easily be financed can be given the priority they deserve.

This new authority which the Congress has given us will run for a 3-year period. It is our hope that underdeveloped countries will take advantage of this legislation to accelerate their economic development.

Mr. Chairman, I think most of us would agree that the world has made important strides since the war in dealing with the problem of economic development. At the same time we are all, I am sure, acutely aware of the immense task still to be done. We cannot be content merely to look backward. It seems to me as a business executive, just as a manufacturer of automobiles is constantly

trying to improve his already tried and tested models, so must we endeavor to make more effective our existing institutions and our existing methods of dealing with this problem. On the other hand, just as the automobile manufacturer is also constantly searching for basically new designs, so must we be alert to new ways and means which have practical applications for the future.

The peoples of the underdeveloped countries are eager for additional tools for economic growth. The compelling economic reasons for assisting these peoples to convert their aspirations into reality have often been analyzed, and I need not go into them at this time. But economic development has a larger significance. It is something which is good in itself because it affects people, their dignity, and their freedom. Economic development can mean the difference between explosive tensions and stability, between apathy and hope, between serfdom and constructive citizenship. It can contribute to the development of a stable, democratic society of free men.

These are powerful reasons for continued efforts by all of us to hasten the economic development of the underdeveloped countries.

U.S. Delegations to International Meetings

Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO Regional Committee Meeting

The Department of State announced on October 6 (press release 559) that the U.S. Government would be represented at the Fourteenth Pan American Sanitary Conference and the Sixth Meeting of the Regional Committee of the World Health Organization at Santiago, Chile, October 8-22, 1954, by the following delegation:

Delegates

- W. Palmer Dearing, M.D., *Chairman*, Deputy Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
- Frederick J. Brady, M.D., International Health Representative, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
- Howard B. Calderwood, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

- Roy Anduze, M.D., Commissioner of Health, Virgin Islands Department of Health, Charlotte Amalie, Virgin Islands

William Belton, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
 E. Ross Jenney, M.D., Chief of Health, Welfare and Housing Field Party, Foreign Operations Administration, Santiago, Chile
 Juan A. Pons, M.D., Secretary of Health, Puerto Rico Department of Health, San Juan, Puerto Rico
 Walter W. Sohl, Jr., *Secretary of Delegation*, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

The Pan American Sanitary Conference is the supreme governing body of the Pan American Sanitary Organization (PASO), the international coordinating authority for public health in the Americas, and serves as the Regional Committee for the Americas of the World Health Organization. The Conference, which meets once in 4 years, delegates its powers to the Directing Council, which meets yearly during the 3 years between Conferences. The Thirteenth Pan American Sanitary Conference was held at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, October 2-10, 1950.

The Fourteenth Conference will plan the course of the Pan American Sanitary Organization for the next 4 years. Among the agenda items are the following: (1) The Director's reports—i. e. annual report, reviewing the Bureau's activities in 1953; and a 4-year report, from the beginning of 1950, for consideration of the Conference; (2) 1955 program and budget; (3) malaria eradication; (4) health reports of governments; (5) election of the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau for a 4-year term beginning February 1, 1955, and submission of his name to the World Health Organization in Geneva for confirmation as WHO Regional Director; and (6) Executive Committee nominations to fill vacancies on the 7-member Executive Committee, caused by the termination of the periods of office of Ecuador and Mexico. There will also be a series of technical discussions in the form of seminars held concurrently with the Conference Session. The subjects chosen this year are (1) methods of improving the reliability of raw statistical data required for health programs; (2) control of infant diarrheas in the light of recent scientific progress; and (3) application of health-education methods in rural areas in Latin America.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

International Rice Commission

Amended Constitution of the International Rice Commission and Rules of Procedure. Approved by the Seventh Session of the FAO Conference at Rome, December 10, 1953. Entered into force December 10, 1953.

Members of the Commission:

United States	Italy
Australia	Japan
Burma	Korea
Cambodia	Laos
Ceylon	Mexico
Cuba	Netherlands
Dominican Republic	Pakistan
Ecuador	Paraguay
Egypt	Philippines
France	Thailand
India	United Kingdom
Indonesia	Viet-Nam

BILATERAL

Costa Rica

Agreement for a cooperative project in agricultural research in Costa Rica, pursuant to the general agreement for technical cooperation of January 11, 1951 (TIAS 2186). Effected by exchange of notes at San José June 28 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

Guatemala

Agreement providing for transfer of military equipment and materiel to the Government of Guatemala, subject to certain understandings. Signed at Guatemala July 27 and 30, 1954. Entered into force July 30, 1954.

Honduras

Agreement relating to duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges on relief supplies and packages. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa August 26 and September 17, 1954. Entered into force September 17, 1954.

Liberia

Agreement relating to duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges on relief supplies and packages. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia May 6, August 23, and September 15, 1954. Entered into force September 15, 1954.

Thailand

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 27 and September 1, 1954. Entered into force September 1, 1954.

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to October 11 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 559 of October 6, 561 of October 7, and 563 of October 8.

No.	Date	Subject
565	10/11	Dreier: Columbus Day.
*567	10/11	Educational exchange.
†568	10/11	Foreign Service memorial.
569	10/11	Robertson visits Formosa.
*570	10/12	Program for Mohammed Ali visit.
*571	10/12	Educational exchange.
*572	10/12	Educational exchange.
†573	10/12	German dollar-bond debts.
*574	10/13	Program for Tubman visit.
†575	10/13	Waugh: Colombo plan.
†576	10/14	Aldrich: N.Y. Board of Trade.
†577	10/14	Baldwin: Asian economic development.
578	10/14	Hoover: Greeting to Mohammed Ali.
†579	10/15	Phillips designation (rewrite).
*580	10/16	Department honors ceremony.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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The Record on Disarmament

Publication 5581

15 cents

A Subcommittee of Five of the U.N. Disarmament Commission met at London in May-June 1954 to carry out the General Assembly's resolution of November 28, 1953, to "seek in private an acceptable solution." Following these talks, the Subcommittee's report was transmitted to the Disarmament Commission, which dealt with the Subcommittee's results at New York on July 20-29, 1954.

The Record on Disarmament is a report on these meetings. As stated in the Letter of Transmittal, the discussions gave a clear indication of the present direction of Soviet thinking on disarmament. The Soviet Union showed no serious desire to negotiate the subject. It confined its efforts to glib distortions to support the propaganda slogan "ban the bomb."

This 20-page document gives a running account of the developments in the secret talks at London, the records of which have now been made public, and the meetings at New York. The booklet provides a summary of the chief Western proposals and tactics. It concludes with a section on the implications of the discussions.

Copies of *The Record on Disarmament* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 801

November 1, 1954



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JOHN J. ...
Superintendent of Documents



NOV 24 1954

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXI, No. 801 • PUBLICATION 5639

November 1, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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Fifth Annual Honor Awards Ceremony

On October 19 the Department of State held its fifth annual honor awards ceremony at Constitution Hall, Washington, D. C. Following are texts of remarks made by the President and Secretary Dulles at the ceremony.¹

SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 591 dated October 19

Mr. President, your presence here does us all honor. It symbolizes the vital importance of foreign affairs to every aspect of American life. It is a reminder of the historic relationship between the Chief Executive, who is constitutionally responsible for the current conduct of foreign affairs, and the Department of State and the members of the Foreign Service who serve him.

The Department of State and the Foreign Service can boast a record of service that is older than the Republic itself. It was to the Department of State that the first Congress entrusted the safekeeping of the Great Seal of the United States. Our Chiefs of Mission abroad are the personal representatives of the President.

So we have a special and time-honored relationship to the Chief of State.

When I first became Secretary of State I spoke of the high regard in which I held the careers you of the State Department and Foreign Service have chosen. I said:²

... today we are the "shock troops" in the cold war which is being waged against us. Upon us depends, more than upon any other group of men and women in this country, the decision as to whether or not we will meet

this threat, and whether we will meet it peacefully. I cannot imagine a greater opportunity or a greater challenge that confronts anyone than confronts us and our affiliates in the Foreign Service in the Embassies all around the world. We have a tremendous task, a tremendous responsibility, and a tremendous opportunity.

These words expressed what I believed then and they express what I believe now.

We live in adventurous and dangerous times. Such times bring forth great acts. Today we single out a few of the men and women who have responded to the challenge of our times in a manner and in circumstances which are outstanding. That is why they, in particular, are being cited today.

There are, of course, many kinds of service that command such honor. First of all there is courage. One officer of the Foreign Service will not be able to receive his award today because he gave his life to save the lives of others. Other brave acts will receive recognition, acts of rescue and of fortitude in far places.

There is also another form of devotion to duty which is no less deserving of recognition. I refer to the kind of initiative and ability which, in a real and direct way, contributes to the success of our foreign policy. This may take many forms, from the negotiation of a treaty or settlement that requires months of skill and patience, to the completion of a delicate mission calling for tact and boldness in equal measure. It may be the type of consistently high day-by-day performance that inspires others.

Many of the awards today go to members of the Civil Service, which is contributing its full and equal share of outstanding work.

And let us remember those who are absent today. Most of these are members of the Foreign Service who are now on duty overseas. Their awards will be conferred on them at their posts.

¹ For a list of individuals and units honored for outstanding performance of their duties, see press release 585 dated Oct. 18 (not printed).

² BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 240.

This ceremony is an expression of the morale and spirit of our whole Department and of its generally high standard of performance. It is a reaffirmation of an honorable tradition of service to the nation. The success of our mission is dependent on the total of the skills and dedication which each brings to the performance of his or her task. As the head of the Department, I am at most the sum total of all its parts. As such, I feel proud as I stand here on this occasion.

Now it is my high privilege to present one who knows at firsthand our Foreign Service through his own great services at home and abroad, in war and in peace, one who provides us with our greatest inspiration because of his own life of dedicated service to the welfare of our Nation—the President of the United States.

THE PRESIDENT

White House press release dated October 19

In his opening remarks the Secretary well described my relationships with this great group, both with the Foreign Service and with the State Department civil personnel. So you can understand why I feel that this is a family gathering. I feel it keenly and hope you do the same, because you are the people that execute a responsibility that is laid upon me by our Constitution—the responsibility for the foreign affairs of our country.

You are, of course, in carrying this responsibility, concerned with promoting the prosperity and happiness and well-being of the United States, through solidifying those relations with other nations that will be helpful in this regard.

Now this can be done only in peace. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, it seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace if there is to be a happy and well world. I often recall an argument I got into once with a foreign diplomat. He was a member of the British Foreign Office. And he was very worried about the arrangement that had been made to place the control of Germany temporarily in the hands of soldiers. He thought—and I don't know why—that those war-weary soldiers would be too anxious to start a war, and finally in rather resentful disgust I said to him, "My friend, I would like for you to know that the soldier has only one excuse for living in this world, and that is to regain the peace that you diplomats lost in the first place."

Now the reason I bring this up is that, even if there was a modicum of truth in what I said then, there no longer is. The soldier can no longer regain a peace that is usable to the world. I believe that the best he could do would be to retain some semblance of a tattered nation in a world that was very greatly in ashes and relics of destruction. But possibly he could keep us from immediate and complete domination by some outside force. That would be a poor climate in which to start again the development of a peace. Certainly it would be a far worse opportunity than we now have.

The reason I paint this little picture—even in a sort of digression—is this: We have glorious opportunity ahead of us, because we have opportunity in a world that has not yet suffered that kind of destruction—pray God must not suffer that kind of destruction.

In these halting words, and with these halting examples, I am trying to impress upon you my opinion of the importance of your work. There is no task facing the world today so important as maintaining a peace and giving to the world confidence that that peace will be just and lasting.

That is the measure of what you people and those like you—those above you and those below you—in these services must do for America.

Now, some among you today are being rewarded for unusual service. I have been a party to such ceremonies in the military service many times during my lifetime. They reward for courage, unusual ability, and devotion and dedication, just as do you people. And I remind you that in my conviction your work is now more important than theirs. But I want to bring out another point. Those experiences I had in the military service convinced me that the gradations in character among the different services is often difficult to determine. We select one man for a decoration and then another man is not selected. And yet the second man may have faced hardships, dangers, and privation. But you can say, well, if this service is not rewarded what shall we do? I think you can only remind yourself of the words on the Iwo Jima Statue, "Uncommon Courage Was a Common Virtue."

So these people, as they come up to be decorated, will be representative of each of you. Each of you will at least vicariously and in some small part be a recipient of that same award. By the same token, one day undoubtedly you will be standing

there to receive a token that will be representative of the work of a great body. Because only as we think of it in that way, only as we work together from top to bottom, only as we give loyalty and not jealousy and envy, only as we cling together secure in our confidence that we are dedicated to the great ideals of Americanism, justice and decency and fair play—even for those with whom we are dealing, sometimes at swords-points, across the distances of an ocean—only as we do that can we be truly successful.

If there is any organization that should have the highest morale based firmly in its own convictions as to the importance of its work, the necessity for successful accomplishment regardless of what critic or opponent may say, a morale based in that high belief in a cause, then that should be the Foreign Service and the State Department—as, indeed, I believe it is.

So you can understand something of the happiness I feel when I gather here with you to witness the decoration of a few among you who, standing as symbols for all, will exemplify and typify the appreciation that your country feels toward them—and each.

Rededication of Memorial to Foreign Service Officers

Press release 568 dated October 11

Following are the texts of remarks made on October 11 by Secretary Dulles; the remarks of Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, who introduced the Secretary; and a letter from President Eisenhower to Mr. Dulles read by Mr. Murphy at a ceremony at the Department of State rededicating the Foreign Service memorial tablet honoring Americans who lost their lives under heroic or tragic circumstances while on active duty in the United States Foreign Service.

Remarks by Mr. Murphy

Mr. Secretary, early in 1933 a significant ceremony took place in the lobby of the old State Department building on Pennsylvania Avenue. A memorial tablet honoring diplomatic and consular officers who had lost their lives in line of duty was unveiled by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson.

This memorial tablet was just recently moved here to the new headquarters of the Department

of State, where it might better serve as a reminder and inspiration to officers and employees of the Department and the Foreign Service, and to visitors who pass through this hall.

Today we are gathered here for the purpose of rededicating this monument to the 65 members of the American Foreign Service who lost their lives under tragic or heroic circumstances between the years of 1780 and 1933, and of paying tribute to the six additional members whose names have been added to this roll of honor subsequent to its original dedication.

Sharing this solemn observance with us from the Department and the Foreign Service, I am happy to note, are Chairman Henry M. Wriston and other members of the Secretary's Public Committee on Personnel, who are so deeply interested in the Foreign Service.

And now it is my great privilege, as President of the American Foreign Service Association, to invite our distinguished Honorary President, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to speak.

Remarks by Secretary Dulles

I am very glad to respond to the invitation of the President of the Foreign Service Association to rededicate this memorial. Mr. Murphy, as Deputy Under Secretary of State, is also the highest ranking career member of the Foreign Service. On this moving occasion, he represents a corps of men and women whose tradition of quiet devotion to the national interest is older than the Republic itself.

In 1780 William Palfrey, commissioned by the Continental Congress as the first United States consul, was lost at sea on the way to his post in France. Since then, 71 diplomatic and consular officers have lost their lives on active duty under "heroic or tragic circumstances." One died 3 years ago while rescuing fellow workers when the United States chancery building in Korea was destroyed by fire. One lost his life on a torpedoed ship during World War I. Several were killed in earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. Some died of disease while serving in remote posts. A number were assassinated. All gave their lives in the service of their country.

We who come here today in grateful memory of these men of the Foreign Service would do well to keep in mind that it is beyond our power to honor them. It is they who, by the quality of

their service, have honored us. It is they who have responded to the challenge of the poet: "Act well your part; there all the honour lies."

Mr. Murphy has a letter from the President of the United States which I ask him now to read.

Letter From President Eisenhower

LOWRY AIR FORCE BASE,
COLORADO

October 9, 1954

The Honorable JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

I count it a privilege to join with you and the members of the Foreign Service in paying tribute to the men of that Service who lost their lives under heroic or tragic circumstances in carrying out their duties on foreign soil. As we rededicate their memorial let us also rededicate ourselves to the high ideals of the organization which they so nobly served. Under inspired leadership, I know that the men and women of our splendid Foreign Service will tirelessly attack the grave problems before them, with courage, with intelligence, and with full devotion to the proud traditions of our land of freedom.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Paris Conference on European Security

Following is the text of a nine-power communique issued at Paris on October 21, together with a statement made by Secretary Dulles at the Washington National Airport on October 19 and a list of the principal U.S. delegates to the Special Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

COMMUNIQUE OF OCTOBER 21

The Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (M. Spaak, Mr. Pearson, M. Mendes-France, Dr. Adenauer, M. Martino, M. Bech, M. Beyen, Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Foster Dulles) met in Paris on October 21st to complete the discussions begun at the recent London conference on security and

European integration within the framework of a developing Atlantic community dedicated to peace and freedom.¹

The Ministers were informed of the agreement reached between the Foreign Ministers of France, the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in regard to ending the occupation regime in the Federal Republic.

The nine Ministers then considered the reports of the working parties set up in Paris and London to give effect to the principles agreed at the London conference. They reached agreement on the text of four protocols strengthening and extending the scope of the Brussels Treaty Organization, expanded to provide for the participation of Italy and of the German Federal Republic, and on the text of accompanying documents.

They agreed that the London working group consisting of representatives of Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom should remain in being during the interim period before the formal accession of the German Federal Republic and Italy to the Brussels Treaty Organization.

The Ministers expressed to the secretaries general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Brussels Treaty Organization, who were invited to be present at the meeting, their thanks for the valuable preparatory work done in the two organizations between the London and Paris conferences and for the facilities placed at their disposal by NATO for their meetings in Paris.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 592 dated October 19

I am leaving for Paris to follow up the work of the London conference of 2 weeks ago. At that time it was agreed to restore German sovereignty, to amend the Brussels Treaty to admit Germany and Italy and to establish a "Council of the Western European Union," and to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty. Since the London conference, work has been proceeding on the completion of the documents needed to put into effect these historic deci-

¹ For text of the final act of the London Conference, see BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515.

sions, and it is hoped that the final executive acts can take place at Paris.

There is first to be a meeting on the questions relating to German sovereignty. This will bring together Chancellor Adenauer and the Foreign Ministers of the three Western occupying powers—Mr. Eden of Britain, Mr. Mendès-France of France, and myself.

Then there will be a meeting of the same nine Foreign Ministers who met in London and who worked out the plan for making over the Brussels Treaty into a means of achieving a large measure of European defense unity. The United States, while deeply interested in this development, will not itself be a member of this Brussels Treaty group. But we will cooperate closely with the treaty powers, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Then there will be a meeting on October 22 of the North Atlantic Treaty Ministerial Council. At that meeting, consideration will be given to inviting German membership and to strengthening the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander so that he can more effectively integrate the NATO forces, including those of Germany.

There are many difficult problems to be solved.

However, I believe they can be solved if it is possible to sustain the good spirit of cooperation and sense of high responsibility which were developed at the London conference.

As I said in going to that conference,² the primary responsibility rests upon the European countries themselves. The United States, however, has a vital interest in the outcome. We shall be sympathetic and responsive to effective steps by the European countries to promote their strength and unity in the defense of freedom.

U.S. DELEGATION TO NAC MEETING

Press release 590 dated October 19

United States representatives

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

Special Assistant, Roderic L. O'Connor

Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Senior advisers

David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community

James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
General J. Lawton Collins, U.S.A., U.S. Representative on the Military Committee

C. Douglas Dillon, American Ambassador to France

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 489.

H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

John C. Hughes, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Livingston T. Merchant, Coordinator, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Strengthening Pakistan's Economy and Defense Capabilities

U.S.-PAKISTAN COMMUNIQUE OF OCTOBER 21

Press release 599 dated October 21

As the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan draws to a close, the Government of the United States and the Government of Pakistan consider it fitting to reaffirm their common purpose in striving to assure peace and economic security to their peoples. They are convinced that those objectives can be attained through measures of collective security, self-help and economic cooperation. At the same time, they share a common conviction that their goals can be attained only where fundamental spiritual values are permitted to flourish.

The Prime Minister and cabinet members accompanying him have had discussions of problems of mutual interest with a number of high-ranking officials of the United States, including President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson and Foreign Operations Administration Director Stassen.

The discussions were preceded and have been accompanied by earnest efforts within the United States Government to determine measures which the United States might take to strengthen Pakistan, bearing in mind Pakistan's special position in the Middle East and South Asia, its unreserved friendship and cooperation with the United States in its efforts for the security of the free world, and the economic problems with which Pakistan is at present faced.

With the report of the special Foa mission sent to Pakistan last summer under the leadership of Mr. H. J. Heinz II, it became clear that, despite its own tremendous efforts, Pakistan was in urgent need of increased economic assistance to ameliorate shortages of consumers goods and industrial raw materials, and that economic development pro-

grams must be increased if economic stability were to be attained. Accordingly, it has been agreed that the United States Government will make available to Pakistan in the current fiscal year about \$105 million in economic aid, part of which will be in the form of loans. This figure, which is five times last year's aid, includes funds for technical assistance, flood relief as previously agreed upon consequent to the disaster of last August in East Pakistan, and funds for developmental purposes. To meet Pakistan's urgent needs for consumer goods and industrial raw materials, the total figure also includes a substantial amount in the form of agricultural commodities.

Recognizing Pakistan's position in the common defense effort and following the military assistance agreement signed with the United States this spring, the United States will endeavor to accelerate the substantial military aid programs for Pakistan, which are beginning this year. In this connection, the United States cannot make commitments beyond the limits of existing and current appropriations. However, the Government of the United States and the Government of Pakistan intend to continue to study together in this and future years the best means of achieving their mutual objective: the strengthening of the economy and the defense capabilities of Pakistan.

The Colombo Plan

by Samuel C. Waugh

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

The theme of your conference is "Strengthening Economic Ties Between the United States and Asia." There is no need to tell this audience the importance of that objective. Indeed, your Council exists largely for that purpose—to enlarge American understanding of the nature and content of our economic relations with Asia and to strengthen the economic ties between our country and Asian countries.

Neither do I need to tell the members of this audience how important it is for our own interests and for the sake of peace and stability in the world that the aspirations of the countries of Asia for economic progress should be fulfilled. In those countries it is literally true that the future of the democratic way of life and the democratic form of government depends to a very considerable extent on whether or not it will prove possible to

achieve some measurable economic progress, some visible economic development, by democratic methods.

All of the free countries of Asia stand challenged by the totalitarian governments of Russia and Red China. They are constantly being told that enormous progress has been made and is being made in those Communist countries. They are not in a position to say that this is not so. They know, however, that if it is so this progress is being accomplished at a great price in human freedom and dignity.

Nevertheless, whatever progress is being made in the slave states is a challenge to the free countries. The peoples of those free countries—many of them newly independent and newly possessed of the freedom to manage their own affairs—have chosen a system of government that is democratic and free. The peoples in these countries, however, are not academic political scientists; they are farmers in the fields and workers in the factories. To them the worth of a political system is measured by what it can do—what it can produce in

¹Address made before Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, New York, N. Y., on Oct. 14 (press release 575 dated Oct. 13).

For an article on the Colombo Plan, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 441.

the way of economic well-being and increasing general welfare.

To us the outcome of this challenge and this effort is of the greatest importance. I need not belabor with you the reasons why this is so. You know them full well.

I have been asked to talk today about one important set of economic ties between the free countries of Asia and the United States and certain other free countries of the West—the Colombo Plan. In fact, I suggested I might talk to you about the Colombo Plan—in the first place, because I have just returned from Ottawa where I headed our United States delegation at the annual meeting of the Colombo Plan countries; and in the second place, because I think that not enough of our people understand what the Colombo Plan is and what our relationship to the Plan involves.

The Colombo Plan was conceived initially in 1950 as an organization of Commonwealth countries to focus attention on the economic development problems of the countries of South and Southeast Asia. It is designed to provide a framework within which international cooperative efforts can be made to promote sound and enduring economic progress in that area.

As I said, in its origins the Colombo Plan was a Commonwealth concept. It initially included on the one side the economically developed countries of the Commonwealth such as Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; and on the other side the newly independent or not yet fully independent Asian countries members of the Commonwealth such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, British Borneo, plus Burma.

In the interim, however, the geographic scope of the membership has been so radically enlarged that it can no longer be thought of as being, in any way except historically, a Commonwealth project. Not only has the United States since 1951 associated itself as a full member, but other non-Commonwealth countries of South and Southeast Asia have also joined, such as Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Last week at Ottawa, Japan was admitted to membership, and Thailand and the Philippines, which had heretofore been observers, also became full members. In all, there are now 17 member countries, and the area stretches from Pakistan to the Philippines. In this area live 720 million people, about 29 percent of the world's population.

A Committee for Economic Development

What is the Colombo Plan? The easiest and most enlightening answer to that question is to explain it is not a plan in the commonly accepted use of the word "plan," but that it is exactly what its title says it is—the Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. It is a committee of nations all of which are, for one reason or another, constructively interested in the economic development of the free countries of this area. It is a consultative committee, not a continuing organization. There were initial formative meetings of the group in 1950 and 1951 at Colombo, at Canberra, and at London. Starting in 1952 there have been annual meetings to review progress in economic development and to assess prospects for the future.

In the course of the formative meetings the member countries of the South and Southeast Asia area were encouraged to formulate economic development programs and thereby to translate their somewhat vague aspirations for economic progress into concrete schedules of definite and identifiable things to be done. In order to lend concreteness and definiteness to the undertaking, the countries agreed to envisage a 6-year period extending from July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1957, and to set down as specifically as possible what, during this period, they hoped to be able to accomplish, how they expected to finance their programs, what policies and legislative measures they expected to have to pursue, and what goals of investment and production they hoped to be able to reach.

These economic development programs—each of which is an individual country development program—when taken collectively are known as the Colombo Plan.

The subsequent meetings, which took place after the formative meetings, were held in 1952 and 1953 at Karachi and New Delhi, and this year (1954) in Ottawa. At these annual meetings the countries of the area review the results of the year just passed. They lay out on the table for frank and friendly discussion what they have accomplished, what they have failed to accomplish, what difficulties they have encountered, what changes they have felt constrained to make in their development plans, and what policies they have pursued. Similarly, they evaluate their prospects for the future; they try to assess what is likely to happen in the way of changes in the terms of

trade, increases or decreases in public revenues, shortfalls or overages in the achievement of specific development targets. They appraise what has been available to them heretofore and what is likely to be available in the future in the way of external assistance. They examine what has been and what is likely to be the role of private foreign investment in their economic development, what they have done and left undone to attract foreign investment and mobilize domestic capital.

The Colombo Plan period from 1951 to 1957 is, you will notice, just a little bit more than half over. After the formative meetings the significance of the 6-year framework has, I think, become progressively less. The usefulness of the 6-year concept was that it helped and enabled the countries of the area to view their development problems more concretely. It forced them to examine their problems and their aspirations in terms of what definite, concrete things could be done within a finite and agreed period of time. This searching examination by the Colombo Plan countries was very healthy. It made for realism and for a very valuable, if painful, translation of general plans into precise projects.

Annual Review of Progress

Now, however, the benefits of this rigid time period have been realized. It is no longer necessary or even very useful to continue refining and modifying the 6-year targets. Indeed, at the very first annual review meeting—that held at Karachi in 1952—it was agreed by the Colombo Plan countries that they would no longer keep making technical and statistical adjustments in the 6-year plans. The plans were sufficiently definite that it would be possible—and more useful—to meet each year to review and assess what had been accomplished in the preceding year and to evaluate the tasks and the problems for the foreseeable period lying ahead.

It has been customary in the deliberations of the Consultative Committee to draw a loose line of distinction between the so-called recipient countries and the so-called contributing countries. The distinction is, however, becoming more and more a tenuous one because—and this is one of the great virtues of the Plan—there has been engendered a process of cooperation and mutual aid among the recipient countries such that almost all of them

are to greater or lesser extent contributing countries to one another. They borrow technical skills and technical assistance from each other according to their respective needs and their respective capacities to assist.

Nevertheless, certain member countries obviously are altogether or almost altogether contributing countries. The United States is one of this group.

I have said that we are a full member of the Colombo Plan. I have also said that we are a contributing-country member. Now what does this mean?

The point that must be emphasized is that the Colombo Plan is simply an intergovernmental committee. We do not contribute anything to any central pool. There is nothing analogous to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. There is no process by which the contributions of the contributing countries are parceled out or allocated by any international organization. Our assistance to the countries of the area—like that provided by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—is bilaterally given and bilaterally received. Our contribution, in other words, is the sum total we do in the various countries of the area to promote the economic development of those countries. Our aid programs are our governmental contribution. We are not under any contractual obligation either to provide any definite amount of assistance to any one country or to all of them taken together; nor, for that matter, are we under any contractual obligation to provide aid at all to any particular country. In Burma, for example, our aid program terminated at the request of the Burmese Government.

Neither are we under any obligation to provide assistance in any uniform way or according to any uniform pattern. Our aid programs in Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia have been very different in their nature and orientation from our programs, for example, in India and Indonesia. Nevertheless, whatever we do to help to promote economic development in any of the countries of the area is accepted and regarded as our contribution in relation to that particular country.

I have been emphasizing our aid programs and our public contributions toward economic development in this area. Indeed, the whole Colombo Plan intellectual framework emphasizes to a very large extent public programs of economic development and public techniques of intergovernmental

cooperation. This is understandable. The governments of the area naturally are in a better position to measure what has been accomplished by public action and to assess what needs to be done through public development projects. Likewise the aid that is given by governments and received by governments is easier to measure than the less tangible benefits of private foreign investment.

Nevertheless, this natural tendency to concentrate upon what is done in what these countries call "the public sector" does not reflect any unhealthy bias in favor of public projects. Indeed, the countries of this area are fully aware of the benefits of and their need for private foreign capital. They have, for example, included prominently in their calculations of sources and possibilities of external assistance an assessment of what can be borrowed on the private international capital markets and of what steps need to be taken by them to improve their credit-worthiness. Many of the countries in the area have taken specific measures to improve the climate for foreign investment. They have issued official declarations welcoming foreign enterprise either in general or at least in specific fields. They have publicly recognized also that government measures are not the only factors governing the import of capital, and, for that matter, that the mere absence of discriminatory government measures is not in all cases sufficient to overcome the shyness of foreign capital. Hence they recognize further that if they desire foreign participation in specific fields they will probably have to take positive steps to attract it.

Therefore, in the various annual reviews the Colombo Plan countries have recognized and welcomed any evidence that may have developed during the preceding year of willingness on the part of foreign investors to undertake enterprises in the countries of the area, especially if these enterprises happen to be undertaken jointly with local capital—as was the case, for example, with the Sui gas project in Pakistan and the oil refinery investments in India and as promises to be the case in the investment finance corporations being established in India and Ceylon.

Private Capital Mobilized

The countries of the area have not only, therefore, recognized the need and the scope for private foreign participation in the development process;

they have also recognized the overwhelmingly urgent problem of mobilizing private domestic capital. In the most recent annual report, for example—that which was just prepared at Ottawa and which has not yet been published—they have noted that governments can help to mobilize private capital by seeking to minimize the hindrances to initiative arising from such factors as burdensome governmental regulations and irksome methods of tax administration.

In the annual meetings the countries of the area are prepared to face frankly the difficulties that exist and the shortcomings which have manifested themselves. These meetings are by no means a eulogy upon the accomplishments of the year just finished. They are rather a frank and friendly review of what has been done and what still needs to be done.

The prevailing tone, for example, of the annual report just drafted at Ottawa is one of optimism combined with stark realism. The countries, when they reviewed the pace and the content of economic development during the year just passed, were able to conclude that significant and encouraging progress had been made in a number of important respects but that there was no room for relaxation of effort. They recognized that in some countries the progress realized was relatively small; that throughout the region as a whole the population has been growing rapidly (indeed, at an annual rate of slightly over 9 million) and that, therefore, food production per capita (despite very creditable increases in total food output) was still below prewar levels; that underemployment in rural areas was widespread and that unemployment in urban areas, particularly of educated persons, presented a serious social problem; that trained personnel in many fields was not yet available in sufficient numbers; that in some of the countries of the area the process of formulating balanced development programs was still not far enough along; that there was only a narrow margin of production over consumption and that, therefore, the level of savings and the level of tax revenues provided on the whole only a precarious base for development financing.

This is indeed a formidable enumeration of problems to be faced and difficulties to be overcome. It is, of course, not the whole story. Just as I did not want you to think that the annual meetings of the Colombo Plan group of countries were limited to an uncritical eulogy of results

achieved, neither did I want you to think that they represent a session of breastbeating and complaining over the hardness of the task. Indeed, at this same Ottawa meeting which produced the catalogue of problems which I summarized a few minutes ago, the countries of the area were able also to record that their own outlays on development had increased considerably over those for the preceding year. In India, for example, development expenditures by public authorities for the year 1951-52 were roughly \$550 million. For the year 1953-54, they had increased to \$705 million and are expected for the year ending June 30 next to approximate \$1,170 million if financing is available. For Pakistan the comparable figures are for the fiscal year 1951-52, \$125 million; for the fiscal year 1953-54, \$275 million.

These, indeed, are very creditable results and expectations. I mention them merely lest you think that the sessions of the Colombo Plan meetings are devoted entirely to lamenting over the difficulties of the economic development problems of the area. But to return to the summation of the problems, the frankness with which the countries of the area have discussed among themselves and with us their problems and difficulties and shortcomings is in its aggregate a most gratifying experience. I am reminded of the remark made at the 1953 Colombo Plan meeting by Indian Finance Minister C. D. Deshmukh (who was the chairman) that the Colombo Plan was "a great experiment in human relations." It is very rarely that governments are able to come together and with so much freedom and honesty and openness to say what they have done, what they have failed to do, what they still need to do, what they intend to do, and what are the political and cultural limitations upon what they can do.

If there is any conclusion to be drawn as concerns what the members of this Far East-America Council might learn from the experience, at governmental level, in the Colombo Plan, it is, I should think, that there are almost limitless possibilities of fruitful cooperation between the United States and the countries of Asia if there is evidenced the same frankness, the same patience, and the same understanding. We in government know that there are difficulties in the way of establishing business connections in the countries of Asia. We know that there are frictions, there are uncertainties, there are difficulties of mutual understanding. However, from our experience at the

governmental level we are quite certain there is a great fund of common interest and of common viewpoint. We conclude, therefore, that there is much which should be done and can be done to accomplish the objective stated as the theme of this conference: "Strengthening Economic Ties Between the United States and Asia."

Transfer of Destroyers to Japan

Remarks by Everett F. Drumright¹

I consider it a great honor to represent the Secretary of State on this important occasion. Two destroyers of the United States Reserve Fleet are being turned over today on loan to the Government of Japan under the Mutual Security Program. His Excellency the Ambassador of Japan [Sadao Iguchi] is with us here to receive the vessels on behalf of his Government. Two Japanese crews, comprising officers and men of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, have been the welcome guests of this country for several weeks while they have been trained in the handling of these vessels. These Japanese crews will take the destroyers to Japan, where they will be an important addition to the modest defensive forces which Japan has now begun to establish.

It is appropriate for us to recall at this moment the words of Prime Minister Yoshida at the San Francisco Conference, on the conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. At that time he so aptly stated:

Unfortunately, the sinister forces of totalitarian oppression and tyranny operate still throughout the globe. These forces are sweeping over half the Asiatic continent—sowing seeds of dissension—spreading unrest and confusion—and breaking out into open aggression here and there—indeed, at the very door of Japan.

The Prime Minister went on to say:

When the Allied troops are withdrawn from our country with the conclusion of peace—producing a state of vacuum in the country—it is clear as day that this tide of aggression will beat down upon our shores. It is imperative for the sake of our very existence that we take an adequate security measure.

To meet the danger he had described, Prime Minister Yoshida shortly after the conclusion of the peace treaty signed a Security Treaty entered

¹ Made at Charleston, S. C., on Oct. 19 (press release 583 dated Oct. 18). Mr. Drumright is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

into between Japan and the United States.² In this treaty the United States indicated its willingness to maintain certain of its armed forces in Japan, in the expectation that Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct or indirect aggression. This treaty recognized the threat of aggression against Japan and Japan's inability at that time to provide adequately for its own defense.

The danger that Prime Minister Yoshida so fully recognized at that time still exists. Japan continues to be a major target of the international Communist conspiracy. However, since September 1951 the Government and the people of Japan have taken steps to assume increasing responsibility for the defense of their homeland. In the last session of the Diet, approval was given to the expansion of Japanese armed forces. The mission of these forces was also amended to include specific responsibility for defense against external aggression. In the meantime, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government had signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.³ This gives the legal basis for the United States to provide military assistance to Japan under the Mutual Security Program. This program is based on the premise that only by true mutual effort can the nations of the free world reserve their independence and freedom. I cannot help at this moment but recall your very profound statement, Mr. Ambassador, at the Japan Society Dinner in New York City on March 18, 1954. You then said:

In this common endeavor for our mutual self-preservation, Japan is now ready to contribute her proper share. Out of the tragedy of war and out of the political, economic, social, and moral convulsions which followed in the wake of conflict, Japan has emerged with a keen realization that she cannot stand alone in this world.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 463.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 5, 1954, p. 518.

Mr. Ambassador, no member of the free world community can stand alone today. Our very presence here in Charleston is indicative of the true mutuality of the free world. The loan of these two vessels to your Government represents not only the intention of the U.S. Government to assist in the defense of Japan, but also the desire of your Government to assume this responsibility. The strength of the entire free world is dependent on the individual strength of its members. We have very recently seen in the conclusion of the Manila Pact further recognition of the interdependence of free nations in their common determination to resist aggression. Your Foreign Minister has pledged Japan's moral support to this arrangement. As time progresses, Japan will achieve its own position of strength in the Far East and will be better able to contribute to the common effort.

These two vessels—the *Asakaze*, meaning Morning Breeze, and the *Hatakaze*, meaning Flag-fluttering Breeze—will play their part in securing the defense of Japan. I am sure that the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has chosen well you officers and men who take these vessels back to their duty stations. I know that you will take back to Japan more than the technical knowledge of ships acquired during your few months of training here. I am sure that you will take back to your people the strong friendship, esteem, and good will which our people feel for yours.

I wish you a pleasant voyage and success in your future missions.

Letters of Credence

Union of South Africa

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Union of South Africa, Dr. John Edward Holloway, presented his credentials to the President on October 18. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 582.

Economic Development and Political Evolution in Asia

by Charles F. Baldwin

*Economic Coordinator, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs*¹

The political evolution of a nation and of a people is not something which develops out of the doctrines of political philosophy or the activities of political leaders alone. It comes about as a result of a fusion of the forces which most directly affect and condition the lives of the people of the country. One of the most influential of those is the economic force.

It is surely true that man cannot live by bread alone. The materialistic doctrines of Marxian dogma leave unsatisfied urges of mankind which far transcend the material. It is, however, equally true that the spirit of man, which stimulates the political development of free men, finds hope and encouragement in an atmosphere of material progress and personal well-being. That fact is implicit in the concepts of democracy.

One of the vitally important necessities of modern life is to see international developments in reality—not influenced by preconceived ideas or wishful thinking. If we look beneath the surface of Asian events today—as we must if we are to understand them clearly—we see Asia as a vast area where two powerful political movements have been occurring simultaneously. One of them, which represents the age-old longing of human beings to control their own destinies, we can call the revolution of Asian nationalism. The other, representing the equally old determination of a ruling clique to gain and exercise power by any means, is the massive and menacing impact of communism. One of these forces could light the way to greater human freedom and advancement

in Asia; the other could extinguish that light for a long time.

Since the last war the political status of hundreds of millions of Asians has been changed completely. Before the war no country of South and Southeast Asia, with the single exception of Thailand, governed itself. Now, all of them (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and the non-Communist part of Viet-Nam) are self-governing—all except Malaya, which has been promised its independence by the British Government. This is an historical fact not only of profound political importance but of almost equally significant economic importance.

The government of each of these newly independent countries bears the heavy responsibility of establishing and maintaining an economic climate which will be conducive to political stability—an atmosphere in which the spirit of political independence and personal freedom will flourish. Essential to the welfare of these countries, therefore, is a process of economic development which will insure a steady increase in the opportunities for the advancement of their people and which will better satisfy the aspirations of their people.

This need for economic growth is a basic part of the economic problem of Asia, which is really two problems which tend to be complementary. Japan, the only country which is highly advanced industrially, has experienced the characteristic postwar difficulties of the large industrial countries, complicated by a shortage of natural resources. All of the other free Asian countries reveal the customary characteristics of retarded

¹ Address made before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, New York, N. Y., on Oct. 14 (press release 577).

economic development. In all of them progress—in some of them considerable progress—in attacking the problem has been made, but a great deal more remains to be done.

The people of these countries want a higher standard of living. Their governments have promised them a higher standard of living. If those promises are not kept, or if for any other reason economic improvement does not take place, public disillusionment and resentment will replace hope and confidence, and the opportunities for troublemakers to take advantage of public discontent will multiply.

There is a temptation, when we are confronted by problems so vast and perplexing as those of Asia, to resort to generalities which, while momentarily comforting, do not always hold up under analysis. The problem of economic underdevelopment in Asia is far reaching, deeply rooted, and not susceptible of quick and easy solution. It is possible, however, to identify the main elements of the problem and to suggest at least an approach to the solution.

Low Per Capita Incomes

The most simplified statement of the basic problem is that the income of the average Asian is too small to produce the savings needed to finance adequate economic development. Japan, Malaya, and the Philippines have annual per capita national incomes equivalent to around \$200. The figure for Ceylon is roughly about one-half of that amount; in Thailand, the Indochina states, and Indonesia it ranges from about \$60 to \$75, while in Burma and India it is even lower. In an area of rapidly increasing population, an income which is distributed so thinly is unable to satisfy basic needs and also provide sufficient economic stimulus to raise appreciably the relatively low level of economic development.

There are, of course, factors other than low income and a slow rate of capital formation which are retarding economic progress. Because of the inability to generate internally sufficient capital for investment purposes, a steady and increasing flow of outside capital could be an important economic stimulant. Unfortunately, the movement of foreign private investment capital to Asia since the war has been little more than a trickle in comparison with the needs. In recent years net private foreign capital investment in the countries

of South and Southeast Asia has amounted to only about \$25 million per year, slightly over one-half of which has been United States private investment. One can hope that more foreign private capital will move into free Asia for productive purposes within the next few years, but it seems unlikely that such additional resources will be sufficient to change appreciably the overall economic situation in the near future.

Directly affecting the scale of economic development in Asia is the problem of human attitudes. Under the most favorable circumstances the evolution of new ideas and practices in Asia will require time and painstaking effort. The gap between the concepts about material aspects of life of a great many Asians and of dwellers in more industrially advanced countries is wide. Many of those concepts have a deeply rooted religious and philosophical basis, and the task of adjusting them to the requirements of a more complex economic society will challenge the wisdom and patience of Asian governments and leaders. In fact, the ability to bring about this transition under tolerable conditions may prove to be one of the greatest tests of the governments of Asian countries.

Essential to the accomplishment of this transition will be the development of an entrepreneurial group of sufficient size and experience to undertake and manage the kind of projects which are needed.

Equally necessary will be an enlargement of the present Asian reservoir of skilled technicians. The technical assistance programs which have been carried on in Asia with the support of the United States and other countries have begun to reduce the proportions of this problem to some extent, but it is still a fundamental obstacle. A great deal more in the way of technical training in the shortest possible time will have to be accomplished, both by private enterprise and by governments in Asia, before a sound technical foundation to support a durable structure of economic development can be built.

Closely associated with the human factor is the need for sound governmental policies to support the process of economic growth. Wise budgetary and fiscal policies will be necessary to prevent "feast and famine" trends and to derive full benefits from each stage of economic progress. This will not be an easy task, particularly for the gov-

ernments of the newly independent countries which are having to learn quickly the difficult lessons of governing in the modern world, but it will be an essential task.

Basic Objectives

There are differences of opinion with respect to the best means of accelerating economic development in Asia. To the young Dyak whom I met a few months ago in the interior of Borneo and who was studying better methods of basic agriculture under an Australian technical instructor, economic development has one meaning. To the Chinese manager of a new textile plant in Singapore whom I met a few days later, it has another. The pattern must, of course, necessarily vary according to different conditions in different countries. In general, however, the following objectives should be sought—and in fact are being sought by many of the country developmental programs today:

A basic objective should be to increase agricultural efficiency, exploit agricultural potentialities more fully, and better diversify agricultural output. The free Asian countries have essentially agrarian economies; the process of their industrialization should rest upon an increasingly strong foundation of agricultural productivity. In the countries of free Asia there is a challenging opportunity to demonstrate that economic development in a free society need not be at the expense of agriculture, as it has been under Communist planning, but can benefit the tillers of the soil as well as the workers in industry.

Another objective should be the provision of more adequate transportation and a more abundant supply of power. Those of you who have traveled off the well-beaten paths in Asia need not be reminded of the primitive transportation facilities which are often the rule rather than the exception. The provision of better transportation and more abundant power should, of course, be designed to stimulate and not outdistance the general pace of economic development, but it can and it should be an important stimulant.

An essential objective should, of course, be the development of industries which are economically justified and most likely to contribute to economic growth and to the expansion of trade. This is the most alluring sector of any economic develop-

ment program and the one which presents the most dangerous pitfalls. In this vitally important phase of economic development, intelligent and realistic forethought will be necessary to avoid the uneconomical expenditure of time, effort, and money and to insure that industrialization will be of the kind most suited to the available human and material resources.

There is a rather understandable tendency in most underdeveloped countries to try to emulate the more highly industrialized countries without always considering fully the phases of development through which those countries have passed. While big, basic industries play a vital part in the economic life of the United States and other industrial nations, the role of the small industries has also been a vital one. Their role in the economic growth of Asia can also be of fundamental importance.

Private American businessmen and investors have already been able to contribute substantially, directly and by example, to the economic development of Asia; they should be able to make an even more important contribution in the future. Every Asian employee that is trained, every employee benefit program that is instituted, every new, constructive investment that is made, and every new technical process which is introduced and applied assists in the endeavor. Many American firms are doing these things today. We hope that the number will increase in the future.

The need for workable plans of economic development and for their accomplishment is recognized by almost every enlightened Asian. It is highly important from the standpoint of the security of the people of the free world that these plans should be realized. Only by their realization can the trade of these countries with their great populations be expanded with benefits not only to themselves but to other countries of the free world. Only by their realization can Asian expectations be satisfied and economic and political stability achieved.

The problems which will continue to arise in Asia will test the capacity of the Asians and of their non-Asian friends to concentrate on the larger and essential objectives and not be distracted by momentary setbacks and rebuffs. Many countries of Asia are endeavoring to achieve economic evolution in a relatively short period of time and under conditions much more disad-

vantageous than those which attended the growth of the now highly developed countries. As they struggle to develop, they will need the friendly and sympathetic understanding and assistance which the United States and other economically advanced countries can extend to them. By the ex-

tension of such assistance, we can demonstrate our good intentions and the sincerity of our friendship. We can also make more secure for the free people of Asia as well as for ourselves the benefits which economic, political, and social stability in a free society can make possible.

The Need for a More Liberal Foreign Trade Policy

by Winthrop W. Aldrich
*Ambassador to Great Britain*¹

I have now spent almost 2 years in London. In the course of these 2 years I have had the privilege of observing at very close range a truly extraordinary series of American diplomatic successes. Under the wise guidance and leadership of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles the United States has been cast more and more in the role of a good partner in the fellowship of nations.

The Korean War was fought by us in that spirit of partnership against aggression which gives the United Nations meaning; and the armistice which came at last was the result of long and concerted effort by the free nations.

In this spirit of partnership we were able to assist Great Britain and Egypt in the final settlement in regard to the Suez Canal Base. In this same spirit we also played a helpful part in the conclusion of the Iranian oil dispute.

The Manila Pact and the ringing Pacific Charter that was signed there were twin landmarks. The pact was a firm step in collective self-defense in Southeast Asia, and the charter was a bold proclamation of the principles of self-determination, self-government, and independence in that part of the world.

And now within the last few days can be added the triumphant conclusion of the Nine-Power

Conference and the signing of the Trieste Agreement.

The pact that was signed at the Nine-Power Conference is, I believe, the best arrangement for the security of Western Europe that could be found after the rejection of Epc. Out of the vacuum that the collapse of Epc created, and the anxious month that followed it, has emerged a workable plan for the sovereignty and rearmament of Germany and a hard core of unity at the center of the North Atlantic Community. The successful work of the architects at London has been crowned by the approval of the German Bundestag and—just the day before yesterday—by the approval of the French National Assembly.

During the whole period of the Conference Great Britain and the United States worked together in the closest fellowship. We rendered support to our great ally, who had taken the initiative in finding a plan to fill the vacuum created by the rejection of Epc.

Because the collapse of the Epc plan was a collapse from within, Mr. Dulles wisely felt that the initiative for new proposals at the Nine-Power Conference rested with the European nations there. But his statesmanship helped to guide the Conference over many shoals.

Trieste was also essentially a European problem, a 9-year fever spot where the territorial wishes of Italy and Yugoslavia appeared irreconcilable. But a long year of discussions and con-

¹ Address made before the Board of Trade of New York at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 14 (press release 576).

ferences, in which Great Britain and the United States assisted, finally brought about a compromise, and one more danger spot has been removed.

All of these events that I have enumerated will cause no comfort to the Soviet. The partnership of free nations has been tremendously strengthened by these achievements.

And now to speak of more immediate business.

Importance of Trade Relations

As members of the Board of Trade in the largest port and the leading commercial center of our Nation, you are vitally concerned with the foreign economic policy of the United States. As American Ambassador to one of the world's great trading nations, I have been impressed anew with the enormous importance of our economic relations with the rest of the world, not only in the economic sphere but in the political and military spheres as well.

The phenomenal growth of our country and its transformation in so short a time from a new underdeveloped continent into the greatest economic power on earth have caused our foreign trade relations to become a problem of extraordinary urgency.

I believe that an increasing number of our people, and particularly of our business community, have become aware of the problem and clearly understand where the solution lies. And we are indeed fortunate that today we have in the White House a President who *has* this clear understanding.

To meet the needs of the times, the American people should have as one of their main objectives the promotion of the highest possible levels of international trade.

As a nation devoted to the ideal of free, competitive enterprise, we have a natural leaning toward a world in which trade is conducted on a multilateral basis, in which there is no discrimination between sources of supply, in which every businessman has a chance to trade according to his choice and his capabilities, in which there is a minimum of government interference, and in which currencies are freely convertible. We all know that these conditions will not be created unless the U. S. is prepared to take a hand in bringing them about.

That is why I believe the recent recommenda-

tions of the President's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy,² headed by Mr. Clarence B. Randall, should be adopted. They constitute a hardheaded practical program designed to fit smoothly into our American economy and to further the national interest.

We must not let ourselves be deluded into thinking that anything we do in this direction is merely for the benefit of other people or is designed to save the whole world at our own expense. Quite the contrary. A liberal foreign trade policy for the U. S. is dictated by the intelligent self-interest of the American people. It will certainly help other free nations, and it will certainly strengthen the bulwarks of freedom everywhere. But it is equally essential for our own increased prosperity here in America and for the ultimate security of our own land and our way of life.

Since I have been in London I have had it brought home to me time and again how direct and sharp are the effects of our foreign trade policy on our own economic welfare in the United States.

Large numbers of Americans count on export markets for their livelihood and their standard of living. In agriculture alone we have about 40 million acres representing from 10 to 12 percent of the Nation's agricultural output, whose harvests go into the export trade. There are many American factories that sell their manufactures throughout the world. President Eisenhower has pointed out that the jobs of more than four million of our people depend on foreign trade.

Exports Dependent on Imports

It is an elementary fact of economic life that if we expect to receive dollars in payment for our exports, we have to make those dollars available abroad.

What does this mean? It means simply that if we restrict our imports under the theory that we are protecting America and the American standard of living, we are in fact doing exactly the opposite. Restriction of our imports means restriction of our exports. And that can mean reduced employment and living standards not only for the many Americans—farmers, manufacturers, workers—depending on exports, but for the American

² BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1954, p. 187.

consuming public as a whole, which has to pay higher prices for its goods.

This point strikes you with much more force if you are sitting, as I do in London, at one of the points abroad where America buys and consequently is able to sell—or, sometimes unfortunately, where America does *not* buy and consequently cannot sell.

Day after day in London we in the Embassy have visits from Americans anxious to sell their products in the U.K. and British Commonwealth. They want to sell automobiles and hardwoods and fruits and many other U.S. products. They always get the same reply. "We like your products. We want them. But we do not have enough dollars. If we were able to earn the dollars, we would gladly buy from you."

And at the same time we hear from British businessmen of the difficulties they encounter in our market, of delays in customs formalities, of high tariffs in many cases, of low bids rejected on the basis of our Buy American requirements, and, above all, of uncertainty because of escape clauses or other provisions of our tariff laws governing the conditions under which they may do business.

All these difficulties that are put in the way of foreign imports to the United States frustrate the foreign exporter. But at the same time they do something else. They frustrate the American exporter as well. Every time we stop a possible import, we lose a probable sale abroad.

If we do not move in the direction of a more liberal trade policy, there is every likelihood that we will not stay where we are in foreign trade matters. We are more likely to move backward into the morass of greater restriction, narrow bilateralism, and lower volumes of trade. These things have a momentum of their own, backwards as well as forwards. Such a development could endanger our whole economy.

It is a fact of great significance that one of the main factors which kept our recession last winter from getting worse was the maintenance of a high demand for our goods abroad.

I believe the preponderance of opinion among American businessmen, farmers, labor leaders, and economists today is tending increasingly to the view that a more liberal U.S. foreign trade policy is essential to our own national prosperity.

But today there is an even more urgent reason—

over and above economic self-interest—why we should follow the lead of President Eisenhower and support a higher level of two-way trade. It is this: The safety of our Nation demands it.

This is an entirely new development. And again it is due to the tremendous importance which the American economy has now achieved in the world picture. Our market is so huge that a small upward or downward movement in our imports, unimportant as it may be in relation to our total consumption, may mean the difference between prosperity and depression for many other countries. And if things go seriously wrong with our economy and if we do not behave reasonably, intelligently, and fairly in the manner in which we handle our large share of world trade, economic havoc can be created in many places where it is to our national interest to see prosperity, stability, and good will.

In the world of today we must cultivate our friendships and strengthen our alliances. One of the most important factors in this process is the manner in which we deal with our foreign trade.

Liberal Policy Essential to Defense

There are three very specific reasons why a more liberal foreign trade policy is essential to the defense of the U.S.:

(1) If we provide a better market for our friends, we strengthen their economies. This makes a stronger foundation for their own defense efforts and makes their lands more immune from the enemy's fifth column, which feeds on economic difficulty. By liberalizing imports we achieve this by trade, which benefits ourselves as well as the other countries.

(2) Friendly countries that are denied access to the American market must find markets elsewhere. Our enemies do not miss any opportunity to exploit our shortcomings. They say, "You see, you cannot trade with the United States. Trade with us instead." To many who have found difficulty in trading with us, such as the Dutchman or Dane whose cheese or whose butter has been excluded from the United States, these words are bound to have their effect. Such offers have already had some serious effects on American trade as well as on our common security.

Now a certain amount of East-West trade may do no harm. It may possibly do some good. But

it would become dangerous if there should be too great a dependence by smaller and weaker countries in Europe and the East on Soviet markets for their prosperity and economic existence.

(3) As the strongest nation in the partnership of the free world, it is vital for the United States to keep the confidence of the nations to whom we are allied and on whom we depend. Time and again we have taken the initiative in suggesting and working out action which later on has been successfully taken by the free nations in concert. But I would be less than frank with you if I did not say that every time we seem to doubt or waver in the adoption and continuance of a firm liberal trade policy for the United States, we sow the seeds of doubt in the minds of other countries as to our dependability as a leading partner. Every time the Buy American act is enforced to favor the purchase of some higher costing American equipment over a lower foreign bid, it causes only a small ripple of interest on this side, but I can assure you it creates waves of headlines and criticism, resentment, and bitterness in the country affected overseas. The cost of this kind of so-called protection for a single American firm is terribly great to our Nation as a whole.

Randall Commission's Recommendation

That is why I would so strongly endorse the recommendation of the Randall Commission to amend drastically such discriminatory legislation. And that is why I believe so deeply in the wisdom and necessity of our adopting promptly the rest of the foreign economic policy which has been put forward by President Eisenhower.

Since the war, in addition to helping other countries militarily and financially to regain their strength, we have taken the lead in trying to develop sound trade rules based upon the principles of private enterprise, free competition, individual initiative, and equal opportunity. We have preached this gospel fervently to the rest of the world. I believe that we as well as others should live up to it.

One important step we can take is to enable the United States to play its full part in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which provides a framework of worldwide trade rules.

Our participation has been partially clouded by the fact that Congress has neither approved nor

disapproved the GATT. Nevertheless, its rules have been largely accepted as the rules of international trade. The countries which are parties to it have met frequently and have settled many trade problems which might otherwise have grown into troublesome disputes. A remarkable atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust has grown up in GATT, which is potentially a great unifying force in the free world. Such understanding and trust are especially necessary when, as at present, the Soviets are intensifying their "trade peace offensive."

Many countries are anxious to proceed with further negotiations for the reduction of tariffs. But no group of countries is willing to go ahead with any significant tariff action unless the United States can participate in the necessary negotiations. Until we adopt the President's proposal for cooperation in this field, we are not in a position to participate.

There are other practical reasons why we should favor the promotion of a high level of world trade as widely as possible on a multilateral basis. About 85 percent of our imports are raw materials mainly from underdeveloped countries. There is also the special problem of Japan, which must be taken back into the Western society of trading nations on a fair basis so that she can again earn her living without unusual subsidies. To accomplish this, there must be a concerted effort in the free world to make room for perhaps an additional 500 or 600 million dollars' worth of annual Japanese exports during the next few years.

Need for Action Now

I have just one other point to make.

Never has the time been more ripe for action in this field than this present moment.

Partly as a result of our own efforts and assistance, partly as a result of the energy and determination of the other countries themselves, many nations of the free world have largely recovered from the effects of the war. Their currencies are more stable, their production is once again forging ahead beyond the prewar levels, their gold and dollar reserves are rising. The rationings and restrictions of wartime are being discarded one after another. There has been an increased swing toward economic freedom in many countries, particularly in the last 2 years. And

many nations in Europe and in the British Commonwealth are beginning to talk seriously about convertibility and return to the healthy trade conditions which we all desire.

But I think it is now clear that the final steps will not be taken by many countries until they feel sure that we, too, will continue to move in the desired direction.

President's Views

It is encouraging to know that President Eisenhower is keenly aware of this situation and of the need for maintaining the present momentum toward freedom. In his letter to Mr. Harry Bullis of General Mills some weeks ago,³ the President wrote: "The prudent widening and deepening of the channels of trade and investment by us will not only produce good results in themselves, but will encourage similar action by our friends abroad. That is the route to better markets and better feeling."

And the President added: "It is my present intention to give high priority to progress in this whole field in planning for next year's legislative program."

New developments and new needs are coming to the fore in large areas of the world. The free nations stand at the point of transition from emergency to long-term policies. What form these policies take will depend to a very large extent upon our national decisions in the months ahead.

We cannot afford to miss this opportunity to take action in behalf of the economic welfare of our own people and the security of ourselves and our friends the world over.

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that the American people support President Eisenhower in his efforts to move as rapidly as possible toward a forward-looking foreign economic policy. In this effort I think the business community has a special responsibility. Perhaps more than anyone else in our country, our leaders of commerce and finance, of industry and agriculture, can see clearly what we have to gain if we succeed and what we risk losing if we fail.

With the peace and prosperity of our land so clearly at stake, I am confident we shall succeed.

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 13, 1954, p. 371.

Admission of Polish Seamen to U.S.

Press release 601 dated October 22

Acting Secretary Hoover and Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., on October 22 agreed that it would be in the national interest to admit to the United States 22 Polish seamen who defected from communism while their ships were in Formosa. The grant of entry was under the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act which gives the Attorney General discretionary power to admit aliens who would otherwise be inadmissible, when there is a showing the entry would be in the national interest.

Instructions relative to admission of the seamen to the United States have already been sent to Formosa by the Department of State.

Petty Offenses Under Immigration Laws

Press release 593 dated October 20

A single petty offense against the law is no longer a bar to granting an alien a visa to enter the United States.

Visa applications are now being considered by the Department of State under provisions of a new regulation permitting issuance of a visa to an alien notwithstanding his conviction of a single offense which under American legal standards would be a misdemeanor, rather than a felony, and a conviction for which the penalty actually imposed was imprisonment not to exceed 6 months, or a fine of not more than \$500, or both.¹

Scott McLeod, Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security, and Consular Affairs, said the regulation reflects the legislative intent of the 83d Congress that section 4 of Public Law 770 (the Immigration and Nationality Act), which it implements, be administered in accordance with American legal standards.

Heretofore, single convictions for rationing violations and other minor offenses had been a bar to visa issuance to aliens and had in many instances brought about introduction of private bills in the Congress for waiving of the single minor offense restriction in individual cases.

¹ For text of the regulation, dated Oct. 14, see 19 *Fed. Reg.* 6785.

Case of Joseph S. Petersen

Press release 595 dated October 19

Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., an American citizen, has been charged with obtaining classified defense information which could be used to the advantage of a foreign power in violation of the laws of the United States. The foreign government involved has now been publicly identified as the Netherlands Government. The U.S. Government has taken this matter up with the Netherlands Government and has received that Government's assurances that it had believed that the transmission of this information was in accordance with an authorized arrangement between the two Governments. The Department has no reason to question the good faith of the Netherlands Government which has been amply demonstrated by that Government's complete cooperation during the investigatory period.

For its own part, however, the U.S. Government must affirm that the activities of the American citizen involved in this case were completely unauthorized by his Government and were carried out under his own personal responsibility, without the knowledge of his superiors and in violation of the laws of the United States.

Reorganization of German Coal and Iron and Steel Industries¹

The following Law No. 76 issued by the Allied High Commission for Germany, which amends Law No. 27 (Reorganization of German Coal and Iron and Steel Industries), is deemed to be of interest to certain United States citizens as having legal effect upon them or their property.

LAW NO. 76—AMENDING LAW NO. 27² (REORGANIZATION OF GERMAN COAL AND IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES)

The Council of the Allied High Commission enacts as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of Law No. 27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"1. The Steel Trustee Association established under United States Military Government Law No. 75 and United Kingdom Military Government Law No. 75 and Regulation No. 2 issued thereunder shall continue to

exist and shall exercise the functions conferred on it by the present Law or by regulations or orders made hereunder. The Allied High Commission may remove any member of the Steel Trustee Association and appoint other members of such Association."

ARTICLE 2

Sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 1 of Article 7 of Law No. 27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(e) Any other action taken in connection with reorganizations of liquidations under this Law to the extent provided by regulations or orders hereunder."

ARTICLE 3

Article 11 of Law No. 27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"ARTICLE 11

REGULATIONS AND ORDERS

The Allied High Commission may issue such regulations and orders for the purpose of implementing any provision of this law as it shall deem necessary or proper in order to carry fully into effect the purposes of this Law."

ARTICLE 4

Article 13 of Law No. 27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"ARTICLE 13

BOARD OF REVIEW

1. There is hereby established a Board of Review. The number, nationality, and method of appointment of members of the Board shall be determined by the Council of the Allied High Commission. Each member shall be a qualified lawyer or expert who shall not be otherwise concerned with the administration of this Law. The decision of a majority of the members of the Board shall constitute the decision of the Board. In the absence of a majority, the order which is the subject of review shall be deemed to have been confirmed.

2. The Board shall have jurisdiction to review any order issued under paragraph (e) of Article 5 of this Law on the petition of any interested person to the sole extent of determining whether the distribution made to such person has afforded him fair and equitable treatment within the provisions of the Law and of the regulations issued thereunder.

3. A petition for review of an order issued before May 15, 1952 shall be filed before November 15, 1952. A petition for review of any order issued on or after May 15, 1952, shall be filed within six months of the date of issue.

4. The petition shall be filed with the Board or with the authority which issued the order the review of which is sought.

5. In considering a petition for review the Board shall determine solely whether the order the review of which is sought is supported by substantial evidence and is correct as a matter of law. The filing and pendency of a petition shall not operate as a stay of the order except and to the extent that a stay may be directed by the Board upon a motion for such relief.

6. The Board shall establish its rules of procedure. It may take evidence of any kind and summon witnesses and experts in accordance with the provisions of the German Code of Civil Procedure. It may demand security for costs from a petitioner, but if the petition is granted in full, the security shall be refunded and no costs shall be levied against the petitioner. If the petition is not granted in full, the costs shall be assessed by the Board

¹ 19 Fed. Reg. 6611.

² 15 Fed. Reg. 8591.

on the principles laid down in the *Kostenordnung* of November 25, 1935 (*Reichsgesetzblatt* I, page 1371)."

Done at Bonn, Petersberg, on April 30, 1952.

On behalf of the Council of the Allied High Commission.

IVONE KIRKPATRICK,
United Kingdom High Commissioner for Germany, Chairman.

For the Secretary of State:

GEOFFREY W. LEWIS,
Deputy Director, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.

OCTOBER 7, 1954.

World Bank Loan to El Salvador for Coastal Highway

On October 12 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development made a loan of \$11,100,000 to El Salvador to pay the foreign-exchange costs of completing an all-weather highway along the Pacific Coast. The highway will be 190 miles long and will extend from the Guatemalan border to the Port of La Union on the Gulf of Fonseca.

The Philadelphia National Bank is participating in the loan, without the International Bank's guaranty, to the extent of \$250,000 of the first maturity falling due on April 15, 1959.

The primary purpose of the highway is to open new areas to cultivation and make possible increased agricultural production. El Salvador has a good highway system but lacks all-weather roads in the coastal zone. This region contains the only sizeable expanse of fertile land remaining to be developed in El Salvador. The coastal highway will provide an artery, connecting with existing roads, through the entire region and will be an important step toward opening the country's last major land reserve to cultivation and settlement. Eventually the highway may also become an important international highway linking El Salvador with Guatemala and Honduras.

Construction of the coastal highway was started several years ago. At present 25 miles are open to traffic, and another 17 miles are being constructed and financed by the Government without outside assistance. The bank's loan will finance the foreign-exchange costs of the remaining sections totaling 148 miles. These sections are expected to cost the equivalent of \$16 million and to take 4 years to complete.

Construction will be done by contractors chosen through international competitive bidding for unit-price contracts based on detailed specifications of each section to be built. The Government is taking steps to retain an experienced firm of consulting engineers to prepare the detailed plans and specifications for the project and invitations to bid, to analyze and make recommendations on bids, and to supervise construction. Apart from some minor items, construction equipment and materials will be supplied by the contractors. The proceeds of the loan, therefore, will be used mainly to cover the foreign-exchange portion of payments to contractors. The Government will provide the required local currency from budgetary appropriations. The Highway Department of El Salvador will maintain the new highway and will expand its maintenance facilities for this purpose.

Because of inadequate roads in the coastal zone, transport costs are high throughout most of the area, access to markets is difficult, and farmers receive low prices for their produce. Considerable waste is caused by the slow haulage of crops, the movement of livestock on the hoof, and the stoppage of transport during the rainy season. As a result, operators of large farms concentrate on producing a few cash crops of sufficient value to support high transport costs, and small farm owners find it difficult to do more than subsistence farming.

The new highway, with feeder roads to be built by the Government, should alleviate this situation. With good roads, providing year-round access to wider markets at lower transport costs, agricultural production in the coastal zone should increase in value by the equivalent of about \$10 million a year. In addition, denser settlement of the zone will help relieve population pressure elsewhere in El Salvador. Roads alone will not bring about these results, but the Government is also planning to continue its efforts to improve health conditions in the coastal plains, to promote soil conservation and better production methods through agricultural extension services, and to facilitate the establishment of more adequate processing, storage, and credit facilities.

This is the second bank loan to El Salvador. A loan of \$12,545,000 was made in December 1949 for the construction of a 30,000-kilowatt hydroelectric plant on the Lempa River, which began operating in June 1954. Most of the electricity

from the new plant is being distributed in San Salvador, the capital, and in San Miguel, a key industrial center.

After having been approved by the Executive Directors, the loan documents were signed on October 12 by Hector David Castro, Ambassador for El Salvador at Washington, and Rafael Meza Ayau, Minister of Economy of El Salvador, on behalf of the Government of El Salvador, and by Eugene R. Black, President, on behalf of the International Bank.

Import Fees Imposed on Almonds and Filberts

White House Office press release dated October 11

The President on October 11 issued a proclamation imposing a fee of 10 cents a pound on imports of almonds into the United States over 5 million pounds, and a fee of 10 cents a pound on imports of filberts into the United States over 6 million pounds, during the period October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, inclusive.

The President's action modified the recommendations of the Tariff Commission. In its report¹ the Commission recommended a 10 cents per pound fee on imports of almonds above 4½ million pounds and a 10 cents per pound fee on imports of filberts above 5½ million pounds.

During the quota year just ended there was a 5 cents per pound fee on the first 7 million pounds of almonds imported into this country, which is now revoked, and a 10 cents per pound fee on imports in excess of 7 million pounds. There was no quota or fee on imports of filberts during the past year. During the previous year, however, there was an absolute quota on imports of filberts of 4½ million pounds.

The President's action was based on the recent unanimous report on edible tree nuts by the United States Tariff Commission. The Commission's investigation was made under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, which authorizes limitations on imports when imports are interfering with or threaten to interfere with domestic price-support or marketing programs.

The Tariff Commission's report resulted from its fifth continuing investigation into the effect of

imports on the domestic marketing program for edible tree nuts.

The proclamation applies to shelled almonds and blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste) and to shelled filberts, whether or not blanched.

The Tariff Commission did not report or make recommendations with respect to walnuts. The Commission stated that it was making no finding at this time on walnuts because further investigation was needed.

Text of Proclamation 3073²

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as added by section 31 of the Act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 773, reenacted by section 1 of the Act of June 3, 1937, 50 Stat. 246, and amended by section 3 of the Act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1248, section 3 of the Act of June 28, 1950, 64 Stat. 261, and section 8 (b) of the Act of June 16, 1951, 65 Stat. 72 (7 U. S. C. 624), on April 13, 1950 the President caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation to determine whether almonds, filberts, walnuts, Brazil nuts, or cashews are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, certain programs undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to almonds, pecans, filberts, or walnuts, or to reduce substantially the amount of any product processed in the United States from almonds, pecans, filberts, or walnuts with respect to which any such program is being undertaken; and

2. WHEREAS the said Commission instituted such an investigation on April 13, 1950, which it has been conducting since that date on a continuing basis and in the course of which it has from time to time reported to the President regarding the need for the imposition of restrictions pursuant to the said section 22 in order to prevent imports of almonds, filberts, walnuts, Brazil nuts, or cashews from rendering ineffective, or materially interfering with, the said programs, or from reducing substantially the amount of any product processed in the United States from almonds, pecans, filberts, or walnuts with respect to which any such program is being undertaken; and

3. WHEREAS import fees on shelled almonds and blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste) imposed pursuant to the President's proclamation of September 29, 1953 (Proclamation 3034; 18 F. R. 6345),³ which proclamation was issued under the authority of the said section 22, will cease to apply to such articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption after September 30, 1954; and

4. WHEREAS further in the course of the said investigation, on September 24, 1954, the said Commission reported

¹ Copies of the report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D. C.

² 19 Fed. Reg. 6623.

³ BULLETIN of Nov. 2, 1953, p. 602.

to me its findings regarding the need for import restrictions under the said section 22 on certain tree nuts after September 30, 1954; and

5. WHEREAS, on the basis of such report of September 24, 1954, I find that shelled almonds, and blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste), and shelled filberts, whether or not blanched, are practically certain to be imported into the United States during the period October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, both dates inclusive, under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the programs undertaken by the Department of Agriculture under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, with respect to almonds and filberts, which programs will be in operation during such period; and

6. WHEREAS I find and declare that the imposition of the import fees hereinafter proclaimed is shown by such investigation of the Commission to be necessary in order that the entry of almonds and filberts described in the fifth recital of this proclamation will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said programs undertaken by the Department of Agriculture:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that a fee of 10 cents per pound, but not more than 50 per centum ad valorem, shall be imposed upon shelled almonds and blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste) entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, both dates inclusive, in excess of an aggregate quantity of 5,000,000 pounds; and that a fee of 10 cents per pound, but not more than 50 per centum ad valorem, shall be imposed upon shelled filberts, whether or not blanched, entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, both dates inclusive, in excess of an aggregate quantity of 6,000,000 pounds. The said fees shall be in addition to any other duties imposed on the importation of such almonds and filberts.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eleventh day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-ninth.



By the President:

HERBERT HOOVER, JR.,

Acting Secretary of State.

Limitations on Imports of Oats Into United States

White House press release dated October 4

The President on October 4 signed a proclamation limiting imports of oats into the United States from all sources to 40 million bushels during the period October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, inclusive.

The President's action was based on the recent unanimous report on oats by the United States Tariff Commission.¹ The Commission's investigation was made under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, which authorized limitation on imports when imports are interfering with or threaten to interfere with domestic price-support or marketing programs. The allocation between Canada and all other foreign countries set forth in the proclamation is based upon total imports during five marketing seasons, 1948-49 to 1952-53. The proclamation applies to oats, hulled and unhulled, and unhulled ground oats.

The Tariff Commission's report resulted from its second investigation into the effect of imports of oats on the domestic price-support program for oats. This second investigation was directed by the President on August 20, 1954.² The Tariff Commission's first investigation and report resulted in a proclamation on December 27, 1953,³ limiting imports of oats into the United States from sources other than Canada to 2½ million bushels during the period December 23, 1953, to September 30, 1954. From December 10, 1953, to September 30, 1954, Canada voluntarily limited shipments of oats to the United States to 23 million bushels.

Text of Proclamation 3070⁴

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as added by section 31 of the act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 773, reenacted by section 1 of the act of June 3, 1937, 50 Stat. 246, and as amended by section 3 of the act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1248, section 3 of the act of June 28, 1950, 64 Stat. 261, and section 8 (b) of the act of June 16, 1951, 65 Stat. 72 (7 U. S. C. 624), the Secretary of Agriculture has advised me that

¹ Copies of the report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D. C.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 6, 1954, p. 340.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 57.

⁴ 19 Fed. Reg. 6471.

he has reason to believe that oats, hulled or unhulled, and unhulled ground oats are practically certain to be imported into the United States after September 30, 1954, under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to oats pursuant to section 301 and 401 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic oats with respect to which such program of the Department of Agriculture is being undertaken; and

WHEREAS, on August 20, 1954, I caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation under the said section 22 with respect to this matter; and

WHEREAS, the said Tariff Commission has made such investigation and has reported to me its findings and recommendations made in connection therewith; and

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said investigation and report of the Tariff Commission, I find that oats, hulled and unhulled, and unhulled ground oats, in the aggregate, are practically certain to be imported into the United States during the period from October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, inclusive, under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said price-support program with respect to oats; and

WHEREAS, I find and declare that the imposition of the quantitative limitations hereinafter proclaimed is shown by such investigation of the Tariff Commission to be necessary in order that the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of oats, hulled and unhulled, and unhulled ground oats will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said price-support program:


Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that the total aggregate quantity of oats, hulled and unhulled, and unhulled ground oats entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period from October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, inclusive, shall not be permitted to exceed 40,000,000 bushels of 32 pounds each, which permissible total quantity I find and declare to be proportionately not less than 50 per centum of the total average aggregate annual quantity of such oats entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the representative period from July 1, 1948, to June 30, 1953, inclusive; and that, of the foregoing permissible total quantity, not more than 39,312,000 bushels of 32 pounds each shall be imported from Canada and not more than 688,000 bushels of 32 pounds each shall be imported from other foreign countries.

The provisions of this proclamation shall not apply to certified or registered seed oats for use for seeding and crop-improvement purposes, in bags tagged and sealed by an officially recognized seed-certifying agency of the country of production: *Provided*, (a) that the individual shipment amounts to 100 bushels (of 32 pounds each) or less, or (b) that the individual shipment

amounts to more than 100 bushels (of 32 pounds each) and the written approval of the Secretary of Agriculture or his designated representative is presented at the time of entry, or bond is furnished in a form prescribed by the Commissioner of Customs in an amount equal to the value of the merchandise as set forth in the entry, plus the estimated duty as determined at the time of entry, conditioned upon the production of such written approval within 6 months from the date of entry.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 4th day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-ninth.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State.

Four Engineers Go to Thailand To Plan Highway Project

The Foreign Operations Administration announced on October 11 that four highway engineers have left for Bangkok, Thailand, to begin an engineering reconnaissance for a modern highway to link Bangkok and the isolated northeast provinces. The Governments of the United States and Thailand are preparing to start construction before the end of 1954.

Called the "Northeast Highway," the road will cost an estimated \$7.5 million and is scheduled for completion in about a year. It will run from Saraburi, near Bangkok, to Ban Phai, 200 miles northeastward in the heart of the northeast plateau, passing through Korat, the northeast's principal city.

The road is seen as a key to the economic development of the potentially rich northeast region. It will strengthen the economic and social ties of the northeast with the Bangkok area, bringing about more export of produce from the northeast and enabling that area to import other needed goods to improve the standard of living of the people.

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned during October 1954

UNESCO 2d International Seminar on the Role of Museums in Education.	Athens	Sept. 12-Oct. 10
FAO Council: 20th Session	Rome	Sept. 27-Oct. 8
Nine Power Meeting	London	Sept. 28-Oct. 3
International Congress of Chronometry	Paris	Oct. 1-5
International Philatelic and Postal Exhibition	New Delhi	Oct. 1-5
Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia ("Colombo Plan"): Ministerial Meeting.	Ottawa	Oct. 4-9
FAO Working Party on Fertilizers: 4th Meeting	Tokyo	Oct. 4-10
FAO Working Party on Rice Breeding: 5th Meeting	Tokyo	Oct. 4-10
PASO Executive Committee: 23d Meeting	Santiago	Oct. 4-6
International Council for Exploration of the Sea: 42d Annual Meeting.	Paris	Oct. 4-12
UNESCO Seminar for Leaders of Youth Movements	Havana	Oct. 5-26
10th General Conference on Weights and Measures	Paris	Oct. 5-14
Caribbean Commission and UNESCO: Joint Technical Conference on Education and Small-Scale Farming in Relation to Community Development.	Port-of-Spain	Oct. 6-15
2d International Meeting of Communications	Genoa	Oct. 6-12
U. N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 4th Session	Tokyo	Oct. 6-11
PASO 14th Pan American Sanitary Conference and 6th Meeting of the Regional Committee of WHO.	Santiago	Oct. 8-22
General Assembly of the International Commission of Criminal Police: 23d Session.	Rome	Oct. 9-14
FAO International Rice Commission: 4th Session	Tokyo	Oct. 11-19
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 5th Session	Geneva	Oct. 11-23
U. N. ECE Committee for Development of Trade: 3d Session	Geneva	Oct. 11-16
International Wheat Council: 16th Session	London	Oct. 12-17
Four Power Meeting	Paris	Oct. 20-23
Nine Power Meeting	Paris	Oct. 21-23
NAC Special Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Oct. 22-23
PASO Executive Committee: 24th Meeting	Santiago	Oct. 22-23
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 2d Meeting.	Vancouver	Oct. 25-30*
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Financial Aspects of Economic Development Programs.	Bangkok	Oct. 25-30
GATT <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Agenda and Intersessional Business.	Geneva	Oct. 26-27
UNESCO Executive Board	Rio de Janeiro	Oct. 31 (1 day)

In Session as of October 31, 1954

U.N. General Assembly: 9th Regular Session	New York	Sept. 21-
ICAO Air Transport Committee: 23d Session.	Montreal	Sept. 27-
ICAO North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting: 3d Session	Montreal	Oct. 5-
WMO <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting on North Atlantic Meteorological Telecommunications.	Montreal	Oct. 5-
ICAO Southeast Asia Regional Communications Coordinating Meeting.	Bangkok	Oct. 18-
ILO Metal Trades Committee: 5th Session	Geneva	Oct. 25-
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 9th Session of Contracting Parties.	Geneva	Oct. 28-
Bogotá International Exposition	Bogotá	Oct. 29-

Scheduled November 1, 1954-January 31, 1955

UNESCO Budget Committee	Montevideo	Nov. 1-
UNESCO Executive Board	Montevideo	Nov. 1-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East.	Bangkok	Nov. 1-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Oct. 21, 1954. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; U. N., United Nations; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; WHO, World Health Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; NAC, North Atlantic Council; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; Icem, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; Ecosoc, Economic and Social Council.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled November 1, 1954–January 31, 1955—Continued

FAO European Forestry Commission: Working Party on Afforestation.	Geneva	Nov. 5–
1st World Conference of Printing Enterprises	São Paulo	Nov. 6–
14th International Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy	Luxembourg	Nov. 7–
International Philatelic Exposition	São Paulo	Nov. 7–
FAO European Forestry Commission: 7th Session	Geneva	Nov. 8–
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources (Committee on Industry and Trade): 1st Session.	Bangkok	Nov. 8–
FAO Meeting on Economic Aspects of the Rice Situation	Rangoon	Nov. 11–
UNESCO General Conference: 8th Session	Montevideo	Nov. 12–
3d Inter-American Accounting Conference	São Paulo	Nov. 14–
Customs Cooperation Council	Brussels	Nov. 15–
ICAO Special European-Mediterranean Communications Meeting	Paris	Nov. 16–
ILO Governing Body: 127th Session	Rome	Nov. 16–
Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy (4th Extraordinary Meeting of Inter-American Economic and Social Council).	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 22–
ICEM <i>Ad Hoc</i> Subcommittee on Draft Rules and Regulations	Geneva	Nov. 22–
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee	London	Nov. 22–
ILO 8th International Conference of Labor Statisticians	Geneva	Nov. 23–
International Sugar Council: Executive Committee	London	Nov. 23–
International Sugar Council: 2d Session	London	Nov. 24–
ICEM Subcommittee on Finance: 6th Session	Geneva	Nov. 25–
Caribbean Commission: 19th Meeting	Cayenne (French Guiana)	Nov. 29–
ICEM 8th Session of the Intergovernmental Committee	Geneva	Nov. 30–
NAC Ministerial Meeting	Paris	November*
FAO 4th World Forestry Congress	Dehra Dun (India)	Dec. 11–
Inter-American Seminar on Secondary Education	Santiago	Dec. 29–
U. N. Ecosoc 18th Session of Council (resumed)	New York	December
10th Pan American Child Congress	Panama City	Jan. 10–
U. N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Trade: 1st Session	Hong Kong	Jan. 10–
WHO Standing Committee on Administration and Finance	Geneva	Jan. 10–
Pan American Highway Congress: Permanent Executive Committee Meeting.	Mexico	Jan. 13–
U. N. Ecosoc Commission on International Commodity Trade: 1st Session.	New York	Jan. 17–
WHO Executive Board: 15th Meeting	Geneva	Jan. 18–
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 24–

Disarmament Talks in U.N. Political Committee

*Statements by James J. Wadsworth
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S. delegation press release 1981 dated October 19

The general debate on disarmament has gone on for over a week.² We think that the discussion has been extremely useful in clarifying a number of important matters. It has shown that the differences between the Soviet Union and the free world are almost as great as ever.

The two sides are in the position of two politi-

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Oct. 19 and Oct. 22.

² For statements by Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Wadsworth on Sept. 30 and Oct. 12, and the text of the Soviet proposal, see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1954, p. 619.

cal parties seeking to elect their slates in a given community. Both parties have put antierime planks in their platforms. Both agree that we need policemen. But one party wants to let its policemen cover their whole beats and make arrests pursuant to law whenever they discover crime. The other party says, "Oh, no. The policeman can only stay on Main Street, and if he should observe a crime there, he can merely report the commission of the crime to the Municipal Council, which in due course will hold a meeting. The policeman cannot make the arrest."

It seems appropriate at this time to review the situation to see exactly where we stand. First, however, I should like to stress a point which has not been discussed very fully. The greater part of the discussion in this committee has been devoted to the Anglo-French memorandum of June 11³ and to the Soviet proposals of September 30.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 182.

This is entirely fitting since the British-French memorandum is the instrument which had led to any narrowing of the gap between the Soviet Union and the free world that may have taken place. What I want to stress now is that, important as they are, neither the Anglo-French memorandum nor the Soviet proposal, nor the two combined, can be said to constitute a complete disarmament program.

Over a period of years agreement has been reached on just what are the chief elements of such a program. Last year these elements were set forth in the first preambular paragraph of the General Assembly resolution of November 28, a paragraph which received 54 affirmative votes and no negative votes.⁴ These elements were: *first*, the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; *second*, the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons of mass destruction; *third*, the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only; and *fourth*, the carrying out of the whole program under effective international control and in such a way that no state should have cause to fear that its security was in danger.

During the discussions in the Disarmament Commission and in the subcommittee this summer, it became apparent that there was a *fifth* element of a disarmament program which was not completely covered by any of the four elements described in the General Assembly resolution: The fifth element was the relation of the other four elements, or, to put it in other words, the timing and phasing of the prohibitions and reductions and of the establishment of international controls.

The Anglo-French memorandum was written to deal with this fifth element. Since it covers the relationship of the other four elements, naturally it refers to them. The Anglo-French memorandum was, of course, never intended to be a complete disarmament program. For example, it does not contain any formula for determining the levels to which armed forces and atomic armaments would be reduced. It does not go into any detail as to the type of international control machinery which would be set up or as to the powers and functions of an international control organ. It does not

deal with numerous basic problems in connection with the prohibition of atomic weapons, such as the type of installations which must be controlled, or the nature of the control. These latter problems are treated fully in the United Nations atomic energy plan approved by previous General Assemblies. The Soviet Union does not agree with the solution suggested in the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy. But we feel sure that the U.S.S.R. will agree that any solution of the problem of atomic weapons must cover the subjects that are dealt with in the United Nations atomic energy plan.

In short, the Anglo-French memorandum and the Soviet draft resolution, however different they may be, both deal with the same set of problems. They do not by themselves deal with all of the basic problems of a disarmament program. One of the flaws of the Soviet resolution, in our opinion, is the following sentence: "Accordingly the convention should contain the following basic provisions." We read this to imply that the Soviet Union regards its proposal as a disarmament plan rather than merely one of the elements of a disarmament plan.

Fundamental Differences

It may be useful at this time to point out just where we stand, in the thought that, if we know where we stand, it will be easier to plot our future course.

Three fundamental and basic differences have emerged between the Soviet Union and the other members of the Disarmament Commission subcommittee. The *first* of these relates to the reduction of armed forces and nonatomic armaments. The position of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States is that we should first agree upon levels to which armed forces and armaments will be reduced. The amounts of reductions would be the difference between these agreed levels and the levels of December 31, 1953. These reductions would take place in two stages: 50 percent of reductions in the first stage and 50 percent in the second stage. The Soviet proposal goes along with the idea that the reductions shall be made from the December 31, 1953, level and that the reduction shall take place in two stages: 50 percent in each stage. Mr. Vyshinsky, however, has made it clear that the Soviet Union still favors a "proportional" reduction. In other words, the Soviet Union still

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1953, p. 838.

favors an overall reduction of one-third, or of some other fraction, applicable to all countries, the type of reduction which would perpetuate the present imbalance of armed forces and conventional armaments in favor of the Soviet Union. However, Mr. Vyshinsky says this is a matter to be decided by the international convention.

The *second* major divergence relates to the powers and authority of the international control machinery. Mr. Vyshinsky went back once again to the detailed Soviet proposals of June 1947 concerning an international control organ. The proposals, when originally made, were made to the Atomic Energy Commission and related only to the control of atomic energy. They were discussed fully and exhaustively in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1947 and 1948. At that time a committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, consisting of Canada, China, France, and the United Kingdom, prepared a working paper which concluded "that the Soviet Union proposals ignore the existing technical knowledge of the problem of atomic energy control, do not provide an adequate basis for the effective international control of atomic energy and the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons, and therefore do not conform to the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission." This working paper was included as annex IV of the Third Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated May 17, 1948, and was approved by the General Assembly at the time it adopted the United Nations atomic energy plan.

The Soviet proposals then dropped out of sight, until suddenly the Soviet representative revived them in the subcommittee discussion in London last spring. Why did they drop out of sight? You will recall that in 1952 Mr. Vyshinsky brought to the Sixth General Assembly some new proposals on international control which he glorified as a great concession to the West.⁵ He conceded at that time that the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a *continuing* basis but should not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of states. Since this was in contrast to the Soviet's previous insistence on *periodic* inspection, we all hoped that a door had been opened to agreement on a fundamental principle. During the disarmament discussions in 1952

we strove without success to find out what the Soviet Union meant by "continuous inspection." Finally, in London last spring the Soviet representative tried to put life in the ghost of 1947, as his definition of "inspection on a continuing basis." He thus succeeded only in demonstrating that the "continuous inspection" of 1952 was identical to the "periodic inspection" of 1947. The great concession of 1952 turned out to be no concession at all.

Now, since September 30, the Soviet Union has talked about an international control organ with "full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all states." At first glance this looked good since, in theory at least, it could encompass the powers which this Assembly has decided are essential.

On October 15 Mr. Vyshinsky continued to assert that the Soviet Union favors a control organ capable of "powerful" and "effective" control. Exactly what powers would this mighty and powerful organ have? On October 15, and again yesterday, Mr. Vyshinsky answered this question by again calling up the ghost of 1947 and reading to us these 1947 proposals.

Furthermore, he referred to the United States working paper on the control organ presented last summer by Mr. [Morehead] Patterson.⁶ He pointed out that the United States paper took the position that in cases of violations the control commission can close plants, and then he said:

... if some people are prepared to accept that, we are not to be counted among them. I must say that quite openly. We feel that to vest such functions in a control commission is impossible.

It is clear that on this all-important question of the powers of the international control organ there has been no change in the Soviet position. Once more, Mr. Vyshinsky continues to insist, just as he did in 1947, that the really important powers in connection with a disarmament program must be exercised by the Security Council, where all of the permanent members have a veto.

We fail to see why the U.S.S.R. objects to thorough and effective international control. If the U.S., the U.K., France, and all the rest of us are willing to subject ourselves to it, what has the Soviet to fear? Are we to assume that she has

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 127.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 179.

something to hide—something she doesn't want the world to know? How can any disarmament plan work if, as I said last week, the steps of the plan cannot be carried out in full sight of each other?

The Soviet accuses the U.S. of preparing for another war; of aggression against Formosa and all kinds of other fantastic crimes and intentions. How best can we display to the world that we are completely honest in our statements and straightforward in our intentions? We think it is by opening wide our doors and inviting an international control body to come in freely and fully; to inspect our atomic installations, our munitions plants, and, yes, even our button factories. What is more, we are prepared to accept corrective action on the part of the control organ in the event a violation is found.

On the other hand, we in the United States suspect the Soviet Union of planning world conquest behind their facade of disarmament statements. Will *they* take the same steps to reassure the world that we are prepared to take? While Mr. Vyshinsky answered "No," he kept one ember burning. He suggested that this problem too should be worked out in the international convention.

Question of Timing and Phasing

The *third* fundamental difference between the Soviet position and that of the other states which participated in the London discussion relates to the timing and phasing of the most important elements of the disarmament program. Mr. [Selwyn] Lloyd got to the heart of this difference in the second question which he addressed to Mr. Vyshinsky last Friday. He asked: "Does the Soviet Government agree that the officials of the control organ should be in position, ready and able to function in the countries concerned, before those countries begin to carry out the disarmament program?" There is nothing that I can add to Mr. Lloyd's explanation of the fundamental significance and importance of this problem. If we interpret Mr. Vyshinsky's answer correctly, he didn't say "Yes" and he didn't say "No"; once again, he said: "This will be decided in the convention." Can we assume that the Soviet attitude will be any less rigid when we come to negotiate the convention? After all, they have never shown themselves willing to discuss in detail any of the concrete proposals brought forward to date.

But, in his very last intervention on October 15, Mr. Vyshinsky took pity on us and did answer Mr. Lloyd's question in a manner which, I fear, is all too clear. He referred to paragraph 5 of the Franco-British memorandum and noted that Mr. Lloyd had stated that we diverged on this point. Then Mr. Vyshinsky said, "That is correct; we do." Now what does the fifth paragraph of the Franco-British memorandum say? It says:

5. After the constitution and positioning of the Control Organ, which shall be carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the Control Organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect.

So it is clear that, in substance, Mr. Vyshinsky's answer to Mr. Lloyd's second question is strongly in the negative.

There are other differences, but the three which I have just outlined are the most important. As a result of the discussions in this committee which, I repeat, have been extremely useful and which, in my view, have come better to grips with the problem than any previous United Nations discussions, where do we stand and where do we go? Let us admit again that on one important point the differences have been narrowed. The Soviet Union now admits that the disarmament program can take place in stages and that 50 percent of the reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments can take place before the prohibition of atomic weapons. Despite this concession, we are still some distance from the down-to-earth detailed negotiations that will be necessary to work out a disarmament convention. It would not be very profitable to start discussing the number of aircraft carriers, the number of bombers, the number of ground forces that each state will be permitted under a disarmament program until we have some agreement on how to work out those figures. Mr. Vyshinsky says that the Soviet Union has one view and that the other members of the subcommittee have a different view and that we will work this out in the convention.

Similarly, it would not be very profitable to work out the machinery, powers, and functions of an international control organ and then to find out that the control organ will never be in a position to exercise its powers. Here, again, Mr. Vyshinsky says: "This is a question of method. Let's leave it to the convention."

That is where we stand today. Now where

Resolution on Disarmament¹

U.N. doc. A/C.1/752/Rev. 2 dated October 22

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem,

Conscious that the continuing development of armaments increases the urgency of the need for such a solution,

Having considered the Fourth Report of the Disarmament Commission of 29 July 1954 (D.C/53 and D.C/55), and the documents annexed thereto, and the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/750) concerning the conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction,

1. *Concludes* that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing for:

(a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments;

(b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;

(c) The establishment of effective international control, through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

The whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to seek an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem, taking into account the various proposals referred to in the preamble of the present resolution and any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference;

3. *Suggests* that the Disarmament Commission reconvene the Sub-Committee established in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII);

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly as soon as sufficient progress has been made.

¹ Approved unanimously by Committee I on Oct. 27.

should we go? What course of action should we follow in this committee?

On each of these fundamental problems there are divergent views. It would be theoretically possible for the Assembly to recommend that the Soviet Union should accept our view. We frankly doubt whether the General Assembly's approval of the Anglo-French memorandum or of the United States working paper on a control organ would advance by one day the achievement of an agreed disarmament program unless the General Assembly decision had the support of the Soviet Union. Yesterday the representative of Syria [Ahmad Shukairy] made this point most effectively.

We have had some success, even though it is much less than we had originally hoped on September 30, in narrowing the differences that separate us. It seems to us that there is no alternative course but to try again. The subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission seems to be the machinery best suited to promote genuine negotiation. It would be naive to suppose that progress in the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee will be rapid. Certain Soviet moves here in the United Nations are not calculated to reduce international tensions. None of us can wave a magic wand which will produce immediate agreement. We are not counseling delay, nor do we welcome it; we are merely pointing out that progress comes as a result of serious thought and thorough preparation, all of which is time-consuming. We may have to grope along another series of blind alleys before we find another one which leads closer to agreement. But we know of no other course.

In the meantime, the United States believes that the Canadian resolution, which we are cosponsoring,² affords the best hope of progress in the field of disarmament. The machinery provided in this resolution can move as fast as the Soviet Union will permit it to move. We are certainly anxious that it should move with the greatest possible speed consistent with the attainment of genuine agreement.

I should now like to address a brief remark to my good friend, Sir Percy Spender. I attach the greatest significance to his suggestions with respect to the further progress of our discussion of disarmament at this session. Nevertheless, I am sure

² U. N. doc. A/C.1/752/Rev. 1.

that he will agree that our debate to this point has very closely outlined the points of agreement and disagreement between the views of the Soviet Union and those of the other members of the London subcommittee. I doubt if any further clarification can be obtained at this session. The type of problem which Mr. Vyshinsky desires to be solved by the convention will not be solved in 3 weeks or 6 weeks.

I fully agree with Sir Percy's view as to the vital contribution which can be made by what he has termed the "middle" and "small" powers. We have had ample evidence of this already, and I certainly hope that we shall have more before our present debate is over. The United States certainly does not believe that progress in this field can be made only by the so-called Great Powers.

That is one reason why we support the Canadian resolution, which calls upon the Disarmament Commission to pursue its work. That Commission, with its 12 members, certainly enables other powers to voice their views on a plane of complete equality with the Great Powers. Then, too, the results of its work will again be reviewed by the General Assembly. In brief, I hope that, when we shall have concluded our general debate in this committee, all members of this body will have had ample opportunity to contribute fully to this vital task.

The distinguished representative of Syria spent a considerable part of his challenging and able presentation yesterday in pointing out the seemingly irreconcilable attitudes of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in spite of the fact that we both apparently espouse the same general principles. I join with him in wondering whether "peace" means something in Russian that is wholly incompatible with what it means in English.

We are ready to demonstrate that the peace we want is worth real sacrifice; that it is a precious thing deserving of persistent and impartial protection; that it will flourish under proper safeguards in the broad light of day. We reaffirm our conviction that peace, as we mean it, cannot thrive on an exclusive diet of lip service; that it will suffer seriously from the drought of neglect; that it will wither and die in the dark dungeons of secrecy.

Yesterday Mr. Vyshinsky stated that he would much rather be offered advice than be asked questions. I directed no questions to him. However,

much as I hesitate to offer advice, he asked for it. I suggest that his Government accept the same international controls that the rest of us are willing to accept.

U.S. delegation press release 1990 dated October 22

The procedural agreement just announced by the distinguished representative of Canada [David M. Johnson], an agreement which now provides for the cosponsorship by all five members of the Disarmament Commission's subcommittee of the resolution originally tabled by Canada, very properly refers this question to that subcommittee. We join with our other cosponsors in welcoming this agreement, and we pledge the continued efforts of the United States to achieve fully safeguarded disarmament.

The subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, will be able to probe into the many technical aspects of disarmament. These technical aspects have been brought forth during our debate on this subject and have shown the divergencies which exist. But the deliberations of the subcommittee will test the extent to which good faith animates the Soviet Union in its present approach to disarmament matters. We await that test with interest.

The work we will undertake will call for constructive, unrelenting effort from every subcommittee member and the United States will do its part.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in common with my colleague from Canada I wish to comment very briefly on the question posed to the former cosponsors by the distinguished delegate of India [V. K. Krishna Menon] the other day and of which we were reminded today by the distinguished delegate of India. Since this seems to be a day somewhat devoted to unanimity, I am very happy to tell him that the United States, having studied the questions and the answers of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Lloyd, the United States finds itself in full accord with Mr. Lloyd's answers. There may be some aspects of clarification or even elaboration which the United States might wish to add to Mr. Lloyd's answers. However, these are of a highly technical nature and I do not propose to burden the committee with them today. If the distinguished delegate of India would be desirous of our doing so, we will be very happy to submit them to him in writing, but they will not in any sense affect the substance of the answers.

Progress in Highway Development for Latin America

SIXTH PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY CONGRESS, CARACAS, JULY 11-23, 1954

Important impetus is expected to be given to the development of highways throughout Latin America as a result of the resolutions and recommendations of the Sixth Pan American Highway Congress, held at Caracas, Venezuela, from July 11 to July 23, 1954. It was a fully representative meeting, with 19 of the 21 American Republics sending official delegations. Outstanding among its accomplishments were the unanimous adoption of a permanent plan for the organization of future Congresses, with emphasis upon executive and technical committee work, and the institution of intensive studies for the financing and construction of the Pan American Highway System. Along with these were many other decisions which reflected the determination of governmental and private bodies to make headway rapidly and constructively on the problems of highway improvement and expansion.

The Caracas meeting, latest of a series which began at Buenos Aires in 1925, was pronounced by many participants as the most effective to date. It carried out successfully the formative planning begun at the Fifth Congress at Lima in 1951 and a special Congress at Mexico City in 1952,¹ and marked the coming to full maturity of this important hemispheric organization. In all of these activities, the United States has played a leading part.

The Seventh Congress will be held at Panamá City, R. P., in 1957.

United States Delegation

The members of the U.S. delegation were as follows:

Walter Williams, Under Secretary of Commerce, *Chairman*

¹ For an article on the special Congress, see *BULLETIN* of Jan. 19, 1953, p. 105.

Charles P. Nolan, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, *Vice Chairman*

J. Harry McGregor, Chairman, Subcommittee on Roads, House of Representatives

George H. Fallon, Member, Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives

Herbert Ashton, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce

Sewell Marcus Gross, American Road Builders Association

Edwin W. James, American Society of Civil Engineers²

Henry H. Kelly, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State

Gale Moss, American Association of State Highway Officials

Francis C. Turner, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Norman B. Wood, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

William L. Brewster, second secretary of the American Embassy at Caracas, acted as liaison officer.

Organization of the Congress

All working sessions were held in the library building of the University City, a large enclave of structures which eventually will house many thousands of students. The physical facilities of the building were excellent, with auditoriums and

² Special mention should properly be made of the participation of Mr. James, who has attended all of the Pan American Congresses except the first two as a U.S. delegation member. Mr. James was in charge of the cooperative work of the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads on the Inter-American Highway from 1929 until his retirement in 1953. During that period he made more than 60 inspection trips to various parts of the highway, in addition to engineering surveys in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. To innumerable government officials, engineers, and economists throughout the Americas, he is known as "the father of the Inter-American Highway."

assembly rooms of ample dimensions and attractive architectural style.

On the morning of July 11, the chiefs of delegations met in a preliminary session with the Organizing Committee and principal officers of the secretariat and designated the Minister of Public Works of Venezuela, Dr. Julio Bacalao Lara, as president and Dr. Eduardo Arnal, Dean of the Faculty of Engineering, Central University of Venezuela, as secretary general of the Congress. Dr. Francisco J. Hernandez of the Pan American Union was permanent secretary, as at previous Congresses.

At the formal opening session the same afternoon, held in the Great Hall of University City, these designations were confirmed. In addition, the Presidents of the American Republics were made honorary presidents and the Ministers of Public Works honorary vice presidents. Five technical commissions were established, to cover the following subjects: international affairs, highway education, construction and maintenance, legislation and administration, and highway safety. A committee on coordination and style was also appointed.

Technical Papers and Reports

As is customary in a technical conference, large numbers of papers had been submitted by organizations or individuals for consideration. The Final Act of the Congress listed 159 such papers. Of these, 51 were the subject of resolutions; 59 were recommended to be published in full in the proceedings (including the following from the United States: "Economic Potentialities of the Pan American Highway," by Edwin W. James; "Soil Testing," by M. D. Morris; and "Repair Shops for the Care of Highway Equipment" and "Highway Planning in the United States," by the Bureau of Public Roads); and 49 were recommended to be summarized in the proceedings (including a paper by J. Stanley Williamson on "Highway Maintenance in Ecuador").

The most important reports presented were those of four special committees appointed by the Mexico City Congress in 1952 to prepare for the Caracas meeting. A so-called Interim Committee, which was in effect an executive committee, with its chairman representing Mexico and with officials from Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and the United States as its members, recommended a plan

of organization for the future Congresses and offered suggestions on the technical committee reports. The latter were submitted by committees on financing, chaired by Mexico; on planning and routing, chaired by Brazil; and on the organization of highway departments, chaired by Peru.

Work of the Commissions

Much of the work of the Congress was performed in the technical commissions, although this did not prevent many hours of discussion in the plenary sessions as well. Members of the U.S. delegation took an active part.

In Commission I, on international affairs, the principal topic was the permanent organization of the Congresses. After a brief discussion of a revised plan informally submitted by the permanent secretariat, the original "Plan of Organization of the Pan American Highway Congresses" as drawn up by a five-nation committee earlier this year was unanimously approved with only minor editorial changes. Other matters handled by this commission included the regional and worldwide treaties on international road traffic of 1943 and 1949, plans for financing the construction and improvement of the Pan American Highway System, and coordination of transport.

In Commission II, on highway education, papers were presented on three principal subjects—descriptions of national highway systems, histories of national highway development, and the preservation of archeological and historical monuments.

Commission III, dealing with plans, construction, and maintenance, was divided into six subcommissions: preliminary studies, earth movement, pavements, bridges, drainage, and maintenance. The principal work of the subcommissions was to consider and recommend disposition of some 25 technical papers submitted to the Congress.

Commission IV dealt with highway legislation, administration, economics, and finance. Representative McGregor served as vice chairman of this commission, of which the principal work was the consideration and discussion of the recommendations of the Technical Committee on Highway Administration (Lima Committee). Of special interest to the United States, and particularly to the Bureau of Public Roads, was a resolution which recommends that the several countries

establish priority of construction on the Pan American Highway as follows: first—opening and constructing impassable sections to all-weather standard; second—improving substandard sections to all-weather standard and constructing permanent structures; third—paving. This resolution coincides with the policy of the Bureau of Public Roads to establish just such priority of construction on the Inter-American Highway program throughout Central America and Panama.

Commission V, on highway operation and safety, considered a number of papers on highway traffic standards, signs, and nomenclature. Among other actions it requested the executive committee to undertake studies which would fix the basis for greater uniformity in the designation and identification of highway routes throughout the various American countries.

Resolutions

In four plenary sessions, spaced at intervals during the Congress and ending on July 20, definitive action was taken on the many proposals considered by the Congress. The Final Act was signed at a brief closing ceremony on the morning of July 23.

The total number of resolutions adopted was 53. Notable among them were the following:

Resolution I: Recommendation of a permanent "Plan of Organization of the Pan American Highway Congresses," which sets forth among other matters the objectives of the organization—chief of which is to facilitate and promote the development of highways in the American continent; establishes relations with the Organization of American States; provides that the Congresses will be held every 3 years, with five classes of participants—official delegates appointed by Governments of the American States, certain committee members, the representative of the Organization of American States, special observers representing international organizations, and other observers; creates a permanent Executive Committee and four technical committees of experts to cover the fields of governmental highway departments, planning and routing of highways, financing, and terminology; and calls for a permanent secretariat, to be provided by the Pan American Union.

In a separate action, the Congress designated the following countries to hold the chairmanships

of these committees: executive, Mexico; highway departments, Peru; planning and routing, Brazil; financing, Venezuela; terminology, Argentina. The United States will have membership on all except the committee on planning and routing. The Executive Committee will be the chief motivating force for the next Congress, since responsibility for carrying out the recommendations of the Caracas meeting will largely devolve upon it. Its members are Mexico (chairman), Argentina, Brazil, United States, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Its first meeting will be held at Mexico City, January 13–17, 1955.

An interesting feature of this new organization plan, which won unanimous approval at Caracas, is that it involves no financial commitments for the member countries other than the expenses of the host countries for the periodic Congresses or for committee meetings. Operation of the plan will be watched with great interest, for if it proves successful, its simplicity, economy and concentration upon effective committee work may well commend it as a prototype for similar international technical organizations. The Caracas resolution was framed in the form of a recommendation to the Council of the Organization of American States, but its approval by that body and its consequent entry into force for all future Congresses are expected.

Resolution II: Organization of a technical study, with the authorization and collaboration of Panama and Colombia, of a practicable route for the Pan American Highway through the Isthmus of Darien. All of the American countries interested in this project are invited to lend their assistance, and the permanent Executive Committee is placed in general charge. The Darien Peninsula, still largely unexplored, presents one of the most difficult gaps in the Pan American Highway, with about 170 miles of undeveloped and unknown territory between the present highway connections in Panama and Colombia. The Caracas resolution marks the start of a vigorous attack upon this problem. The United States is expected to offer technical assistance, particularly as regards aerial surveys, with no commitment as to financial assistance.

Resolution III: Preparation of a plan, by the Financing Committee and the Executive Committee, for the financing of the entire Pan Ameri-

can Highway System "on the basis of continental cooperation, both governmental and private."

Resolution IV: Preparation of a formula, by the Executive Committee in cooperation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to assist individual countries to obtain funds for highway development.

Resolution V: An expression of thanks to the U.S. Government for its help in the construction of the Inter-American Highway (Guatemala to Panama).

Resolution X: Suggestion that the American countries adopt uniform symbols for highway maps and that the United Nations be urged to continue its efforts to establish worldwide uniformity in road signs and signals.

Resolution XIII: Recommendation that the Executive Committee study the possible uniformity of highway specifications and design standards which would conform to the limitations on vehicle dimensions and weights as set forth in international conventions. (The U.S. delegation understands this to have particular reference to the vehicle size and weight limitations embodied in annex 7 to the Convention on Road Traffic of 1949.³)

Resolution XVI: Interchange of information among the countries of the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea area and convening of a conference by the Executive Committee to establish a "tourist circuit" embracing the southern United States, Cuba, Yucatan, and central Mexico.

Resolution XVIII: Compliments to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America for its study on transportation in Central America, with a recommendation that it produce a similar study for South America.

Resolution XIX: Recommendation that government agencies, automobile associations, and organizations of commerce, industry, and production support the formation of bodies representative of commercial highway transport in all its phases.

Resolution XX: Recommendation that all the American States should adhere to the worldwide

Convention on Road Traffic (Geneva, 1949), establish promptly the distinctive sign indicating national origin of motor vehicles in international traffic as provided by that treaty, and study the United Nations proposals for qualifications of drivers in international traffic with a view to their adoption as a basis for uniform issuance of drivers' permits; and that any country which has not yet done so should also ratify the regional Convention on Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic (Washington, 1943) in order to meet the special documentary requirements of countries in this hemisphere pending ratification of the world convention.

Resolution XXIV: Recommendation that a Department of Traffic, Highways, or Roads be created in each country where it does not already exist and that information on such departments be sent to the permanent secretariat.

Resolution XXVI: Suggestion that adequate rights-of-way be obtained for highways, 60-meter minimum width for principal routes and 30-meter for secondary, with 100 meters, if possible, for all roads on the Pan American Highway.

Resolution XXVII: Recommendation that each country establish a National Commission on Communications to prepare a general plan for the national and regional development of highways, railways, inland and ocean waterways, and airways, with a view to coordinated economic and social betterment; that such a plan determine the steps necessary to be taken for both immediate and future development of the country; and that on completion of the work of the Commission, a National Council of Communications be established as a consultative body to study traffic changes in the various modes of transport and other unforeseen developments which may affect the coordinated program.

Resolution XXIX: Suggestion that the American States adopt the contract method for construction of highways.

Resolution XXX: Suggestion that the governments give preferential attention to the maintenance of highways.

Resolution XXXIII: Suggestion that the governments promote the construction of local roads in order to augment areas under cultivation,

³ For a summary of the 1949 convention see BULLETIN of Dec. 12, 1949, p. 886.

attract new industries, increase traffic on the principal routes, and develop the national economy and culture.

Resolution XXXIX: Recommendation to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to convene a meeting of traffic experts before the next Pan American Highway Congress is held.

Resolution XLII: Resolution to hold the Seventh Pan American Highway Congress in Panamá City, R. P., in 1957.

Resolution XLIV-A: Recommendation that schools for operators of construction and transportation equipment be established and that aerial photographs be used as part of the means for determining highway locations.

U.S. Announcement

One of the chief events of the Congress required no specific resolution. It was an announcement by the chairman of the U.S. delegation in the plenary session of July 16 to the following effect:

I am sure that most of you already know that in May of this year the United States Congress made an effective contribution toward completion of the inter-American portion of the Pan American Highway between Mexico and the Panama Canal by authorizing the future appropriation of funds required to complete the Inter-American Highway by 1960 in cooperation with the Central American countries and Panama. You will be interested to learn that this legislation was introduced and skillfully guided to final approval in the Congress by the Honorable J. Harry McGregor, Congressman from the State of Ohio, aided by the Honorable George H. Fallon, Congressman from the State of Maryland, both of whom are present with us here in Caracas as members of the United States delegation to this Congress.

As all of us are aware, one of our objectives here is to develop a means to hasten opening of the 25-mile gap in the highway in northern Guatemala. I am glad to be able to announce to the delegates to this Sixth Pan American Highway Congress that I have just received information that hearings have already been completed and that the Congress of the United States has before it now the bill for the actual appropriation of sufficient funds to permit the United States Government to enter into a cooperative agreement with the new Government of Guatemala to commence work on this section of the highway. Should the United States Congress act favorably on this appropriation, funds would then be available with which the United States and Guatemala could negotiate an agreement for the immediate beginning of construction on this important section of the highway.

The statement was greeted by applause. To

many of those present, it meant that the last political obstacle to completion of the Inter-American Highway was about to be removed and that a through overland connection between the United States and the Panama Canal could become a reality, if the United States Congress so desired, within a period of perhaps 5 years.

• *This report was drafted for the U.S. delegation by H. H. Kelly, officer in charge of inland transport matters for the Office of Transport and Communications Policy.*

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952.¹ *Notification by Australia of extension to:* Territories of Papua and New Guinea, Nauru and Norfolk Island, August 9, 1954.

Commodities—Sugar

International sugar agreement. Done at London under date of October 1, 1953. *Ratification deposited:* Lebanon, September 23, 1954.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.² *Acceptance deposited (with reservation):* Mexico, September 21, 1954.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953.¹ *Acceptance deposited:* Egypt, September 29, 1954.

BILATERAL

Greece

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation. Signed at Athens August 3, 1951. Entered into force October 13, 1954.

Proclaimed by the President: October 18, 1954.

Treaty of establishment. Signed at Athens November 21, 1936. Entered into force October 22, 1937. 51 Stat. 230. *Terminated:* October 13, 1954 (upon entry into force of the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation of August 3, 1951).

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

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No.	Date	Subject
†581	10/18	Agreement with Belgium.
582	10/18	Union of South Africa credentials (rewrite).
583	10/18	Drumright: transfer of destroyers.
*584	10/18	Visit of Adenauer.
*585	10/18	Honor awards ceremony.
*586	10/18	Statement to UNESCO Commission
*587	10/19	Drew: swearing-in ceremony.
*588	10/19	Educational exchange.
*589	10/19	Hare: designation as Director General of Foreign Service.
590	10/19	U.S. delegation to NAC meeting.
591	10/19	Dulles: awards ceremony.
592	10/19	Dulles: departure for Paris.
593	10/20	New regulation on immigration.
†594	10/19	Dulles: Suez Base agreement.
595	10/19	Petersen case.
†596	10/21	Wainhouse: U.N. Charter review.
†597	10/21	Treaty with Greece.
*598	10/21	Arrival of Hong Kong refugee.
599	10/21	U.S.-Pakistan communique.
†600	10/21	Copyright arrangement with India.
†601	10/22	Foreign Relations volume.
*602	10/22	Brown: Germany's role in free world.
†603	10/22	Dulles: United Nations Day.
604	10/22	Admission of Polish seamen.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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The Record on Disarmament

Publication 5581

15 cents

A Subcommittee of Five of the U.N. Disarmament Commission met at London in May-June 1954 to carry out the General Assembly's resolution of November 28, 1953, to "seek in private an acceptable solution." Following these talks, the Subcommittee's report was transmitted to the Disarmament Commission, which dealt with the Subcommittee's results at New York on July 20-29, 1954.

The Record on Disarmament is a report on these meetings. As stated in the Letter of Transmittal, the discussions gave a clear indication of the present direction of Soviet thinking on disarmament. The Soviet Union showed no serious desire to negotiate the subject. It confined its efforts to glib distortions to support the propaganda slogan "ban the bomb."

This 20-page document gives a running account of the developments in the secret talks at London, the records of which have now been made public, and the meetings at New York. The booklet provides a summary of the chief Western proposals and tactics. It concludes with a section on the implications of the discussions.

Copies of *The Record on Disarmament* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 802

November 8, 1954



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NOV 24 1954



The Department of State bulletin

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November 8, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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Peace in Freedom

Address by the President¹

We have come together in memory of an inspiring moment in history—that moment, 300 years ago, when a small band of Jewish people arrived on the ship *Saint Charles* in what was then the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam. It was an event meaningful not only to the Jews of America but to all Americans—of all faiths, of all national origins.

On that day there came to these shores 23 people whose distant ancestors had, through the Old Testament, given new dimensions of meaning to the concepts of freedom and justice, mercy and righteousness, kindness and understanding—ideas and ideals which were to flower on this continent. They were of a people who had done much to give to Western civilization the principle of human dignity; they came to a land which would flourish—beyond all 17th century dreams—because it fostered that dignity among its citizens.

Of all religious concepts, this belief in the infinite worth of the individual is beyond doubt among the most important. On this faith our forefathers constructed the framework of our Republic.

In this faith in human dignity is the major difference between our own concept of life and that of enemies of freedom. The chief of these enemies a decade and more ago were Nazi and Fascist forces, which destroyed so many of our fellow men. Today the Communist conspiracy is the principal influence that derides the truth of human worth and, with atheistic ruthlessness, seeks to destroy the free institutions established on the foundation of that truth.

Asher Levy and his party came to this land on that long-ago day because even then they had to

find a country where they could safely put into practice their belief in the dignity of man.

In this respect, as in so many others, they were no different from scores of other groups that landed on our shores. Only 34 years earlier, another party had landed at Plymouth Rock. That group, too, came here in the hope of escaping persecution, of gaining religious freedom, of settling quietly in the wilderness to build their homes and rear their families.

And there was another noble concept of our common Judeo-Christian civilization shared by these two groups and by all others who have come to this land: the ideal of peace.

I recall that wonderful prophecy of Isaiah: "And the work of righteousness shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness, quietness and assurance forever."

The pursuit of peace is at once our religious obligation and our national policy. Peace in freedom, where all men dwell in security, is the ideal toward which our foreign policy is directed.

I know that I am speaking to people who deeply love peace. I know that, with all other Americans, you share a profound thanksgiving that, for the first time in 20 years, there is no active battlefield anywhere in the world.

Moreover, while fighting has been brought to a halt during the past 21 months, still other developments favorable to the maintenance of peace have been brought about through understanding and through persistent and patient work, in which your Government has been a helpful participant. Some of these developments have commanded our headlines—Korea, Indochina, Egypt, Trieste, Iran, Guatemala.

Our people and their Government are dedicated to making this a just and lasting peace.

In the years immediately ahead, the advance-

¹ Made at the American Jewish Tercentenary Dinner at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 20 (White House press release).

ment of peace will demand much of us—our strength, our patience, our wisdom, our will. It will demand, above all, a realistic comprehension of the world and of its challenging problems. Some of the factors in these problems are new, some old.

The principal and continuing factor is the persistently aggressive design of Moscow and Peking, which shows no evidence of genuine change despite their professed desire to relax tensions and to preserve peace. Continuing, also, is the breadth and scope of the Communist attack; no weapon is absent from their arsenal, whether intended for destruction of cities and people or for the destruction of truth, integrity, loyalty.

Development of New Weapons

The major new factor in the world today, beside the absence of fighting, is the rapid development in military weapons—weapons that in total war would threaten catastrophe. This single product of science should be sufficient to stimulate the genuine efforts of all, including the Kremlin, to give to the world a true and permanent peace.

For our part, we shall explore every avenue toward that goal. With any and all who demonstrate honesty of purpose, we are happy to confer. But well we realize that, in the circumstances of the moment, America must remain strong, and the community of free nations must likewise remain strong, to discourage the use of force in the world. In this effort, we must help to harmonize the divergent views of the many free, self-governing nations, and without encroaching upon rights which all people cherish. For in the diversities of freedom are a tremendous might, a might which the imposed system of communism can never match.

Our nation, because of its unmatched productivity and power, both existing and potential, holds a prime responsibility for maintaining peace. How, then, shall we meet this responsibility? With what policies can we best pursue our goal of peace?

Certain fundamentals are clear. Our nation does not covet the territory of any people. We have no wish to dominate others. The peace we seek is a secure and a just peace, not bought at the expense of others, of principle, or of abject surrender of our vital interests. Peace so bought

would at best be an illusion, and at worst a permanent loss of all that we hold most dear.

The following avenues must be trod as we make our way toward our peaceful goal.

First, we must tirelessly seek—through the United Nations, through every other available means—to establish the conditions for honorable peace.

Second, we must promote the unity and collective strength of other free peoples.

Third, we must maintain enough military strength to deter aggression and promote peace.

In these thoughts, we Americans overwhelmingly agree.

To examine briefly the first principal avenue, we stand ready to join all others in removing fear among nations. We shall resolutely adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter. We shall constantly urge the Communist rulers to do the same. We shall keep open the existing channels for negotiation and shall use them whenever there is any prospect of positive results.

At the Berlin and Geneva conferences, our nation sought serious negotiation on German unity, on a treaty for Austria, and on a political settlement for Korea. Our efforts found no similar response from the Communist side. We will not be misled by proposals intended to divide the free nations and to delay their efforts to build their own defenses. Nevertheless, no matter how discouraging the prospect, no matter how intractable the Communist regimes, we shall press on in search for agreement.

We will welcome an agreement on a workable system for limiting armaments and controlling atomic energy. Moreover, if the armaments burden can be lifted, this Government stands ready to ask the Congress to redeem the pledge made a year ago last April to help support, from the funds thus saved, a worldwide development program.

The second road leading toward our peaceful goal concerns our efforts to strengthen and unify other free peoples.

To meet the challenge destiny has laid upon our country, we must strive to help free peoples achieve their own security and well-being; we must encourage regional groupings of these peoples; we must ourselves foster and practice policies that encourage profitable trade and productivity in the free world.

In these areas, there has been heartening prog-



Secretary Dulles Reports to President in First Open Cabinet Meeting

On the evening of October 25 President Eisenhower and his Cabinet met at the White House in an open session, with nationwide press, radio, and television coverage, to hear Secretary Dulles' report on the outcome of the recent negotiations at Paris. Mr. Dulles reviewed the Four Power meeting, where agreements were approved on the subject of restoring German sovereignty; the Nine Power meeting, which reached final agreement on the documents required to amend the Brussels Treaty, establish the Council for Western European Union, and set up an agency for the control of the armed forces; and the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where the 14 members unanimously approved the protocol which will invite Germany to become a full and equal member of NATO.

Several of the other Cabinet members asked Mr. Dulles specific questions—on the Saar settlement, on the prospects of ratification, on Soviet reaction. To the question about how the Soviet Union feels about the Paris agreement, Mr. Dulles replied, in part: "I would say that I feel pretty confident that the Soviet Union doesn't like what is going on. . . . There is behind this program a sense of urgency and momentum, so that I don't believe the Soviet Union will be able to break it up."

In conclusion Secretary Dulles said: "What has happened during these last few weeks has demonstrated that there is a basis for a good partnership on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean."

A transcript of the Cabinet meeting, reproduced in pamphlet form, may be obtained from the Public Services Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

ress. We have broadened our alliances. We have helped to remove sources of conflict. We have helped to build firmer foundations for social and economic progress in our quest for peace.

Negotiations at Paris

For some years free world nations have sought to associate the Federal Republic of Germany in the Atlantic community. Rejection of the European Defense Treaty by the French Assembly 7 weeks ago was a setback to that hope. Yet, no nation in Western Europe was willing to accept this setback as final. In the recent meetings at London, the free Western nations reasserted their basic unity and established a new pattern for achieving their common purposes. Secretary of State Dulles has just joined our European allies in Paris in further important negotiations to strengthen European cooperation.

In Southeast Asia we have sought united action to preserve for the free countries of that area the independence accorded them at the end of World War II. Unfortunately, in recent years no foundation was laid for effective united action to prevent Communist gains. Because of their consequent isolation, the governments that bore the burden of the Indochina war understandably sought its conclusion in the face of the limitless manpower of China.

But recently at Manila we succeeded in negotiating a treaty with Asian and European countries. This pact symbolizes the desire of these nations to act together against aggression and to consult together on measures against subversion. The Manila Pact, bringing together states of the East and the West, and the related Pacific Charter are a long step toward the peaceful progress to which all Asian peoples aspire, whether or not members of the pact.

In this hemisphere, we have strengthened our solid understanding with our American neighbors. At the Caracas conference earlier this year, the American Republics agreed that if international communism were to gain control of the political institutions of any one American state, this control would endanger them all and therefore would demand collective action. Recently such a threat arose in Guatemala. The American states were preparing to act together to meet it when the Guatemalans themselves removed the danger.

The Caracas agreement will stand as a bulwark of freedom in the Western Hemisphere.

In a number of areas throughout the free world, dangers to peace have been eliminated. The problem of Trieste, a threat to peace for a decade, has now been satisfactorily solved by Italy and Yugoslavia, with friendly assistance from the United States and Great Britain. Egypt and Britain appear to have reached an amicable adjustment of questions centering on Suez. Iran has been helped in settling its difficult internal problems and is moving toward firm and friendly relations with the West.

In the Near East, we are all regretfully aware that the major differences between Israel and the Arab States remain unresolved. Our goal there, as elsewhere, is a just peace. By friendship toward both, we shall continue to contribute to peaceful relations among these peoples. And in helping to strengthen the security of the entire Near East, we shall make sure that any arms we provide are devoted to that purpose, not to creating local imbalances which could be used for intimidation of or aggression against any neighboring nations. In every such arrangement we make with any nation, there is ample assurance that this distortion of purpose cannot occur.

The fact that so many stubborn problems have been resolved with patience and forbearance surely justifies our hope that, by similar efforts, the nations of the free world will be able to eliminate other problems. Such efforts themselves tend to bring the free nations closer together. In speaking recently of the London Conference, Sir Winston Churchill said of his country and the United States, "True and friendly comprehension between our kindred nations has rarely reached a higher standard."

When we think of these many encouraging developments over the world, and the patient, helpful work that brought them about—when we contemplate the fact that the seemingly endless war in Korea, with its tragic casualty lists, is a thing of the past—and when we see improvement in area after area, from Suez to Iran, from Trieste to Guatemala, from London to Manila—then we indeed take heart.

In addition, we must devise means by which more highly developed countries can assist peoples who face the difficulties of an earlier stage of economic development.

As we continue to assist in these efforts, we shall also contribute much to free world unity by the wise use of our great economic power. We have, in the past, provided indispensable assistance to our partners. We continue to stand ready to help: to repair the ravages of war; to ease economic difficulties caused by vital efforts to build defensive military strength; to relieve disasters from flood or famine.

Sharing the Economic Burden

Economic relations, however, are not a one-way street. If the common goal is to be reached, free nations must subordinate the selfish to the general interest. All must bear their fair share of the common burden. All must do more to liberalize the exchange of goods among free peoples. Let us be mindful, first of all, of our own responsibility in this field. Bold action could release powerful forces of economic enterprise from which the whole free world would benefit.

If there were no other reason for national policy being concerned every day and every minute with the nation's economy and with full employment, it would be justified by the need for this kind of economic strength in meeting world problems.

We must continue to explore ways in which nuclear discoveries can be turned to the service of man's peaceful needs. Since our nation's proposal for an international effort toward this end was laid before the United Nations last December, we have taken the initiative in this direction. We would welcome the participation of the Soviet Union. But this great effort for human welfare cannot wait upon their decision.

Our third major road leads us to maintain enough military strength to deter aggression and to help keep peace in the world.

This strength is a trust on which rests the hope of free men.

Neither in size nor in character can our military establishment remain static. With constantly changing dangers, with rapidly changing developments in the science of warfare, our military forces, too, must change. From atomic submarine to atomic cannon, from new weapon systems to new military organizations, this giant, complex structure must respond to the current needs of our time. Above all, its purpose is to prevent aggres-

sion and war. Our forces will never be used to initiate war against any nation; they will be used only for the defense of the free world.

Together with the armed strength of other free nations, our military power—the greatest in our peacetime history—is today a deterrent to war. This awesome power we must and shall maintain, for we are determined that at all times, in today's uncertain world, we shall be able to deal effectively and flexibly with whatever situations may arise.

My friends, in these many ways our nation will continue tirelessly in its quest for peace based on justice. In recent months, we have come far, and yet we know that the road ahead is long and difficult. But we shall continue to press on toward our goal.

And as we do, we shall keep faith with those of earliest America who, as they came to these shores three centuries and more ago, launching a venture in freedom unparalleled in man's struggle over the ages, sought peace and freedom and justice, for themselves and for those who were to follow.

Yes, my friends, we know, with the prophet Isaiah, that the work of righteousness shall be peace.

We know that the Lord will give strength unto all of us as we strive tirelessly, confidently, for peace.

Visit of Prime Minister Yoshida

The Department of State announced on October 28 (press release 614) that Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, after completing visits to Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, the Vatican, and the United Kingdom, would arrive at New York on November 2 and at Washington on November 7.

The purpose of his visit is to promote amicable relations and to further understanding between Japan and the United States. He will meet President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other American leaders with whom he hopes to exchange views on matters of mutual interest and concern to both countries.

The Prime Minister will stay in Washington until November 11, when he will leave for Japan, traveling by plane by way of San Francisco and Honolulu.

Visit of Chancellor Adenauer

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany arrived at Washington on October 27 for discussions with the President and Secretary Dulles. During his stay he and the Secretary, on October 29, signed a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and the Federal Republic. Following are the texts of a statement made by Chancellor Adenauer on his arrival at the Washington National Airport, a statement issued by the President and the Chancellor on October 28, and an announcement of the treaty signing, together with statements made at the signing by Secretary Dulles and the Chancellor.

AIRPORT STATEMENT BY THE CHANCELLOR

[Translation]

Today, for the second time, I set foot on the soil of this hospitable, great, and free country. Many decisive events have taken place within the year and a half since my last visit.¹ At that time a question was not yet settled which perhaps was a matter of life or death for my people and was of the utmost importance to the fate of Europe and to the preservation of peace in the world.

The question was whether the North Atlantic Alliance, on whose strength and effectiveness the freedom of the world is based, could be so implemented in Europe that it would constitute a genuine deterrent to any aggressor. This was the meaning of the invitation extended to us to join, as a new partner, the community of the free people united in this alliance.

The German people, aware of their common responsibilities with the free world, did not hesitate to accept the invitation. It was uncertain for

a long time, however, which form of German participation in the defense of the free world would find the agreement of all European partners.

We hope that these doubts and this uncertainty have now passed. During the conferences of London and Paris, solutions were found to which all participating governments could agree. We could not have overcome the terrible state of uncertainty, anxiety, and insecurity with which we lived so long had we not had the generous support of the American Government and American public opinion on our road to assuming our own full responsibilities and to our final acceptance into the community of free peoples.

My satisfaction with what we have just achieved is, therefore, mixed with deepest gratitude toward the American people and their Government for their understanding and their assistance. We owe gratitude to President Eisenhower for his unflinching confidence in us, and we owe gratitude to Secretary of State Dulles for his foresight, wisdom, and steadfastness which were so much in evidence at the conferences where our fate was decided.

I am moved to express this feeling at the very moment of my arrival in the United States. The whole German people are united in the desire to live in continual, cordial friendship with the American people.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHANCELLOR

White House press release dated October 28

At the end of their meeting today the President and the Chancellor issued the following statement:

I

During this morning's conversations we took an opportunity to renew the spirit of friendship and

¹ For material relating to the Chancellor's visit in April 1953, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, p. 565.

confidence which has marked our relationship in the past, especially in our efforts to overcome the very serious situation which faced us during the past few months. We reviewed the decisions taken at London and Paris and we are convinced that with the coming into effect of the Agreements signed this past weekend, the road towards a strong and united Europe will have been paved. We view the understanding reached between the Governments of France and the Federal Republic of Germany as an especially encouraging step towards lasting peace in Continental Europe. This understanding was greatly furthered by the commitment on the part of the United Kingdom to maintain forces on the Continent. The basis for a European community has thus been established.

The continued interest in and support of this community by the United States was reiterated. Together with the strengthened North Atlantic Treaty Organization, now to include the Federal Republic of Germany, these new agreements will, we are convinced, serve to reinforce the defense system of the free world.

II

We particularly addressed ourselves to the question of German reunification. The demand for a reunited Germany in freedom is viewed by us as the legitimate demand of the German people. We are agreed that this aim shall be achieved only by peaceful means. We are convinced of the necessity of continued efforts towards this goal and are agreed that such efforts will be made by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany together with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France.

In this connection, we exchanged views on the latest Soviet note.² It is our initial view that this does not seem to offer any new proposal on the part of the Soviet Union; it appears essentially as a reiteration of the positions taken by Mr. Molotov at the Conference in Berlin regarding Germany and European security.

We have no doubt that the strengthening of free Europe which will result from the recent London and Paris Agreements will aid our efforts to bring freedom and unity to all of the German people.

² Delivered to the U.S., British, and French Ambassadors at Moscow on Oct. 23.

III

We discussed the unfortunate fact that large numbers of German prisoners of war and civilian deportees are still held in custody in areas behind the Iron Curtain, mainly the Soviet Union. The Chancellor requested the continued assistance of the United States in obtaining the release of these prisoners. This question has for some time been the subject of investigation by a United Nations Commission. The Chancellor was assured that the United States stands ready, now as in the past, to offer every support and assistance considered useful in accomplishing this end.

IV

We also discussed the question of German assets in the United States. The President expressed sympathy for the problem raised by the Chancellor in his letter of July 17, 1954, to him on this subject³ and again expressed his willingness to explore such problems along with the question of American war claims. We were agreed that conversations between representatives of our two Governments will soon begin.

SIGNING OF TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

Department Announcement

Press release 616 dated October 29

Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer today signed a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The treaty signing is the culmination of a negotiation that began at Bonn over a year ago and was completed in Washington by delegations headed respectively by Walther Becker of the German Foreign Office and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.

The treaty is designed to regulate basic economic relations between the two countries in accordance with advanced and enlightened standards and to direct the future development of those relations along mutually beneficial lines. It replaces, in the greater part, that treaty of 1923 between the United States and Germany which was the forerunner and basic instrument in the devel-

³ BULLETIN of Aug. 23, 1954, p. 270.

opment of this Government's modern commercial treaty program.

The new treaty contains 29 articles, together with a protocol and exchanges of notes, and covers in some detail a wide range of subject matter.⁴ In brief, each of the two countries (1) agrees to accord within its territories to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to engaging in commercial, industrial, and financial activities; (2) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons, their property and interests that reflect the most enlightened legal and constitutional principles; (3) recognizes the need for special attention to stimulate the international movement of investment capital and agrees that such movements shall not be unnecessarily hampered; and (4) reasserts its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping.

From the standpoint of aiding the economic interests of Germany, the treaty is the first of this type negotiated by that country since the war and represents an additional step in its forward-looking plans to attain a viable and sound economy and thereby contribute to the improvement of the economic welfare and security of the European community.

The U.S. program for the negotiation of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation is an integral part of this country's policy for the furtherance of liberal principles of trade and economic relations in general, and particularly for creating throughout the world conditions favorable to economic development. This treaty is the eleventh of its type which the United States has signed since World War II and follows the same general pattern as the others. Internationally, these treaties provide a detailed legal basis for the protection of American private interests abroad. Domestically, they reinforce in terms of international obligation the position of the Federal Government as guardian of the rights of foreigners and foreign enterprises in this country, a policy that has developed in conformity with the Constitution and Federal law. Treaties of this type also confer upon qualified aliens "treaty merchant" and "treaty investor" status under the immigration laws, i. e. the privilege of indefinite

sojourn in the United States for engaging in trade between the two countries or for supervising a substantial investment.

The treaty will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent and, after the constitutional ratification process of both countries has been completed, will enter into force one month after the exchange of ratifications.

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 617 dated October 29

MR. CHANCELLOR: The signing of this treaty will mark the final official act of your all-too-short visit to Washington. Its meaning goes far beyond the terms which it contains. For this treaty will stand as the symbol of the completion of the process of reestablishing normal relations between our two countries. It will place our commercial relations once again on a peacetime basis.

I am particularly mindful of the fact that this treaty is not only a treaty of commerce but also a treaty of friendship. That relationship has marked our recent historic discussions in Bonn, London, and Paris and our talks here during the past 2 days. Now, this friendship is duly formalized for the years to come.

Some observers consider that the Paris agreements which we signed last Saturday had primarily as their objective a contribution by Germany to the Western defense, or, to put it more directly, German rearmament. That is not how we in the United States regard the matter, and I know that it is not how you regard the matter. The responsible leaders of both our nations have learned the dangers of militarism. Of course, all of the free peoples have a duty to contribute to the common defense. But our primary concern is to develop strong ties of friendship and peaceful commerce between the nations. It is that great and noble end which will be served by this treaty which we sign here today.

Statement by Chancellor Adenauer

[Translation]

MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany I have signed with particular pleasure this Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, which was negotiated between our two Governments in a positive and constructive spirit.

⁴The unofficial text (not printed here) is attached to press release 616.

I wholeheartedly agree with what you said in evaluating the results of the Paris Conference. It is not the question of raising some divisions which is at the bottom of our political activities, but the strengthening of ties of friendship within the free world and the further development of the welfare of our nations. We regret that we are forced to undertake efforts in the military field in order to protect these values.

I therefore welcome this treaty as a further firm element in the peaceful cooperation of our two countries. This treaty is a commercial and legal instrument of a comprehensive and modern character which is intended to establish a firm basis for relationships of trade, industry, and navigation between our two countries, as well as between individual citizens, on which our economic, cultural, and human relations can freely develop. I hope that this treaty will give new and strong momentum to the stream of living forces which in the past few years has begun to flow again from the manifold contacts and relations between the United States and Germany.

It was the particular aim of these negotiations to make our mutual trade relations as liberal as possible and to create favorable conditions for the exchange of goods and services between our two economies. I am therefore convinced that the treaty will have fruitful effects for the activities of our two countries.

What gives this event deeper significance is the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany concluded its first Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the great American nation.

In the last few years and months we have rightly recalled to ourselves again and again the importance for us and for the other freedom-loving countries of the protection that our mighty American friend is offering us against the threat to which we are continuously exposed. But we do not want to forget that the worth of that protection is not higher than the values it protects.

A rich and prosperous life shall be possible within this protected area; free countries shall peacefully compete in a free exchange of their gifts and the products of their industry to promote the welfare of their citizens and to further their civilization.

These convictions form the basis of the impressive development of the United States and are the same ideals which form the foundations of our own political and economic life.

This common character of the ethical foundations is the basis of the friendship that unites our nations. This friendship is therefore much more than a mere community of interests which owes its existence to a present, and we hope passing, external threat.

That is why this friendship constitutes a lasting element in the life of our nations. To bear witness to this is the main object of the treaty we have just concluded.

Iranian Oil Agreement

Press release 610 dated October 28

The U.S. Government is happy to learn that the agreement-in-principle, signed on August 5, 1954, between the Government of Iran and an International Oil Consortium, has been ratified by the Iranian Senate [October 28] following its recent approval by the lower house.

This action by the Iranian Parliament lays the basis for the immediate resumption of Iran's oil industry.

Under the leadership of the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi there is good reason to believe that Iran will be in a better position than in the recent past to make full use of its great natural resources; that, as a result of this far-reaching development, its people will enjoy a new era of economic and social progress; and that they will play an ever-increasing role in the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East.

A Preview of the U. S. Position at the Rio Conference

by Henry F. Holland

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

The bond that unites our American States is in its essence a spiritual tie born of our common struggle for liberty and of our consecration to identical moral and ethical standards. It is a relationship which we believe ennobles all those who share it. Its genius is our knowledge, proven again and again by experience, that through patience, understanding, and tolerance this kinship becomes steadily more meaningful—a source of strength and growth for all of us. Tonight I shall undertake a second report on the economic aspects of that relationship. The first was made in a talk given last April in New Orleans.² I still adhere to the convictions expressed then and shall recall one or two of them to you.

Our basic goal in the economic field in this hemisphere is to make an effective contribution to the establishment in each American Republic of a strong, self-reliant, and durable economy, one that will mean better living standards for all our peoples. We recognize and we shall vigorously defend the right of each American State to determine the methods by which it will seek that goal. Correspondingly, in our contributions we shall try to be consistent with those sound principles which experience has demonstrated to be the basis of strong economies.

One of these is the principle that governments should invade the field of business only when absolutely necessary and then, if possible, only on a temporary basis. Where private enterprise is willing to undertake the task, it should be made responsible for the production, distribution, and

marketing of goods and services. The role of governments in the economic field, we believe, is to create those conditions under which private enterprise can perform its task with maximum effectiveness and with full respect for its obligation to society and humanity. These conditions include guaranties of property and contract rights; an opportunity to earn a reasonable rate of return adequate to attract new capital; a stable and expanding international trade; the establishment of sound currencies; clearly enunciated and stable economic policies; the encouragement of strong and independent labor movements. They also include constant vigilance for the physical and spiritual needs of our people.

In April I emphasized the importance of the Conference of Ministers of Finance or Economy to be held next month in Rio de Janeiro. That conference gives us an opportunity to define economic goals, to compare our policies, and to coordinate them as far as possible. At Rio we can work toward the establishment of that kind of economic relation that should exist normally and permanently between mature, peaceful, and self-respecting nations, nations which are genuinely and deeply interested in each other's welfare. The time has come for us to concentrate on the kind of help which we can give to each other consistently, dependably, and on a long-term basis, shifting our emphasis from temporary and emergency measures.

In New Orleans I said that in preparation for the Rio Conference we would undertake to clarify and define our Government's policies and would discuss them with our sister states well in advance of the meeting. In other words, we do not view that conference as an occasion for any dramatic disclosures of new policies. We are considerably

¹ Address made before the Pan American Society of the United States, Inc., at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 27 (press release 608).

² BULLETIN of May 17, 1954, p. 764.

more interested in performance and accomplishment. That calls for extensive consultation not only at the conference but before and after it. The economy of this hemisphere is a whole composed of interrelated parts. The more smoothly those parts fit together, the stronger is the whole. This process of interlocking is not a task to be undertaken and concluded at the Rio Conference. It is a long-term job, in which that conference should be only an episode, albeit a very important one.

Preparations for Rio Conference

Taking this approach we began in April to prepare for the conference. A sub-Cabinet committee comprised of representatives from every interested department and agency of our Government met twice weekly over a period of months to review our past economic policies in the hemisphere and to make specific recommendations for the future. The work of that group was largely concluded by the latter part of August, and its recommendations have been accepted. A number of us have spent much of the intervening time discussing those plans and policies with the governments of our sister republics. Let me outline them for you.

We have reemphasized that our mutual American goal must be a world at peace, in which the free democratic peoples can prosper and in which every man may have a chance to provide for his family improved standards of living and better opportunities for the future. Perhaps the most important single economic development in the hemisphere is the growing determination among men everywhere somehow to achieve better living standards, to feed, clothe, house, and educate themselves and their families better. That determination, if encouraged, can become a powerful factor in our progress. If the Rio Conference is to have any significance, it must be remembered as a time when the American family assembled to rededicate itself to a joint and several effort to better the lives of its men, women, and children.

Americans everywhere as they go about their daily work must have the confidence that here work and self-discipline will achieve the kind of housing, clothing, food, and education that make for dignity in living. Our children must look at their future with the same confidence. As nations, as peoples, as business and industrial communities, every step that we take toward achieving this goal

will be richly rewarded. Let me emphasize that, while that achievement will surely help in our united effort to eliminate communism from the Americas, our purpose would be the same if there were no Communist problem. It is our own interest in making of this hemisphere a better home for ourselves and our children that makes us steadfast in this purpose. An acceptable standard of living should be sought as an end in itself, not as a defense against communism.

The primary burden in each state must be borne by its own people and its own government. Nothing that the government or people of one country can do will raise living standards in another unless the internal conditions essential for progress are already there. If they are, we can, however, hasten the process somewhat by our own helpful policies. These to a considerable extent depend upon economic and legislative actions by our governments. This is particularly true with respect to the elimination of unnecessary controls and regimentation of economies. An outstanding example is the recovery made by Peru in the last 5 years where unsound controls and regulations were removed and export and import trade were progressively allowed to set the exchange rates without artificial manipulation. As was to be expected, the initial effects were disquieting, but the long-term advantages of a free economy are now fully apparent.

So each of us must be ready to carry his own load. That does not mean, however, that he must carry it alone. We know now that, just as there is an American political security, there is an American economic security in which we are all partners, and that whenever in any American State that freedom and that security are impaired, every other member of the family suffers. The long-term self-interest of each of us justifies our helping others to progress steadily toward a solution of this basic economic problem. The fight against hunger, disease, illiteracy, and human misery in this hemisphere must become more of a joint and several effort, each facing his own problem squarely but each trying in good faith to make some contribution to the efforts of the others. We attach great importance to the combined aspect of this effort. The problem is not how one nation can help 20 others to raise their living standards. It is how every American State without neglecting its domestic responsibilities can find

some way to help the other 20. The problems of none of us are so great but that each can find some way to demonstrate his sincere interest in the welfare of every other.

What have we concluded will be our own contribution? We believe that it can be most effective in three fields—commerce, finance, and technical assistance. In each, we have tried to define policies which are consistent with our laws and with what we believe to be practically possible in the United States today. Anything else would be pure theory, and we are interested in accomplishment. We shall, of course, take active interest in other fruitful fields of cooperation such as the encouragement of tourist travel.

Strengthening Commerce

In the field of commerce our policy will be that announced by President Eisenhower in his message on foreign economic policy sent to Congress last March.³ By those means which our laws permit and which are practically achievable we shall attempt to achieve more free and healthy trade and payments, to stabilize and strengthen our international commerce, and gradually and selectively to reduce those artificial barriers which obstruct it both here and abroad.

It may be hard to develop a policy, but it is harder still to apply it in the individual test cases. Here in this country when an issue is to be decided those on each side support their views tenaciously and energetically. That is wholesome even though it produces some pretty hot contests, particularly in the field of tariffs and quotas. Moreover, even people who wholeheartedly support a general policy of expanding foreign trade will fight hard for higher tariffs to protect their own interest. We would be unrealistic if we expected people to act in a less human fashion.

One thing is certain. Again and again the President's policy on foreign trade will be put to test, and each time it is, these clashes between opinions and interests will occur. No one can prophesy with certainty their outcome in specific cases and under specific circumstances. It is obvious from experience in a world of affairs that our performance in the application of our announced policy in the field of international and inter-American trade will not be uniform. However, I be-

lieve that we can say with conviction that the great majority of our decisions will be consistent with the President's policy and that the exceptions will be based upon good and valid reasons. In my judgment there has never been a time when the people of the United States and their representatives in the legislative and executive branches of our Government have been more aware of the crucial importance of international trade to our survival. To preserve the strength of our economy this Nation must export and import. To export we must accept the goods of other nations in payment for ours. It is just as simple as that. Unless we buy more from our neighbors in this hemisphere and sell more to them, neither our economies nor theirs will develop rapidly.

I am asked what guaranties we can give of the stability of this foreign trade policy. The answer is obvious. The best guaranty of that policy lies in spreading to every corner of our country a clear understanding of the stake that each United States citizen has in our foreign trade. If we reduce our purchases of sugar from Cuba, by the same dollar amount we reduce our sales to her of automobiles, farm implements, rice, and other agricultural products. If we do not buy oil from Venezuela, we correspondingly reduce our tremendous volume of exports to her. The same happens if we reduce our purchases of wool from Uruguay or of coffee from Brazil, Colombia, and the other coffee-producing countries, if we do not buy lead and zinc from Canada, Mexico, and Peru, copper from Chile, tin from Bolivia. The same truth holds throughout the hemisphere.

Capital for Economic Development

The second field in which we shall try to make an effective contribution toward raising living standards is that of finance. To progress economically a nation must have capital. It must come, of course, from either public or private sources. By far the more prolific is the last. Private investors in the aggregate are able at any time to produce quantities of capital that enormously exceed the maximum that governments can contribute. Today much private capital is available here and in other nations which accumulate it.

This being true, if a government wants to attract capital for economic development, what better can it do than institute those policies and cre-

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 19, 1954, p. 602.

ate those conditions that will logically encourage all private investors, both domestic and foreign. Both groups on the whole will react in the same way to a given set of conditions. Anything that discourages a Mexican investor is likely to discourage one from the United States or Argentina. By the same token conditions that attract one will attract the other.

I am afraid we may have placed too much emphasis on measures to attract the foreign investor. A government that wants foreign investors should first take a careful look at the local investor. If he is exporting his capital or investing it only in such nonproductive things as real estate, then it is a reasonable certainty that the foreign investor will be reluctant to enter. But if the domestic businessman is demonstrating his own confidence by investing in the sound and productive economic development of his country, then in order to attract the foreign investor it is necessary to add only two factors. The first is assurance of equal treatment to domestic and foreign investors, and the second is reasonable assurance of an opportunity to repatriate profits. Where the local situation is such that the domestic investor is active, add these two factors and the foreign investor will come if he is wanted.

We believe that in the 20th-century American businessman, be he Brazilian, Mexican, North American, or what you will, lies the greatest hope for prosperity in our hemisphere. Private enterprise went through a period of evolution when its lack of interest in basic human welfare brought it into ill repute and led nations to experiment with other systems. Those experiments have generally failed miserably, producing high costs, inferior goods and services, financial and political instability. They tended to make people lose confidence in currency, their savings, and their ability to take care of themselves and to devote their attention instead to plans to insure that governments would take care of them. We may now be emerging from that period of experiment. If so, it was not in vain.

In the last decades and particularly since World War II, I believe a new kind of businessman has developed throughout the American hemisphere, a 20th-century businessman, one with a social conscience, who understands that a business which habitually fails to pay its workers a decent livelihood is not an asset to its owners, to its commu-

nity, or to its nation. This new businessman has demonstrated a willingness to discipline himself and to submit to just discipline from his government. At the same time he has preserved that relentless drive, inexhaustible resourcefulness, and fierce pride in excellence of performance that no other system has even approached. He deserves the support of our governments.

I am told that we place too much emphasis on the role of private enterprise in solving our economic problems. The system has no peculiar sanctity. Our attitude toward it derives from the fact that it is the only economic system that fully preserves our philosophy of the dignity of every man; because better than any other system yet devised by man it has demonstrated the ability to make vast quantities of goods and services available at reasonable prices. Only private enterprise is equal to the task of developing the huge resources of this vast hemisphere, resources which could support a greatly increased population and at a much higher standard of living.

Government Financing

Yet we know that private enterprise cannot do the job without some government help. There are development projects that are essential to the progress of our countries and for which private capital will not be available even under the most favorable circumstances. That is true here in the United States as well as in Latin America.

For those projects governmental financing is needed. In some cases the local government will be equal to the task. In others it will be unable itself to provide the required amount of capital but will be able to service a long-term international loan.

Here we think first of the International Bank. It was created to perform precisely this task. On the whole its record has been excellent. Its personnel is highly trained and experienced. It has capital available to lend. It would be shortsighted not to make maximum use of the bank. However, we recognize that there will be projects, both public and private, for which foreign financing will be required and which will lie outside the normal scope of International Bank lending.

To meet this need the United States proposes to intensify and expand the activities of the Export-Import Bank. Through it we shall do our utmost to satisfy all applications for economic develop-

ment loans that fulfill certain sound and logical standards. First, the project must be one for which private capital would not reasonably be available, even under favorable conditions. Preference will be given to applications from countries which have taken measures which would reasonably encourage private capital. The project must be one for which it cannot be reasonably expected that capital will be available from the local government or from the International Bank.

Secondly, the loan itself must be economically sound. We feel that unsound loans, those which a reasonable man must assume will not be repaid, do more harm than good. A defaulted loan impairs a nation's credit and makes it harder for it to negotiate loans which would otherwise be perfectly sound. A defaulted loan creates resentments at home and abroad. Several Latin American governments have expressed to us strong opposition to accepting so-called soft loans, pointing out that the liquidation of old debts which should never have been incurred imposes an unjustified burden on a national economy. On the other hand, acceptance of a sound loan standard encourages us all to follow those wholesome policies that not only increase the borrowing capacity of governments but lead to the establishment of strong business enterprises which can themselves qualify for loans that do not encumber the credit of their governments.

Third, the project to which the loan relates must be one in the mutual interest of the two governments and their peoples. The credit of a government should not be burdened for a project which has no bearing on the welfare of the taxpayers who must eventually repay it.

Lastly, the amount of the loan should not exceed the prudent lending capacity of the Export-Import Bank. After thoughtful consideration, we believe that the bank's capacity is and will continue to be adequate fully to support this policy. In reaching this conclusion we are entirely aware that this policy implies a substantial increase in the bank's activities.

Technical Assistance

I now come to the field of technical aid. This hemisphere is richly endowed with natural and human resources which are as yet but inadequately developed. Through technical assistance and training, these presently available resources can

more quickly and effectively be put to use. Through technical assistance, agricultural lands which barely feed their occupants can be made to produce marketable supplies for cities as well. Technical assistance can correct substandard housing by making information available on construction methods and economical materials. Through technical assistance, disease can be reduced and life expectancies raised. In the field of technical assistance almost every nation can find some way to make its contribution to a vast attack on human misery. Our policy will be to strengthen and to diversify our contribution in the field of technical assistance, but only, of course, if this is desired and requested by the governments concerned.

The policies which I have outlined mark, as you might expect, a compromise between the sincere convictions of those within our Government who would not have gone so far and those who would have gone farther. A number of proposals submitted from within our own Government or from abroad have not been accepted. We are not foreclosing the discussion at Rio of any proposal supported by any delegation. We shall participate in all discussions and in good faith. However, we feel that it is constructive to announce our own views far in advance of the conference and to invite those of the other governments so that the work of coordinating our policies and our efforts can begin long before we arrive at Rio.

Price Stabilization

The governments of Latin America are interested in devising means to stabilize prices for the products which they sell in world markets. The problem is one which concerns us as well, for we also have exports whose prices fluctuate widely. We have attempted by various means to solve this problem here at home. None has proved entirely successful. This does not mean that we will abandon our efforts to find a solution or that we will be unwilling to consider those proposed by other American States. However, our own experience leads us to believe that a hemisphere-wide program which would simply shift to this Nation a large part of the risk for price fluctuations is not justified by the nature of the problem. The cost would exceed our capacities whether the program contemplated direct payments or buffer stocks created to support prices.

We are reluctant to guarantee to finance whatever portion of the cost of development projects a local government may find itself unable to carry because of a drop in prices of its goods. Such programs would tie up part of the government's borrowing capacity without any certainty that it would ever in fact be used.

There are practical ways to reduce the magnitude of the problem, even if it cannot be eliminated. Maintaining high and stable levels of economic activity and income will help. Assurance to producers everywhere of greater and more dependable access to the world's markets will neutralize some of the factors that produce these violent fluctuations in prices. If we maintain more accurate methods of estimating future supply and demand, those unforeseen shortages and excesses that distort prices can be minimized.

Another proposal which has been made is that we create an inter-American bank whose capital would be largely furnished by the United States and which would make loans directly to foreign companies without the guaranty of their governments. We feel that such a bank would either compete with private lending institutions or would largely duplicate services available through the Export-Import Bank. The latter is now authorized to extend credit to private borrowers whether domestic, foreign, or mixed, and it does not always require a guaranty from the local government. So flexible is the service offered by the Export-Import Bank that there are few lending operations which it cannot undertake within the limits of the policy we have outlined. We feel, therefore, that the benefits from creating still another independent banking institution would not justify the expense and time required to organize it, assemble and train its personnel, and establish operating procedures. Better, quicker, and more effective, we feel, is the achievement of those same benefits through intensified activity of the Export-Import Bank.

We have heard but little support either at home or abroad for massive programs of grant aid in this hemisphere. I believe that it is generally recognized that, save in cases of real emergencies and such special projects as the Inter-American Highway, these programs are neither needed nor wanted by the other American States.

I should mention at least briefly the question so often asked as to whether our policy is not really

to discourage industrialization in Latin America, forcing it to supply us with raw materials which we will fabricate and resell as manufactured goods. Such a policy would be directly contrary to our own best interests. One of our problems is to sell our own foods and raw materials, as well as our manufactured goods. We export more than four times as much to Canada as to any other country in the world. Canada is rapidly industrializing, and the more she industrializes the more she buys from us and we from her. The same is true in Latin America. Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba are industrializing rapidly. They are, respectively, our third, fifth, and sixth most important customers. Obviously, we serve our own interests by encouraging sound industrialization in Latin America.

These, then, are the policies which we are submitting to the Latin American Governments and to the Cabinet Ministers who will head their delegations at Rio. I have heard surprise that they include no dramatic, startling new element that will create a theatrical impact at Rio. I am grateful for that. It lets us center emphasis and attention where it should be centered, on our great need to define our basic problem—how to better the lives of our people—and to set about solving it.

The reaction of the South American Governments and business communities to these policies is in my opinion profoundly significant. In the 10 South American capitals whence I have just returned we found general receptiveness to our belief that if vigorously and energetically pursued by our Government these policies will meet the need that exists in this hemisphere. Latin Americans are clear and intensely realistic thinkers, and I found everywhere a willingness to face their problems squarely and analyze them with commendable courage. Our sister republics are not waiting passively for us or for anyone else to come and solve their problems for them. The other members of this American family look to us for economic policies and conditions of trade which fully protect our own interests but which are stable, dependable, and generous. They look to us as a source of capital on sound terms and conditions. They are anxious to participate with us in programs of technical assistance that will pool and extend our common resources in that field. They agree with us that the 20th-century private businessman, whatever may be his nationality, can do

more for this hemisphere than can all our governments combined, and that he deserves our support.

The great question mark that I found everywhere was not as to the adequacy of these policies but as to how we will apply them. These policies require self-restraint and some sacrifice from us. They will prove more controversial here at home than programs whose only significance is their dollar cost. These policies are aimed squarely at the basic needs of Latin America—stable and expanding markets, access to sound development loans, technical assistance. Their effect in this hemisphere can be tremendous. If we are loyal to them, if we apply them vigorously and generously, we will have done our part. With these assurances from us any American State that is re-

solved to combat inflation through sound fiscal and monetary policies, and to clear the way for an enlightened private enterprise, can reasonably expect to make steady progress toward the goal to which I have so often referred. I am confident that the governments and the peoples of this hemisphere are disposed to adopt that course and to pursue it steadfastly. This conviction leads me to submit that, if we as a people and we as a Government determine that these undertakings which we propose to make to Americans everywhere shall be fairly and generously fulfilled, then truly we stand in this hemisphere on the threshold of an era of great progress which will make of our lands a better inheritance for our children and will earn for us the gratitude of future generations.

The Communist Conspiracy in Guatemala

Statement by John E. Peurifoy

*Ambassador Designate to Thailand*¹

Let me say that I am deeply and sincerely pleased at the opportunity to testify before your committee. I believe that the Communist attempt to seize Guatemala, and particularly their reversal last June, is one of the most dramatic episodes that has taken place in a long and tremendously costly ideological struggle that has engulfed us since the end of World War II. As several witnesses commented, we have seen one free people after another disappear behind the Iron Curtain. Last June in Guatemala, for the first time one of them returned. The revolution led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas demonstrates what a few courageous, determined, and dedicated persons can

accomplish even in the face of the organized might and ruthlessness of a police state.

Before beginning my testimony, I would like to take this opportunity to explode a popular and flattering myth regarding the part that I personally played in the revolution led by Colonel Castillo. My role in Guatemala prior to the revolution was strictly that of a diplomatic observer: to inform my Government regarding events there and, when requested to do so, to advise the responsible officials in the Department of State on policy matters concerning Guatemala. The first and only active role that I played in the events last June was to lend my good offices to assist in negotiating the truce between the forces of Colonel Castillo and the military junta that was established in Guatemala after President Arbenz resigned. And even this role, Mr. Chairman, was undertaken only at the request of the junta. The revolution that overthrew the Arbenz government was engineered and instigated by those people in Guatemala who rebelled against the policies and ruthless

¹Made before the Subcommittee on Latin America of the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression on Oct. 8. Mr. Peurifoy was Ambassador to Guatemala from Oct. 5, 1953, to Sept. 15, 1954.

For a documentary study on *Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala*, see Department of State publication 5556, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., 35 cents.

oppression of the Communist-controlled government.

It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that the purpose of your hearings is to determine:

1. Whether or not the government of President Arbenz was controlled and dominated by Communists.

2. Whether or not the Communists who dominated Guatemala were in turn directed from the Kremlin.

3. Whether or not the Communists from Guatemala actively intervened in the internal affairs of neighboring Latin American Republics.

4. Whether or not this Communist conspiracy which centered in Guatemala represented a menace to the security of the United States.

My answer to all four of those questions is an unequivocal "yes."

The Arbenz government, beyond any question, was controlled and dominated by Communists. Those Communists were directed from Moscow. The Guatemalan Government and the Communist leaders of that country did continuously and actively intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring countries in an effort to create disorder and overthrow established governments. And the Communist conspiracy in Guatemala did represent a very real and very serious menace to the security of the United States.

And with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a fifth point; that menace still continues in Latin America. The Red conspiracy in Latin America has not been completely crushed. The loss of Guatemala represents a serious setback to the Kremlin, not a final defeat. As President Castillo pointed out in a statement before your committee, the democratic forces have merely won the first battle in a long war.

Of course it is true that the seriousness of the threat to our security has been greatly diminished since Colonel Castillo's successful revolution. Nevertheless, as long as this conspiracy is active—and I fear that will be for many years to come—the menace will continue to be a very real one in this hemisphere.

That is the reason why I think your committee is rendering a very substantial service to the American people in holding these hearings. Your committee is alerting the public to the danger to us represented by Moscow's program of aggression in Latin America. As you know, Mr. Chairman,

it is exceedingly difficult for our Government to formulate effective policies to combat a situation as serious as this one without the support of a well-informed public.

I believe that these hearings will not only be invaluable to Congress in evaluating legislative proposals concerning Latin America but that they will also greatly assist the executive branch by mobilizing informed public opinion.

Now, with your permission, I should like to elaborate briefly on the four points summarized above.

Communist Control of Arbenz Government

I believe that an incident which occurred shortly before I became Ambassador to Guatemala illustrates conclusively the fact that the government was under the complete domination of the Communists. One of the principal programs of the Communist Party in Guatemala was the agrarian reform, which they used as a weapon to gain political control over the farmworkers and the landless peasants. I understand that an officer of the Department of State may testify before your committee at a later date and will be prepared to give you a more detailed discussion of the agrarian reform law. For the purpose of my testimony, it is sufficient to state that under the agrarian reform law President Arbenz was the final arbiter of any and all disputes concerning the expropriation of land and its redistribution among the peasants. Owners of expropriated land were denied the right of appeals to the courts. Nevertheless, one Guatemalan landowner did appeal. And on February 6, 1953, the Supreme Court of Guatemala rocked the government and particularly the Communist Party by announcing, as a result of a 4-1 vote, that it would hear the landowner's appeal.

The decision was immediately and angrily denounced by the Communists, who charged that it was in violation of that section of the law denying the right of such appeal. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, José Manuel Fortuny, and other Communist leaders demanded that the court be impeached. The next day a resolution was submitted to the Congress by a Communist deputy, was immediately passed, and the entire court was impeached. New judges were quickly appointed, including the one who had voted against granting the hearings, the decision was hastily reconsidered by the new court, and the owner was denied the right of appeal.

Mr. Chairman, I submit to this committee that, when the Communist Party can demand and get the dismissal of a Supreme Court of a country, then the Communist Party, for all practical purposes, controls the government of that country.

This, however, is only one illustration of the degree of control that the Communists exercised over the government of Guatemala during the regimes of Juan José Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz.

The facts of Communist penetration of the Guatemala Government and of the political, economic, and social life of the nation are well known to your committee. It is hardly necessary for me to recall the salient features—that of the 56 members of the Guatemalan Congress 51 were members of the “national front” supporting Arbenz and dominated by its Communist members; that principal Government agencies in agriculture, social security, propaganda and public information, education, and labor were in the direct hands of the Communist Party; that the labor organization of the country was entirely dominated by Communist-controlled unions affiliated with the Communist Western Hemisphere labor arm, the CTAL, and with the worldwide Soviet labor instrument, the WFTU. In addition, the press, radio, and public forum were increasingly warped into tools of Communist propaganda and relentlessly being closed to anti-Communist patriotic Guatemalans. The Guatemalan delegates to international organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the numerous regional and functional agencies of international cooperation which have been set up to aid the worldwide cause of peace were mere spokesmen for Soviet aggression and deception.

Part of Kremlin Strategy

This Communist penetration in Guatemala was the most striking example of the Kremlin's strategy in Latin America. Busy with power expansion into Europe and Asia, the Red rulers of Russia have long pushed their conspiracy in Latin America as a diversionary tactic which, while showing no immediate gain of territory under their domination, would at least weaken and harass our defenses. By creating a beachhead within our own zone of vital security, from which sabotage and subversion could be achieved against us and our neighbors, the Kremlin aimed at promoting anarchy within the Western Hemisphere;

they aimed at demoralizing this hemisphere by breaking its unity against Communist aggression and throwing the inter-American system into a state of confusion and dispute. They sought to divert Latin American attention from their depredations and crimes in Europe and Asia by pushing forward Spanish-speaking front men who, in native accents, accused the United States of the aggressions and crimes which the Soviet itself was actually performing.

The Communists in Guatemala were working for these Soviet aims under consistent and disciplined Soviet control. This control was exercised directly through the Communist Party itself. Seven of the 11 members of the Party's political committee are known to have visited the Soviet Union, 6 of them having made trips in the past 2 years. José Manuel Fortuny, the Party's Secretary General, took his most recent trip to Moscow from November 5, 1953, to January 12, 1954. The Party's leaders in labor unions, agrarian unions, and teacher unions all visited the Soviet Union in recent times, at least within the past 2 years, as did also leaders of Communist-front organizations such as the youth organization, the women's organization, and the university students' front.

The effectiveness of the training and instruction given to the Guatemalan Communists while in the Soviet Union was immediately manifest in the close integration of the Communist institutions in Guatemala with Soviet policy. No case of Soviet direction was more clear than what occurred after the return of Fortuny last January. A press and propaganda campaign, stirring alarm over resistance of anti-Communists to the Arbenz regime, was immediately cranked up in the endeavor to prepare public opinion for the blow to fall. Then, at the end of January 1954, the dramatic announcement was made of the uncovering of a subversive “plot,” with the sinister note of foreign intervention, linking the United States by innuendo as “the country of the North” from which direction and aid were allegedly being furnished the “plotters.”

This set the stage for wholesale arrests of anti-Communist citizens and for subsequent imprisonment, torture, and even murder. Many who were later released, beaten and broken, were pushed across the frontiers into Mexico and Honduras by the vicious truncheon-wielding police. These victims of Communist suppression comprised outstanding leaders in the free labor movement, the

independent press, radio commentators, and the decent citizenry who did not bow down to a Communist state ruled by Arbenz. Your committee is well aware that these tactics of brutal suppression and terrorization of the opposition are characteristically the last blow of communism in a country outside of the Soviet Union before complete seizure of power.

Extensive Travels of Guatemalan Communists

The contacts between the Guatemalan Communist Party and the international Communist movement were easily maintained through travel other than to Moscow. Guatemalan Communist labor leaders, for instance, affiliated with and working for the Soviet international labor organization, traveled to the WFTU headquarters in the Soviet sector of Vienna in Eastern Europe and made lengthy visits to the Communist centers in Budapest and Bucharest, under the guise of attendance at annual conventions of international Communist labor organizations. The youth organization, the "Alliance of Democratic Youth of Guatemala," affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth with headquarters in Bucharest, Rumania, sent its leaders behind the Iron Curtain each year to attend and receive instructions at these Soviet congresses.

The women's organization, the "Guatemalan Women's Alliance," affiliated with the International Federation of Democratic Women, had headquarters in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The student group, "The Democratic University Front," affiliated with the International Student Unions with headquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, sent its delegates to these student meetings for their dose of Communist indoctrination and organization. The phony peace front, "The National Peace Committee," affiliated with the World Peace Council, also with headquarters in Communist Czechoslovakia, made ample use of the various Soviet-sponsored so-called "Peace Conferences" held in Europe and Asia, as a means of orientation, instruction, and indoctrination of Guatemalan Communists traveling as delegates to these affairs.

I have for the committee's attention a chart indicating travel back and forth to the Soviet Union by principal Guatemalan Communists in recent years.²

² Not printed.

No one knowing the complexity of operating a large political movement on an international scale can observe the cohesion which the Communist organizations in Guatemala displayed with their international Communist headquarters without realizing that such would be impossible without the most efficient and rapid system of communications, instruction, and directives. Frequent travels to Moscow, useful and necessary though they are for training and indoctrination, are hardly sufficient to assure simultaneous action of all cogs in a worldwide machine. This system requires communications, and these we know were regularly transmitted by courier, radio, and cable. The presence of the Soviet Embassy in neighboring Mexico kept open a channel of communications, enjoying the privilege of diplomatic immunity and confidential codes; and it was no accident that the two principal Guatemalan representatives in Mexico were both identifiable Communists, Ambassador Alvarado Fuentes and Consul General Pinto Usaga.

The Soviet itself did not plant its own diplomatic mission in Guatemala, as this would have been too obvious a link between the Guatemalan Communists, traitors to their country, and the great Soviet fatherland whose agents they had become. Just as the Guatemalan Communist Party did not disclose itself under its true name until 1951, preferring the security of a veiled operation within other parties, so the Soviet itself did not show its hand openly but operated through satellite missions, commercial travelers, and its own traveling officials, such as the Commercial Attaché of the Embassy in Mexico City.

Threat to Guatemala's Neighbors

The threat of Soviet communism, which is dedicated to expansion, conquest, and ultimate world revolution, was therefore not directed against Guatemala alone but to its peaceful and vulnerable neighbors. The Guatemalan people were the first nation in the hemisphere to suffer Communist control, but others were marked for conquest. The Guatemalan Government, as a tool of Soviet policy, aimed at disruption of the peace of the area by cynically maintaining a sustained campaign to undermine their governments.

Your committee has already heard testimony to the effect that the principal Communists of Cen-

tral America had received refuge, aid, and comfort in Guatemala. Many of them had even been rewarded with government jobs. These foreign agents of communism were thus able to use Guatemala as a base for their operations against their home countries. They were assisted in their subversive activities by scores of Guatemalan Communists and many Spanish Communists who were given visas to Guatemala during the early years of President Arevalo's regime. The increasing flow of propaganda material and trained agitators from Guatemala into the neighboring countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua became so overt that each of these governments, at various times, found it necessary to close their borders to Guatemalan travelers and to invoke rigid restrictions on all travel. This committee will be interested in these samples of Communist propaganda, printed in Guatemala and freely circulated in Central America. I am glad to submit these copies.

One of the most blatant examples of intervention by Guatemalan Communists in the affairs of neighboring republics was the strike which paralyzed Honduras for 8 weeks last spring. The success of their efforts came to startled public attention on May 1, 1954, when a general strike broke out in the northern area of the country and continued for a period of 8 weeks. There had been no previous labor disturbances in Honduras, no negotiations for contracts pending, and no rejections of workers' petitions. The duration of the strike would have been impossible without substantial help from abroad.

There is ample evidence that the strike was planned, instigated, and directed from Guatemala and was undoubtedly intended to unseat the Honduran Government. Help to the strikers was channeled through Guatemala and consisted not only of guidance and instructions but surely of the material aid publicly promised by the Communist-dominated Guatemalan National Federation of Labor, for a minimum calculation of the cost of the strike, involving as many as 44,000 workers over a period up to 8 weeks, would indicate it to be not less than three-quarters of a million dollars. No such sums of money were ever collected among the strikers in Honduras and could only have come from a foreign power. The Honduran Government, which had seized a Guatemalan military plane which flew into the northern

area of the country without authorization a month before the strike, found reason to expel three Guatemalan honorary consuls who had been appointed to small towns in the strike zone only a few months before. The damage to the economy of Honduras was very considerable and was clearly a part of the Communist plan to disrupt Central America.

Arms Shipment in May 1954

The jars and jolts to Guatemala's neighbors in Central America through strikes, political agitation, and subversion were evidences of the growing Communist threat, but it was during the critical period of the spring of 1954 that the Soviet made its big stab to solidify its strength in Guatemala. This was the shipment of arms on the *S. S. Alfhem*, which came into Puerto Barrios on May 15, 1954.³ The cargo manifest was fraudulent, listing as glassware and laboratory equipment some 2,000 tons of modern arms for the Arbenz government, packed in more than 15,000 cases. The cargo, which was of Czech origin, had left the Communist port of Stettin, Poland, about 3 weeks before and pursued a zigzag course across the Atlantic, giving false destinations three times en route.

The Guatemalan armed forces were not without arms, and their numbers were already at least equal and probably superior to the total armed forces of the three immediate neighbors, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The Soviet primarily intended to drive a wedge into the middle of this continent. The four Central American Governments, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, all communicated to the Department of State their request for joint measures against the introduction of further armed force into the area. Our Government was moving rapidly to present this threat to all members of the Organization of American States, for action by the inter-American system, when the movement by Col. Castillo Armas in late June 1954 overthrew the Communist government which had acquired the arms.

How thoroughly the Arbenz government was following the dictates of the Soviet Union was clearly shown during this crisis in the incident of the nonaggression pacts. At a moment when the alarm of Guatemala's neighbors was highest over

³ BULLETIN of June 7, 1954, p. 873.

the *Alfhem* shipment, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister ostentatiously sent cables to the Governments of Honduras and El Salvador, protesting friendship and offering to sign treaties of nonaggression with them. The very term used, "nonaggression pact," was a giveaway of the inspiration whence this maneuver came. It is a Soviet term, unfamiliar to Central American diplomacy and almost unheard of in the relations of our hemisphere, which has a long and honored history of peaceful settlement of disputes by the machinery set up in our inter-American system. The nonaggression pact idea has repeatedly been used as a tactic of deception. Indeed, if we could write an accurate dictionary definition of the term "nonaggression pact," it would be "(a) Agreement between Stalin and Hitler on August 23, 1939, just before outbreak of World War II which paved way for Nazi attack and was later used to conceal preparation for war between Russia and Germany; (b) Any similar agreement, apparently for peaceful purposes but concealing intent to make war." Guatemala's smaller neighbors were not deceived and rejected the invitation, reminding the Guatemalan Government that no need for such a pact exists between peace-loving neighbors. Indeed, Honduras invited Guatemala to show its peaceful purposes by ceasing to support the strike in northern Honduras.

The Guatemalan Communists also planned high-level infiltration of all Central America, but in this adventure their plans were too ambitious and failed.

New Central American Organization

We in the United States are always so conscious of our own mistakes, Mr. Chairman—and I might add particularly those mistakes in the fields of foreign affairs—that it is rather comforting to note that the other side sometimes makes their mistakes too. One such incident involved the Organization of Central American States, which is generally referred to as ODECA. Such an organization had been discussed for generations among the Central American republics. In 1951 the Communist-oriented Government of Guatemala, anxious to extend its influence in Central America, seized the initiative and sent proposals to the Governments of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica that a conference be held to lay plans to form such an organization. The confer-

ence was held at San Salvador, and a charter of the organization was adopted. An interim committee was set up. A subsequent meeting to draft final plans was scheduled in Guatemala in the latter part of 1952.

However, suspicion developed that the Communists of Guatemala planned to use the new organization as an additional vehicle for extending their influence into the affairs of neighboring Central American republics. Shortly before the meeting in Guatemala City was to be held, the Government of El Salvador became so incensed at the activities of Guatemalan Communists agitating within that country that they closed the borders, rounded up more than 1,500 subversive suspects—many of them Guatemalan nationals—and expelled them from the country. Then the Government of El Salvador notified the other members of ODECA that it proposed to submit a resolution at the conference in Guatemala City demanding investigation of communism in Central America and the adoption of measures by all five Central American countries to counteract this menace.

This boomerang of Communist plans was exceedingly embarrassing to the Arbenz government, for the organization Arbenz had initiated in an effort to extend Communist influence was threatening to go into reverse and become a vehicle to combat communism. The Arbenz government twice postponed the proposed conference in Guatemala City and exerted the strongest diplomatic pressure on El Salvador not to submit its proposed resolution. When these efforts failed and El Salvador stood firm in its intent, Guatemala finally withdrew from ODECA, on April 1, 1953, brazenly charging its neighbors with "aggression." This is another typical Soviet tactic, to accuse the peaceful victims of Communist schemes of the very crime which the Communist aggressors are about to commit against them.

To attract as much attention as possible, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister sent a message to the Security Council of the United Nations repeating the same charges. He did not, however, ask for any action, which was in itself confession that the charges lacked proof and that the forum of the United Nations was used only for propaganda purposes. Since it was obvious that only one country, Guatemala, was the source of the Communist problem in the area, the Arbenz regime could not tolerate that its activities against its

neighbors be placed under the spotlight of an international meeting. And it had one other equally serious motivation, that the Organization of Central American States, a new and valiant effort by these small countries themselves to integrate their economies and lift the living standards of their people, should collapse and not become a bulwark against Communist advances in the area.

Threat to U.S. Security

I need hardly refer to the menace of this Soviet attempt to win Central America as aimed at our own vital interests and security; this is self-evident, for geography alone supplies the reason. Central America lies almost at our southern borders, no more than 3 hours' flying time by modern warplanes from the Gulf ports and even nearer to our greatest strategic installation anywhere in the world, the Panama Canal. If any part of this area should fall under Soviet power, it would shake the foundations of our defenses. The Soviets know that. They were willing to pay a very high price in funds, manpower, organization, propaganda, and subversive skills to gain a base in Guatemala. And we know that the hardheaded, practical men of the Kremlin dedicate their best efforts on objectives which strike closest to the United States. For if we should weaken and succumb, the road would lie open to their domination of the whole world.

Thus, the struggle of the Guatemalan people to throw off the Communist control was as much a struggle for the safety of Guatemala's neighbors, and ourselves, as it was to regain their own liberties.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me state that the menace of communism in Guatemala was courageously fought by the Guatemalan people themselves, always against the superior odds which a police state has over the decent, patriotic citizen. Communist power was broken by the Guatemalans alone, and their deeds of heroic sacrifice deserve and will always receive the admiration and applause of our own people. They fought the battle which is the common battle of all free nations against Communist oppression, and they won the victory themselves.

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have both publicly pledged our support to the new Government of Col. Castillo Armas and our aid

to the Guatemalan people. It is my earnest hope and confidence that all feasible means to extend this aid will be promptly developed, so that Guatemala may resume its place as a prosperous and progressive member in the family of free nations.

U.S. Aid to Guatemala

Press release 618 dated October 29

On October 30 Norman Armour, Ambassador to Guatemala, delivered the following aide memoire to the President of Guatemala, Carlos Castillo Armas:

The American Ambassador informed His Excellency that the following aid is being made available by the United States to the Government and people of Guatemala for the present fiscal year: Roosevelt Hospital \$500,000; Inter-American Highway \$1,425,000; general purposes \$3,200,000; technical assistance \$1,300,000; total \$6,425,000.

The Ambassador recalled that the Government of Guatemala is to make matching contributions of its own towards some of the projects for which the aid is to be used and stated that he and the officials of the Foa would be pleased to discuss promptly with the Government of Guatemala procedures for utilization of the aids.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 83d Congress, 2d Session

- Study of Overseas Administrative Personnel Problems. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. March 16, 1954. 21 pp.
- Report on Audit of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1953, with Letter of Transmittal from the Acting Comptroller General of the United States. H. Doc. 399, May 20, 1954. 26 pp.
- Review of the United Nations Charter. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Proposals To Amend or Otherwise Modify Existing International Peace and Security Organizations, Including the United Nations. Part 6, Des Moines, Iowa, June 19, 1954. 156 pp.
- Strategy and Tactics of World Communism. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 3, July 1 and 8, 1954. 40 pp.
- Return of Confiscated Property. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3423 To Amend the Trading with the Enemy Act. July 1 and 2, 1954. 248 pp.

Soviet Propaganda and International Tension

by John Moors Cabot
*Ambassador to Sweden*¹

In democracies the people determine the broad lines of foreign policy. Any organization which helps to keep the people informed about what is going on in other countries is therefore doing something very necessary. I applaud the work of the Swedish-American Association of Borås because it is doing that needed work.

We know that in our generation democracy has been challenged both on the right and on the left. Those who would destroy democracy are forever trying to promote misunderstandings within democracies and between democracies. As the representative of another democracy, a traditional friend of Sweden, I should like to discuss a problem which faces all free nations. You will rightly recognize what I say as a plea for my country's viewpoint. You may well not agree with me, but I hope that you will think over the case I present carefully.

"Warmongering Imperialists"

The biggest newspaper chain in the world is not in the United States, although one edition is published in New York. Other newspapers of the chain are published practically all over the world; I believe you have a couple here in Sweden. The head office of the chain is in Moscow, and it keeps a very tight rein on all of the member newspapers.

Now this newspaper chain talks continually about a lot of things we should like to see in this world, such as peace and coexistence and better living conditions for the masses. It says that all these things would be possible if only the ruling

circles in the United States, together with their reactionary stooges in other countries, were not greedy, warmongering imperialists. Incidentally, until recently the chain insisted that among the most reactionary of these stooges were the Social Democratic parties in Europe, but there has apparently been an agonizing—and doubtless temporary—reappraisal in this regard.

This charge of imperialism and warmongering seems pretty serious, and it doesn't refer to the dead past when the United States and many other democracies showed imperialistic tendencies. It refers to the recent past and the present. If it were justified, the record should show brilliant successes for such a policy backed by our great power and wealth. I think when these newspapers charge us with imperialism they might explain why over the years it has increasingly been the miserable failure the actual record shows.

To the north of us lies Canada, a country of immense natural wealth still largely undeveloped despite the fabulous progress of recent years. Twice in the last 40 years Canada has loyally sent her forces to aid the mother country, Great Britain, in desperate struggles to preserve freedom in Europe. By so doing, Canada clearly exposed a 3,000-mile frontier to such imperialist ambitions as the United States might manifest. Was it strange that Canada didn't send a single regiment to the frontier as a precautionary measure in either World War? The curious fact is that, if we have our family differences with Canada, I frankly cannot imagine either nation worrying about possible aggression from the other.

To the south of the United States is Mexico. Our relations with Mexico have not always been happy—we fought a war in 1846-48 and have had recurrent troubles until recently.

¹Address made before the Swedish-American Association at Borås, Sweden, on Sept. 30.

We continue to have our differences with Mexico, but I think an event which I personally witnessed is typical of our present relations. In October 1953 the Presidents of Mexico and the United States together dedicated Falcón Dam on the Rio Grande—the Mexican-American border. Could it be imperialism to build a dam in cooperation with a neighboring nation when the money might so easily have been spent for military adventures? Could it be that, despite the pretexts an imperialistic nation might have used during Mexico's prolonged civil war in 1911–20 and again when our oil properties were expropriated in 1938, we actually preferred to cooperate with a weaker neighbor?

In the sparkling Caribbean area, to the south of the United States, are a number of small republics—just as there used to be some small republics across the Baltic Sea. Historically, these Caribbean republics have tended to be poor, weak, and disorganized. What tempting morsels for imperialist ambitions! In one, Panama, is our greatest strategic asset, the Panama Canal, which we hold under a perpetual treaty. Panama has no army, yet in 1936 and again in 1953 it asked us to revise certain treaty provisions regarding the canal which it did not consider fair. We failed to use the Panamanian demands as an excuse to gobble Panama—in fact I doubt that the Panamanians would have made the demands if they had had certain other neighbors. Instead, we sat down with the Panamanians to work out revised agreements.

Lest anyone think the governments of the Caribbean republics are stooges of the United States, let me mention a couple of personal episodes. In May 1953, when I was Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, one Caribbean republic put out a story that I was consorting with Communist agents to overthrow its government. It happens the government was badly misinformed, but do you recall any case in which any newspaper in the chain to which I referred earlier made any such accusation against its head officers?

False Charges in Guatemala

In 1953 we became increasingly concerned that the then Government of Guatemala had succumbed to the blandishments of this newspaper chain. When I strove mildly to point out the danger, the chain accused me of favoring the inter-

ests of the United Fruit Company, which had important interests in Guatemala, because I was a big stockholder in it. Incidentally, the Swedish newspapers in the chain repeat this story from time to time; you will probably find it in tomorrow's editions if you look. The fact is that I have never had a share of United Fruit stock in my life, and I have no other personal reason to favor the United Fruit. The same accusation has been made with equal untruth about Secretary Dulles. All of this was merely a part of the campaign the Communist marionettes in Guatemala put on against the United States; I really don't recall any case in history where a small nation has put on such a provocative campaign against a powerful neighbor, whether or not the neighbor was imperialistic. Fortunately, the people of Guatemala have now taken care of the situation there.

In the Western Hemisphere our sister republics are going through a period of amazing, fruitful development—a period similar to that through which the United States went in the past century. Even today, although their combined military strength is a small fraction of ours, their economic resources are already substantial and are developing rapidly. What a luscious morsel for imperialist greed!

How did the United States react to these unparalleled opportunities? In 1823 we proclaimed that we would not tolerate any effort of any European power to oppress or control the destiny of any American republic which had declared its independence. During the 19th century a series of attempts were made to break this Monroe Doctrine, particularly when we were distracted, as during our Civil War. We thwarted them—at times by a show of military force—and every American nation which was independent in 1823 is independent today.

Inter-American Cooperation

Far from seeking to dominate our sister republics, we have been seeking in a series of inter-American conferences since 1889 to build up a cooperative relationship with them. If the spirit of our relations is similar to that existing between the Scandinavian nations, I ask you to remember that the material factors—the military and economic power, the traditions, the language, and organizational stability—were very disparate in America. Europeans sometimes forget how much

our American experience in cooperative relationships contributed to the United Nations, and how the basic concept of NATO, that an attack on one is an attack on all, was first worked out by the American Republics. In the light of our long and honorable record of settling disputes in the Americas by peaceful means, it was really a bit annoying in the recent case of Guatemala to have inter-American action stopped by a veto in the Security Council, and then to have not only the chain of newspapers to which I have referred, but also many of our European friends, lecture us on our failure to protect the Guatemalan Government which had done everything in its power to harm us.

But for Europeans, American problems seem far away. Let us consider what the United States might have done in the Old World if it had acted in the imperialist tradition.

From 1914 to 1918 all of the great powers in Europe were engaged in a desperate war. To secure allies, each side dangled juicy offers before other nations, and a series of secret treaties were written describing how the booty was to be divided even before it was secured. In 1917 we entered the war. What did we demand of our prospective allies as the price of our entry? Nothing. Having contributed the winning margin in blood and treasure to our weary allies, what did we secure in the peace settlement? For ourselves, nothing—not an inch of territory, not even an economic asset. We tried at the peace table to uphold the principle that people have the right to determine under what government they wish to live. By the mandate system, we tried to circumscribe the old colonialism. We let others take these mandates, and took none ourselves—strange conduct for an allegedly imperialist nation.

At the end of World War I we had two million soldiers in Europe, and our war production was just beginning to roll. For years after the war Europe lay prostrate, requiring our help simply to live. Machiavelli would have rubbed his hands. We, however, disbanded our army, sponsored a series of disarmament agreements in which we made the greater sacrifices, and helped the European nations regain their feet. Strange to say, we haven't been hearing very much from the newspaper chain recently about the massive aid we extended to Russia to relieve famines on more than one occasion between the wars.

Lend-Lease in World War II

Despite the proverb that opportunity knocks but once at any man's door, the Second World War gave us an even better opportunity to promote our alleged imperialistic purposes. What did we do? We provided England, Russia, and other nations fighting aggression enormous quantities of goods to help them in their fight. We took such risks that we were ourselves attacked. To Russia alone we sent over \$10 billion of lend-lease equipment. What did we demand in return from the hard-pressed nations which we were aiding? Nothing. If the United States was an imperialist nation, its diplomacy was singularly inept.

At the end of World War II we again had a powerful army in Europe and incomparably the greatest fleet and air force in the world. We alone had the atom bomb. The Old World was again prostrate after 6 years of war. If ever a nation was in a position to promote imperialistic purposes, it was the United States in 1945.

What did we do? We again disbanded our army and air force and put our fleet in mothballs. We shipped hundreds of millions of dollars of relief supplies through UNRRA to Soviet Russia and other parts of Europe. We offered to share the secret of the atom bomb with other nations in return for their agreement that it should be placed under secure international control. If you look in any edition of the oft-mentioned newspaper chain, you might not realize that we were the first to propose a means of stopping atomic warfare, when we had the bomb and no one else did. At the same time we gave full independence to the Philippines and we offered it to Puerto Rico.

Marshall Plan Aid

The postwar prostration of Europe was such that it became doubtful that Europe could recover with its own resources. We again offered our help through the Marshall plan—and the offer originally included Soviet Russia, which rejected it. In the past 40 years we have poured some \$75 billion into Europe. We are supposed—and you don't have to read the newspaper chain to hear this—to be very materialistic, always chasing dollars. If one can get dollars by giving them away, wouldn't it be nice to know how it is done? This aid is also said to have promoted our economic imperialism. If so, we've got an awfully bad bar-

gain for what we have poured out—our total foreign investments are worth only a fraction as much as the aid, and we have secured no privileged markets or other economic concessions in return. We do think that what helps our friends generally helps us, but that is another matter.

Now I am sure I did not need to go into such detail to convince you that this newspaper chain's picture is—shall we say?—a bit distorted. Few people in Sweden or the United States take what it says seriously. But the shrill charges the newspaper chain wearisomely repeats have a curious way of turning up in the thinking of people who haven't the slightest sympathy with what the chain stands for. They turn up in the idea that this is just another struggle for power between two colossi, which is of concern to other countries primarily because the two may go to war and involve everyone else—this, although the record shows that our direct interests have seldom been involved in the cold war; that, as in World War II, we became involved because we felt that if other nations fell, our own security would ultimately be affected.

They turn up in the criticisms so often heard of foreign statesmen who in their own country's interest do or say something favorable for the United States. They turn up in the criticism of our atomic bomb tests, whereas those of others go unmentioned. Apparently our atomic bombs are even the only ones that affect the weather.

They turn up in attacks upon our conviction that the Chinese Communist regime is not peace loving—and developments in Korea did not silence them. They turn up in attacks on our efforts to promote an integrated system of defense forces in Western Europe, despite the fact that such forces would defend European homes rather than American interests. They turn up in the idea that it is provocative to sign a purely defensive pact in Southeast Asia against a clear menace of aggression.

They turn up particularly in wildly exaggerated ideas that any foreign nation which is or might be friendly in the face of common peril is untrustworthy, weak, greedy, corrupt, reactionary, vacil-

lating, rash, imperialistic, and anything else which may make it difficult for nations to cooperate for the common good.

This newspaper chain works skillfully on our own democratic mentalities, which tend to believe that where there is smoke there must be fire; that where there is a dispute, there must be right and wrong on both sides; that the truth must always be between extremes. When the newspaper chain makes up a story out of whole cloth and only ten percent of it is believed—or only ten percent of the people believe it—it is still that much ahead. When a democratic political leader or editor feels that he must attack a friendly foreign nation to show how objective he is, the newspaper chain has again profited.

I hope you will think deeply of the factors which are producing international misunderstanding today. I know that you here in Sweden justly pride yourselves on your ability to ascertain, amid all the sound and fury, what is really going on, but that is a quality which democratic nations need more than ever today. I hope particularly that all free nations will try to be understanding of each other and of each other's motives. The most powerful newspaper chain in the world is working overtime to sow suspicion, distrust, and disagreement between free nations. If those nations listen to this siren's voice and quarrel among themselves, it will be at sorry day for freedom—everywhere.

Nuclear Explosions in U. S. S. R.

The Atomic Energy Commission announced on October 26 that there had been a series of detonations of nuclear explosives in Soviet territory. This series began in mid-September and has continued at intervals to the present. As is generally the case with nuclear detonations, these tests have resulted in some widespread fall-out of radioactive material, but insignificantly in the United States.

The United Nations and World Security

by David McK. Key

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

As we here in Washington join today with more than 7,000 other American communities and with the peoples of 80 nations in celebrating United Nations Day, we have a feeling of special closeness to the organization that was conceived in the dark days of the war. For it was in this city, in the seclusion and beauty of Dumbarton Oaks, that the Great Powers in 1944 committed themselves to the creation of the world organization to be. The representatives of those powers recognized the signs of victory through the clouds of war, and they realized that the responsibility for planning an organization for the maintenance of peace was in their hands. They acted accordingly. Had these men been unable to agree among themselves at Dumbarton Oaks, there would have been no basis for the founding conference to be held in San Francisco the following year.

But if we take pride in our special tie with the United Nations, let us be even more grateful that it has extended round the world. Let us be grateful that it binds us with many other countries, a number of whose diplomatic representatives are present here to share with us this celebration of the ninth anniversary of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter.

In addition to welcoming these distinguished diplomatic representatives, we are honored in having with us Mr. Morehead Patterson, National Chairman of the United States Committee for United Nations Day. I also wish to congratulate Mr. Edgar Morris, Chairman of the Washington Committee, and thank him and the other members of the Committee for their able efforts in organizing this celebration. And to all of you I

am privileged to bring the warm greetings of the Secretary of State.

I think we would do well to consider for a few minutes why we assemble here to observe United Nations Day. What is the significance of this public gathering and of countless others like it in every country of the world?

In the first place, we pay tribute to man's successful efforts to agree to organize world society *against* war and *for* the creation of conditions of peace and well-being. In the second place, we mark 9 years of growth and progress of the organization established to accomplish these purposes and its evolution toward a more effective instrument of international security and world order. In the third place, we indicate our faith in the future of the United Nations and our determination to make it serve ever better the interests of peace.

Purpose of United Nations Day

The United Nations can have little effect and influence in the world beyond the faith and loyalty which its member nations and the citizens of these member nations give to it. Therefore, it is most fitting that one day a year be set aside for such observances as these in which we can reaffirm the unity of mankind's need for the United Nations. This common agreement and support is too often lost sight of during the day-to-day operations of the organization when the task of reconciling opposing views of member states on crucial world issues sometimes makes it appear that the United Nations is itself the cause of strife and disunity.

I think it is correct to say that the importance which the public attaches to the deliberations, recommendations, and actions of the United Na-

¹ Remarks made at the Washington, D. C., United Nations Day observance on Oct. 24.

United Nations Day

Statement by Secretary Dulles¹

Sunday [October 24] the world is celebrating the ninth anniversary of the coming into force of the charter of the United Nations. The 60 members of the United Nations, and several nonmember nations, are observing this anniversary.

In the United States alone, 7,000 cities, towns, and villages are holding celebrations.

A spontaneous bond of this kind is symbolic of the vitality of the United Nations. It can only arise from a deep conviction that the United Nations is a living force throughout the world.

The charter is a great landmark in the understanding of the nature of peace. It recognizes that peace is far from being a passive concept. It recognizes that peace is a call to action. To attain it requires faith and comradeship among the nations, great courage and great sacrifice.

That is the spirit of the charter, and that is the spirit in which peace must be sought without ceasing.

I believe that the peace we all long for is an attainable goal. I believe that the United Nations can greatly help to realize that dream of peace. Thus the United Nations justifies our faith and our support.

¹ Issued on Oct. 23 (press release 603 dated Oct. 22).

tions is yearly becoming greater. As the problems facing the world community have become more critical, owing in large part to developments in atomic energy, the world has looked more and more to the United Nations for security and for long-range solutions designed to ease international tensions. This public concern and impatience is basically a healthy sign and an indication of the vitality of the organization. If during its first 9 years the United Nations had become nothing more than a figurehead or symbol of man's good intentions, public support and interest would long ago have abandoned it. The United Nations has, however, increased in stature during these years and by its action has earned increased public confidence.

A record number of communities in the United States are observing United Nations Day this year. In this connection, it is gratifying to note that an analysis of United States public opinion polls and other indices of public sentiment indicate that

never in its history has the United Nations enjoyed the support of so large a proportion of the American public.

Value of Criticism

Perhaps I should also observe that there has at the same time been much outspoken and sometimes bitter criticism of the United Nations. This criticism does not cause me undue concern. In fact, criticism should be welcome since no organization or system which depends for its life on the understanding and support of the people can develop in a healthy and vigorous manner without the warnings and stimulation of vigorous opposition and criticism. If this is a sign of vitality, and I believe it is, we have no need to fear that the United Nations is in danger because of public criticism. On the contrary, we should be concerned if there were an absence of criticism, which would indicate public apathy.

Let us rededicate ourselves here to the basic proposition of the founders of the United Nations—namely, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Only 4 days ago President Eisenhower, underlining the urgency which faces us in turning this proposition into a workable plan, stated that science has brought the world to a point where war does not present the possibility of defeat or victory but only the alternative in degrees of destruction. In other words, it is no longer the “scourge of war” but annihilation by war which we face. The world cannot again hazard recourse to war as a shortcut to peace. Our only rational alternative is to use peaceful means to establish international peace. This must be done by and through the United Nations, which the President has described as “man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield.”

In closing, I wish to pay tribute to the thousands of men and women, employees of the United Nations or of its respective member governments, whose lives are devoted to carrying forward the purposes of the United Nations and who, though scattered in many lands, are working in common under the United Nations Charter for the peace, security, and well-being of mankind. We who observe here today the founding of the United Nations owe them a continuing debt of gratitude.

Intensifying International Efforts To Aid Refugees

Statements by A. M. Ade Johnson

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S. ROLE IN REFUGEE RELIEF

U.S. delegation press release 1967 dated October 4

Today I have my first opportunity to speak before this group, and I would like to express it that I am highly gratified to be associated with the humanitarian work of the Third Committee. As one who has spent a good part of his life in various welfare causes, I feel proud to be one of you who are working in international fellowship—in the spirit of one for all and all for one—to help alleviate human distress.

Here in the United States virtually all of us are descendants of immigrants, and a goodly portion of our ancestors came to our shores as refugees. Some of them sought sanctuary from oppressive political systems, some sought a place where they could practice their religious beliefs freely, some sought homesteads and a higher standard of life. In a sense, the refugee problem has been with us in America since almost the first days of our nation. We are a nation of refugees. For this reason, among others, we have always been deeply attentive to the plight and aspirations of those seeking refuge.

Over the years, the American Government and the American people have played a conscientious part in the relief and resettlement of refugees. Statistics do not give more than a cold picture of our traditional concern, but they do reveal the extent to which the United States has participated in refugee and migration affairs in recent years. To various United Nations and intergovernmental agencies including UNRRA, my government pro-

vided more than \$3,161,000,000. In programs directly administered by the United States Government, more than \$68 million have been expended. More than \$900 million have been contributed to bilateral programs. And contributions from private organizations and individuals in the United States amount to \$1 billion 724 million since 1940. The total of these various programs relating to refugee aid is close to \$6 billion. I think that this is—and that you will agree that this is—some measure of contemporary American interest, so far as our interest can be measured in monetary terms.

As a descendant of an immigrant family, I have shared with other Americans an awareness of the events and circumstances that have caused peoples to seek better and freer lives in places of their own choosing. My work in the labor field has brought me even closer to the problems of this nature, and I was quite moved by the report we heard last Friday from Dr. van Heuven Goedhart.² The plight of so many thousands of uprooted and displaced persons in Europe and Asia which he depicts was noted by all, I am sure, with deep concern.

On behalf of my delegation I want to thank Dr. van Heuven Goedhart for his report, and particularly for his devotion to a vast and complicated task. Undeterred by acute difficulties, he has tackled his job with determination and, it is obvious, with a sense of personal obligation.

It is with satisfaction that my delegation takes note that the High Commissioner has continued his work in cooperation with a number of other

¹Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Oct. 4 and Oct. 12 and in plenary session on Oct. 21.

²Dr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, introduced his annual report (U.N. docs. A/2648, Add. 1 and Add. 2) on Oct. 1.

agencies concerned with different aspects of the refugee problem. Among these agencies are the International Labor Office, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the Council of Europe, the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration, the Organization for European Economic Council, the United States Escapee Program, and the many voluntary organizations in the field. The cooperation between the Office of the High Commissioner and the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration has been of the greatest importance in moving European refugees from Shanghai. It is essential that this close cooperation between the High Commissioner and the Migration Committee be continued. Our delegation notes with special satisfaction that in 1953 the Migration Committee assisted in the resettlement of 19,711 refugees, and has made provisions for moving another 19,800 refugees in 1954.

Dr. van Heuven Goedhart's report shows the importance of providing legal and political protection to refugees. This continuing responsibility may be technical and unspectacular in character, but it has a vital significance in the lives of many thousands of refugees throughout the world. It is a heavy responsibility, one which the High Commissioner has carried out conscientiously. Thousands—hundreds of thousands—of refugees, directly or indirectly, have received protection and assistance from the High Commissioner's office. Through the efforts of the High Commissioner and the cooperation of various non-governmental organizations, many of those people have found their way out of refugee camps to new homes. It is my view that Dr. van Heuven Goedhart has served with distinction.

Much Still To Be Done

Yet, as no one knows better than the High Commissioner, there is much work to be done.

It is now 36 years since the First World War, but today we are again confronted by the need of helping displaced victims of that conflict. Many of them are aging, and less able to help themselves than formerly. We also have tens of thousands of victims of the Second World War to think about—men, women, and children in Europe and Asia who, for whatever reasons, are seeking settlement outside the countries of their origins. As the High Commissioner has so graphically pointed out, some

of the families involved have been living as long as 8 or 9 years in various refugee camps, without certainty as to the future, and some, no doubt, with little hope. There are children in those camps who have known no other homes. Relatively few of these refugees are employed. This is a big and tragic problem and one for which all of us must feel a deep sense of responsibility and accept willingly the moral obligations to seek some kind of solution.

The principal problem before this committee is the new proposal of the High Commissioner concerning permanent solutions of the most difficult refugee cases. The Executive Branch of the United States Government has given careful consideration to the proposal of the High Commissioner, and our delegation had listened with deep interest to the further explanation given by the High Commissioner in his very inspiring statement last Friday afternoon.

The present emergency program of the High Commissioner is of great importance and of concern to the members of this committee. The United States Government concurs in the conviction of the High Commissioner that it is not enough merely to provide emergency relief to the most desperate cases in Shanghai and elsewhere, important as this is from a humanitarian point of view. It is essential that permanent solutions be found at an early date for the other difficult cases, especially the 88,000 refugees now living in camps—the group whom the High Commissioner calls “the forgotten people.” On behalf of the United States Government our delegation endorses, in principle, the proposals of the High Commissioner for a program for these refugees.

Concerning the administrative aspects of the High Commissioner's activity, the United States Government has concluded that the establishment of two separate programs and two separate funds might lead to confusion on the part of governments, legislative bodies, and the public in our several countries. Our Government proposes therefore that the General Assembly authorize the High Commissioner to establish a single, combined fund. This fund, like the present United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund, would be financed by voluntary contributions from governments and private sources. The fund would be devoted primarily to the promotion of permanent solutions but would also include assistance to the most needy cases.

Text of Resolution Authorizing International Fund for Refugee Aid¹

U.N. doc. A/Resolution/203

The General Assembly,

Having considered the problems of refugees within the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the light of his report to the General Assembly at its ninth session,

Having noted with satisfaction the work accomplished for refugees,

Noting that, in spite of the efforts made, there is little hope that—at the present rate of repatriation, resettlement, or integration—a satisfactory solution to these problems will be reached within a reasonable period of time,

Considering that, while the ultimate responsibility for the refugees within the mandate of the High Commissioner falls in fact upon the countries of residence, certain of these countries have to face particularly heavy burdens as a result of their geographical situation, and some complementary aid has been shown to be necessary to accelerate the implementation of a programme for permanent solutions,

Recalling resolution 728 (VIII) of the General Assembly and resolution 549 (XVIII) of the Economic and Social Council,

Considering that the programme outlined in the report of the High Commissioner contains a number of constructive elements for an effective attempt at achieving a permanent solution to the problems of certain groups of the refugees who are the concern of the High Commissioner, having special regard to family groups,

1. *Authorizes* the High Commissioner, in accordance with his Statute, to undertake a programme designed to achieve permanent solutions within the period of his current mandate for the refugees included within the proposals in his report to the General Assembly at its ninth session (A/2648, chapter IV, section 4, and A/2648/Add.2, paragraphs 1 to 11);

2. *Requests* the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, in co-operation with the High

¹ Sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United States; approved by Committee III on Oct. 18 by a vote of 40-5 (Soviet bloc) - 10; adopted by the General Assembly on Oct. 21 by a vote of 44-5-8.

Commissioner, to negotiate with the Governments of Member and non member States for voluntary contributions towards a fund based on the proposals of the High Commissioner (the amount to be determined by the High Commissioner's Advisory Committee at its next session), to be devoted principally to the promotion of permanent solutions, and also to permit emergency assistance to the most needy cases, such fund to incorporate the fund authorized by the General Assembly in resolution 538 B (VI);

3. *Authorizes* the High Commissioner to make appeals for funds for the purposes set forth in paragraph 2 above;

4. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council, not later than its nineteenth session and in the light of proposals to be submitted to it by the High Commissioner upon the advice of his Advisory Committee, either to establish an Executive Committee responsible for giving directives to the High Commissioner in carrying out his programme and for exercising the necessary controls in the use of funds allotted to the Office of the High Commissioner or to revise the terms of reference and composition of the Advisory Committee in order to enable it to carry out the same duties;

5. *Requests* the High Commissioner to prepare, for presentation to the inter-governmental body mentioned in paragraph 4 above, detailed proposals for projects designed to achieve permanent solutions, including plans for adequate financial or other contributions from sources within the countries of residence;

6. *Requests* the Governments concerned, in the negotiation of agreements with the High Commissioner for the projects for permanent solutions under this programme, to give assurances that they will assume full financial responsibility should any of the refugees within the scope of the programme still require assistance at the end of the stipulated period;

7. *Urges* Member and non-member States to co-operate with the High Commissioner to the fullest extent in this programme;

8. *Requests* the High Commissioner to include in his annual report a statement on the measures which he has taken under the terms of the present resolution.

The main objective of a single, combined fund—or indeed, of any new program in the refugee field—should be to enable the United Nations to make one final effort to assist in finding solutions for the most difficult refugee cases. It has always been the position of the United States Govern-

ment, and it continues to be the position of our Government, that the primary responsibility for refugees must rest with the countries of asylum. Other countries, either through unilateral action or through contributions to international agencies, can help the countries of asylum temporarily in

caring for refugees on their soil and in repatriating or in resettling them, or in assimilating them into their own population. But the primary responsibility, the ultimate responsibility, must rest with the countries of asylum.

The High Commissioner has proposed a 5-year program by which the United Nations would assist the countries of asylum in finding permanent solutions for the refugees on their soil. It is our view that this concept of a 5-year program is essential to whatever plan the General Assembly may adopt. Our Government feels strongly that United Nations financial support for providing emergency assistance and for promoting permanent solutions should be limited to another 5-year period. This would not mean that some refugee problems would not remain after 5 years and that the work of the High Commissioner with regard to the legal and political protection of refugees might not be continued. This does mean, however, that the High Commissioner should do everything possible over the next 5 years to help find permanent solutions for all the refugees in question. This also means that the basic responsibility for refugees rests now, and will continue to rest, with the countries where the refugees reside. The High Commissioner should approach these countries in order to obtain their assurance that they will assume full financial responsibility at the end of the 5-year period should any of these refugees still require assistance.

Careful consideration would have to be given to the financing of such a program and to its administration. Only 16 governments and the Holy See have contributed to the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund. Of these only 12 are members of the United Nations. Any program in the refugee field, to be really successful, must have a wider range of financial support. Any such program must also have adequate matching contributions from the countries of asylum. These are matters which will need to be weighed in establishing realistic financial plans for any such program.

The Assembly should also make provision, if it wishes to accept the High Commissioner's proposals, for greater governmental participation in the planning and budgeting of the program. This would provide the High Commissioner with assistance in the proper management and financing of the kind of combined program which I have been

outlining. Greater governmental authority could be achieved either by expanding the terms of reference of the present Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner or by establishing a new executive committee representing the governments primarily concerned in the financing and administration of the combined program.

U.S. Proposals

To recapitulate, Mr. Chairman, these are the points which the United States feels are essential for the establishment of the new program:

(1) The program should be designed to achieve within a 5-year period permanent solutions for the refugees included in the High Commissioner's proposals;

(2) There should be only one fund, which would be devoted primarily to the promotion of permanent solutions but which would include emergency assistance to the most needy cases;

(3) The basic responsibility for the refugees must continue to rest with the countries of asylum, and, in addition, the High Commissioner should approach these countries to obtain assurances that they will assume full financial responsibility should any of these refugees still require assistance at the end of the 5-year period;

(4) Provision should be made for greater governmental participation in the planning and budgeting of the High Commissioner's work;

(5) The program must have a wide range of financial support, including adequate matching contributions from the countries of asylum.

If there is a satisfactory resolution of these points, the Executive Branch of our Government will request the Congress for an authorization and an appropriation for a contribution to the program. Our delegation must make clear, however, that its general support for such a combined program of 5 years' duration cannot be construed as a commitment to provide funds to the program, and the delegation cannot, of course, give any assurance at this time of what action the Congress will take.

The final decision of the United States Government on a possible contribution to a new, combined program will be influenced by the extent to which other governments are prepared to make funds available for this program. It will be influenced also by the extent to which governments of the

countries of residence cooperate in planning and financing projects. In fact, the Assembly's resolution should urge these governments to sustain a concerted effort to resolve their refugee problems during the 5-year period of the United Nations program. The final decision of our government will also depend, of course, upon the merits of the particular projects which might later be proposed under the program.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to repeat that the United States delegation holds the work of the High Commissioner in high regard and is anxious that it succeed. Our delegation desires that these tragic victims of war and revolution find security and an opportunity to build a normal life. Our delegation desires that the United Nations do what it can within the next 5 years to assist the countries where these refugees reside in solving their problems. This is a humanitarian cause, one which should enlist the support of governments, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens. It is a humanitarian cause to which the United Nations has already contributed much. It is a cause which deserves the support of each and every one of us.

FALSE ACCUSATIONS BY SOVIET

U.S. delegation press release 1977 dated October 12

I spoke briefly at the end of the last session³ in response to the false accusations of the representative of the U.S.S.R. [G. F. Saksin] against my country. His statement, which purported to be a reply to the High Commissioner, was actually an unprovoked attempt to divert this committee from the humanitarian issue before it by obscuring it under a propaganda barrage.

The speech was obviously carefully prepared in advance for such a deliberate attack, an attack that can only poison the atmosphere of this committee and create further international tensions. It calls into question the sincerity of Soviet pretensions, loudly proclaimed in recent months, that it is seeking to lessen these tensions.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. claimed that the free world in general and the United States in particular was artificially fostering the refugee problem in order to obtain cheap labor.

³ Not printed here.

This is a strange charge from a country which has been found by a United Nations body to employ slave labor on a vast scale.

Earnings of Refugees

I can state categorically to this committee that refugees admitted to the United States earn wages comparable to those of other residents. As a matter of fact, before any refugees may be admitted under the laws at present in force, government employment bureaus in the area to which they are to go must certify that they will be given wages and working conditions comparable to those of other people in the area.

I might also point out, Mr. Chairman, that even if the allegation were true that refugees earn only half of the wages of a citizen, they would still be earning about three times the amount they could expect in the U.S.S.R. Anyone who cares to check this can do so in the *United Nations Publication on National and Per Capita Incomes in Seventy Countries in 1949*, the latest information the United Nations has produced.

With respect to repatriation I have already made our position clear. The United States has no objection, and has never had any objection, to voluntary repatriation. We will oppose any forcible repatriation with all our power. What irritates the U.S.S.R. is that whenever residents of Communist countries have had an opportunity to be free of their control, many thousands of them have refused to return. What can be wrong with conditions behind the iron curtain to cause this?

With respect to subversion, one need only examine the record. The irresponsibility and insincerity of the Soviet allegations is evident to the entire free world, which knows well such names as Nikolai Khokhlov, Yuri Rasvorov, Vladimir Petrov and his wife, as well as Dr. Marek Korowicz. Except for the latter, the world knows that they were part of the worldwide intelligence apparatus of the Soviet Union.

The U.S.S.R. attack on the so-called Kersten Amendment of the Mutual Security Act is an old and familiar allegation—the falsity of which has been exposed in previous sessions of the General Assembly. The purpose of the amendment was to give aid and comfort to those escaping from behind the iron and bamboo curtains.

The only activity undertaken by the United States Government under the so-called Kersten Amendment (Sec. 401) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 has been the United States escapee program, and about \$12.7 million has been made available from its inception in March 1952 through June 30, 1954.

The objectives and activities of the escapee program are: "to provide reception, interim care and maintenance, and resettlement assistance to recent Soviet and satellite escapees in Europe, and to undertake assistance projects on behalf of selected escapee groups or individuals in other areas of the world."

As of May 31, 1954, 11,027 escapees had been resettled from Europe, primarily in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Latin America. On the same date, 24,126 escapees represented the current case load in Europe. This has been a tremendous humanitarian effort which has earned not only the gratitude of those unfortunate ones who were able to escape but of the entire free world.

Heroic Feats of Escapees

The record of those who have used every conceivable means to flee from their Soviet masters is well known. One reads daily of the heroic feats of those who have risked their lives to escape the barbed wire, the mine fields, and the other nefarious impediments that have been erected to prevent this ever-increasing flight to freedom. Unfortunately we also read about those who have lost their lives or have been maimed in those attempts.

Despite the "new look" put on the horrors of Soviet existence by the new regime, the continued opposition among the masses and the spreading revulsion among members of the state apparatus is reflected in the thousands that continue to flee under the threat of life imprisonment in forced labor camps or even punishment by death.

Is it not significant that during the first 6 months of 1954, 4,624 persons were officially registered as escapees from the Soviet Union and the satellite countries? These included 989 from the U.S.S.R., 350 from Albania, 29 Balts, 141 Bulgarians, 1,234 from Czechoslovakia, 791 Hungarians, 844 from Poland, and 246 Rumanians.

In the first half of this year a total of 95,200 East Germans reported to refugee-receiving cen-

ters in West Berlin and the Federal Republic. These figures reflect a continuing pattern of those escaping in earlier years.

I suppose it is because of the extent of this mass flight, and the fact that it reveals the horrible conditions of life under Soviet control and the will of man to revolt against these conditions, that the U.S.S.R. representative has taken it upon himself to attempt to divert attention from the true picture by making wild and false allegations.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION

U.S. delegation press release 1987 dated October 21

The problem of refugees has become such a familiar aspect of life in this present century that we are constantly in danger of forgetting that refugees are human, with the same hopes, the same aspirations, and the same desires that exist within the hearts of us all. In this turbulent world anyone might say and might well say that there but for the grace of God go I.

The refugee problem is a human problem with which we are all concerned. We should all deal with it in a human way. We were asked today to approve a resolution which will make possible another expression of the traditional assistance for refugees which the international community has extended through the United Nations and otherwise. The resolution before us is but a piece of paper which can have meaning only under two circumstances. The first is the provision of generous financial support by a large number of governments. The second is a vigorous implementation of the program to reach permanent solutions for these refugees. I am confident that under the able leadership of Dr. van Heuven Goedhart the refugees will receive efficient and understanding aid. I hope that the governments here will be in a position to provide him with the resources essential to his task.

It is with a good deal of personal satisfaction that I am able to express the support of the United States of America for this resolution and to inform this Assembly that the executive branch of the U.S. Government will request the Congress for authorization and an appropriation for our contribution to this program. I must also state that this obviously cannot be construed as a commitment at this time.

The Soviet delegation has claimed that there would be no refugee problem but for the political and economic purposes of the free world. The shallowness, the falsity of this allegation is so obvious that it needs no further elaboration here. No amount of words and no amount of verbal smog can obscure the true situation. As the High Commissioner so adequately said in his report, it must never be forgotten that the refugees are people who have made a sacrifice for the sake of freedom. There can be no question but that the free world is under obligation to see that their sacrifice is not made meaningless. The problem of the refugee is a concern for all of humanity. It is a problem with only one political aspect, and that is the conflict between the desire of the refugees to remain free and the desire of certain countries that these refugees should be forcibly returned to an uncertain fate in the lands from which they had fled. This demand for forcible repatriation is obviously unacceptable to free peoples anywhere.

The policy of my Government is to continue to make every effort to aid those in need. We are happy to join in support of this project which touches the conscience of the freedom-loving world.

Foreign Forces in Burma

*Statements by Charles H. Mahoney
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

PROGRESS IN EVACUATION

U.S. delegation press release 1975 dated October 12

The statements which we heard yesterday have made it clear that substantial results have been achieved in the evacuation of foreign forces from Burma. The hopes which were expressed in the General Assembly last December have been fulfilled to a marked extent. In fact, the results have surpassed the expectations which were then entertained. According to the final report of the Joint Military Committee,² prepared pursuant to the General Assembly's Resolution of December 8, 1953, a total of 5,742 troops and 881 dependents

were repatriated to Formosa, along with 177 prisoners of war and 186 refugees.

The task was not an easy one. Negotiations to reconcile the interests of several parties seldom go smoothly. It was to be expected that delays and difficult situations would at times arise to plague the course of the operation. Nevertheless, despite the inevitable delays and difficulties, the Joint Military Committee has given us an excellent example of what can be accomplished through peaceful international action and the exercise of good will and perseverance. Although the Government of Burma withdrew from the four-nation committee in September 1953, it continued to cooperate with the Governments of Thailand, China, and the United States through a liaison group which was an integral part of the joint effort. Without the cooperation of Thailand—which cooperation was given wholeheartedly and unstintingly—no evacuation would have been possible. The Government of the Republic of China, for its part, did not rest with the evacuation of the 2,000 at first anticipated. It continued to exert its influence to set in motion a second, then a third, phase of evacuation.

Even before this problem was first discussed in the Seventh General Assembly, the United States fully recognized the justice of Burma's desire to eliminate from its territories these foreign forces, who refused to submit to Burmese authority and who engaged in improper activities on Burmese soil. We have consistently adhered to that view. At the same time we have maintained that there are limits to what can be done through international action. The objective has been a limited one: to persuade as many irregulars as possible to leave voluntarily, and to provide the means for their doing so—thus easing the problem and reducing it to manageable proportions for Burma. I am happy to note that this objective has been achieved.

An undetermined number of irregulars still remain in Burmese territory, despite all efforts to induce their voluntary evacuation. It is our understanding that the majority of these forces are scattered and in disorganized groups. Their overall leadership disappeared with the surrender of the headquarters at Mong Hsat and the other principal bases.

Some of the remnants are reported to have retired to the remote regions of the northern Shan

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Oct. 12 and Oct. 14.

² U. N. doc. A/2740.

State. Others are in the Tenasserim Peninsula, which forms the southern tip of Burma. Still others are reported in the border area between Burma and Thailand. It is indeed heartening to know that the Thai and Burmese Governments are now concerting plans to deal jointly with this mutual problem. It is noteworthy, too, that this useful example of international cooperation has to some extent grown out of the relationships formed during the activity of the Joint Military Committee.

That Committee has finished its task. The evacuation operation in which the Governments of Burma, China, Thailand, and the United States have been jointly engaged—pursuant to the General Assembly's Resolutions of April 23 and December 8, 1953—has been brought to a close by mutual consent of those four Governments.

The United States Government, however, will not abate its interest in the problem. We would be prepared in the future, as we have been in the past, to exchange views with the interested parties regarding such aspects of the problem as they may wish to raise.

In closing, I should like, on behalf of the United States Government, to thank the distinguished representatives of the Governments of Burma, Thailand, and China for their expressions of appreciation for the part played by the United States in the joint operation recently completed.

U. S. POSITION

U.S. delegation press release 1978 dated October 14

I wish to make a few comments on the resolution before us.

I shall not take the time of the Committee to refute the completely false and unfounded charges made by the Polish representative against the United States yesterday. The record of the United States speaks for itself. The Government of Burma, itself, has expressed its appreciation for the persistent efforts on the part of the United States in the peaceful evacuation of the irregular forces from Burma.

I now turn to the draft resolution which is being sponsored by Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.³ We are happy to note that among these countries are those which

pooled their collective judgment in sponsoring the resolution adopted last year by the General Assembly. They have once again given positive evidence of their continued interest in the peaceful settlement of this problem pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution of December 8, 1953.

The U.S. Government will support the 10-power resolution. It is a document which we believe meets the requirements of the situation. It strikes a positive note. It recognizes that the situation in Burma has been eased and the magnitude of the problem considerably reduced. At the same time, in our view, it would be remiss for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution which overlooks the fact that foreign forces still remain in the territory of the Union of Burma and have failed to respond to the declarations of the General Assembly. Burma has a right to expect the continued moral backing of the General Assembly in the task which lies ahead of it before a complete solution of this problem can be accomplished.

The U.S. Government has cooperated willingly during the past year and a half in bringing about the results achieved to date through the Joint Military Committee. That Committee was formed by the Governments of Burma, Thailand, China, and the United States in order to give concrete substance to the recommendations of the General Assembly—and it was only after the interested parties had recognized that the limits of voluntary evacuation had been reached that the Joint Military Committee's activities were terminated.

Our support for this resolution is not only an affirmation of our view that real progress has been made but also a reaffirmation that our interest in Burma's problem will not abate. We stand ready to exchange views with the parties concerned regarding any measures which may be suggested in keeping with the spirit and letter of the resolution before us and the previous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

TEXT OF AGREED RESOLUTION⁴

U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.2 dated October 15

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report (A/2739) dated 27 Sep-

⁴ Adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Oct. 15 by a vote of 57-0-0; China did not participate. In a separate vote on paragraph 2, the U. S., Thailand, and the Soviet bloc abstained. The resolution was approved in plenary session on Oct. 29, 56-0-0.

³ U. N. doc. A/AC.76/L.1 dated Oct. 13.

tember 1954 of the Government of the Union of Burma on the situation relating to the presence of foreign forces in its territory.

Having taken note of the report (A/2740) of the Joint Military Committee for the evacuation of foreign forces from Burma, the efforts of which were directed to securing the removal of these foreign forces,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that nearly 7,000 persons, both foreign forces and their dependants, have been evacuated from Burma and that this constitutes a substantial contribution to the solution of the problem pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly;
2. *Expresses its appreciation* of the efforts of the Governments of the United States of America and of Thailand in helping to bring about this evacuation;
3. *Deplores* the fact that considerable foreign forces with a significant quantity of arms still remain in the territory of the Union of Burma and have failed to respond to the declarations of the General Assembly that they should either leave the territory of the Union of Burma or submit to internment;
4. *Declares* once more that these forces should submit to disarmament and internment;
5. *Assures* the Government of the Union of Burma of its continuing sympathy with and support of the efforts of that Government to bring about a complete solution of this serious problem;
6. *Urges* all States to take all necessary steps to prevent the furnishing of any assistance which may enable foreign forces to remain in the territory of the Union of Burma or to continue their hostile acts against that country;
7. *Invites* the Government of the Union of Burma to report on the situation to the General Assembly as appropriate.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Contracting Parties to GATT

The Department of State announced on October 26 (press release 609) that Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, would be chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opening at Geneva on October 28. The delegation also includes the following:

Vice Chairman

Winthrop G. Brown, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, London

Congressional Members

Senator Albert Gore

Senator Frank Carlson
Representative Jere Cooper
Representative Richard M. Simpson

Public Members

Lamar Fleming, Jr., Anderson, Clayton and Co., Houston, Tex.
Cola Godden Parker, Kimberly-Clark Corp., Neenah, Wis.

Advisers

Kathleen Bell, Department of State
A. Richard DeFelice, Department of Agriculture
Robert Eisenberg, American Legation, Luxembourg
Morris Fields, Department of the Treasury
Joseph Greenwald, Department of State
Walter Hollis, Department of State
Florence Kirlin, Department of State
Gerald D. Morgan, Administrative Assistant to the President
Bernard Norwood, Department of State
Alexander Rosenson, Department of State
Robert E. Simpson, Department of Commerce
Edward F. Thompson, Department of the Treasury
Leonard Weiss, Department of State
Clayton E. Whipple, Department of Agriculture

Secretary of Delegation

Henry F. Nichol, Department of State

Technical Secretary

Virginia McClung, Department of State

The Ninth Session will deal primarily with a proposed revision of the GATT. In his message of March 30, 1954, to the Congress, the President recommended that the GATT be renegotiated with a view to simplifying and strengthening the instrument in order to make it contribute more effectively to a workable system of world trade. He also stated that the renegotiated organizational provisions of the agreement would be submitted to the Congress early next year for its approval.

The GATT was originally developed in 1947 to lay down a set of rules for the conduct of international trade. The current review will take into consideration the improved world economic situation since 1947. It is hoped that this improvement will make possible further relaxation of restrictions now imposed by some countries on the import of U.S. goods. The review will also consider the need of underdeveloped countries to develop and strengthen their economies. Provisions of the agreement affecting international trade in agricultural commodities are also expected to be examined during the review.

U.S.-Belgian Agreement on Defense Use of Technology

Press release 581 dated October 18

The Secretary of State announced on October 18 the signing of an agreement with Belgium to facilitate the interchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. The agreement was signed in Brussels on October 12 by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, and U. S. Ambassador Frederick M. Alger, Jr.

The agreement is expected to foster the exchange of technology for defense purposes both between the Governments of Belgium and the United States and between the private industries of the two countries. Thus it should benefit the efforts of both countries in providing for their national defense and in contributing to the mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

This agreement with Belgium is the third of a series being negotiated with the NATO countries, and with Japan, to be signed to date. Similar agreements have been signed with Italy and the United Kingdom.

The agreements recognize that privately owned technology should, to the greatest extent practicable, be exchanged through commercial agreements between owners and users. They also stipulate that rights of private owners of patents and technical information should be fully recognized and protected in accordance with laws applicable to such rights. Other provisions are intended to assure fair treatment of private owners when they deal directly with a foreign government and in cases in which private information communicated through government channels might be used or disclosed without authorization. Another feature of the agreements relates to arrangements by which owners of patentable inventions placed under secrecy by one government may obtain comparable protection in the other country.

The agreements also provide as a general rule that government-owned inventions shall be interchanged for defense purposes on a royalty-free basis.

Each of the agreements provides for the establishment of a Technical Property Committee to be composed of a representative of each Government. These Committees are charged with general responsibility for considering and making recommendations on any matters relating to the agreements brought before them by either Government. One of the specific functions of the Committees is to make recommendations to the Governments, either in particular cases or in general, concerning disparities in their laws affecting the compensation of owners of patents and technical information.

The U.S. representative to the bilateral committees in Europe is assigned to the Office of the U.S. Special Representatives in Europe, 2 Rue St. Florentin, Paris.

The U.S. representatives on the Technical Property Committees are backstopped by the Inter-agency Technical Property Committee for Defense, chaired by the Department of Defense and including representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Government Patents Board. This Committee is assisted by a business advisory group representing the primary industries concerned with defense production.

Treaty of Friendship With Greece Proclaimed

Press release 597 dated October 21

The President proclaimed on October 18, 1954, the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Greece. The treaty was signed at Athens on August 3, 1951. It was approved, subject to a reservation respecting the practice of professions, by the U.S. Senate on July 21, 1953, and by the Greek Parliament on June 1, 1954. Instruments of ratification were exchanged at Athens on September 13, 1954, and by its terms the treaty entered into force 1 month thereafter on October 13, 1954.

Entry into force of the new treaty establishes a comprehensive and formal set of advanced standards to govern basic economic relations between the United States and Greece, and to serve as a potential means of directing the future development of those relations along mutually beneficial lines. It contains provisions on basic per-

sonal freedoms, property rights, investment and business activities generally, exchange regulations, the treatment of imports and exports, shipping, and other matters affecting the status and activities of the citizens and enterprises of either country when within the territories of the other.

U.S. and Mexico To Negotiate Broadcasting Agreement

Press release 615 dated October 28

The United States has accepted the invitation of Mexico and will send a delegation to Mexico City to begin discussions with Mexican authorities on standard-band broadcasting on November 4, 1954. The U.S. delegation will be headed by Rosel H. Hyde, Commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission, and will include officials from the Fcc and the Department of State and from industry.

The primary purpose of the meeting will be to negotiate an agreement on standard-band broadcasting between the two Governments. The previous basic agreements between the United States and Mexico in this field have expired.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Copyright

Universal copyright convention and three related protocols. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952.¹

Ratification deposited: Haiti, September 1, 1954.

Accession deposited: Laos, August 19, 1954.

Postal Matters

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution; and provisions regarding air-mail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.

Ratification deposited: Rumania, September 27, 1954.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Paris revision, 1949) annexed to the international telecommunication convention (Atlantic City, 1947), and final protocol. Signed at Paris August 5, 1949. Entered into force July 1, 1950. TIAS 2175.

Acceptance deposited: Mexico, September 13, 1954.

BILATERAL

Germany

Agreement concerning the treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights of December 8, 1923, as amended (44 Stat. 2132 and 49 Stat. 3258). Signed at Bonn June

3, 1953. Ratified by the President October 8, 1954. Instruments of ratification exchanged October 22, 1954. *Entered into force:* October 22, 1954.

Guatemala

Agreement amending agreement of May 19, 1943 (57 Stat. 1111) to provide for completion of construction of the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 28 and August 28, 1954. Entered into force August 28, 1954.

India

Agreement relating to copyright relations. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 21, 1954. Entered into force October 21, 1954; operative retroactively from August 15, 1947. Presidential proclamation issued October 21, 1954.

Ryukyu Islands

Parcel post agreement, and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo July 19, 1954 by the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands and at Washington July 30, 1954 by the U.S. Postmaster General. Ratified by the President August 23, 1954. Entered into force October 15, 1954.

United Kingdom

Supplementary protocol amending the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income of April 16, 1945 (TIAS 1546) as modified by the supplementary protocol of June 6, 1946 (TIAS 1546). Signed at Washington May 25, 1954.

Ratified by the President: September 22, 1954.

STATUS LIST ²

Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 2899.

Countries which have accepted the regulations

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Date of acceptance</i>
Australia.....	Dec. 9, 1949
Belgium.....	July 19, 1951
Brazil.....	Sept. 27, 1949
Bulgaria.....	Dec. 15, 1953
Burma.....	Dec. 23, 1949
Canada.....	July 15, 1949
Chile.....	May 23, 1949
Colombia.....	Oct. 10, 1952
Denmark.....	Nov. 28, 1949
Dominican Republic.....	Aug. 3, 1949
Ecuador.....	Dec. 13, 1949
Egypt.....	Sept. 8, 1951
Finland.....	Sept. 6, 1951
France.....	Apr. 23, 1949
Germany.....	Jan. 22, 1954
Greece.....	June 24, 1950
Haiti.....	May 26, 1954
Hungary.....	Feb. 1, 1952
Iceland.....	Aug. 19, 1949
India.....	Mar. 28, 1950
Iraq.....	Aug. 8, 1949
Ireland.....	Oct. 16, 1950
Israel.....	Dec. 29, 1953
Italy.....	Feb. 19, 1951
Liberia.....	Dec. 30, 1953
Mexico.....	Nov. 18, 1949
Netherlands.....	June 2, 1949
New Zealand.....	May 23, 1949

¹ Not in force.

² As of Sept. 27, 1954.

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Date of acceptance</i>
Nicaragua.....	Dec. 23, 1949
Norway.....	July 4, 1952
Pakistan.....	Nov. 23, 1949
Panama.....	Feb. 4, 1954
Peru.....	Sept. 4, 1952
Philippines.....	Mar. 3, 1953
Poland.....	Aug. 12, 1949
Portugal.....	Feb. 24, 1953
Rumania.....	Jan. 10, 1952
Spain.....	Aug. 5, 1950
Sweden.....	Mar. 4, 1950
Turkey.....	Nov. 27, 1950
Union of South Africa.....	July 24, 1950
U. S. S. R.....	July 19, 1951
United Kingdom.....	June 14, 1950
United States.....	Oct. 26, 1951
Venezuela.....	Dec. 28, 1953
Yugoslavia.....	Oct. 7, 1949

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 601 dated October 22

The Department of State announced on October 30 the publication of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Volume V, The American Republics*. This is the last of the series of five volumes of diplomatic correspondence to be published for the year 1937.

The multilateral negotiations covered by the documentation in this volume are about equally concerned with economic and political questions. Economic matters are emphasized in the correspondence on bilateral relations between the United States and other American Republics. Such correspondence comprises three-fourths of this 800-page volume.

In the record on multilateral negotiations a major portion of the documents relates to three subjects: the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, construction of the Inter-American Highway, and a proposal by the United States to lease destroyers to the American Republics for training purposes. The latter proposal (pp. 149-174) and a suggestion by the President of Colombia that the United States and Colombia cooperate in surveillance of areas adjacent to the Pan-

ama Canal (pp. 438-439) are evidence of an awareness among the American Republics of the coming of World War II.

Discussions concerning possible reciprocal trade agreements and efforts to secure equitable treatment for American business interests are the chief subjects of bilateral diplomacy dealt with in this volume. Trade agreement talks were held with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Equitable treatment for American business interests was the subject of discussions with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.

Copies of this volume (V, 807 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$3.75 each.

THE DEPARTMENT

Designations

Christopher H. Phillips as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, effective October 15 (press release 579).

Victor Purse as Deputy Chief of Protocol, effective October 10.

Charlton Ogburn, Jr., as Chief of the Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, effective October 10.

Office Designation

The following office designation is effective September 22 under the Bureau of Inspection, Security, and Consular Affairs: Departmental Inspection Service (DI).

FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointment

The President on October 11 appointed Gerald A. Drew to be Ambassador to Bolivia.

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to October 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 579 of October 15, 581 of October 18, 597 of October 21, and 601 and 603 of October 22.

No.	Date	Subject
*605	10/25	Woodward: Swearing-in ceremony.
*606	10/26	Hearings on Philippine trade.
†607	10/26	Delegation to metal trades meeting.
608	10/27	Holland: Preview of Rio Conference.
609	10/26	Delegation to GATT meeting.
610	10/28	Iranian oil agreement ratified.
*611	10/27	Educational exchange.
†612	10/27	Exchange of publications with Germany.
†613	10/28	Merchant: U.S. diplomacy.
614	10/28	Visit of Yoshida (rewrite).
615	10/28	Radio talks with Mexico.
616	10/29	Friendship treaty with Germany.
617	10/29	Dulles: Signing of friendship treaty.
618	10/29	Aid to Guatemala.
*619	10/29	Death of Bundestag president.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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1937, Volume V, The American Republics

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Copies of this volume may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.75 each.

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7353 / 7 / 30

The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 303

November 15, 1954



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Boston Public Library
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DEC 28 1954



The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXI, No. 803 • PUBLICATION 5667

November 15, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:

52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

Results of Paris Conference

The Department of State this month released a publication entitled London and Paris Agreements, September–October 1954 (for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., 45 cents) containing documents on the recent London and Paris conferences. The volume also includes the text of Secretary Dulles' report to the President and the Cabinet on October 25. Reprinted below are texts of the agreements signed at Paris on October 23 relating to NATO, to the Brussels Treaty of 1948, to the occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to Berlin.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NATO

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty, and

Having noted that the Federal Republic of Germany has by a declaration dated 3rd October, 1954,¹ accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken upon its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of that Treaty, and

¹ For text of the Final Act of the London Conference, Section V of which contains the Oct. 3 declarations, see BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515.

Having further noted that all member governments have associated themselves with the declaration also made on 3rd October, 1954, by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic¹ in connection with the aforesaid declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Agree as follows:

Article I

Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the Federal Republic of Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of that Treaty.

Article II

The present Protocol shall enter into force, when (a) each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified to the Government of the United States of America its acceptance thereof, (b) all instruments of ratification of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgium Government, and (c) all instruments of ratification or approval of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of the United States of America shall inform the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each notification of acceptance of the present Protocol and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duty certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Representatives, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Protocol.

SIGNED at Paris the twenty-third day of October nineteen hundred and fifty four.

For Belgium: P. H. SPAAK
For Canada: L. B. PEARSON
For Denmark: H. C. HANSEN
For France: P. MENDÈS-FRANCE
For Greece: S. STEPHANOPOULOS
For Iceland: KRISTIN GUDMUNDSSON
For Italy: G. MARTINO
For the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg: Jos. BECH
For Netherlands: J. W. BEYEN
For Norway: HALVARD LANGE
For Portugal: PAULO CUNHA
For Turkey: F. KÖPRÜLÜ
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern-Ireland: ANTHONY EDEN
For the United States of America: JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Resolution To Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference Concerning the Powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

1. *Recognising* the necessity of strengthening the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of reinforcing the machinery for the collective defence of Europe, and desirous of specifying the conditions governing joint examination of the defence effort of member countries,

2. *Recalls* that:

(a) the resources which member nations intend to devote to their defence effort as well as the level, composition and quality of the forces which the member nations are contributing to the defence of the North Atlantic area are each year subject to collective examination in the NATO Annual Review for the purpose of reaching agreement on force goals, taking into account expected mutual aid;

(b) the defence expenditures incurred by the member nations and the extent to which the recommendations emerging from the Annual Re-

view have been carried out are the subject of periodical review during the year.

3. *Agrees* with the terms of the Agreement on Forces of Western European Union;² and that with respect to the forces which the members of Western European Union will place under NATO Command on the mainland of Europe and for which maximum figures have been established in that Agreement, if at any time during the NATO Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits established in this Agreement, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to unanimous approval by the members of Western European Union, expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. *Decides* that all forces of member nations stationed in the area of the Allied Command Europe shall be placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe or other appropriate NATO Command and under the direction of the NATO military authorities with the exception of those forces intended for the defence of overseas territories and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

5. *Invites* member nations to make an initial report for consideration and recognition by the Council on those forces which they plan to maintain within the area of Allied Command Europe for the common defence, but not to place under the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, taking into account the provisions of relevant NATO directives bearing on that subject; the initial report will include a broad statement of the reason for which the above forces are not so placed. Thereafter, if any changes are proposed, the North Atlantic Council action on the NATO Annual Review will constitute recognition as to the suitability and size of forces to be placed under the authority of the appropriate NATO Command and those to be retained under national command.

6. *Notes* that the agreements concluded within the framework of the Organization of Western European Union on the internal defence and police forces which the members of that Organization

² See p. 724.

will maintain on the mainland shall be notified to the North Atlantic Council.

7. *Agrees*, in the interest of most effective collective defence, that in respect of combat forces in the area of Allied Command Europe and under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

(a) all deployments shall be in accordance with NATO strategy;

(b) the location of forces in accordance with NATO operational plans shall be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned;

(c) forces under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and within the area of Allied Command Europe shall not be redeployed or used operationally within that area without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, subject to political guidance furnished by the North Atlantic Council, when appropriate, through normal channels.

8. *Decides That*:

(a) integration of forces at Army Group and Tactical Air Force level shall be maintained;

(b) in view of the powerful combat support units and logistic support organization at Army level, integration at that level and associated Air Force level will be the rule, wherever formations of several nationalities are operating in the same area and on a common task, provided there are no overriding objections from the point of view of military effectiveness;

(c) wherever military efficiency permits, in light of the size, location and logistic support of forces, integration at lower levels, both in the land and air forces, shall be achieved to the maximum extent possible;

(d) proposals to the North Atlantic Council, indicating any increases in commonly financed items of expenditure, such as infrastructure which might be entailed by the adoption of such measures, should be submitted by the NATO military authorities.

9. *Agrees* that, in order to improve the capability of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to discharge his responsibilities in the defence of Allied Command Europe, his responsibilities and powers for the logistic support of the forces placed under his authority shall be extended.

10. *Considers* that these increased responsibilities and powers should include authority:

(a) to establish, in consultation with the na-

tional authorities concerned, requirements for the provision of logistic resources;³

(b) to determine, in agreement with the national authorities concerned, their geographic distribution;

(c) to establish, in consultation with these authorities, logistic priorities for the raising, equipping and maintenance of units;

(d) to direct the utilisation, for meeting his requirements, of those portions of the logistic support systems made available to him by the appropriate authorities;

(e) to co-ordinate and supervise the use, for logistical purposes, of NATO common infrastructure facilities and of those national facilities made available to him by the national authorities.

11. *Agrees* that, in order to ensure that adequate information is obtained and made available to the appropriate authorities about the forces placed under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe including reserve formations and their logistic support within the area of Allied Command Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe shall be granted increased authority to call for reports regarding the level and effectiveness of such forces and their armaments, equipment and supplies as well as the organization and location of their logistic arrangements. He shall also make field inspections within that area as necessary.

12. *Invites* nations to submit to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe such reports to this end as he may call for from time to time; and to assist inspection within the area of Allied Command Europe by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of these forces and their logistic support arrangements as necessary.

13. *Confirms* that the powers exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime extend not only to the organization into an effective integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training; that in this field, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime; and that he should receive facilities from member nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of Allied Command Europe earmarked for that Command.

³ By logistic resources should be understood all the matériel, supplies, installations and parts thereof necessary for the prolonged conduct of combat operations. [Footnote in the original.]

14. *Directs* the NATO military authorities to arrange for the designation by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of a highranking officer of his Command who will be authorised to transmit regularly to the Council of Western European Union information relating to the forces of the members of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe acquired as a result of the reports and inspections mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 12 in order to enable that Council to establish that the limits laid down in the special agreement mentioned in paragraph 3 above are being observed.

15. *Agrees* that the expression "the area of Allied Command Europe" as used throughout this Resolution shall not include North Africa; and that this Resolution does not alter the present status of the United Kingdom and United States forces in the Mediterranean.

16. *Directs* the NATO Military Committee to initiate the necessary changes in the directives to give effect to the above policies and objectives of the North Atlantic Council.

Resolution on Results of the Four and Nine Power Meetings⁴

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

Recognising that all the arrangements arising out of the London Conference form part of one general settlement which is directly or indirectly of concern to all the NATO Powers and has therefore been submitted to the Council for information or decision;

Have Learnt with satisfaction of the arrangements agreed between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and of the Federal Republic of Germany for the termination of the occupation régime in the Federal Republic as set forth in the Protocol communicated to the Council;

Welcome the decision of the Brussels Treaty Powers to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty as modified and completed by the Protocols and other documents communicated to the Council, and hereby record their agreement with the provisions of those Protocols and documents insofar as they concern action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

⁴ Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on Oct. 22. For text of the communique issued on the same date, see p. 732.

Welcome the extension of the Brussels Treaty as an important step toward the achievement of European unity; and express confidence that there will be the closest co-operation between the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which remains the foundation of the security and progress of the Atlantic Community.

Take Note with satisfaction of the statements made on 29th September 1954 in London by the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and of the declaration by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom concerning the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe;⁵
Finally,

Record their deep satisfaction at the happy conclusion of all the above arrangements which together constitute a decisive step in fortifying the North Atlantic Alliance and uniting the Free World.

Resolution of Association With the Tripartite Declaration of October 3, 1954

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,

Welcoming the declaration made in London by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 3rd October, 1954, and the related declaration made on the same occasion by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic,

Notes With Satisfaction that the representatives of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have, on behalf of their Governments, today associated themselves with the aforesaid declaration of the Three Powers.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE BRUSSELS TREATY

Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To Accede to the Brussels Treaty

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Parties to the Brussels Treaty of March the 17th, 1948, for collaboration in economic, social and cul-

⁵ BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 523.

tural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence;⁶

Aware that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy;

Noting with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe;

Convinced that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the Treaty;

Decide,

in application of Article IX of the Treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to this Treaty, as modified and completed in accordance with the decisions of the Conference held in London from September the 28th to October the 3rd 1954, which are recorded in its Final Act.

Protocol No. I Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March the 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand,

and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

Inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security;

Desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe;

Convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims;

Having taken into consideration the decisions

⁶ For text, see *London and Paris Agreements*, p. 57, and BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 528.

of the London Conference as set out in the Final Act of October the 3rd, 1954 and its Annexes;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Who, having exhibited their full powers found in good and due form,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty as modified and completed by the present Protocol.

The High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol consider the Protocol on Forces of Western European Union (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. II), the Protocol on the Control of Armaments and its Annexes (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. III), and the Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. IV) to be an integral part of the present Protocol.

Article II

The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty: "to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" shall be modified to read: "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe".

The opening words of the 2nd paragraph of Article I shall read: "The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VIII. . .".

Article III

The following new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IV: "In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization".

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

Articles IV, V, VI and VII of the Treaty will become respectively Article V, VI, VII and VIII.

Article IV

Article VIII of the Treaty (formerly Article VII) shall be modified to read as follows:

"1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organizations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execu-

tion of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.

"2. This Council shall be known as the "Council of Western European Union"; it shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary: in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. IV.

"3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

"4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments".

Article V

A new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IX: "The Council of Western European Union shall make an Annual Report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe".

The Articles VIII, IX and X of the Treaty shall become respectively Articles X, XI and XII.

Article VI

The present Protocol and the other Protocols listed in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

They shall enter into force when all instruments of ratification of the present Protocol have been deposited with the Belgian Government and the instrument of accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other High Contracting Parties and the Government of the United States of America of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Paris this 23rd day of October 1954 in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

For Belgium: P. II. SPAAK

For France: P. MENDÈS-FRANCE

For the Federal Republic of Germany: ADENAUER

For Italy: G. MARTINO

For the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg: JOS. BECH

For the Netherlands: J. W. BEYEN

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern-Ireland: ANTHONY EDEN

Protocol No. II on Forces of Western European Union

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Having consulted the North Atlantic Council,
Have appointed,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. The land and air forces which each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall place under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime on the mainland of Europe shall not exceed in total strength and number of formations:

- (a) for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the maxima laid down for peacetime in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty on the Establishment of a European Defence Community signed at Paris, on 27th May, 1952; and
- (b) for the United Kingdom, four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force;
- (c) for Luxembourg, one regimental combat team.

2. The number of formations mentioned in paragraph 1 may be brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make them suitable for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, provided that the equivalent fighting capacity and total strengths are not exceeded.

3. The statement of these maxima does not commit any of the High Contracting Parties to build up or maintain forces at these levels, but maintains their right to do so if required.

Article 2

As regards naval forces, the contribution to NATO Commands of each of the High Contracting

Parties to the present Protocol shall be determined each year in the course of the Annual Review (which takes into account the recommendations of the NATO military authorities). The naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany shall consist of the vessels and formations necessary for the defensive missions assigned to it by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization within the limits laid down in the Special Agreement mentioned in Article 1, or equivalent fighting capacity.

Article 3

If at any time during the Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Article 4

In order that it may establish that the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2 are being observed, the Council of Western European Union will regularly receive information acquired as a result of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Such information will be transmitted by a high-ranking officer designated for the purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Article 5

The strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be fixed by agreements within the Organization of Western European Union, having regard to their proper functions and needs and to their existing levels.

Article 6

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. She undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decision in the knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in

the event of an acute overseas emergency. If the maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, she will, through Her Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the United Kingdom formations are maintained.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article 1 of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Paris this 23rd day of October, 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

[Signatures same as in Protocol No. I.]

Protocol No. III on the Control of Armaments

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Have appointed . . . ,

Have agreed as follows:

Part I—Armaments not to be manufactured

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, take note of and record their agreement with the Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (made in London on 3rd October 1954, and annexed hereto as Annex I)^{6a} in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The types of armaments referred to in this

^{6a} *London and Paris Agreements*, p. 46; *BULLETIN* of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 519.

Article are defined in Annex II.⁷ These armaments shall be more closely defined and the definitions brought up to date by the Council of Western European Union.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, also take note of and record their agreement with the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in the same Declaration that certain further types of armaments will not be manufactured in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, except that if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a recommendation for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the content of the list of these armaments is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submits a request accordingly, such an amendment or cancellation may be made by a resolution of the Council of Western European Union passed by a two-thirds majority. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are listed in Annex III.⁸

Part II—Armaments to be controlled

Article 3

When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the High Contracting Parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union.

Article 4

Without prejudice to the foregoing Articles, the types of armaments listed in Annex IV will be controlled to the extent and in the manner laid down in Protocol No. IV.

Article 5

The Council of Western European Union may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris on the 23rd day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single

copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

[Signatures same as in Protocol No. I.]

Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Having agreed in accordance with Article IV of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, to establish an Agency for the Control of Armaments,

Have appointed

Have agreed as follows:

Part I—Constitution

Article 1

The Agency for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") shall be responsible to the Council of Western European Union (hereinafter referred to as "the Council"). It shall consist of a Director assisted by a Deputy Director, and supported by a staff drawn equitably from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, Members of Western European Union.

Article 2

The Director and his staff, including any officials who may be put at the disposal of the Agency by States Members, shall be subject to the general administrative control of the Secretary General of Western European Union.

Article 3

The Director shall be appointed by unanimous decision of the Council for a period of five years and shall not be eligible for re-appointment. He shall be responsible for the selection of his staff in accordance with the principle mentioned in Article 1 and in consultation with the individual States Members concerned. Before filling the posts of Deputy Director and of the Heads of Departments of the Agency, the Director shall

⁷ London and Paris Agreements, p. 47.

⁸ Ibid., p. 48.

obtain from the Council approval of the persons to be appointed.

Article 4

1. The Director shall submit to the Council, through the Secretary General, a plan for the organization of the Agency. The organization should provide for departments dealing respectively with:

- (a) the examination of statistical and budgetary information to be obtained from the members of Western European Union and from the appropriate NATO authorities;
- (b) inspections, test checks and visits;
- (c) administration.

2. The organization may be modified by decision of the Council.

Article 5

The costs of maintaining the Agency shall appear in the budget of Western European Union. The Director shall submit, through the Secretary General, to the Council an annual estimate of these costs.

Article 6

Officials of the Agency shall be bound by the full NATO code of security. They shall in no circumstances reveal information obtained in connexion with the execution of their official tasks except and only in the performance of their duties towards the Agency.

Part II—Functions

Article 7

1. The tasks of the Agency shall be:

- (a) to satisfy itself that the undertakings set out in Protocol No. III not to manufacture certain types of armaments mentioned in Annexes II and III to that Protocol are being observed;
- (b) to control, in accordance with Part III of the present Protocol, the level of stocks of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III held by each member of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe. This control shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

2. For the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Agency shall:

- (a) scrutinise statistical and budgetary information supplied by members of Western European Union and by the NATO authorities;
- (b) undertake on the mainland of Europe test checks, visits and inspections at production plants, depots and forces (other

- than depots or forces under NATO authority);
- (c) report to the Council.

Article 8

With respect to forces and depots under NATO authority, test checks, visits and inspections shall be undertaken by the appropriate authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the case of the forces and depots under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Agency shall receive notification of the information supplied to the Council through the medium of the high-ranking officer to be designated by him.

Article 9

The operations of the Agency shall be confined to the mainland of Europe.

Article 10

The Agency shall direct its attention to the production of end-items and components listed in Annexes II, III and IV of Protocol No. III, and not to processes. It shall ensure that materials and products destined for civilian use are excluded from its operations.

Article 11

Inspections by the Agency shall not be of a routine character, but shall be in the nature of tests carried out at irregular intervals. Such inspections shall be conducted in a spirit of harmony and co-operation. The Director shall propose to the Council detailed regulations for the conduct of the inspections providing, inter alia, for due process of law in respect of private interests.

Article 12

For their test checks, visits and inspections the members of the Agency shall be accorded free access on demand to plants and depots, and the relevant accounts and documents shall be made available to them. The Agency and national authorities shall co-operate in such checks and inspections, and in particular national authorities may, at their own request, take part in them.

Part III—Levels of Stocks of Armaments

Article 13

1. Each member of Western European Union shall, in respect of its forces under NATO authority stationed on the mainland of Europe, furnish annually to the Agency statements of:

- (a) the total quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III required in relation to its forces;
- (b) the quantities of such armaments cur-

rently held at the beginning of the control years;

- (c) the programmes for attaining the total quantities mentioned in (a) by:
- (i) manufacture in its own territory;
 - (ii) purchase from another country;
 - (iii) end-item aid from another country.

2. Such statements shall also be furnished by each member of Western European Union in respect of its internal defence and police forces and its other forces under national control stationed on the mainland of Europe including a statement of stocks held there for its forces stationed overseas.

3. The statements shall be correlated with the relevant submissions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Article 14

As regards the forces under NATO authority, the Agency shall verify in consultation with the appropriate NATO authorities that the total quantities stated under Article 13 are consistent with the quantities recognised as required by the units of the members concerned under NATO authority, and with the conclusions and data recorded in the documents approved by the North Atlantic Council in connexion with the NATO Annual Review.

Article 15

As regards internal defence and police forces, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified by the members, provided that they remain within the limits laid down in the further agreements to be concluded by the members of Western European Union on the strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe.

Article 16

As regards other forces remaining under national control, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified to the Agency by the members.

Article 17

The figures furnished by members for the total quantities of armaments under Articles 15 and 16 shall correspond to the size and mission of the forces concerned.

Article 18

The provisions of Articles 14 and 17 shall not apply to the High Contracting Parties and to the categories of weapons covered in Article 3 of Protocol No. III. Stocks of the weapons in question shall be determined in conformity with the

procedure laid down in that Article and shall be notified to the Agency by the Council of the Western European Union.

Article 19

The figures obtained by the Agency under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 18 shall be reported to the Council as appropriate levels for the current control year for the members of Western European Union. Any discrepancies between the figures stated under Article 13, paragraph 1, and the quantities recognised under Article 14 will also be reported.

Article 20

1. The Agency shall immediately report to the Council if inspection, or information from other sources, reveals:

(a) the manufacture of armaments of a type which the member concerned has undertaken not to manufacture;

(b) the existence of stocks of armaments in excess of the figures and quantities ascertained in accordance with Articles 19 and 22.

2. If the Council is satisfied that the infraction reported by the Agency is not of major importance and can be remedied by prompt local action, it will so inform the Agency and the member concerned, who will take the necessary steps.

3. In the case of other infractions, the Council will invite the member concerned to provide the necessary explanation within a period to be determined by the Council; if this explanation is considered unsatisfactory, the Council will take the measures which it deems necessary in accordance with a procedure to be determined.

4. Decisions of the Council under this Article will be taken by majority vote.

Article 21

Each member shall notify to the Agency the names and locations of the depots on the mainland of Europe containing armaments subject to control and of the plants on the mainland of Europe manufacturing such armaments, or, even though not in operation, specifically intended for the manufacture of such armaments.

Article 22

Each member of Western European Union shall keep the Agency informed of the quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III, which are to be exported from its territory on the mainland of Europe. The Agency shall be entitled to satisfy itself that the armaments concerned are in fact exported. If the level of stocks of any item subject to control appears abnormal, the Agency shall further be entitled to enquire into the orders for export.

The Council shall transmit to the Agency information received from the Governments of the United States of America and Canada respecting military aid to be furnished to the forces on the mainland of Europe of members of Western European Union.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Paris this 23rd day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

[Signatures same as in Protocol No. I.]

Resolution on Production and Standardisation of Armaments⁹

The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Anxious to increase the effectiveness of their common Defence forces to the maximum,

Desirous of ensuring the best possible use of their available armament credits by means of the rational organization of production,

Noting the importance in this connection of standardising weapons and weapon components,

Desirous of facilitating any agreements to this and between all or certain of the Seven Powers:

(1) Recall the decision taken at the London Conference to set up a Working Party to study the draft directives submitted by the French Government on 1st October 1954 and such other documents as might subsequently be submitted on the problem of the production and standardisation of armaments.

(2) Agree to convene a Working Group in Paris on the 17th January 1955 of the Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the

⁹ Adopted by the Nine-Power Conference on Oct. 21.

United Kingdom, to study the draft directives and other documents referred to in the foregoing paragraph, with a view to submitting proposals to the Council of Western European Union when it comes into being.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OCCUPATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:

Article 1

The Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Finance Convention, the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952, the Protocol signed at Bonn on 27 June 1952 to correct certain textual errors in the aforementioned Conventions, and the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952, as amended by the Protocol signed at Bonn on 26 July 1952,¹⁰ shall be amended in accordance with the five Schedules¹¹ to the present Protocol and as so amended shall enter into force (together with subsidiary documents agreed by the Signatory States relating to any of the aforementioned instruments) simultaneously with it.

Article 2

Pending the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution, the following provisions shall apply:

- (1) The rights heretofore held or exercised by the United States of America, the United

¹⁰ For a summary of the Bonn conventions of May 26, 1952, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 888; for texts, see S. Executives Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

¹¹ Schedule I is entitled *Amendments to the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany*; Schedule II, *Amendments to the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany*; Schedule III, *Amendments to the Finance Convention*; Schedule IV, *Amendments to the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation*; Schedule V, *Amendments to the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members*.

For texts, see *London and Paris Agreements*, pp. 65-94.

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall be retained and exercised by them, and nothing in any of the instruments mentioned in Article 1 of the present Protocol shall authorize the enactment, amendment, repeal or deprivation of effect of legislation or, subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, executive action in those fields by any other authority.

- (2) On the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Military Security Board shall be abolished (without prejudice to the validity of any action or decisions taken by it) and the controls in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall thereafter be applied by a Joint Four-Power Commission to which each of the Signatory States shall appoint one representative and which shall take its decisions by majority vote of the four members.
- (3) The Governments of the Signatory States will conclude an administrative agreement which shall provide, in conformity with the provisions of this Article, for the establishment of the Joint Four-Power Commission and its staff and for the organisation of the work.

Article 3

1. The present Protocol shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be deposited by the Signatory States with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The present Protocol and subsidiary documents relating to it agreed between the Signatory States shall enter into force upon the deposit by all the Signatory States of the Instruments of Ratification or Approval as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. The present Protocol shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each Signatory State with certified copies thereof and notify each State of the date of entry into force of the present Protocol.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Representatives duly authorized thereto have signed the present Protocol.

DONE at Paris this 23rd day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:	JOHN FOSTER DULLES
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:	ANTHONY EDEN
For the French Republic:	P. MENDES-FRANCE
For the Federal Republic of Germany:	ADENAUER

Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany

In view of the present international situation and the need to ensure the defence of the free world which require the continuing presence of foreign forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:

Article 1

1. From the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution, forces of the same nationality and effective strength as at that time may be stationed in the Federal Republic.

2. The effective strength of the forces stationed in the Federal Republic pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article may at any time be increased with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. Additional forces of the States parties to the present Convention may enter and remain in the Federal territory with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for training purposes in accordance with the procedures applicable to forces assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, provided that such forces do not remain there for more than thirty days at any one time.

4. The Federal Republic grants to the French, the United Kingdom and the United States forces the right to enter, pass through and depart from the territory of the Federal Republic in transit to or from Austria (so long as their forces continue to be stationed there) or any country Member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the same basis as is usual between Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty or as may be agreed with effect for all Member States by the North Atlantic Council.

Article 2

The present Convention shall be open to accession by any State not a Signatory, which had

forces stationed in the Federal territory on the date of the signature of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany signed at Paris on 23 October 1954. Any such State, desiring to accede to the present Convention, may deposit with the Government of the Federal Republic an Instrument of Accession.

Article 3

1. The present Convention shall expire with the conclusion of a German peace settlement or if at an earlier time the Signatory States agree that the development of the international situation justifies new arrangements.

2. The Signatory States will review the terms of the present Convention at the same time and subject to the same conditions as provided for in Article 10 of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Article 4

1. The present Convention shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States and Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be deposited by them with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany which shall notify each Signatory State of the deposit of each Instrument of Ratification or Approval. The present Convention shall enter into force when all the Signatory States have made such deposit and the Instrument of Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

2. It shall also enter into force on that date as to any acceding State which has previously deposited an Instrument of Accession in accordance with Article 2 of the present Convention and, as to any other acceding State, on the date of the deposit by it of such an Instrument.

3. The present Convention shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each State party to the present Convention with certified copies thereof and of the Instruments of Accession deposited in accordance with Article 2 and will notify each State of the date of the deposit of any Instrument of Accession.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Representatives duly authorized thereto have signed the present Convention.

DONE at Paris this 23rd day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

ANTHONY EDEN

For the French Republic:

P. MENDES-FRANCE

For the Federal Republic of Germany:

ADENAUER

Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic agree as follows:

1. The rights retained by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic after the entry into force of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, which are referred to in the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany as amended by the said Protocol, will be exercised by their respective Chiefs of Mission accredited to the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The Chiefs of Mission will act jointly in the exercise of those rights in the Federal Republic of Germany in matters the Three Powers consider of common concern under the said Protocol and the instruments mentioned in Article 1 thereof.

3. Those rights which relate to Berlin will continue to be exercised in Berlin pursuant to existing procedures, subject to any future modification which may be agreed.

4. This agreement shall enter into force upon the entry into force of the said Protocol.

DONE at Paris on the twenty-third day of October, Nineteen hundred and fifty-four in two texts, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the

United States of America: JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland: ANTHONY EDEN

For the Government of the

French Republic: P. MENDES-FRANCE

With respect to Berlin, in addition to the Allied security guarantees for the city in the London communique of October 3, 1954, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have noted with deep satisfaction the close and friendly cooperation between the Allied and Berlin authorities. The Three Powers are determined to ensure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation. Accordingly, the three Governments have instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the authorities of that city with a view to implementing jointly and to the fullest degree possible the foregoing principles.

Special NAC Ministerial Session

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE¹³

1. The North Atlantic Council held a Ministerial Session in Paris today under the Chairmanship of Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece. This meeting, which was attended by Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers of member countries, dealt with issues of vital importance for the security of the free world, and for the promotion of greater European unity, within the framework of a developing Atlantic Community. In particular, the meeting was called to approve arrangements designed to bring about the full association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West, and a German defence contribution. On the invitation of the Council, Dr. Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, attended the meeting as an observer.

2. The Council noted that all the agreements reached at the London Conference¹⁴ and at the subsequent meetings of the Four and Nine-Power Conferences¹⁵ form part of one general settlement which is directly or indirectly of concern to all the North Atlantic Treaty Powers and which was

accordingly submitted to the Council. The Council welcomed this settlement.

3. The Council was informed of the agreement reached between the Foreign Ministers of France, the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in regard to ending the occupation regime in the Federal Republic.

4. The Council was informed of the agreement reached on the text of four protocols strengthening and extending the scope of the Brussels Treaty Organization—now Western European Union—expanded to provide for the participation of Italy and of the German Federal Republic, and on the text of accompanying documents. The Council welcomed this agreement and agreed with the provisions of the Protocols to the Brussels Treaty insofar as they involve action by the North Atlantic Council or other NATO authorities.

5. The Council welcomed the declaration made in London by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 3rd October, 1954, and the related declaration made on the same occasion by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.¹⁶ It noted with satisfaction that the representatives of the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have today associated themselves with the declaration of the Three Powers.

6. The Council approved a resolution to reinforce the existing machinery for the collective defence of Europe, chiefly by strengthening the powers of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

7. The Council approved a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty inviting the Federal Republic of Germany to join NATO. The Protocol will be signed tomorrow by the fourteen Foreign Ministers, and will enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance, and when all instruments of ratification of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government, and when all instruments of ratification or approval of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

¹² Issued on Oct. 23 by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

¹³ Issued at Paris on Oct. 22.

¹⁴ For text of the final act of the London Conference, see BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515.

¹⁵ For the communique issued on Oct. 21 after the Nine Power Conference, see *ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 638.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 520.

8. The Council heard a statement by the Foreign Minister of Italy on the recent agreements reached on the Trieste problem.¹⁷ The value of these agreements from the Atlantic and European point of view was emphasized.

9. The Council agreed to hold its next Ministerial Meeting on or about 15th December next.

10. The Council reaffirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty remains a basic element in the foreign policies of all member governments. It agreed that there must be the closest possible co-operation between Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in all fields and that any duplication of the work of existing agencies of Nato will be avoided. The Council reaffirmed its unity of purpose in the pursuit of peace and progress. The present conference and the agreements reached represent a new and decisive step in the development of the Atlantic Community.

11. The text of the agreements and documents will be issued separately tomorrow, Saturday, October 23, after the signing ceremony.

White House Consultations on European and Asian Agreements

*Statement by James C. Hagerty
Press Secretary to the President*

White House press release dated October 30

The President met today with the Secretary of State; Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Under Secretary of State; Mr. Douglas MacArthur, Counselor of the State Department; Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Consideration was given to further constitutional procedures with reference to the agreements designed to restore sovereignty to Germany and to bring Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. Similar discussion and consideration was given to the Manila Pact for collective security in Southeast Asia.

The President decided to transmit all of the relevant documents in both these matters to the Senate following its reconvening on November 8th. This is being done with a view to obtaining

the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of such of these instruments as require Senate action.

The President hopes that the Senate will refer these instruments to the Foreign Relations Committee for study and report so that the full Senate would be able to act promptly on these matters when it meets for its new session in January.

Reply to U.S.S.R. on "Atoms for Peace" Program

News Conference Statement by the President

White House press release dated November 3

I thought you might be interested in knowing about recent developments in the "Atoms for Peace" program of the United States.

Today John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, is delivering to Mr. Zaroubin, the Soviet Ambassador, our reply¹ to the Soviet aide memoire of September 22d.² You will recall that this Soviet message indicated that they apparently wanted to renew the negotiations to implement the proposal which I made to the United Nations last December³ for an international pool of fissionable material and information. I hope that this will start a new phase in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations which will be more fruitful than the first phase, during which the Soviets showed a lack of interest in cooperating with the United States to further international cooperation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Later on this week Ambassador Cabot Lodge is going to give a report on American preliminary plans in connection with the international agency in the Political Committee of the United Nations.⁴ This great project is very close to my heart, and I am glad to see that we are making good progress toward establishing the agency. We are determined to get on with this international project whether or not the Soviets participate.

I am glad to be able to tell you also that Morehead Patterson of New York has agreed to serve under Mr. Dulles, in the Department of State, as United States representative to conduct the diplo-

¹ Not printed.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 486.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

⁴ See p. 742.

¹⁷ For text of the agreements, see *ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1954, p. 556.

matic negotiations looking to United States participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency. I am going to see Mr. Patterson tomorrow to tell him about the great importance which I attach to this International Atomic Energy Agency.

Letters of Credence

Spain

The newly appointed Ambassador of Spain, Don José Maria Areilza, Count of Motrico, presented his credentials to the President on November 6. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 630.

U.K.-Egyptian Agreement Regarding Suez Canal Base

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 594 dated October 19

The signing of the final agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom on the Suez Base is an event of far-reaching importance and an occasion for renewed congratulations to both countries.

This action, following the initialing of the agreement in principle last July,¹ marks the successful resolution of a problem which has existed in some form for many years. Its solution has been facilitated by the development of a spirit of mutual confidence between the two countries which augurs well for their future relations.

I believe that the removal of this deterrent to closer cooperation will open a new approach to peaceful relations between the Near Eastern states and other nations of the free world. It is my hope that this cooperation may now develop fully to the mutual advantage of all concerned and will strengthen the stability and security of the area.

Egypt now assumes new and fuller responsibilities as the military base in the Suez Canal Zone passes from British to Egyptian control. I am pleased to note that in accepting these responsibili-

ties Egypt has reiterated in the agreement its adherence to the principle of freedom of transit through the Canal in conformity with the 1888 convention.

TEXT OF MAIN AGREEMENT²

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Egypt,

Desiring to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from Egyptian territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth in Part A of Annex I within a period of twenty months from the date of signature of the present Agreement.

Article 2

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the Treaty of Alliance signed in London on the 26th of August 1936, with the Agreed Minute, Exchanged Notes, Convention concerning the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt and all other subsidiary agreements, is terminated.

Article 3

Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in Appendix A to Annex II, shall be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the present agreement. To this end they shall be organised in accordance with the provisions of Annex II.

Article 4

In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on the 13th of April 1950, or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively. These facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.

Article 5

In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez Canal Base area in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, these forces shall withdraw immediately upon the cessation of the hostilities referred to in that Article.

² For texts of an annex on withdrawal, an annex on the organization of the Base, 17 exchanges of notes, and an agreed minute, see British Command Paper 9298.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 9, 1954, p. 198.

In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States or on Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

Article 7

The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft under Royal Air Force control. For the clearance of any flights of such aircraft, the Government of the Republic of Egypt shall accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the aircraft of any other foreign country with the exception of States parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States. The landing and servicing facilities mentioned above shall be afforded at Egyptian Airfields in the Suez Canal Base area.

Article 8

The two Contracting Governments recognise that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th of October 1888.

Article 9

(a) The United Kingdom is accorded the right to move any British equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion.

(b) There shall be no increase above the level of supplies as agreed upon in Part C of Annex II without the consent of the Government of the Republic of Egypt.

Article 10

The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 11

The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement shall be considered as an integral part of it.

Article 12

(a) The present Agreement shall remain in force for the period of seven years from the date of its signature.

(b) During the last twelve months of that period the two Contracting Governments shall consult together to decide on such arrangements as may be necessary upon the termination of the Agreement.

(c) Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any extension of the Agreement it shall terminate seven years after the date of signature and the Government of the United Kingdom shall take away or dispose of their property then remaining in the Base.

The present Agreement shall have effect as though it had come into force on the date of signature. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Cairo, this nineteenth day of October, 1954, in duplicate, in the English and Arabic languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ANTHONY NUTTING.

RALPH SKRINE STEVENSON.

F. R. BENSON.

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER.

ABDEL HAKIM AMER.

ABDEL LATIF BAGHDADI.

SALAH SALEM.

MAHMOUD FAWZI.

U.S. Aid to Viet-Nam

U.S. Ambassador Donald R. Heath on October 23 delivered the following message from President Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a *de facto* rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such

aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

With reference to the President's remarks concerning the provision of American aid directly to the Vietnamese Government, the decision was announced in a joint communique issued at Washington on September 29 at the end of the U.S.-French talks on Indochina¹ that the channel for French and for United States economic aid, financial support, and other assistance to Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam would be direct to each state. It was also announced that the United States representatives would begin discussions soon with the respective governments of the three States regarding direct aid.

United States economic assistance to Viet-Nam, as well as to Cambodia and Laos, has been provided directly to these states for some time.

United States financial assistance for the support of the armed forces of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, however, has until now been provided through the French Government. As soon as arrangements can be made, financial support for the Vietnamese National Army will be provided directly to the Government of Viet-Nam, as will be done in the case of Cambodia and Laos.

The decision to provide assistance through direct channels conforms with the sense of Congress as expressed in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which provides that, as far as possible, assistance furnished to Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam should be direct. It also conforms with the previously expressed wishes of the Vietnamese Government, which signified its full accord with the decision.

Relative to the President's reference to United States assistance in the movement of Vietnamese citizens from areas passing under Communist military control, the number so far evacuated, largely through assistance provided to the Vietnamese Government by the United States and France, now comes to over 400,000. Of these, approxi-

mately 140,000 have been evacuated by the U.S. Navy. The United States is also assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the resettlement of refugees.

Settlement of Debts Represented by German Dollar Bonds

Press release 573 dated October 12

The Allied High Commission for Germany announced on October 1 that the Combined Steel Group had approved and issued an order under Allied High Commission Law 27 for the settlement of the debts represented by the U. S. dollar bonds issued by the Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G. and one of its subsidiaries.

The settlement will result in transferring the debts in the total amount of approximately \$25 million to nine of the new companies which were formed out of the assets of Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G., i. L.

There will be no joint liability for the new debts, but the companies concerned will each issue new bonds expressed in dollars to the amount of their liability and will deliver these new bonds to depositories in the United States, the Irving Trust Company and the National City Bank of New York. The depositories will in turn issue participation certificates to the holders of bonds which have been validated in accordance with the validation law for German foreign currency bonds, in exchange for the old bonds, giving each such bondholder an undivided interest in the new obligation held by the depository.

Since participation certificates will be issued only for validated bonds, all holders of old bonds are urged to register them for validation as soon as possible with the Validation Board for German Dollar Bonds, 30 Broad Street, New York, N. Y. The depositories will collect the interest due and the amortization payments for transmittal to the holders of the participation certificates.

A guaranty has been given by the Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau, Frankfurt/Main, that the deutschemark equivalent of the payments of interest and principal will be forthcoming on the due date.

The new obligation will bear interest as provided for by the London agreement of February

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 534.

27, 1953, and will mature on January 1, 1968.

Claimants who do not agree with this procedure may appeal to the Board of Review as provided for in the Allied High Commission Laws 27 and

76 within 6 months of the date of issue of the order. Such appeals may be addressed to the board in care of the Allied High Commission at Bonn, Germany.

Some Problems of Charter Review

by David W. Wainhouse

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

First, let me commend your initiative in organizing this seminar. In meeting here today to study the problems of charter review, you are answering the call of the Secretary of State to contribute your views to your Government. This is a great tribute to the working of responsible American democracy.

Those who participated in the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 have not forgotten the warmth of your hospitality and the beauty of your city. Your consideration of the many problems of charter review should be especially well informed because so many of you were able to observe at close hand the birth of the United Nations.

Secretary Dulles, as you know, has already stated that he favors the holding of a review conference. If the General Assembly next fall votes in favor of holding the conference, as is expected, it will presumably take place either in 1956 or at least by 1957.

Meanwhile, the task of preparation has been undertaken. The Secretary has called upon the American public to help develop the position which the United States should take at the review conference. This in itself is an historic step in foreign affairs. It was not so long ago that the conduct of foreign affairs was regarded as the domain of a privileged few. Now it is becoming

more and more responsive to public opinion. Foreign policy in our country is just as effective as the public opinion which supports it. We cannot and do not expect support in such a far-reaching area as charter review without an informed public opinion. That is the way our democracy works.

We are not convinced by arguments that the subject matter is too technical or too controversial for the American public. We believe that, just because it is technical and controversial, it should be discussed as widely and fully as possible. In our society it is far more desirable to debate an issue without settling it than to settle an issue without debating it. The American people today are debating issues of foreign policy and, more than they realize, are helping to condition foreign policy through their debates. Policy makers in the Government are in a better position than ever before to assess and give weight to public opinion in their efforts to find solutions to these problems.

I am glad to report that preparations for the review conference are moving ahead on many fronts. As the result of an overwhelming vote in the General Assembly of last year,² the United Nations Secretariat is now preparing important background documentation in connection with the charter review conference. This will include the publication of some unpublished documents of the original San Francisco Conference in 1945, a survey of present duties of United Nations organs,

¹ Address made before the Bay Area Citizens Committee for U.N. Charter Review, San Francisco State College, San Francisco, Calif., on Oct. 23 (press release 596 dated Oct. 21).

² For text of resolution (A/Resolution/133 dated Nov. 28, 1953), see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1953, p. 909.

and a detailed index of the San Francisco Conference documents. This preparatory work can give all members of the United Nations a general idea of the practical adjustments to changing circumstances which have been made in carrying out the provisions of the charter. It can show to what extent the charter has adaptability and capacity for development as a constitutional instrument. It should help clarify where the imperfections of the charter are. And it should show what deficiencies in the charter can be corrected either by changes in the charter or in the rules of procedure.

The policies which the United States will follow at the conference will be determined after the democratic consensus in this country, to which I referred earlier, has made itself felt on the important problems. One of the most effective means in developing this consensus has been the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Wiley. Under its able Chief of Staff, Dr. Francis Wilcox, it has already completed four excellent studies—on the veto, the development of the United Nations Charter, membership, and representation and voting in the General Assembly.³ These are required reading for all those interested in the subject of charter review.

The Senate Subcommittee itself has been tapping the grass roots of public opinion by holding hearings in many States and areas throughout the United States. Hearings have already been held in Akron, Milwaukee, Greensboro, Louisville, Des Moines, and Minneapolis.⁴ Others are scheduled

³ The first four studies are: *The Problem of the Veto in the United Nations Security Council* (Feb. 19, 1954); *How the United Nations Charter Has Developed* (May 18, 1954); *The Problem of Membership in the United Nations* (May 21, 1954); and *Representation and Voting in the United Nations General Assembly* (September 1954). A fifth study has now been published: *Pacific Settlement of Disputes in the United Nations* (Oct. 17, 1954).

⁴ *Review of the United Nations Charter: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Proposals To Amend or Otherwise Modify Existing International Peace and Security Organizations, Including the United Nations*. Part 1: Testimony of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U. S. Representative to the United Nations, Jan. 18 and Mar. 3, 1954; Part 2: Akron, Ohio, Feb. 12, 1954; Part 3: Milwaukee, Wis., Apr. 10, 1954; Part 4: Greensboro, N. C., May 15, 1954; Part 5: Louisville, Ky., June 7, 1954; Part 6: Des Moines, Iowa, June 19, 1954; Part 7, Minneapolis, Minn., July 10, 1954.

during the coming months, and I understand that one will be held here in San Francisco. The Subcommittee has already published some 900 pages of these hearings. They reflect a surprising amount of local interest in the subject in these widely scattered parts of the United States. Everyone has an opportunity to present his views. Many divergent viewpoints are expressed. When the Subcommittee finishes its hearings and studies, its report will be awaited with great interest.

The work of the Senate Subcommittee is being supplemented by that of private organizations, such as the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. These are supporting, or are themselves preparing, serious and detailed studies and are holding seminars with a view to placing their findings at the disposal of our Government. The Department of State is also preparing detailed studies of the problems which relate to charter review. Thus, with an enlightened and informed public opinion, with the recommendations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the studies of the private organizations, we expect that sometime late in 1955 we will be ready to consult in detail on our specific proposals with our free world allies.

Charter review is basically a political problem. It must be considered in the context of existing relations among states and the demands of the world situation from the standpoint not only of United States interests but also of the parallel interests of the rest of the free world. The United Nations is a voluntary association of sovereign states. It depends on the free cooperation of its members for implementation of its decisions. Care must therefore be taken at a review conference to avoid action which would jeopardize this cooperation and to assure that the decisions reached will contribute to, rather than detract from, the free world's sense of common interest. If the charter review conference is to succeed as an instrument for strengthening the United Nations, it can only do so if the views of other members of the free world are taken fully into account. As Secretary Dulles has aptly put it:

... while a charter review conference should be welcomed as a means of strengthening the United Nations, difference of opinion about how to do this should not then be pressed to a point such that the review conference would result in undermining the United Nations or dis-

rupting it. The United Nations as it is, is better than no United Nations at all.³

Scope of Review

This brings me to the question of what the scope of charter review should be. Should charter review be approached with the thought of doing very little or very much by way of changing the United Nations?

Anyone is, of course, free to suggest any proposal no matter how extreme. We know that there are those who feel that the failure of the United Nations to fulfill all their earlier hopes derives from the fact that it does not go far enough. They advocate its transformation from a voluntary organization of sovereign states into some sort of superstate. At the other extreme are those who are basically skeptical of all worldwide efforts toward international cooperation. They would like to see the United States withdraw from the United Nations. Still others would like to see the U. S. S. R. and its satellites expelled and the United Nations turned into a closely knit military alliance.

While, as I say, these advocates are entitled to express their opinion, we have already found it helpful to think in terms of excluding such proposals from the proper scope of charter review. We believe that the purpose of such review is to strengthen the existing organization, not to destroy it or completely change its character. To try to write a completely new charter would, as the Secretary of State has put it, "open a Pandora's box." The chances of bringing together in a new organization anything approaching the present membership of the United Nations would not be good.

We have made it clear to the General Assembly that we favor *review* of the charter and not necessarily *revision*. As our representative expressed it, "We do not know now whether changes in the Charter will be desirable or possible. . . ." Other countries also have seen the question as one of holding a general conference to survey the charter in the light of the United Nations experience since 1945—to look it over, without any advance commitments or preconceived notions favoring amendment. This is still our basic approach to the problem of charter review. We reject the viewpoint

of the Soviet bloc, which has opposed even discussion of charter review, misconstruing it as a campaign to amend the charter, and to amend it in one particular—by eliminating the veto.

No decision has yet been taken on what amendments to the charter, if any, the United States should advocate. The past 9 years' experience in the United Nations points to certain major questions as likely to arise at any review conference. Let me draw your attention to some of these questions in the hope that you might find it useful in the course of your discussions today.

1. Membership

One of these questions is the scope of the United Nations membership. Nine years ago the United Nations was in a sense much more nearly universal than it is now. Since 1945, many new nations have come into being. A number of the ex-enemy states, excluded from original membership in the United Nations, are again becoming accepted members of the world community. There are now 19 applicants for United Nations membership. Fourteen of these would have become members save for the Soviet veto. The other five—sponsored by the Soviet Union—have never received a majority vote since it has not been thought they met the charter qualifications for membership. This impasse with respect to new members has caused growing concern.

Would it be desirable to make membership in the United Nations as nearly universal as possible, always remembering, of course, that there are some countries that still completely disregard accepted standards of international conduct? Does article 4 of the charter, which speaks of "peace-loving states" who are "able and willing" to carry out the obligations of the charter, set forth the proper criteria for membership? Should the veto on the admission of new members be eliminated? You will recall that the Vandenberg Resolution of June 11, 1948, recommended a voluntary agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council to remove the veto in this respect, but there has never been such voluntary agreement.

2. Security

It is all too apparent that the Security Council has been unable in this sharply divided world to exercise its "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Are there any feasible charter changes that would en-

³ BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1954, p. 172.

able the Council to discharge more effectively this responsibility? Or should we rely on alternative arrangements? For example, could the charter provisions for membership and voting in the Council be improved?

It is theoretically possible to propose changes, including additions, in the membership of the five permanent members of the Security Council. But such proposals, even if they are not vetoed by one of the present permanent members, do not affect the heart of the problem—that the Soviet abuse of the veto has seriously impaired the Security Council in the security field.

Perhaps some progress can be made in limiting the area of political problems subject to the veto. For example, should the veto be removed from the pacific settlement of disputes under chapter 6 of the charter? This was also recommended by the Vandenberg Resolution, but no success has yet been achieved in that direction. Should we, then, leave the Security Council unchanged and concentrate instead on carrying forward the line of development begun in 1950 with the "Uniting for Peace Resolution"? This would mean assigning greater responsibility in the security field to the General Assembly, where there is no veto. Or, in the present world situation, might we consider leaving primary responsibility for security to collective arrangements and regional organizations authorized by articles 51 and 52 of the charter?

3. General Assembly

The General Assembly has not only grown in importance in the field of security; it has given increasing attention to economic and social problems and to highly charged "colonial" issues. In view of these developments, should there be some type of weighted voting in the General Assembly, reflecting the capacity of members to assume economic and military responsibilities?

Many suggestions have already been put forward in the search for a system which would increase the capacity of the General Assembly to take action in security matters, at the same time protecting the members against irresponsible action in other fields. Some formulae are based on population, some on wealth, some on area, some on ingenious combinations of many criteria. It is important to study all of these very carefully. We must remember, however, that this is not a theoretical exercise but a realistic attempt to improve what we now have. In the last analysis,

what we must decide is whether any new proposal would be clearly superior to the present system of one vote per state with the requirement in article 18 of the charter that decisions on important questions receive a vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting.

Aside from the question of weighted voting, should there be some reallocation of functions as between the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council to enable the United Nations to function more effectively? The magnitude of the program in the economic and social fields, as well as its importance in strengthening the free world, points also to a re-examination of the relationship between the United Nations itself and the specialized agencies to see whether any greater integration would contribute to the efficient operation of this program.

4. Domestic Jurisdiction

There has been a growing tendency in the United Nations for states whose sympathies are aroused by conditions outside their own boundaries to bring these conditions to the attention of the organization. The current session of the General Assembly, for example, has under consideration such problems as Tunisia, Morocco, Cyprus, and Western New Guinea. This tendency has given rise to questions and in some cases has engendered great apprehension concerning the interpretation of article 2 (7) of the charter, which stipulates that the United Nations shall not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. It may be asked, therefore, whether article 2 (7) adequately delimits the competence of the United Nations. Or, should a more precise line be drawn between the common interests within the scope of the United Nations and the individual interests that remain the exclusive concern of a member state?

5. Armaments

The framers of the charter were determined "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." But the question of regulation of armaments did not receive particular emphasis in the writing of the charter. One can only speculate whether the framers of the charter would have given more attention to disarmament if they had known that within 3 weeks of the signing of the charter the first successful atomic explosion would take place. The awful destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the basic split between the Soviet

bloc and the free world have since heavily underscored the need for finding a solution to this problem. Much effort therefore has been and is being spent by the United Nations on this compelling subject.

Mr. Vyshinsky's speech to the General Assembly last month gave some slight hope that Soviet policy, which has thus far been responsible for lack of progress, might—I repeat, *might*—be changing in the direction of a more constructive approach to a comprehensive disarmament system under effective safeguards. The discussions in Committee I during the last few weeks have not given a feeling of encouragement, but you may be sure that we and our allies will leave no avenue unexplored in seeking agreement with the U. S. S. R. on this crucial question. If it turns out that Soviet policy still blocks progress toward disarmament, the question will remain whether anything was omitted from the United Nations basic structure that, if added now, might assist our continuing effort to reach general agreement on a comprehensive program of safeguarded arms regulation and reduction.

6. International Law

We would all agree, I am sure, that so far too little progress has been made by the United Nations in the advancement of international law. The difficulty is not too hard to find. With one-third of the world's population ruled by those who do not recognize any moral law and look upon law as another means whereby those in power destroy their enemies, we can understand the difficulties encountered in expanding the scope of international law.

Secretary Dulles has asked whether the charter provisions are adequate in view of the importance of law as an accepted standard of international conduct. The question which will confront the review conference is what can be done to improve present United Nations activities in the field of codification and development of international law. What can be done to make the actions of nations more orderly? Should efforts to prepare codes of international law be pressed? Should other countries which have not already done so be encouraged to make declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the code? Should there be established, as suggested by some members of the bar and writers on international law, regional international tribunals with jurisdiction of private in-

ternational claims cases submitted by one government against another when negotiation has been unfruitful?

The Case for Charter Review

I have reviewed for you some of the issues which need to be discussed and on which we need advice. I hope you will not be discouraged if you find that it is hard to answer one question without raising others equally difficult. We in the State Department are going through that process ourselves.

The case for charter review is a strong one. Here in San Francisco in 1945 many states accepted charter provisions to which they strongly objected on the understanding that there would be an opportunity to review these provisions at the end of 10 years. It is only fair that this opportunity be provided them.

Charter review can in addition be the means to achieve a real strengthening of the United Nations. Let us not be deterred by the presence of the veto to block any proposal for charter amendment. We know the Soviets can veto such proposals, but we do not propose to do their negotiating for them in advance.

Charter review should bring about a greater understanding of the potentialities of the charter. That the charter is a document capable of growth can be seen from the dramatic transformation which has made the General Assembly the decisively important organ of the United Nations. It should present a clearer realization of the development within the charter framework that has already taken place in order to meet a world situation not foreseen in 1945. Such a reappraisal could also serve to develop improved practices under the charter.

On the other hand, we must bear in mind that a review conference does have its dangers. The United Nations was never more "sheer necessity," as President Eisenhower described it, than it is now. It remains what the President has called "man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield." We recognize that calling the review conference might arouse false hopes and might stimulate efforts to rewrite the charter which could seriously endanger the United Nations. We are determined to avoid these pitfalls, and we are hopeful that from the charter review conference there will result the stronger United Nations we seek.

We are glad that you will be thinking these problems of charter review through with us. Working together we can in the best democratic

tradition strengthen immeasurably the cause of peace, justice, and security for Americans and for the rest of the world.

International Cooperation in Developing the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

Almost 11 months ago many of us in this building heard a speech by President Eisenhower,² who had flown here directly from a conference in Bermuda. His speech addressed itself to the overwhelming problems which then confronted the whole world, and still confront it today.

One problem was the danger of atomic war—wherein one nation could, by surprise attack, inflict grievous atomic damage on the United States and in return receive atomic retaliation of fearsome proportions, leaving a ruin of mangled bodies, cultures, and economic and political systems after the atomic dust had settled.

President Eisenhower knew, and said, that merely to present the threat and to promise retaliation was neither an adequate nor a true picture of the feelings or the purposes of the United States. In the name of the human race, in the name of civilization, in the name of truly peaceful purpose, there had to be the promise of something more than earth-shattering explosions. The President knew, and said, that such a speech had better be left unspoken unless he could add a message of peaceful hope.

In considering how best to present his message of hope, he was faced with a historical fact of controlling significance: the years-long, stubborn problem of negotiating a system for reduction and control of armaments and for the effective elimination of nuclear weapons. Seven years of debate

and negotiations had failed to bring the world closer to this goal.

The President, therefore, decided that to make a proposal which would be wholly within the framework of the trying debates of the past would not be considered, by you or the peoples of the world, an act of hopeful sincerity promising early progress. He wanted to make an offer removed from the aura of past dejection and failure; he wanted to make an offer whose outstanding and unmistakable characteristic was that it was feasible—that it was doable—that men and nations of good will and peaceful purpose could accept easily, and without having to lose face by having to reverse previously stated positions.

And so, on December 8, 1953, standing in the great hall upstairs and before this great Assembly, President Eisenhower said:

I therefore make the following proposals:

The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.

The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I have referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any

¹Made in Committee 1 (Political and Security) on Nov. 5 (U.S. delegation press release 2000).

²BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of worldwide inspection and control.

The President described the main purpose of the new international agency in these words: "to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind." He mentioned specifically the fields of agriculture, medicine, and electric power. Then he added:

The United States would be more than willing—it would be proud to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

The President wished to take every precaution in order to insure that the Soviet Government would take this proposal at its serious, sincere, long-term face value and not interpret it as a short-term propaganda trick.

To insure this, he did two things. First, our Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to advise Mr. Molotov, in advance of the delivery of the speech, that it would contain material of serious import and that we wished the Soviet Government so to consider it. Besides, after the speech was made, and awaiting an initiative from the Soviet Union to hold private conversations, all individuals and agencies of the United States Government were instructed to remain silent as to the details of the proposal and to confine themselves, if the need for explanation arose, to a simple reiteration of the President's own text and the statement that we were awaiting word from the Soviet Union.

The President's second concern had to do with this very body—the United Nations. When he received Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's invitation to address you, he chose to make his proposal before this body, and no other, because he wished the world to know that, in this overwhelmingly important matter, he turned to the United Nations as the international organism most appropriate both to hear the original enunciation of the proposal and to participate in the development of the plan.

Sequel of the President's Proposal

You all know the positive and hopeful response which greeted the President's proposal from all parts of the world. This response has greatly heartened the United States in its work with other states in developing a plan of action.

You know, too, that there was one disappointment—a rejection by the U.S.S.R of the President's proposal until the United States would agree to an unconditional and unsafeguarded ban on the use of atomic weapons. The story of that is contained in a United Nations document which is before you, Document A/2738 of 27 September 1954.³ Beginning on April 27 and continuing throughout this exchange of notes, the Soviet Union insisted that our new hope be shackled to the long debates of the past, where the difficulties of even the smallest progress had been so amply demonstrated.

True enough, the Soviet Union told us in a note delivered on September 22, 1954⁴—the day before the Secretary of State made his opening address to the General Assembly—that it was keeping the door open a tiny crack. Actually the door had been thrown wide open on December 8, 1953, by the United States and has been kept wide open by the United States ever since. The door is still open.

On learning of the essentially negative Soviet attitude, the United States lost no time in proceeding with conversations with other states—conversations whose initiation had awaited only a clear expression of the Soviet position. The states with which we have been conferring are those which have either developed raw material resources or advanced atomic energy programs and are engaged in developing this great force—namely, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Union of South Africa, and Portugal. It is significant that all of us agreed that, despite the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate, we should move ahead with formation of the agency. Our discussions have made some progress, as we shall later point out.

It was in these circumstances that Secretary of State Dulles spoke to this Assembly last September 23d and said:

The United States is determined that President Eisenhower's proposal shall not languish until it dies. It will be nurtured and developed. We shall press on in close partnership with those nations which, inspired by the ideals of the United Nations Charter, can make this great new force a tool of the humanitarian and of the statesman, and not merely a fearsome addition to the arsenal of war.

The United States is proposing an agenda item which

³ See also *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 478.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 486.

will enable us to report on our efforts to explore and develop the vast possibilities for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. These efforts have been and will be directed primarily toward the following ends:

(1) The creation of an international agency, whose initial membership will include nations from all regions of the world. It is hoped that such an agency will start its work as early as next year.

(2) The calling of an international scientific conference to consider this whole vast subject, to meet in the spring of 1955, under the auspices of the United Nations.

(3) The opening early next year, in the United States, of a reactor training school where students from abroad may learn the working principles of atomic energy with specific regard to its peacetime uses.

(4) An invitation to a substantial number of medical and surgical experts from abroad to participate in the work of our cancer hospitals—in which atomic energy techniques are among the most hopeful approaches to controlling this menace to mankind.

I would like to make it perfectly clear that our planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture.

Just this past Wednesday, November 3, President Eisenhower announced that the United States had delivered to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington a reply to the Soviet note of September 22, and that the President hoped that this would start a new phase in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations which might be more fruitful than the past efforts. The President reiterated, however, that the United States is determined to proceed with likeminded states in establishing an international agency to make this great power available to mankind generally as a boon which would benefit us all.

This is the history, briefly told, of the first year of efforts to create an international organization to insure world cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom. The thought that has governed all our suggestions is that what we propose to do is feasible—is doable.

However, before we probe the future of international cooperation in this field, let us see where we stand today; let us review briefly the scientific developments that have brought us beyond the threshold of the atomic age.

The Threshold of the Atomic Age

This moment of our discussion is a moment of excitement and challenge in the science and art of the atom. We in this hall are dealing with something more than the resolutions and amendments and forms of organization which are the tools of

our diplomatic trade. We are dealing with the knowledge of a force, the mastery of a force, whose gigantic power of destruction is exceeded only by its power for human good.

Even we, as laymen, are aware of the thrilling sense of discovery in the minds of the scientists who have been able to put this gift in our hands. If we can share that sense of discovery, then we may hope that our diplomatic progress will be a worthy match for the physical progress that has been brought about by the most adventurous scientific minds of our century.

A few key facts of that atomic progress show clearly that we have already passed the threshold of the peaceful atomic age. The summary which follows herewith will not touch on the achievements in other countries, which are equally promising and of which we shall doubtless hear more in the course of this debate.

We are in the presence of a whole range of atomic discoveries. Of all these discoveries, one of the most advanced for human benefit today stems from the use of the radioactive isotope. Many elements long known to physics, such as gold, cobalt, and carbon, can be changed in atomic reactors into new versions of themselves—radiogold, radiocobalt, radiocarbon, and so forth. A change in their atomic structure makes them give off rays. These rays have two main uses. They can bring about changes in living things. And they can be used as tracers, giving off signals to detection machines, to control the intricate processes of industry or to reveal new facts about the growth and diseases of plants and human beings that had never before been known to man.

Here are a few examples of how these isotopes have already been applied in the United States. Many of these are already well known to technicians in other countries.

First, consider the changing of living things by radiation.

In treatment of cancer, radioactive cobalt and other elements have brought great progress in the killing of cancerous cells, far more effectively than the old X-ray machines.

Radiation has made it possible to preserve and store food without spoiling throughout the winter and spring.

In the development of new agricultural strains, radiation has been used to speed up many times over the genetic mutations from which new and

Draft Resolution on Atomic Energy Plan¹

U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.105 dated November 6

The General Assembly,

Believing that the benefits arising from the momentous discovery of atomic energy should be placed at the service of mankind,

Hoping that international co-operation in developing and expanding the peaceful uses of atomic energy will assist in lifting the burdens of hunger, poverty and disease,

Believing also that all nations should co-operate in promoting the dissemination of knowledge in the realm of nuclear technology for peaceful ends,

A. Concerning an International Atomic Energy Agency

Recalling the initiative of the President of the United States embodied in his address of December 8, 1953,

Noting that negotiations are in progress for the establishment as quickly as possible of an International Atomic Energy Agency to facilitate the use by the entire world of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and to encourage international co-operation in the further development and practical application of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind,

1. *Suggests* that, once the Agency is established, it negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations, similar to those of the specialized agencies;

2. *Transmits* to the States participating in the creation of the Agency, for their careful consideration, the record of the discussion of this item at the present session of the General Assembly;

3. *Suggests* that members of the United Nations be informed as progress is achieved in the establishment of the Agency;

B. Concerning the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

¹ Sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States.

1. *Declares* the interest and concern of the General Assembly in helping in every feasible way to promote the peaceful applications of atomic energy;

2. *Decides* that an international technical conference should be held under the auspices of the United Nations, to explore means of developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy through international co-operation and, in particular, to study the development of atomic power and to consider other technical areas—such as biology, medicine, radiation protection and fundamental science—in which international co-operation might most effectively be accomplished;

3. *Invites* all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to participate in the conference and to include among their representatives individual experts competent in the atomic energy field;

4. *Suggests* that the international conference should be held no later than August 1955 at a place to be determined by the Secretary-General and by the Advisory Committee provided for in paragraph 5;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General acting upon the advice of a small committee composed of representatives of _____ to issue invitations to this conference, to prepare and circulate to all invitees a detailed agenda, and to provide the necessary staff and services;

6. *Suggests* to the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee that, in making plans for the international conference, they consult with competent specialized agencies, in particular the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization;

7. *Invites* the interested specialized agencies to designate persons to represent them at the conference;

8. *Requests* that the Secretary-General circulate for information a report on this conference to all Members of the United Nations, and to other Governments and specialized agencies participating in the conference.

better strains are derived—strains which resist disease and produce better foods and fibers in greater abundance.

Second, consider the use of isotopes as tracers. The applications in this realm of scientific discovery are already multitudinous and in theory are without limit. For instance:

In manufacturing flat sheets—metal, paper, plastic, or any material—their thickness is kept constant by measuring the strength of atomic radiation through the moving sheets.

In welding and riveting, radiation photography

shows up flaws which were once extremely difficult to detect.

In oil pipelines, a radioactive pellet is dropped in the flowing pipe to signal the exact moment when a new kind or grade of oil arrives at its destination.

In agriculture, radioactive tracers mixed into fertilizers show exactly when and how efficiently the fertilizer is absorbed by growing plants—thus saving tremendous waste.

In the poultry industry, chicken feed is traced through the body of the hen until it is converted

into an egg—showing what kind of feed should be given, and at what time, to produce eggs most efficiently.

In fish breeding, tracers have shown where simple chemical treatment could be used to convert sterile bogs into lakes swarming with food fish.

In medicine, tracer research has given us a new synthetic material for blood transfusion; tracers are used to detect faulty blood circulation before it is fatal, and to perform many other miracles of diagnosis; tracers have brought new discoveries about diabetes, thyroid disorders, blood diseases, and, in fact, the entire process by which the living body is nourished and sustained.

In control of epidemics, tracers have been used to follow the migration of disease-bearing flies and mosquitoes, which is an essential step in stamping out these scourges.

These, at the beginning of the atomic age, are a few of the discoveries already made and put to work. Still other projects are well under way, among which perhaps the most extraordinary is the research into the mysterious process of plant growth called photosynthesis, the understanding of which may some day enable us to manufacture vast quantities of inexpensive food out of common chemicals. The effect of this on the standard of living can be conjectured.

Every one of these advances has at its center the use of radioactive atoms. Most of these can be produced in comparatively small atomic reactors. In the United States the chief factory for these isotopes is the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. From Oak Ridge in the past 8 years nearly 50,000 shipments of isotopes have been sent out to factories, laboratories, hospitals, and universities. Most of these have been sent within the United States, but over 2,800 have gone to 50 countries abroad.

It is fitting that the most imposing and most difficult application of atomic energy should be mentioned last: the production of electric power. This is a subject of intensive engineering research in the United States today. This year the Atomic Energy Commission launched a 5-year program for the building of five experimental power reactors in the United States, all radically different in design. None of these is expected to produce power at prices that compete with power plants that burn coal and other conventional fuels. But they will tell us a great deal about the future of

atomic power. For the knowledge we shall all gain from them, these plants will be worth the investment. They point the way to an age when all countries can be assured of abundant electric power, even where natural fuels are scarce. On the basis of this power, new industries can grow to enrich the lives of many millions of people.

One fact stands out about the atomic power reactor, even today in the minds of laymen, and that is its great complexity. This calls for expert knowledge and is another reason why smaller reactors should be built in as many parts of the world as possible. These small research reactors can be built in a year's time for well under \$500,000 in many cases. They will produce most of the radioactive isotopes whose multitude of uses I have tried to describe. They will thus make possible a great increase both in research and in the practical application of the atom in medicine, farming, and industry. But beyond this, they will afford training grounds throughout the world at which a new generation of atomic scientists, engineers, and technicians will learn the principles of reactor technology. Having mastered the research reactor, we will then be moving toward what the world scarcely yet possesses—a body of men trained in all the techniques which will be needed to bring us practical atom power.

Mr. Chairman, the brief report just given on atomic progress in the United States describes many startling advances, discoveries which have already made the world a richer place. Yet these are no more than the nuggets which lie at the surface of a newly discovered mine. They are enough to give us some notion of the undiscovered wealth that lies below.

To tap that wealth in peace and cooperation should be a noble enterprise for the nations of the world. It is fitting that the discovery which brings us together in peace comes from the hands of one of the truly global fellowships of mankind—the fellowship of science, which knows no national boundaries and seeks truth and human betterment. There could be no more fitting salute to this world fellowship of science than our common determination to share some of the atomic knowledge and wealth we already possess, in order that all of us may possess more.

In this spirit, the United States is prepared to make contributions of several kinds to the next forward steps in the atomic field.

Having thus crossed the threshold of the atomic age, we come to the question of the next steps by which we can explore this new world. Here we reach the specific activities which we contemplate for the international agency. We believe that the agency should encourage worldwide research in and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy; it should arrange for nuclear materials to meet the needs of research, development, and practical application to all manner of peaceful activities, including the eventual production of power. We believe the agency should foster the interchange of information on peaceful uses. We expect that the international agency will conduct its activities in such a way as to prepare for the time when the use of atomic energy for peace becomes the predominant and perhaps the exclusive use of this great force.

The agency should be created by a treaty which in our opinion should define the standards and principles governing the organization in the discharge of its functions. All states which originally ratified the agreement should become members of the agency, and there should be a provision for accepting additional members. We believe that members should accept an obligation to supply materials and information for the work of the agency, financial support, facilities for open discussion and contacts among scientists engaged in peaceful research activities.

There is so much to be done that it would be inconceivable for the international agency to carry on all the activities from the outset. As a practical matter the international agency can carry on only a few of the activities in the immediate future—those most suitable to it. Nevertheless, the other activities will and must proceed simultaneously, since they are all part of the basic program of steady forward movement into the atomic age.

We are prepared to start discussion with other countries for the conclusion of bilateral agreements which will make it possible for us, under our laws, to furnish technical information, technical assistance, and necessary amounts of fissionable material for the construction and operation of research reactors to be located abroad.

Now, let me tell you about the progress which the United States is prepared to carry out pending the creation of the agency, partly as a result of the recent amendments to our own Atomic

Energy Act. All these activities will be coordinated with the international agency's own program and may later be undertaken by the agency itself.

No one has to be a scientist to appreciate the fact that basic to success in the development and use of power-producing reactors in any country is the existence of a body of trained technical men. I shall now speak in terms of what the United States Government is prepared to do in 1955—next year—in this field of training.

First comes the field of nuclear reactors. We are prepared to establish a Reactor Training School early in 1955. The first course of this school would deal not only with atomic power theory but the application of that theory.

Our present plans call for inviting between 30 and 50 scientists and engineers from overseas to study practical reactor engineering, in order to furnish sufficient basic science and engineering knowledge to permit the members of this group not only to understand the theory but to become competent to operate reactors.

Initially the atomic information available to the members of this course will be nonsecret. But as the United States and other countries conclude the bilateral agreements required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, additional information will be made available. From the outset, however, the courses offered will give scientists and engineers a basic knowledge of the all-important experimental phases and principles of research reactors; and these are the essential training ground for the far more complicated power reactor.

Second comes the field of safety. Because we are dealing with a power which is both a danger and a boon, it is necessary also that special training courses in radiation safety and medicine should be instituted simultaneously with any training in atomic power development. We propose, therefore, to establish under the sponsorship of the United States Atomic Energy Commission the following courses which will be open to all other nations:

Industrial Medicine—a 1- to 2-year course given by the American universities having a relationship to the Atomic Energy Commission in the medicinal treatment required in industries concerned with atomic energy activity.

Industrial Hygiene—courses in the techniques of main-

taining healthful conditions in industries dealing with hazardous atomic materials.

Radiological Physics and the Theory and Use of Radiation Instruments—instruction to be given at the Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Third in our training program comes the vast field of atomic biology and medicine. The Argonne Cancer Hospital at the University of Chicago, the Brookhaven National Laboratory, and the Cancer Research Hospital at the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies will be open for 1- to 2-year courses on the use of atomic energy in medicine and biology, for approximately five to ten foreign students per course.

The field of cancer is so important, and other countries have made such strides, that we do not wish to restrict our collaboration simply to the study of our techniques. We are therefore prepared to invite as many as 150 competent and distinguished visitors in the field of cancer research from overseas to visit our cancer research facilities during 1955. These guests will not only be free to study our facilities and techniques but will also be encouraged to exchange views with our doctors and scientists.

Fourth and last in our training program comes the field of radioisotope tracer techniques, whose rapid development we have already discussed. In this field, until now, the Atomic Energy Commission has been able to conduct only a limited training program for foreign scientists. The Commission is now prepared to establish special courses for foreign technicians to begin early in 1955—these courses to cover a 4-week period and to be divided into laboratory work, lectures on laboratory experiments, and seminars on special topics. The laboratory experiments would cover the use of instruments, the purification and separation of radioactive from inert materials, and the application of various isotope techniques to all fields of research.

Stated in statistical terms, the training courses we propose in safety, medicine, and biology would bring basic knowledge and training to more than 250 technical men from other nations in the course of the next 12 to 15 months—the limitation on numbers being imposed not by our desire to restrict the sharing of this knowledge but simply by our ability to absorb this number of observers, students, and trainees effectively and efficiently within our present facilities.

So much for our early plans for training.

Closely allied to this is the question of written information about the atom. We anticipate that from the outset the international agency will carry on a series of information and service activities, obtaining information from the operations of member states in connection with their own atomic energy programs and from the agency's own activities. Here is a brief outline of the type of information materials which the United States is prepared to make available in 1955 to the international agency when it is set up.

Contrary to popular belief, the United States has, ever since the beginning of its atomic development, made available, through published documents of the Atomic Energy Commission and articles in scientific journals, a vast body of research material on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Yet the aura of mysterious monopoly still persists in the popular imagination.

You may be surprised, as I was, to realize that, up to now, the publication by the United States of documents available to all on the peaceful uses of atomic energy comes to more than 10,000 papers totaling more than 200,000 pages of data.

Always mindful of the day when it might be beneficial to present this material in package form despite the fact that it has always been available in individual items, we have accumulated 10 complete libraries of our own material, which we are prepared to give to the principal technical libraries of cooperating nations. And we will provide more than 10 if there is a demand for more.

Besides these libraries of our own material, we are prepared to provide complete sets of index cards and our journals of the past 7 years, abstracting 50,000 scientific and technical books and reports, published in all countries. Stated in physical dimensions, what we are prepared to furnish to each one of these foreign libraries is the equivalent of more than 300 lineal feet of published reports and over 200,000 index cards.

Furthermore, we will add to all of these libraries as the material is published, asking only in return that the cooperating nations provide their collections of official nonsecret papers, not available in the general scientific literature, to be placed in the appropriate libraries in the United States.

In addition to training and publication, there is a third step which we must take in the field of research and development. We must further develop the practical applications of the atom to medicine, agriculture, and other peaceful activi-

ties, including the eventual production of power. The international agency will immediately encourage the development of such research activities and will seek to arrange for nuclear materials to meet the needs of research all over the world. It must be recognized, however, that the bulk of research on the atom will continue to be carried on by individual states.

These are the chief forward steps which we in the United States contemplate for 1955. As the President has assured you, atomic materials for projects sponsored by this agency will be set aside for that purpose. We are confident that corresponding contributions to the common enterprise will be made by others. Some steps will be taken by individual states, others by the international agency, and others partly by the states and partly by the agency. In every case we should be guided by the principle that the agency will concentrate on those things which cannot be done, or done not so well, by states and private groups acting alone.

All these steps together, during this coming year, 1955, will bring us measurably further along the road that leads into the peaceful atomic age.

The United States initiated its "Atoms for Peace" proposal through the United Nations. We hope that it will be possible to create the kind of international organization which will be competent rapidly, effectively, and fairly to bring this priceless boon to untold millions beyond our shores.

It is our belief that a relationship should be established between the agency and the United Nations similar to that of the specialized agencies. The exact terms of the relationship must, of course, await creation of the agency itself. The agency will be created by negotiations among interested governments. These negotiations, already in progress, will lead to the conclusion of a treaty subject to the usual constitutional processes of ratification. The International Atomic Energy Agency would consult and cooperate as appropriate with other United Nations bodies whose work might be related to that of the agency, as well as with national atomic energy organizations and regional organizations such as the Organization for European Nuclear Research (OENR).

It would not be practicable to spell out the possible relationships any more precisely at this time until we know better just exactly what the agency will look like when it comes into being. While

there has been a certain amount of general agreement among the states which are negotiating the creation of this agency on some of the administrative features, it does not seem possible to go into these negotiating matters in great detail now. You will recognize that the negotiations must take into consideration the views of the eight negotiating states in the light of their special position in the atomic energy field and also of other states which we hope will participate. In the main the negotiations have followed the line which we indicated in the March 19 outline which we submitted to the Soviet Union and which is before the committee.⁵ But there may be changes.

It may be appropriate at this point to mention one problem that has come up in the negotiations. Originally the United States visualized that the international agency would hold fissionable materials itself. But after the Soviet rejection of the United States proposals, all the negotiating states concluded that it might be preferable that the agency act as a clearinghouse for requests made to the agency by the various beneficiaries. The donor state would earmark fissionable materials for the agency's operations and would transfer those fissionable materials directly to the projects approved by the agency. Since the resources of the agency obviously will be limited, it seems more useful to us to use the resources available to the agency for additional programs rather than for expensive custodial arrangements.

As I said earlier in this statement, the desire and purpose of the United States is that what we do shall remain within the area of the feasible and the doable and not become hampered by being placed in the context of unending arguments or insuperable vetoes. We are proceeding as rapidly as possible, determined that this hopeful enterprise shall not be deterred nor delayed nor interminably frustrated by any who may not wish the blessing of atomic energy to be spread throughout the world.

The resolution which we intend to cosponsor will reflect this desire to go forward as rapidly as possible for the benefit of the entire world.

International Conference

One further way in which the United Nations can contribute materially, in advance, toward the

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 480.

goal of extending to all peoples the benefits of atomic energy is by convening an international conference to discover the field in which progress would be technically feasible and to develop procedures whereby the nations of the world can make known their wants.

The United States intends to support such a conference fully and will send as our representatives qualified scientific and technical persons of the highest calibre that we possess. Our Atomic Energy Commission will remove restrictions from information and make it available in the hope, thereby, of contributing to the value of the conference. Other states will undoubtedly do as much.

The United States has long believed that such a conference of scientists and of government officials concerned with their nations' atomic energy development would materially contribute to the knowledge of the participants and correspondingly benefit their countries. The opportunity to exchange information and become better acquainted with each other's problems in the vast field now opening before our eyes as the beneficial uses of atomic energy become both more feasible and more numerous would be fruitful.

Most of the participants in the conference will undoubtedly be government representatives, many of whom will be experts in the field. The United States believes it appropriate also to invite representatives of various specialized agencies whose tasks are such that the discussions at the conference would be of direct interest. We include in this category such agencies as UNESCO, the ILO, the WHO, and the FAO.

In order to organize the conference, issue invitations, prepare an agenda and rules of procedure, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should act on the advice of a committee composed of representatives of certain states members of the United Nations. For this advisory committee of states, we have in mind a membership which would meet two essential qualifications: knowledge of atomic energy development and appropriate geographic representation.

We recommend that the conference should discuss topics such as probable world power requirements, the possible contribution of atomic energy to meet deficits in conventional fuels, the economics of nuclear power, the health and safety aspects of atomic energy, among other matters.

Discussions could be held on nuclear technology, on reactor application in research and power, on medical and biological applications of atomic energy, on industrial application of radioactive products.

We know that its reports and conclusions would be of great import both to the International Atomic Energy Agency, when it is established, and to individual countries so far as their own atomic energy programs are concerned.

We intend to cosponsor a draft resolution in this committee which will reflect the views just expressed. We believe it will indicate the best pattern for practical United Nations participation in this great work of international cooperation in developing the use of the atom for peace. In cosponsoring this resolution the United States would express its wish to proceed with you on the fulfillment of this program—whose only purpose, in the words of President Eisenhower last December, is "to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

Vote on Disarmament Resolutions

*Statement by James J. Wadsworth
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

In these brief remarks I do not propose to go into the substance of the full and extremely valuable debate that was held in the First Committee on the subject of disarmament. I echo the satisfaction with which others have hailed the unanimity of the vote on these resolutions in the committee, and also the agreement achieved between the members of the so-called London subcommittee in sponsoring these resolutions. No less, Mr. President, do I hail the unanimity with which these same powers and many other representatives of delegations have openly recognized that we have a long and rocky road to travel. Anything less than this sober recognition of the realities would give

¹Made in plenary session on Nov. 4 (U.S. delegation press release 2008). On that date the Assembly approved unanimously the resolution which had been adopted (also by unanimous vote) in Committee I on Oct. 27; for text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1954. The Assembly's resolution (A/Resolution/216) refers two other proposals to the Disarmament Commission for consideration: A/C.1/L.100/Rev.1, submitted by India, and A/C.1/L.101/Rev.1, submitted by Australia and the Philippines.

poor service to the cause to which we are devoted. For our part, in voting for these resolutions today, we pledge our continued and constant efforts to achieve the common goal.

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

Metal Trades Committee of ILO

The Department of State announced on October 26 (press release 607) that the United States would be represented at the fifth session of the Metal Trades Committee of the International Labor Organization (ILO) at Geneva, October 25–November 6, by the following delegation:

Representing the Government of the United States

Delegates

Hersey E. Riley, Chief, Division of Construction Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
William A. Vanstory, Consultant, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce

Representing the Employers of the United States

Delegates

Martin F. Burke, Personnel Director, United Aircraft Corporation, East Hartford, Conn.
Herbert M. Ramel, Vice President, Moog Industries, Incorporated, St. Louis, Mo.

Representing the Workers of the United States

Delegates

Thomas Crowe, International Vice President, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL
Victor Reuther, Assistant to the President and Director, Department for International Affairs, Congress of Industrial Organizations

Adviser

Edward Cote, Co-Director of Region 1–A, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America

The Metal Trades Committee is one of eight industrial committees established by the ILO to deal with problems in some of the most important international industries. Representation on each of the committees is tripartite in nature, with government, employer, and worker representatives from member countries.

At the fifth session, the Committee will concern itself primarily with discussion of (1) a report

relating to production and employment at a high level in the metal trades, which report contains an analysis of the output, as well as of the factors affecting the demand for and of measures which might stabilize the demand for, various metal products and (2) a report on practical methods of labor-management cooperation in metal working plants, which report contains an examination of eight examples of satisfactory in-plant collaboration in Canada, France, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Committee will also consider a general report in which particular attention is paid to developments in the metal trades industry in various countries since the Committee's last session, Geneva, April 21–May 2, 1952, and to important events and developments in the metal trades industry.

In addition to the United States, the following countries have been invited to send tripartite delegations to the meeting: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Union of South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Customs Tariff

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518), relating to the creation of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950.¹

Ratification deposited: Brazil, September 21, 1954.

Germany

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Paris October 23, 1954.

Enters into force when (a) each of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the United States of its acceptance thereof, (b) all ratifications of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty

¹ Not in force for the United States.

have been deposited with Belgium, and (c) all ratifications or approvals of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Federal Republic of Germany. Upon entry into force of the Protocol, an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty shall be communicated to the Federal Republic of Germany by the United States on behalf of all parties to the Protocol.

Protocol on the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, with five schedules, and related letters. Signed at Paris October 23, 1954, by the United States, France, the Federal Republic, and the United Kingdom.

Enters into force upon the deposit of ratifications or approvals by all signatories.

Convention on the presence of foreign forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Paris October 23, 1954, by the United States, France, the Federal Republic, and the United Kingdom.

Enters into force upon the deposit of ratifications or approvals by all signatories and the deposit of the accession of the Federal Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty. Open to accession by any State not a signatory which had forces in the Federal Republic of Germany on the date of signature of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime; accession to be effective on the date of entry into force of the Convention or the date of deposit of accession, whichever is later.

Tripartite agreement on the exercise of retained rights in Germany. Signed at Paris October 23, 1954, by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.

Enters into force upon the entry into force of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime.

Trade and Commerce

Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). Done at Geneva October 24, 1953.²

Signed definitively: Germany, September 27, 1954; Dominican Republic, October 15, 1954; Burma, October 4, 1954.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement to facilitate the interchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. Signed at Brussels October 12, 1954. Entered into force October 12, 1954.

Germany

Agreement relating to the exchange of official publications. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 27, 1954. Entered into force October 27, 1954.

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, with protocol and exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington October 29, 1954. Enters into force one month after the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Libya

Agreement relating to economic aid. Effected by exchange of notes at Benghazi September 9, 1954. Entered into force September 9, 1954.

Agreement relating to military bases in Libya, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Benghazi September 9, 1954. Ratified by Libya October 21, 1954.

Entered into force: October 30, 1954 (the date of receipt by the United States of notification of ratification by Libya).

² Not in force.

Spain

Agreement confirming the bilateral arrangements for a facilities assistance program pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of September 26, 1953 (TIAS 2849). Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid April 9, May 11 and 19, 1954. Entered into force May 19, 1954.

THE DEPARTMENT

Determination in Case of John Paton Davies, Jr.

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 629 dated November 5

Executive Order 10450, issued pursuant to the act of August 26, 1950, became effective May 27, 1953. It deals with "Security Requirements for Government Employment." It establishes new criteria for continuing employment by the United States. These criteria related not only to loyalty but also to reliability and trustworthiness. The new security program which this order establishes provides for various procedures culminating in a final determination by the head of the Department as to whether continued employment "is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security." If not, the head of the Department is required to terminate the employment.

The Executive order requires that the cases of all Departmental and Foreign Service employees who had been investigated under the provisions of the old loyalty program should be readjudicated under the new security standards established by the new Executive order. Accordingly, the case of John Paton Davies, Jr., previously so investigated, came on for readjudication.

On December 29, 1953, the Department's Office of Security concluded that Mr. Davies should be suspended and processed under the new security program.

On January 20, 1954, I directed that a statement of charges be submitted to Mr. Davies with a view to obtaining his sworn answers prior to my determination with reference to his possible suspension. This was done and Mr. Davies made his sworn answers.

I thereupon made a careful examination of the charges, the answers, and the information upon which the charges were based. I concluded that the matter required further inquiry. In this connection it might be noted that Mr. Davies had previously told me that he would welcome whatever further examination I deemed appropriate. Accordingly, on March 23, 1954, I asked that a Security Hearing Board be designated to consider the case. Mr. Davies voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the Security Hearing Board and was not then suspended as would have been the normal procedure. I agreed to nonsuspension because I concluded that under the circumstances then prevailing the interests of the United States would not be prejudiced thereby.

On May 14, 1954, a Security Hearing Board of five persons, drawn from other agencies, was duly designated and convened for the purpose of conducting a hearing according to the statute, the Executive order above referred to, and Departmental regulations. After the Board had studied the complete record, it held hearings throughout the latter part of June and the first half of July.

Throughout these proceedings Mr. Davies had the benefit of able counsel. Mr. Davies testified and called six witnesses who testified on his behalf. Five witnesses who had furnished derogatory information appeared and testified under oath; all but one did so in Mr. Davies' presence and subject to cross-examination by his counsel.

On August 30, after consideration of all the available information and the entire record in the case, the Security Hearing Board reached a unanimous decision. It was that the continued employment of Mr. Davies is not clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. The Board accordingly concluded that his employment in the Foreign Service of the United States ought to be terminated.

Following receipt of the Security Board's decision, I have, as required by the statute and the regulations, reviewed the entire case, and I now make my determination as to its disposition.

My determination accords with that of the Security Hearing Board and is that the continued employment of Mr. Davies is not clearly consistent with the interests of the national security and it is advisable in such interests that his employment in the Foreign Service of the United States be terminated.

The reasons given by the Security Hearing Board for its decision are that Mr. Davies demonstrated a lack of judgment, discretion, and reliability. The Board emphasized that it defended Mr. Davies' right to report as his conscience dictated but found that he made known his dissents from established policy outside of privileged boundaries. The Board also emphasized that its decision stemmed preponderantly not from derogatory information supplied by others but from its own thorough and exhaustive analysis of Mr. Davies' known and admitted works and acts and, in connection therewith, his direct admissions and deficiencies as a witness before the Board.

The Board found that Mr. Davies' observation and evaluation of the facts, his policy recommendations, his attitude with respect to existing policy, and his disregard of proper forbearance and caution in making known his dissents outside privileged boundaries were not in accordance with the standard required of Foreign Service officers and show a definite lack of judgment, discretion, and reliability.

The Security Hearing Board did not find, nor do I find, that Mr. Davies was disloyal in the sense of having any Communistic affinity or consciously aiding or abetting any alien elements hostile to the United States, or performing his duties or otherwise acting so as intentionally to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

Under the present Executive order on security, it is not enough that an employee be of complete and unswerving loyalty. He must be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character.

The members of the Security Hearing Board unanimously found that Mr. Davies' lack of judgment, discretion, and reliability raises a reasonable doubt that his continued employment in the Foreign Service of the United States is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

This is a conclusion which I am also compelled to reach as a result of my review of the case.

I have reached my determination, as the law requires, on the basis of my own independent examination of the record. One of the facts of that record is the unanimous conclusion of the members of the Security Hearing Board that the personal demeanor of Mr. Davies as a witness before them, when he testified on his own behalf and was subject to examination, did not inspire confidence in his reliability and that he was frequently less than

forthright in his response to questions. Conclusions thus arrived at by an impartial Security Hearing Board are, I believe, entitled to much weight, particularly when those conclusions are consistent with the written record which I have examined.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Technical Cooperation—Program of Education. TIAS 2830. Pub. 5250. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with Memorandum of Understanding, between the United States and Liberia—Signed at Monrovia June 23, 1953.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 2834. Pub. 5255. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila June 26, 1953.

Military Bases in the Philippines. TIAS 2835. Pub. 5256. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, implementing agreement of March 14, 1947, as supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila May 29 and June 17, 1953.

Naval Mission to Cuba. TIAS 2836. Pub. 5268. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba, extending agreement of August 28, 1951. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington April 14 and July 2, 1953.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Program in Mexico. TIAS 2837. Pub. 5269. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico, extending agreement of March 29 and August 15, 1949, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at México, D. F., June 30, 1953.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Program in Cuba. TIAS 2838. Pub. 5270. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba. Exchange of notes—Signed at Habana June 30, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Industrial Apprenticeship Training Program. TIAS 2839. Pub. 5271. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil, extending agreement of June 30, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 29, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Program of Education. TIAS 2841. Pub. 5273. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Signed at Cairo June 18, 1953.

Disposition of Certain Accounts in Thailand, Under Article 16 of Treaty of Peace With Japan. TIAS 2844. Pub. 5276. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at Washington July 30, 1953.

Technical Cooperation—Public Health Program. TIAS 2852. Pub. 5293. 15 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Signed at Cairo June 18, 1953.

Collaboration in Atomic Energy Research and Development. TIAS 2993. Pub. 5561. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at Quebec August 19, 1943.

Designations

Raymond A. Hare as Director General of the Foreign Service, effective October 19.

David H. Popper as Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, effective October 24.

William J. Sebald as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, effective November 1.

Max W. Bishop as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, with responsibility for coordinating operational planning in the Department on matters coming before the Operations Coordinating Board, effective November 2.

Walter A. Radius as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective November 2.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 1-7

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to November 15 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 573 of October 12, 594 of October 19, 596 of October 21, and 607 of October 26.

No.	Date	Subject
*620	11/1	Educational exchange.
*621	11/1	Educational exchange.
†622	11/1	U.S.-Libyan agreement ratified.
*623	11/3	Educational exchange.
†624	11/3	Visit of Arab Ambassadors.
†625	11/4	Payment for new German Embassy.
*626	11/4	Program for Mendès-France visit.
*627	11/4	Visit of General Phao of Thailand.
*628	11/4	Dulles-Queen Elizabeth remarks.
629	11/5	Dulles: John Paton Davies, Jr.
630	11/6	Spain credentials (rewrite).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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1937, Volume V, The American Republics

The multilateral negotiations covered by the documentation in this volume are about equally concerned with economic and political questions.

In the record on multilateral negotiations a major portion of the documents relates to three subjects: The Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, construction of the Inter-American Highway, and a proposal by the United States to lease destroyers to the American Republics for training purposes.

Discussions concerning possible reciprocal trade agreements and efforts to secure equitable treatment for American business interests are the chief subjects of bilateral diplomacy dealt with in this volume. Trade agreement talks were held with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Equitable treatment for American business interests was the subject of discussions with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.

Copies of this volume may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.75 each.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 804

November 22, 1954



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The Department of State bulletin

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The New Environment of American Diplomacy

by Livingston T. Merchant

*Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

Tonight, at the risk of violating one of the established principles of polite social procedure, I'm going to talk shop. I plan to talk about my job and the jobs of other American diplomats. In particular, I want to discuss the new physical and conceptual environment in which modern diplomacy must operate.

The job of the American diplomat has changed tremendously during the last generation. Thirty years ago, I think it is fair to say that the average citizen of this country gave relatively little attention to foreign affairs. Foreign policy was an interesting subject for friendly speculation and argument, but most of us did not feel that it intimately affected our personal lives. We did not regard it as nearly so important, for example, as the outcome of a World Series game.

Today this attitude is greatly altered. Our attitudes have changed because the world has changed. A steadily increasing number of people have come to realize that our Nation's foreign policy is a matter of the most vital importance—that the lives of millions of men and women who inhabit this Nation may ultimately depend upon the effective conduct of American diplomacy. For this reason it may be interesting for us to consider some of the principal ways in which the environment of American diplomacy has changed during the past 30 years.

In the first place, I think we can all agree that the stakes of diplomacy are now immensely greater than at any time in the past. Representing the United States abroad has never been an easy or casual task. Nevertheless, in the early years of this century, the United States did not

face an immediate threat to its very existence, as it does today. We were protected by vast oceans, by a long-established balance-of-power system in other parts of the world, and by the physical incapacity of enemy forces to launch a successful invasion of this continent.

The changes that have since taken place can be attributed only in part to political events. The greatly magnified danger to this country results primarily from changes in our physical surroundings. We should remember that the inventors of the airplane and the pioneers in the field of nuclear fission have had a great impact upon our foreign policies. The world has grown smaller; the methods of warfare have grown more destructive; and the United States has inevitably become more vulnerable.

Just as the products of scientific genius have increased our vulnerability, so has our capacity for survival been menaced by international political and economic developments. During the last 20 years we have witnessed the rise of two great empires strong enough to endanger the security of the United States. The Nazi empire was crushed after the most painful and costly war in human history. But the Communist empire rapidly seized many of the territories and peoples held by the Nazis and has continued a relentless program of expansion in all directions.

Nature of Red Threat

Today this Communist empire is the most formidable aggressive dictatorship the world has ever known. It is waging a merciless "cold war" against all free societies, with the purpose of gradually pyramiding its own capacity for attack and weakening the free world's capacity for resist-

¹ Address made before the United Council on World Affairs at Boston, Mass., on Oct. 28 (press release 613).

ance. The Communist objective is to gain unchallenged superiority in all the elements of political, military, and economic power—in population, territory, natural resources, scientific and technical facilities, industrial production, military forces, and the like. For the first time in our national history we are confronted by the possibility that a potential enemy may be able to attain this kind of superiority.

At the present time, of course, the free world as a whole is distinctly superior to the Communist bloc in nearly all the elements of power essential to survival. This means that the Soviet Union is incapable, at this time, of winning an all-out war against the United States and its allies. But it would be suicidal shortsightedness for us to judge the Communist menace solely in terms of the immediate military threat to ourselves. We are menaced equally by the unceasing cold war against other parts of the world. If the Communist bloc should be permitted to capture new territories, to enslave additional millions of people, and to seize new farms, factories, mines, and laboratories, it would eventually be able to outstrip the United States in virtually every form of power, and might leave us no alternatives but surrender or total destruction. Even our substantial lead in nuclear weapons would almost certainly melt away if the Communist bloc should gain overall scientific and industrial superiority. Thus, we face a danger which is at once short-term and long-term. Our prospects for peace and survival will depend upon our ability to deal with both aspects of this danger.

And as our industrial expansion proceeds, we are becoming increasingly dependent on other parts of the world for raw materials. Today there are already a large number of vital commodities which we must import from abroad. With the passage of time, it will become virtually impossible for us to maintain our peacetime living standards, or to win any war that might be forced upon us, without access to foreign sources of raw materials.

When we add these things together—when we consider the growth of Communist power, our increasing dependence upon foreign imports, and our vastly more dangerous physical position in the world—we can see that the very life of this Nation depends, as never before in history, upon active cooperation with other free nations. A primary objective of our foreign policy is to keep other free lands out of Communist hands and to keep

these nations working with us toward our mutual objectives of peace, security, and human progress. We need strong and dependable allies, and the maintenance of friendly and cooperative relations with these allies is one of the principal tasks of modern American diplomacy.

Next, we should note that as the stakes of diplomacy have increased, the alternatives to the art of diplomacy have become vastly more terrible. In past centuries certain governments have often been willing to resort to war when they failed to achieve their objectives through diplomatic devices. Throughout most of human history these wars were fought by professional armies, with little direct effect upon the great masses of the population. By the end of World War I, however, warfare had already become so horrible that many earnest men sought to abolish war as an instrument of national policy. But the terrors of the First World War, and even the Second World War, pale into insignificance when compared with the possible consequences of war in the atomic age. Modern war may bring death to millions of men, women, and children and may mean the destruction of victor and vanquished alike. Under these circumstances it is clear that diplomacy is not only our first line of defense. It may prove to be the only line of defense that really matters.

Our New Responsibilities

A third major change in the environment of American diplomacy has been the rapid movement of the United States from a position of relative isolation to a position of prominence and responsibility in world affairs. It is sometimes difficult for us Americans to appreciate fully the significance of our new status. Recently a European diplomat was going over a collection of state papers relating to European policies in the period just prior to World War I. He had before him Blue Books, White Papers, Yellow Books, diplomatic notes, and despatches—all the important papers of the period. In all these state documents he found not one single reference to the United States as an international political factor of importance. And that was only 40 years ago.

Today I doubt that one could find many official state papers anywhere which do not at least mention the United States. There are few developments in the world today which our Government

can afford to regard with disinterest, and there are few international issues on which the views of the United States are not eagerly awaited.

This assumption of world responsibilities by the United States has not been entirely a matter of choice or design. It has been an inevitable consequence of the environmental circumstances already mentioned. We have assumed new commitments abroad and have entered into new relationships simply because the protection of our national safety and welfare required such steps. Nevertheless, all these developments have profoundly affected the work of the American diplomatic officer. As the agent of a government whose voice is often decisive, he must combine extraordinary insight and initiative with an equal measure of caution and restraint.

The change in America's international position is sometimes described as the "rise of the United States to world leadership." I feel that the word "leadership" is not the best description of our role. It is true that the United States must take the lead on many occasions and must exercise a constant initiative. At the same time, I believe that President Eisenhower gave us a clearer and truer picture of our international position when he recently stressed the word "partnership" rather than "leadership." Our relationships with our friends and allies abroad do not permit us to demand or to dictate but rather to suggest and persuade. We have no satellites, and we want no satellites. The unity of the free world can be maintained only on the basis of partnership. Secretary Dulles has repeatedly emphasized that.

I'm afraid that some Americans expect the United States Government to dominate all its relations with allied governments and are somewhat critical when our allies disagree with us. This attitude is rather unrealistic. When a man enters a business partnership he knows that he cannot thereafter run the business as if it were entirely his own. And when a nation enters an international partnership, it must recognize that it has to take account of the views and interests, and even the prejudices, of its allies. Our job in the Department of State is to protect and promote American interests, and we never forget that fact. But neither do we want to forget what our basic interests really are. We would be very foolish if we allowed ourselves to pursue our secondary interests so intensely that we sacrifice the all-important interest of maintaining the part-

nership itself. Diplomacy is essentially the art of adjusting and accommodating interests, and no partnership can survive without this process of give and take.

A successful partnership involves obligations and burdens, and we need to face this fact frankly. On the other hand, I feel sometimes that we Americans think too much about the obligations and burdens of our international alliances and think too little about the advantages and rewards we receive. We sometimes forget that the people of the United States are protected today not only by approximately 20 divisions in our own American Army but also by roughly 175 divisions in the armies of allied nations. We sometimes forget that it is not American industrial power alone that prevents the Communists from achieving unchallenged mastery of the earth but also the great industrial power of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and other free nations. We forget that the effectiveness of our Air Force would be greatly diminished without the bases and facilities contributed by our allies. In order to understand the true significance of our international partnership, we must constantly remember that each partner receives more from the relationship than it contributes.

An Expanding Diplomacy

Another significant development which has affected the practice of diplomacy is the great expansion of the scope of diplomacy—the sizable extension of the subject matter with which the diplomat must be concerned. The growing complexity of modern civilization and the decreasing self-sufficiency of individual nations have combined to create international problems in fields of activity heretofore unknown. Similarly, the multiple devices and pressures through which the Communist bloc seeks to penetrate the free world have produced the necessity of varied kinds of cooperation in resistance to this penetration. As a result, for example, it is increasingly difficult to draw a sharp distinction between national and international problems or to separate domestic policies from foreign policies. Our own trade and tariff policies were once regarded as a purely domestic concern; now they have far-reaching international implications. A local election in a particular country may be of merely internal in-

terest, but it may also be, on occasion, a decisive battle between the forces of freedom and the forces of slavery.

This development has had important consequences for the job of the individual diplomat. During recent years, there has been a considerable growth of professional specialization in the Department of State and the Foreign Service. We need people who can deal with complex economic problems, financial problems, scientific problems, legal problems, informational problems, geographic problems, politico-military problems, and a variety of other specialties. At the same time, the need for generalists—for men and women who can deal with a wide range of problems—seems greater than ever before. As an organization, the Department of State must be able to combine a broad global perspective with the ability to deal competently with the most finite technical details, and this means that the business of diplomacy is getting bigger and tougher in almost every way.

While I don't want to bore you with statistics, I would like to illustrate the complexity of present diplomatic operations by means of a few facts and figures. The European Bureau of the State Department, which I have the honor to head, deals with all the countries of continental Europe, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, as well as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and various smaller European dependencies, such as Bermuda and British Guiana. We have 277 employees in Washington and are responsible for the work of 27 diplomatic missions and 82 consulates in foreign countries, containing about 2,600 American employees and 5,000 local employees. All the expenses of the Bureau and its overseas posts, including salaries, supplies, communications, travel, etc., total about \$40 million annually.

In an average week, our Bureau in Washington receives 770 cables and 560 despatches from foreign posts. Some of these are purely information; others require decisions and actions by the Department or other agencies of the United States Government. In an average week we send out approximately 200 cables and 160 instructional messages in other forms. This does not include, of course, hundreds of memoranda of official conversations, letters from American citizens, Congressional requests, and so forth. All told, we are required to deal with about 18,000 separate documents each week, many of which involve pains-

taking research and analysis and some of which require decisions that can finally be made only by the President of the United States.

Growth of Multilateral Diplomacy

Still another significant change in the diplomatic scene has been the growth of multilateral diplomacy. This is a relatively recent development. Since the end of World War II many international questions have ceased to be considered primarily on a nation-to-nation basis and have become the subject matter of discussions among large groups of nations. This increased emphasis on multilateral diplomacy has resulted primarily from the development of such organizations as the United Nations, NATO, OAS, and other regional arrangements. It has produced a necessity for a new kind of representational and negotiating relationship, which is exemplified by the international conference.

Even better examples are provided by the large number of international bodies which meet in continuous session and reach day-to-day decisions on a variety of matters in which we and our allies have common interests. NATO alone has more than 20 standing committees on which the United States is represented, and these representatives regularly present questions of fact or policy to the Department of State for decision or advice. A scholar writing a modern textbook on the arts of diplomacy would need a special volume on the practice of multilateral diplomacy.

I should make it clear that multilateral diplomacy has not become a substitute for bilateral diplomacy. It does not lessen the need for effective relationships with individual countries. In some respects it intensifies this need. In order for our representatives to work effectively in international organizations, they must be able to depend upon sound relationships established with each individual government through our regular country missions. In any event, multilateral diplomacy has superimposed additional demands upon our diplomatic establishment. The multilateral conference table offers unique opportunities for international understanding and for prompt and effective action on certain critical issues, but it has inevitably complicated the work of the professional diplomat.

A final noteworthy change in the diplomatic

climate has resulted from the spread of democratic concepts of government. For many years we have been shifting from what may be termed "dynastic" diplomacy toward a kind of "popular" diplomacy. Diplomacy is becoming less concerned with relationships among governments and more concerned with relationships among peoples. Fundamentally, our most valuable and dependable alliances are rooted in this people-to-people relationship. Our long-range hopes for the maintenance of successful working relationships with all free nations, as well as our hopes for the eventual modification of the policies and structures of the Communist system, will depend less upon the influence we can exert on rulers than upon the understanding we can achieve among whole populations.

In practical terms, people-to-people relationships sometimes make the work of the professional diplomat extremely difficult. He must now think in terms of the entire complex of political, economic, social, and cultural forces which determine the purposes and practices of nations and regions. He must recognize that the center of decision is no longer the cloistered chamber but the public forum and that whispered conversations between high officials usually exert less influence upon a nation's policies than the open and widespread pronouncements of the press and radio. He must be prepared at all times to have his decisions and actions tested in the crucible of public controversy and to see his most confidential undertakings analyzed and dissected in the morning newspaper headlines.

"Popular Diplomacy"

It must be confessed that some of my professional colleagues are not always happy about certain features of this so-called "popular diplomacy." There are times, I think, when every officer who has been engaged in delicate international negotiations feels that his chances of a successful result would be greatly enhanced if all newspapers and radios would temporarily vanish from the face of the earth. But the spotlight of publicity has become a fact of life and an inseparable part of modern diplomacy.

There are a few oldtimers in the diplomatic world who find it hard to adjust themselves to the glare of constant publicity. This reminds me of

a story which is fairly well known among Washington bureaucrats. Some years ago, I am told, a citizen wrote a letter to the Department of Agriculture complaining about an excessive outcropping of dandelions on his front lawn and asking how they might be removed. The Department of Agriculture sent him a pamphlet on the subject. Some weeks later he wrote another letter, explaining that the measures suggested in the pamphlet had proved unsuccessful, that the dandelions were still there in large numbers, and that he would like further advice. This time he received a personal letter, setting forth in great detail everything known to modern science about the mysterious techniques of getting rid of dandelions.

After a few months our lawn owner again reported failure. None of the methods suggested had proved effective, and he pleaded for additional help. "I love my lawn," he said, "and I want your advice as to what I should do now." The Department of Agriculture's final letter was simple and to the point. It read: "Dear Sir: We suggest that you learn to love the dandelions, too."

That's what we diplomats will have to do about the newspapers and the radio. They are here to stay, and I think we are learning to love them. We can also take considerable comfort from the knowledge that publicity is often helpful to the processes of diplomacy.

New Burdens on Government

The revolutionary changes I have described in the climate, the character, and the techniques of diplomacy have created new burdens at various levels of government. The President of the United States is required to devote a great deal more of his personal time and energy to foreign affairs than in the earlier years of our history. Members of the Congress have had to become expert in many different aspects of our foreign relations. Naturally, the burden upon the Department of State and the Foreign Service has been equally great. The professional diplomat has not only been required to undergo considerable personal adjustment but has also been required to evolve new concepts and techniques through which the interests of the United States can be served in this dangerous and ever-changing age.

On the whole, I believe that the new climate of diplomacy has certain distinct advantages. For

example, greater popular participation in the conduct of foreign relations is preferable to the system which prevailed in past centuries, when the destinies of nations might sometimes be decided by secret bargains reached by self-seeking negotiators. On the other hand, I should like to emphasize the fact that no nation's diplomatic affairs can be successfully conducted, even today, in a goldfish bowl. There is still a definite need for confidential consultations among governmental representatives and for agreements that do not have to be hammered out in the electric atmosphere of public debate. Moreover, the need for the "personal touch" on the part of the professional diplomat—the need for applying the old-fashioned qualities of tact, patience, imagination, understanding, and determination—has not diminished with the passage of time. In fact, because of the critical nature of diplomatic decisions today, the need for personal diplomatic skill is greater than ever before.

The Diplomatic Corps

This brings me to another subject about which I would like to say a few words—the job of the individual diplomat. Since I myself am a practitioner of this hazardous occupation, you are privileged to take what I say with the proverbial grain of salt. However, I sincerely believe it is a subject that requires more attention and thought than has been given in the past.

It is no secret that our diplomatic officers have been subjected to severe criticism in recent years. This criticism has been varied both in origin and object; it has not been confined to any particular group or philosophy. Some of it is just. Much of it is well-intentioned and without malice. At the same time, I think it is not an exaggeration to say that a great deal of this criticism has been grossly unfair. The overwhelming majority of our diplomatic officers, both in the United States and abroad, are loyal, hard working, and intelligent public servants whose labors too often pass unnoticed.

Very few of those who have joined the American diplomatic corps ever expected glamour or glory as a reward. It is proper that the returning military hero who has won a great battle should receive a welcoming parade. But the diplomat who has perhaps avoided a war—or who has achieved a vital national objective without war—

gets no such acclaim. This, too, is as it must be. Diplomatic successes do not lend themselves to elaborate publicity. In fact, the very phrase "diplomatic victory" is something of a contradiction in terms, since a successful diplomatic effort usually involves an accommodation of interests with other countries and its fruits may be dissipated by the claim that one country or another has achieved a "victory." The most effective diplomacy is often ignored by the headline writers.

Most of my colleagues are quite satisfied to dispense with glory. They accept the fact that the business of diplomacy, like most other businesses, is more than 90 percent hard work—and often very dull work. On the other hand, the average diplomatic officer feels that it is not too much to ask that he be given a modicum of understanding and respect. He doesn't ask that people shower him with ticker tape, if they will only stop pelting him with rotten eggs.

The fundamental sources of this criticism, I believe, are not hard to find. Through no choice of our own, we Americans have been compelled to live in an age of extreme peril. The safety and self-sufficiency that we once took for granted have faded away. We are repeatedly confronted by difficult and painful decisions, which affect our own destiny and that of the whole civilized world. The vast complex of international problems, which seemed so comfortably remote a few years ago, has thrust itself rudely into our daily lives. Under these circumstances it is probably inevitable that the American diplomatic officer should be regarded as an unpleasant reminder of our transition from an era of relative security to an era of danger and insecurity. He is a tangible symbol of an outside world which has become both demanding and menacing.

To put it another way, the diplomatic officer has the unenviable job of telling the American people unpleasant truths and confronting them with painful decisions. This is not the best way to win a popularity contest. From ancient history, we learn that certain kings and sultans made a practice of putting messengers to death when these messengers bore ill tidings. The result, as you would expect, was that these monarchs gradually came to receive only good news, whatever the actual course of events. They thereby lost contact with the true situation in their empires and were eventually destroyed. This country is far

too wise to repeat such a tragic mistake. It is not important that the diplomat be popular, but it is vitally important that he receive the confidence and respect that his labors warrant.

I do not want to imply that the American diplomatic service is above criticism. Secretary Dulles and his staff have recognized the need for constant improvement in the quality of the service and are laboring steadily toward this objective. Significant progress has already been made. In fact, I believe it is remarkable to note the extent to which the American diplomat has adapted himself to the new environment of diplomacy and has risen boldly to accept the unprecedented challenge of the times.

No matter how effective our professional diplomats may become, there will always be room for public criticism, both of policies and techniques. To paraphrase Clemenceau's famous statement on war: "Diplomacy has become much too important to be left solely to diplomats." It is now a matter of life and death to our entire population. But as the general public plays an increasing role in the development and execution of foreign policies, it becomes all the more important that the public understand clearly the intricate problems involved.

The final measure of American diplomacy will be its results. During recent months American diplomats have made important contributions to our national security and to the peace and stability of the whole world. The end of the war in Korea, the accord between the United Kingdom and Egypt, the settlement of the oil controversy in Iran, the Trieste agreement, the Manila security pact and the Pacific Charter, and the more recent agreements in London and Paris on an associated Western European defense system—all these far-reaching developments offer renewed hope for a better and safer universe. And American diplomats take pride in the part we have played—sometimes a key part—in these achievements. We are also proud of the tribute paid the diplomatic corps 2 weeks ago in Washington by President Eisenhower when he stood before us and spoke these words:

If there is any organization that should have the highest morale based firmly in its own convictions as to the importance of its work, the necessity for successful accomplishment regardless of what critic or opponent may say, a morale based in that high belief in a cause, then that should be the Foreign Service and the State Department—as, indeed, I believe it is.

U. S. and Japan Discuss Mutual Interests

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

White House press release dated November 10

President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Yoshida met on November 9 and reaffirmed the spirit of friendly cooperation characterizing the relations between the United States and Japan.¹ The Prime Minister also met with Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Treasury Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Wilson, and Director Stassen of the Foreign Operations Administration. The Prime Minister and Secretary Dulles at their meetings this week, after a full and frank exchange of views on matters of mutual interest, reviewed the conversations held during the past 3 weeks by representatives of the two governments.

I

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the solidarity and determination of the free nations had greatly advanced the cause of world peace. They declared that their governments would, in cooperation with the free nations of Asia, continue their united efforts to maintain and promote the peace and prosperity of Asia. The Prime Minister reaffirmed his Government's determination to make a full contribution to those efforts and in particular stressed Japan's desire to cooperate, wherever possible, in the development of economic strength by the free nations of Asia.

The President and the Prime Minister declared that the goals of their governments are peaceful and that their peoples desire peace and liberty for themselves and their neighbors.

II

Representatives of both governments discussed Japan's economic situation in detail. It was agreed that the economic well-being of the Japanese people is a matter of importance to the entire free world. The achievement of improved economic conditions in Japan depends partly upon the ability of the Japanese people themselves to pursue sound and constructive internal monetary and other economic policies and partly upon

¹ For an announcement of the visit of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, see BULLETIN of Nov. 8, p. 679.

Japan's ability to expand its trade with other countries. By various means since the end of the war the United States has been able to contribute substantially to the economic progress which Japan has achieved. The United States is aware of the efforts which Japan is making to solve its difficult economic problems and will continue to examine sympathetically means whereby it can assist the Japanese people to advance their well-being.

A number of specific measures were discussed in the recent talks. General agreement was reached that the United States would cooperate with Japan in its efforts to expand its foreign trade and achieve a better balance in its foreign economic relations. It was further agreed that the United States would sell to Japan agricultural commodities and that a substantial portion of the proceeds of these sales will be used for Japan's domestic economic improvement and defense support and for regional economic development. Other steps were discussed, such as the establishment of a productivity program in Japan and the mutual benefits which might arise from Japan's participation with the other free nations of South and Southeast Asia in the economic development of that area. Both sides agreed that these measures would be of marked benefit to Japan by improving its economic position and facilitating its efforts to attain a higher standard of living.

III

United States representatives expressed regret over the incident on March 1 in which 23 Japanese fishermen were injured—one fatally—by the fall-out of radioactive materials following a nuclear test in the Pacific. They emphasized their belief that peaceful uses of atomic energy would be steadily developed and would eventually become of great value to Japan and other friendly nations throughout the world.

IV

There was also discussion of the disposition of Japanese assets vested by the United States, and representatives of the United States stated that this matter is under consideration. Among other subjects reviewed were Communist efforts to weaken and discredit the operations of free governments in Asia, the request of Japan for expedited consideration of the cases of war criminals, and the status of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands

in the light of the present international situation as well as the desire of Japan for the return to the Bonin Islands of former inhabitants.

AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

Press release 643 dated November 13

The representatives of the Governments of the United States and Japan today reached an understanding on a \$100 million surplus agricultural commodity program for Japan under the provisions of U.S. Public Law 480.

Of the total amount, commodities with a market value of \$85 million will be sold to Japan for local currency and commodities costing \$15 million will be delivered to Japan as an outright grant to be used in support of the school lunch and clothing program.

The major portion of the proceeds of these sales will be used for Japan's domestic economic improvement, including agricultural development, and for regional economic development. Seventy percent of the local currency accruing from the sale of the commodities under Title I will be used by the Japanese Government on a loan basis. The balance of the proceeds will be used for various U.S. purposes including the purchase of goods in Japan for other friendly countries, cultural exchange, agricultural market development, and expenditures of the U.S. forces in Japan, principally for the housing program under U.S. Public Law 765.

Negotiations on details of the arrangements will be continued both in Washington and Tokyo.

Japan and the United Nations

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*

U.S./U.N. press release 1996 dated October 27

The United States will of course support the renewed application of Japan for membership in the United Nations. Japan is the most populous single nonmember country in the world, and its eventual membership is a certainty. The United States Government believes it is essential to the success of the United Nations that Japan, and all other peace-loving states able and willing to live up to the charter, be admitted to membership as soon as possible.

Trade Agreement Negotiations Involving Japan

Press release 640 dated November 12

UNITED STATES INTENTION TO UNDERTAKE TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements today issued formal notice of the intention of the U.S. Government to participate, under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 as amended and extended, in reciprocal tariff negotiations involving Japan. The President has given high priority to expansion of Japan's trading opportunities because of Japan's vital importance to free world mutual security.

Today's announcement, including the listing of products and the scheduling of hearings, formally opens U.S. preparations for participation in an international tariff-negotiating conference to be convened next February in Geneva, Switzerland, under the sponsorship of the countries associated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The purpose of this conference will be tariff negotiations looking to Japan's full accession to the general agreement, thus enlarging her trade possibilities with other countries as well as with the United States.

To aid in the development of positions which the United States should adopt in the proposed tariff negotiations, and in accordance with established procedures, a list is also published today of the products on which the United States may consider offering concessions. Hearings are also scheduled and opportunity is provided for submission of briefs for the purpose of obtaining views and information from interested persons on all phases of these negotiations, including views for or against concessions which the United States might seek or offer on particular products.

Attached to the committee's notice of intention to negotiate is a list of products on which modifications may be considered during the negotiations. Listing of an item is for the purpose of gathering

information on the possibility of a concession; it does not necessarily mean that a concession will be offered on the product. No tariff concession can be made by the United States on any product not included in this or a subsequent published list.

As indicated in the announcement, the United States also proposes to take advantage of the occasion of these tariff negotiations to carry out four renegotiations arising out of various U.S. actions. In two cases, there was enacted legislation calling for modification of certain trade agreement obligations by an upward adjustment of import duties for commodities affected by exceptional developments. The laws in question are Public Law 689 on fish sticks and Public Law 479 on certain rubber-soled shoes. The third case relates to the escape-clause action taken by the United States in which it modified the concession on dried figs. No change is contemplated in the present tariff treatment of figs, but under the agreement the escape-clause action permits other countries to seek compensatory adjustments either by new concessions on our part or by withdrawal of concessions by affected countries. In a fourth case, when Uruguay became a party to the agreement last December, the United States did not find it possible to proclaim certain concessions that had been negotiated on meat products.

The majority of the listed articles are included for the purpose of giving consideration to concessions in negotiations directly between the United States and Japan. There are, however, many articles which are of primary interest to other countries. For these articles consideration will be given to possible concessions under circumstances where these other countries are also negotiating with Japan under the general agreement and where a concession by the United States would broaden the overall results of the multilateral negotiations through the triangular exchange of benefits.

In addition, because of the extensive and time-consuming nature of the procedures for getting information on possible concessions, there are a relatively few articles of interest primarily to countries which may decide to negotiate with Japan though they have not yet done so. As a general rule no concessions would be made on such products if the country having a primary interest does not complete its negotiations with Japan.

As required by law, the Committee for Reciprocity Information also gave notice that it will receive views of interested persons concerning any aspect of the proposed negotiations. The members of the Committee for Reciprocity Information and the Committee on Trade Agreements are the same. They include a member of the U.S. Tariff Commission and representatives designated by the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Interior, and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

Domestic producers, importers, and other interested persons are invited to present views and all possible information regarding products on the published list, including information relative to section 2 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954. This section provides that no action should be taken to decrease the duty on any article where the President finds that such reduction would threaten domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements. Consideration will be given to submissions concerning wages in the exporting country in accordance with the President's message of March 30.¹ All views and information will be carefully considered in arriving at a decision as to whether or not a concession should be offered by the United States on each product.

There is no limitation on the products on which the United States may request concessions, and domestic producers or exporters interested in developing markets in Japan are invited to present suggestions to the Committee for Reciprocity Information as to concessions which should be sought. The Department of Commerce also furnishes the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements with studies of the trade in and other facts regarding articles exported from the United States on which the United States might consider seeking concessions in the negotiations.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 19, 1954, p. 602.

Hearings before the Committee for Reciprocity Information will open on December 13, 1954. Applications for oral presentation of views and information should be presented to the committee not later than 12 noon, December 3. Persons desiring to be heard should also submit written briefs or statements to the Committee for Reciprocity Information by 12 noon, December 6, 1954. Only those persons will be heard who presented written briefs or statements and filed applications to be heard by the date indicated. Persons who do not desire to be heard may present written statements until noon, December 27, 1954. Details concerning the submission of briefs and applications to be heard are contained in the committee's notice attached to this release.

The United States Tariff Commission also announced today that it would open public hearings on December 13 to receive news and information useful in preparing its "peril-point" report to the President, as required by section 3 (a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, on the extent to which U.S. concessions on particular products may be made in the negotiations without causing or threatening serious injury to a domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products.

Views and information received by the Tariff Commission in its hearings referred to above will be made available to the Committee for Reciprocity Information for consideration by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements. Persons whose interests relate only to import products included in the list published today and who have appeared before the Tariff Commission need not—but may if they wish—appear also before the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

However, persons wishing to present material on U.S. import concessions other than the material they have presented to the Tariff Commission should file written statements or briefs with the Committee for Reciprocity Information, or may, if they wish, request appearance before that committee. Persons wishing to suggest additional items on which U.S. import concessions may be considered, and which do not appear in a published list, should present their views to the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

Copies of the notice of the Tariff Commission may be obtained from the Commission.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON TRADE AGREEMENTS

- I. Trade-Agreement Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Relating to Japan ;
11. Possible Adjustment in Preferential Rates on Cuban Products.

Pursuant to Section 4 of the Trade Agreements Act, approved June 12, 1934, as amended (48 Stat. 945, ch. 474; 65 Stat. 73, ch. 141) and to paragraph 4 of Executive Order 10082 of October 5, 1949 (3 CFR, 1949 Supp., p. 126), notice is hereby given by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements of intention to participate in trade-agreement negotiations, on a reciprocal basis, looking to Japan's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as a means of improving Japan's trading prospects in the free world. With a view to the further expansion of such trading prospects, the United States is also considering, in addition to negotiations directly with Japan, participating in limited negotiations with other contracting parties to the General Agreement that will also be negotiating with Japan, in order to broaden the overall results of the negotiations.

There is annexed hereto a list¹ of articles imported into the United States to be considered for possible modification of duties and other import restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or specific continuance of existing customs or excise treatment in the trade agreement negotiations of which notice is given above. In addition to articles of primary interest to Japan, there are also being listed some articles of interest to certain contracting parties as well as to Japan, and a few articles which are believed to be of primary interest to other contracting parties that may be negotiating with Japan, some of which articles are closely related to articles of primary interest to Japan.

Notice is also given of intention to negotiate settlement of several outstanding problems arising out of various actions by the United States. Negotiations are contemplated looking to such modi-

fication of trade agreement obligations as may be necessary in view of the enactment of Public Law 479 of the 83d Congress relating to certain rubber-soled shoes and Public Law 689 of the 83d Congress relating to certain prepared fish. In addition, the United States modified its concession on figs, fresh, dried, or in brine, as a result of an escape clause action. Finally, the United States did not find it possible to carry out obligations negotiated with Uruguay with respect to certain meat products. Among the possible outcomes of these negotiations might be a granting of such concessions on some items in the annexed list as may be necessary to compensate for the above actions of the United States.

The articles proposed for consideration in the negotiations are identified in the annexed list by specifying the numbers of the paragraphs in tariff schedules of Title I and Title II of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, in which they are provided for together with the language used in such tariff paragraphs to provide for such articles, except that where necessary the statutory language has been modified by the omission of words or the addition of new language in order to narrow the scope of the original language. Where no qualifying language is used with regard to the type, grade, or value of any listed article, all types, grades, and values of the article covered by the language used are included.

In the case of each article in the list with respect to which the corresponding product of Cuba is now entitled to preferential treatment, the negotiations referred to will involve the elimination, reduction, or continuation of the preference, perhaps in some cases with an adjustment or specification of the rate applicable to the product of Cuba.

No article will be considered in the negotiations for possible modification of duties or other import restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or specific continuance of existing customs or excise treatment unless it is included, specifically or by reference, in the annexed list or unless it is subsequently included in a supplementary public list. Only duties on the articles listed imposed under the paragraphs of the Tariff Act of 1930 specified with regard to such articles and import taxes imposed on such articles under the Internal Revenue Code will be considered for a possible decrease, but additional or separate ordinary duties or import taxes on such articles im-

¹Not printed here. Full list appears in the *Federal Register*, Nov. 16, p. 7380, and in Department of State Publication 5653 (Commercial Policy Series 145), which is available in the field offices of the Department of Commerce and from the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C.; in addition copies are on sale for 20 cents each by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.

posed under any other provisions of law may be bound against increase as an assurance that the concession under the listed paragraph will not be nullified. In addition, any action which might be taken with respect to basic duties on products may involve action with respect to compensating duties imposed on manufactures containing such products. In the event that an article which as of January 1, 1954, was regarded as classifiable under a description included in the list is excluded therefrom by judicial decision or otherwise prior to the conclusion of the trade-agreement negotiations, the list will nevertheless be considered as including such article.

Persons interested in exports may present their views regarding any tariff or other concessions that might be requested from Japan. Any other matters appropriate to be considered in connection with the negotiations proposed above may also be presented. Public hearings in connection with the "peril point" investigation of the United States Tariff Commission in connection with the articles included in the annexed list, pursuant to section 3 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, are the subject of an announcement of this date issued by that Commission.

Pursuant to Section 4 of the Trade Agreements Act, as amended, and paragraph 5 of Executive Order 10082 of October 5, 1949, information and views as to any aspect of the proposals announced in this notice may be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information in accordance with the announcement of this date issued by that Committee.

By direction of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements this 13th day of November, 1954.

CARL D. CORSE,
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee
on Trade Agreements

COMMITTEE FOR RECIPROCITY INFORMATION

- I. Trade-Agreement Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade relating to Japan;
- II. Possible Adjustment in Preferential Rates on Cuban Products.

Submission of Information to the Committee for Reciprocity Information

Closing date for application to be heard, December 3, 1954

Closing date for submission of briefs, December 6, 1954

Public hearings open, December 13, 1954

The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements has issued on this day a notice of intention to participate in trade-agreement negotiations, on a reciprocal basis, looking to Japan's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as a means of improving Japan's trading prospects in the free world. With a view to the further expansion of such trading prospects, the United States is also considering, in addition to negotiations directly with Japan, participating in limited negotiations with other contracting parties to the General Agreement that will also be negotiating with Japan, in order to broaden the overall results of the negotiations.

Annexed to the notice of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements, is a list of articles imported into the United States to be considered for possible concessions in the negotiations. The Committee for Reciprocity Information hereby gives notice that all applications for oral presentation of views in regard to the proposed negotiations, which must indicate the product or products on which the individuals or groups desire to be heard, and an estimate of the time required for such presentation, shall be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information not later than 12:00 noon, December 3, 1954, and all information and views in writing of persons who desire to be heard in regard to the foregoing proposals shall be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information not later than 12:00 noon, December 6, 1954. Written statements of persons who do not desire to be heard shall be submitted not later than 12:00 noon, December 27, 1954. Such communications shall be addressed to "Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C.". Fifteen copies of written statements, either typed, printed, or duplicated shall be submitted, of which one copy shall be sworn to.

Written statements submitted to the Committee, except information and business data proffered in confidence, shall be open to inspection by interested persons. Information and business data proffered in confidence shall be submitted on separate pages clearly marked "For official use only of Committee for Reciprocity Information."

Public hearings will be held before the Com-

mittee for Reciprocity Information, at which oral statements will be heard. The first hearing will be at 2:00 p. m. on December 13, 1954, in the Hearing Room in the Tariff Commission Building, 7th and E Streets, N. W., Washington 25, D. C. Witnesses who make application to be heard will be advised regarding the time and place of their individual appearances. Appearances at hearings before the Committee may be made only by or on behalf of those persons who have filed written statements and who have within the time prescribed made written application for oral presentation of views. Statements made at the public hearings shall be under oath.

Persons or groups interested in import products may present to the Committee their views concerning possible tariff concessions by the United States on any product, whether or not included in the list annexed to the notice of intention to negotiate. However, as indicated in the notice of intention to negotiate, no tariff reduction or specific continuance of customs or excise treatment will be considered on any product which is not included in the list annexed to the public notice by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements, unless it is subsequently included in a supplementary public list.

The United States Tariff Commission has today announced public hearings on the import items appearing in the list annexed to the notice of intention to negotiate to run concurrently with the hearings of the Committee for Reciprocity Information. Oral testimony and written information submitted to the Tariff Commission will be made available to and will be considered by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements. Consequently, those whose interests relate only to import products included in the foregoing list, and who appear before the Tariff Commission, need not, but may if they wish, appear also before the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

Persons interested in exports may present their views regarding any tariff or other concessions that might be requested from Japan. Any other matters appropriate to be considered in connection with the proposed negotiations may also be presented.

Copies of the list attached to the notice of inten-

tion to negotiate may be obtained from the Committee for Reciprocity Information at the address designated above and may be inspected at the field offices of the Department of Commerce.

By direction of the Committee for Reciprocity Information this 13th day of November, 1954.

EDWARD YARDLEY

Secretary,

Committee for Reciprocity Information

Talks on U.S.-Philippine Relations

White House press release dated November 3

President Eisenhower received Senator [José P.] Laurel on November 3, and they discussed in general the relations between the United States and the Philippines and the current consultations between the two Governments regarding the Philippine Trade Agreement.¹

The President stated that the United States has observed with great interest and satisfaction the recent progress achieved by the Government of the Philippines toward solving the problems and dislocations caused by World War II. Senator Laurel explained the great desire and need of the Philippine Government to pursue its program for economic development.

President Eisenhower indicated the continuing sympathetic interest of the United States in the effective and rapid economic development of the Philippines and reiterated the intention of the United States to continue to extend aid to the Philippines for this purpose. With this in mind the U.S. Government has extended substantial assistance in the past on both a grant and loan basis and is now considering the Philippine Government's proposal for aid next fiscal year in the form of loans and grants. Both forms of aid would be extended within the framework of the economic development program now being prepared by the Philippine Government and would be designed to encourage maximum participation by private enterprise in the development of the Philippines.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 404, and Oct. 11, 1954, p. 541.

Strengthening the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

*Statement by Samuel C. Waugh
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

The basic idea underlying the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is as simple as it is far reaching. This is that it is possible to construct a code of principles and rules which will guide the conduct of trade among all the countries of the free world and assure that such trade is carried on with the maximum possible freedom and on a basis of equity to all concerned.

Sweeping as this conception is, however, it is but a reflection of the fact embodied in so many facets of international life today, that the world is constantly and rapidly becoming smaller and that countries in their commercial as well as political relations must learn to live with one another. The free world simply must not permit itself to lapse into unrestricted protectionism, discrimination, and controls. If there were no general agreement today, we should have to create one.

In the 7 years during which it has been in effect, the general agreement has amply justified the faith of those who believe that a universal code of trade principles can be made to work. Under its aegis, tariffs of the contracting parties have been substantially lowered on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis; discriminations have been relaxed; numerous trade disputes have been amicably settled; and countries have acquired the habit of consulting together on mutual trade problems. There is every reason to believe that these accomplishments of the agreement have made a significant contribution to the advancement of the objectives which are laid down in its preamble.

¹ Made at the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva on Nov. 10 (press release 637). Mr. Waugh is chairman of the U.S. delegation to the session.

These achievements are a source of solid satisfaction. However, no one has ever claimed that the general agreement is a perfect instrument. Our experience with it in the light of the enormous changes that have occurred in the world economic situation during the last 7 years clearly points to certain adjustments which need to be made and serious deficiencies which should be remedied. If we can reach agreement on such changes we shall have a stronger, more flexible, and a somewhat simpler agreement. This is the task before us, and as the chairman² has suggested in his admirable opening address, further progress toward an effective system of multilateral trade and payments depends in no small measure on how well we accomplish this task.

In approaching this problem my Government has certain major objectives which I shall outline presently. Thereafter, I shall touch on some subjects in which other countries have expressed a strong interest.

Principal U.S. Objectives

The three principal objectives of the United States in the present review are: first, to provide the general agreement with an organizational framework which will permit it to operate more effectively and on a permanent basis; secondly, to strengthen and simplify the provisions relating to quantitative restrictions imposed for financial reasons; and thirdly, to safeguard the tariff concessions and assure their stability, while providing needed flexibility.

I have been gratified to note from the speeches

² Dana Wilgress of Canada.

of my fellow delegates that the objectives I have just outlined are shared by other countries. Permit me now to indicate in general terms my Government's views on each of these points.

First, as to the question of organization: The general agreement was initiated in 1947 as a provisional arrangement except as related to tariffs. This condition, unavoidable at that time, has been a limiting factor in the work of the contracting parties and has endowed the general agreement with an air of impermanence which is unsuited to the attainment of maximum effective action. Under present arrangements, the contracting parties normally meet only once a year to consider problems arising under the agreement. Between these annual meetings, the Intersessional Committee has acted on their behalf, but only with respect to a narrowly defined number of problems. The contracting parties have themselves considered and acted on the great majority of problems arising under the general agreement. Valuable as the work of the Intersessional Committee has been, it has remained essentially a stop-gap device.

My Government believes that this situation must be corrected. Problems of international trade arise almost daily, and it is essential that there be set up, within the framework of the GATT, procedures and arrangements for dealing more expeditiously with problems as they occur. In this connection, we would emphasize the need for close and more effective coordination between the contracting parties and the International Monetary Fund on matters of mutual concern, particularly in the matter of quantitative restrictions for balance of payments reasons.

Secondly, as regards the question of quantitative restrictions imposed for balance of payments reasons: When the general agreement was negotiated in 1947, the world was still struggling to extricate itself from the ruins of the Second World War, and most of the controls which countries had been forced to impose on their foreign trade and payments during the war were still being maintained in full vigor. With reconstruction only fairly begun, production at low levels, inflation still rampant, and monetary reserves depleted, there could be no serious thought of a substantial relaxation of restrictions. The extreme caution necessitated by these conditions is reflected in the broad escapes and hedges written into the balance of payments provisions of the agreement.

Improved Economic Situation

Since then, the world has come far, indeed. Reconstruction has been virtually completed, monetary stabilization has been restored, international reserves have been recouped, production far exceeds prewar levels, and real incomes are everywhere on the upgrade. There are, of course, exceptional situations here and there, but as a whole we are undoubtedly in the midst of considerable prosperity.

This gratifying state of affairs is the result of the efforts of many countries. The war-ravaged countries, in spite of the greatest hardships, have accomplished in a remarkably short period of time the task of at once rebuilding, enlarging, and to a large extent modernizing their economies. The underdeveloped countries have made great strides in expanding output and in developing their human and material resources.

We are happy that our country too has been able to play a part in the postwar recovery of the free world, and we appreciate the friendly references which have been made to the aid which the United States has extended to other countries, and to our various programs by means of which large amounts of dollar exchange have been made available to the rest of the world. But I should like to direct your attention to another factor which for some reason is frequently overlooked, though it is probably more important than any other in the great improvement that has recently taken place in the world's dollar situation. I refer to the massive and constantly growing volume of imports into the United States from the rest of the world. In 1953 the physical volume, that is, the "quantum," of our imports was no less than 28 percent above the volume of 1948. Preliminary estimates indicate that, even with the slight decline in the level of economic activity in the United States, the volume of imports in 1954 will still be about 24 percent above 1948 and some 55 percent above the average for the years 1937 to 1939 inclusive.

The point I should emphasize in this connection is that the maintenance and steady growth of this tremendous volume of imports would have been impossible if the United States had not pursued what, by any fair standard, must be regarded as a liberal commercial policy. To a great extent, of course, these large imports are associated with the high levels of income and employment which the

United States has enjoyed in recent years. But there can be no question that the reductions that have been made in our tariff duties over the last two decades, first through our bilateral reciprocal trade agreements and more recently through the general agreement, have contributed very significantly to this development. In this connection it is noteworthy that in recent years the relative increase in imports of dutiable goods has been considerably greater than that of goods on our free list. Our present volume of imports also reflects another fact, sometimes forgotten in the attention focused on certain quotas maintained by the United States. This fact is that, apart from these exceptions which can only be regarded as minor when viewed against the total volume of our trade, imports into my country are virtually free from quantitative restrictions.

In calling attention to these facts, I do not mean to imply that we intend to stop where we are. My Government appreciates that there are certain directions in which our commercial policy can be further improved. As the President stated in his message which I read to you on Monday, some portions of our program have already been put into effect and, in the President's words,

The remaining parts, especially the heart of the program—extension and amendment of our Trade Agreements Act—will . . . be pressed at the session of the Congress which begins in January, and I look forward to early action.

Policies pursued by the United States have contributed directly to the development of favorable conditions making possible the removal of quantitative restrictions imposed for balance of payments reasons. In successive negotiations under the GATT, the U.S. Government has made substantial tariff concessions which have encouraged the entry of an unprecedented volume of imports.

These are in accordance with the principle of greater freedom of trade to which the contracting parties subscribe. What we do regret, however, and what large elements of our business and farm community do not understand, is that in spite of the great improvement that has taken place in the external financial position and competitiveness of most countries, quantitative restrictions against U.S. products should be so widespread.

Where such restrictions are maintained it is clear that they partially or completely nullify the tariff concessions which the United States has obtained.

Message from the President

Following is the text of a letter from the President to Assistant Secretary Waugh which the latter read to the GATT delegates on November 8.

DEAR MR. WAUGH: Since you are soon leaving to participate in the Ninth Session on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Geneva, I should like to ask that you convey to your fellow delegates the importance that we attach to a successful outcome of the forthcoming renegotiation and review of the Agreement. The task before the contracting parties at this Ninth Session is one of crucial significance to the further economic growth of the free world.

At the time of the Eighth Session, the United States and other countries were reappraising their international economic policies. Based upon such a review in the United States, I recommended in March of this year a program for expanding international trade and overseas investment, for promoting currency convertibility, and for reducing the need for economic aid. Some portions of this program have already been put into effect. The remaining parts, especially the heart of the program—extension and amendment of our Trade Agreements Act—will, as you know, be pressed at the session of the Congress which begins in January, and I look forward to early action.

That program envisages United States participation in a multilateral approach to tariffs and trade. The General Agreement has made a useful contribution to the postwar recovery and restoration of the economic vitality of the free world. It was established at a time when the economies of most countries had been seriously weakened. The trade rules of the Agreement recognized that the objective of the widest possible movement of goods among the countries of the world could not be immediately realized, but the goal was set with confidence that it would be progressively achieved. I am convinced that economic reconstruction and growth has now reached a point in many countries to warrant further development of the Agreement, so that we may progress with even more assurance toward our ultimate objective. It would also seem essential that an effective organization be established for the administration of the Agreement and otherwise to promote an expansion of world trade.

The interests of the participating countries may at times seem to conflict. Our mutual goal is of such importance to the economic strength and well-being of all our peoples, however, that this session must be a practical demonstration of the ability of free countries to reach agreement on difficult issues. I am hopeful that ways and means of moving forward now toward our common goal will be found and that the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties will be one of high achievement.

This is obviously an unsatisfactory state of affairs, from the viewpoint of the contracting parties as well as from that of the United States, and one which cannot continue indefinitely.

It is therefore with particular regret that we heard suggestions on Monday that the revised agreement should not deal firmly and positively with the question of limiting the use of protective quotas. We are also disturbed at suggestions that the firm commitments now in the general agreement against protective quotas be weakened, and that this problem be dealt with on a basis of bargaining or regional discrimination. Such an approach would, in our judgment, prevent the achievement of the objectives for which the agreement stands. It might well lead people in the United States to question the value of the agreement to us and whether there is any hope of our country's ever being able to reap the benefits anticipated from tariff negotiations.

My Government believes that conditions are rapidly approaching the point where the tariff concessions granted to the United States on a reciprocal basis should be made more fully effective. This is one of the reasons for our interest in reexamining the provisions of the general agreement dealing with quantitative restriction for balance of payments reasons.

Now, turning to the third major objective of my Government in the present review: The multi-lateral and reciprocal tariff reductions that have been negotiated in the context of the general agreement constitute the outstanding achievement of the contracting parties. My Government places the greatest emphasis on the need to preserve these gains. Nevertheless, we recognize that special or emergency situations may arise from time to time which may necessitate the review of certain concessions. It should be borne in mind, however, that the tariff concessions are the material of which the agreement is woven; to unravel them by a wide range of renegotiations is to risk destroying the entire postwar fabric of international economic cooperation. Requests for renegotiation at this session should be scrutinized carefully in this light. My Government considers it vital to maintain the stability of existing tariff concessions while providing the necessary degree of flexibility.

During the present review our delegation will wish to discuss with the contracting parties certain problems connected with U.S. agricultural policy.

One aspect of this policy which has been of particular concern to a number of countries relates to the question of export subsidies. In its proposals submitted to the contracting parties in connection with the review, my Government has already indicated that it is prepared to discuss the desirability of appropriate limitations with respect to the use of export subsidies in this field. As regards the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities in the world market, my Government is proceeding on its announced principle that such disposal should not unduly interfere with normal marketings.

Another problem which we would hope to resolve at this session is the relationship between the general agreement and section 22 of our Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended.

One of the misfortunes associated with war is that it leads to a distortion of normal productive patterns. During the Second World War and the early postwar period, the world experienced an extremely severe shortage of foodstuffs and American agriculture was encouraged by the U.S. Government to expand production to the greatest possible extent. One of the methods employed to induce expanded output was the adoption of price-support programs designed to give the American farmer the assurance of a fair return on his production. Now, with the passing of the exigencies of the war and immediate postwar era, certain branches of American agriculture face the painful necessity of curtailing output.

My Government has recently reexamined the agricultural program of the United States in light of this situation and, as you know, has consequently adopted a new policy embodying the principle of flexible price supports. This policy is designed to bring about the necessary readjustments in our agricultural production. However, it is too early to estimate at this stage how soon, or to what extent, it will relieve the United States of the burden of farm surpluses.

In the meantime, it should be realized that the United States cannot afford to permit the unrestricted entry into its domestic market of foreign agricultural products which would not have been drawn thereto but for the magnet created by our price support program. To permit such unrestricted entry would, in the last analysis, mean supporting the world price of agricultural commodities at or near the same level as that guar-

anted to the corresponding American commodities. Obviously, this is something that the American people cannot be expected to do.

Reference was made earlier to the desirability of considering in this review the special requirements of the underdeveloped countries. A major objective of U.S. policy is to encourage the development of the economically less developed countries of the world, and it is a source of satisfaction to my Government that the contracting parties to the GATT include countries in all stages of development. As a general rule the principle of maximum possible freedom of trade which underlies the whole of the general agreement is one whose application is beneficial to all types of economies and to countries in all stages of economic development. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that special problems may be associated with economic development. We believe the agreement should be sufficiently flexible to make it responsive to such problems, subject to procedures which will assure the safeguarding of its general objectives. My Government is prepared to give sympathetic consideration to proposals which would accomplish this purpose.

In conclusion let me repeat the conviction expressed in President Eisenhower's message, that our efforts here must produce a more effective agreement attuned to today's realities. The countries adhering to the general agreement can afford no other outcome, nor can the free world. If we approach our task in the spirit that it is a rededication as well as a review, we shall succeed.

U.S. Policy on Jerusalem

Press release 624 dated November 3

The ranking diplomatic representatives of Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, and Egypt called on the Secretary of State on November 3 to make known the views of their Governments with respect to the plans for presentation of credentials in Jerusalem by the appointed American Ambassador to Israel, Edward B. Lawson.

In the course of the conversation the Secretary recalled the policy of the U.S. Government to look to the United Nations as primarily responsible for determining the future status of Jerusalem. Following normal practice, the presentation of

credentials would be effected by Ambassador Lawson at the place where the Chief of State actually is. The fact that this means that the presentation will take place in Jerusalem implies no change in our attitude regarding Jerusalem nor does it imply any change in the location of the American Embassy in Israel, which is at Tel Aviv.

FOA Announces Program of Aid to Iran

The Foreign Operations Administration on November 2 announced that the United States is prepared to offer aid to Iran in the form of loans and grants totaling \$127.3 million.

Both Iranian and U.S. Government circles have concerned themselves recently with the indication that, even with an oil settlement accomplished, it would be 3 years until Iran's oil revenues would permit it to finance large-scale development from its own resources. To help Iran during the interim period, the United States has decided to make available up to \$127.3 million which would be provided from both Foreign Operations Administration and Export-Import sources. This total includes \$21.5 million for a technical-cooperation program; \$52.8 million for consumer-goods imports, which will be sold by the Iranian Government for local currency (rials), which in turn will be used to support basic governmental expenditures as has been done in the past year; and an additional \$53 million largely for short-term developmental assistance, which would be provided for specifically approved projects.

Iran has not yet fully developed its own plans for economic development although it has submitted proposed projects to the Export-Import Bank for preliminary considerations. Some time, however, will be required for Iran fully to prepare project plans and establish priorities among them, and for the bank to make its required investigations. Of the above \$127.3 million, \$85 million is being offered in the form of loans, the balance in grants; \$15 million of the latter has already been allotted on an emergency basis.

With this assistance the Iranian Government will be able to finance essential Government operations as well as develop and initiate a sound economic development program.

Italian Cabinet Expresses Thanks for Offer of Emergency Aid

White House press release dated November 1

The Italian Cabinet has expressed to our Embassy in Rome its deep and sincere thanks for the offer of the United States to provide emergency relief for the flood disaster region around Salerno.

American voluntary relief agencies are actively cooperating with Italian authorities and the Italian Red Cross in rendering every possible assistance, including the distribution of food, clothing, and medicine to the people of this stricken area.

The Southern Area Command of NATO under Admiral Fechteler has contributed drugs and other medical supplies.

The American people will be gratified to know that their representatives in Italy are participating effectively to alleviate the suffering caused by this tragic event.

Payment to German Republic for New Embassy Building

Press release 625 dated November 4

The Department of State on November 4 transmitted to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany a check for \$300,000 for the acquisition of an Embassy building in the District of Columbia. In a short ceremony, Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler, chargé d'affaires of the Federal Republic, exchanged notes by which the check was transmitted and its receipt acknowledged. The funds were appropriated during the past session of Congress as the result of a bill introduced by Senator William Langer and Representative James G. Fulton.

The purchase of a new German Embassy in Washington became necessary because the previous building was confiscated during World War II.

Following are the texts of the notes which were exchanged.

Secretary Dulles to Ambassador Krekeler

NOVEMBER 4, 1954

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that pursuant to Public Laws 663 and 758, 83rd Congress, the sum of \$300,000 was appropriated

for payment to the Federal Republic of Germany for the acquisition or construction of an Embassy building in the District of Columbia.

I believe this action by the Congress symbolizes the ties of friendship which now exist between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America. Consequently, it gives me much pleasure to transmit herewith a United States Treasury check in the above amount.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Ambassador Krekeler to Secretary Dulles

NOVEMBER 4, 1954

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of November 4, 1954, advising that pursuant to Public Laws 663 and 758, 83rd Congress, the sum of \$300,000 has been appropriated for payment to the Federal Republic of Germany for the acquisition or construction of an Embassy building in the District of Columbia.

The Federal Republic of Germany wishes to express its appreciation for the action of the United States Government in providing these funds which it will devote to acquiring or constructing a new Embassy building in Washington.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of my highest consideration.

HEINZ L. KREKELER

General Collins Undertakes Mission to Viet-Nam

White House press release dated November 3

The President on November 3 designated Gen. J. Lawton Collins as Special United States Representative in Viet-Nam with the personal rank of Ambassador, to undertake a diplomatic mission of limited duration. He will coordinate the operations of all U.S. agencies in that country.

General Collins will proceed immediately to Saigon, where he will confer with Ambassador Donald R. Heath prior to the latter's already scheduled return to the United States for reassignment following 4½ years of distinguished service in Indochina. For the duration of this assignment General Collins will relinquish his other duties, including that of U.S. representative on the Mil-

itary Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Since the conclusion of hostilities in Indochina, the U.S. Government has been particularly concerned over developments in Viet-Nam, a country ravaged by 8 years of war, artificially divided into armistice zones, and confronted by dangerous forces threatening its independence and security.

The U.S. Government is fully aware of the immense tasks facing the Government of Viet-Nam in its effort to achieve solidarity, internal security, and economic rehabilitation. The United States has already played an important role in the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Communist rule in North Viet-Nam.

Moreover, as the President told Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in his letter of October 23d, U.S. representatives in Viet-Nam have been instructed to consider with the Vietnamese authorities how a program of American aid given directly to Viet-Nam can best assist that country. General Collins will explore this matter with Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and his Government in order to help them resolve their present critical problems and to supplement measures adopted by the Vietnamese themselves.

In executing his temporary mission, General Collins will maintain close liaison with the French Commissioner General, Gen. Paul Ely, for the purpose of exchanging views on how best, under existing circumstances, the freedom and welfare of Viet-Nam can be safeguarded.

Cabinet Committee on Telecommunications

White House press release dated November 4

The President announced on November 4 the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on Telecommunications Policy and Organization, with the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as chairman and the Secretaries of State and Defense as members. The Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce and the Directors of the U.S. Information Agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency will participate from time to time on particular matters of concern to those agencies.

The President asked the Cabinet Committee to review existing governmental policies and programs affecting all forms of electrical communications, such as telephone, telegraph, and radio, except that for the purposes of this study domestic radio and television broadcasting services have been excluded. The Committee was asked to make its report by January 31, 1955.

Developments in communications during and after World War II in conjunction with international political events of the postwar period have created a whole range of problems which should be considered from an overall standpoint, rather than on a piecemeal basis. The Nation's basic communications policies, which have not been significantly revised in 20 years, were established in a period when our position in the world and world conditions were quite different.

The Communications Act of 1934 vests in the President responsibility for controlling the operations of the large governmental telecommunications systems and also gives him considerable additional authority for use in time of war or national emergency. This act, which still is the basic expression of U.S. communications policy, assumed the existence of only two alternative situations—peace or war. It contemplated no intermediate situation such as the current cold war period. The President has emphasized the need for a comprehensive up-to-date telecommunications policy adequate to meet both governmental and private requirements of these times.

The President believes that the Government must provide effective leadership in assuring that telecommunications policies and programs will help enable our public and private organizations to play their proper roles in strengthening the unity and peaceful aims of the free world.

Standardization of FOA Procurement Rules

The Foreign Operations Administration announced on November 4 that foreign assistance procurement financing procedures affecting FOA operations in more than 60 countries have been standardized with the adoption of a revised FOA Regulation 1.¹

¹ 19 Fed. Reg. 6629.

This revision was required because of the consolidation last year into one agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, of foreign assistance activities previously conducted by separate agencies.

The revised regulation generally follows the previous edition of Foa Regulation 1 but makes the following principal changes:

It extends the regulation to all countries in which the Foa program operates.

It distinguishes between assistance for specific projects and for general commodity imports.

It eliminates the previous requirement that co-operating countries make refunds to Foa of Foa funds expended for foreign sales agents' commissions.

It also provides rules with respect to reexport and diversion of commodities.

The regulation includes the statutory provisions for informing small business of impending Foa-financed procurement and relating to transportation on U.S. flag vessels of commodities financed by Foa.

Copies of Foa Regulation 1 may be obtained from the Office of Public Reports, Foreign Operations Administration, Washington 25, D. C.

New Customs Regulations Require Fewer Certified Invoices

The Treasury Department announced on October 25 changes in customs regulations which will effect a substantial reduction in the number of documents required of importers. The Department said both foreign traders and the Customs Service would benefit from the reduction in paper work—a major objective of the bureau's continuing management improvement program.

The new regulations require fewer certified invoices, which list such information about imports as the names of the shipper and consignee, selling price of the merchandise, its character, amount to be shipped, etc. The foreign manufacturer or producer pays a consular fee of \$2.50 to have the invoice certified before the nearest U.S. consul.

The Bureau of Customs took an initial step toward relaxing the certified invoice requirement in

1950. Exemptions from the requirement have applied to merchandise that is free of duty or subject only to a specific rate of duty not dependent upon value. The new regulations extend exemptions to all importations not exceeding \$500 in value even when the rate of duty depends upon value. The value of shipments exempted from certified invoice requirements when not imported for sale has been increased to \$1,000.

Customs officials have estimated that the new regulations will eliminate certified invoices for approximately 10 percent of the number of shipments presently requiring such invoices. Studies are continuing to determine what further reductions in paper work, including additional exemptions from consular invoices, may be authorized.

The new regulations are embodied in Treasury Decision 53638.¹

Eximbank Loan to Mexico for Electric Power Program

The Export-Import Bank of Washington on November 5 announced the authorization of a credit of \$750,000 to Cia. Industrial Electrica Mexicana, S.A., to assist that company in the purchase of U.S. materials, equipment, and services for an expansion program which is designed to meet the rapidly growing demand for power in the area served by it.

Cia. Industrial Electrica Mexicana, S.A., distributes electric energy in an important agricultural area in Mexico consisting of the Mexicali Valley in Baja California, including the city of Mexicali and nearby areas. The electric energy distributed by the company is transmitted from the United States.

The Bank of America has indicated a willingness to participate in the financing by furnishing a substantial portion of additional funds required for the program without the guaranty of the Export-Import Bank.

The credit authorized will bear interest at the rate of 5½ percent per annum and will be repayable in 20 approximately equal semiannual installments beginning June 30, 1958.

¹ 19 Fed. Reg. 6857.

U. S. Endorses Report of Collective Measures Committee

Statement by Charles H. Mahoney

*U. S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

In discussing the report of the Collective Measures Committee,² we are pursuing the same important goal we have been seeking during our consideration of disarmament. Collective security and disarmament are opposite faces of the same coin. Their purpose is to achieve a reliable common protection against aggression and thus to insure a lasting peace.

The United States, as we have said time and time again, strongly supports a disarmament program which would give security to all. It earnestly desires a disarmament program which would make it impossible for any country to engage successfully in aggression against any other country.

As we seek to achieve an effective disarmament program, it is equally important that we develop at the same time an effective collective security system to attain the goal of international peace and security. In order to save the world from the scourge of war, nations must band together to deter or suppress aggression wherever it may occur.

Only by a determined effort now to develop the capacity of the United Nations to prevent or to repel future aggression can we hope to maintain international peace and security. The stronger the collective security system, the more likely that we will be able to prevent war; that our soldiers will never have to enter the battlefield; that our tanks and armaments of war will never have to leave the training grounds; and that our airplanes can pursue the commerce of peace.

The charter is not self-executing. The United Nations cannot by some trick of legerdemain make collective security a reality. The building of an effective collective security system is dependent upon the resolve and determination of the members of the United Nations to carry out their obligations under the United Nations Charter. It means that advance preparations are essential if any future collective measures are to be applied promptly and effectively. It means that the burdens involved in such measures must be shared equitably by the greatest possible number of states.

The Government of the United States has consistently supported an effective collective security system under the United Nations. It strongly urged the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950.³ It has given its full support to strengthening the capacities of the General Assembly in the field of collective security. The United States has wholeheartedly backed the work of the Collective Measures Committee established under the Uniting for Peace Resolution to study and report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.

The task of the Collective Measures Committee has been to explore how the collective security system of the United Nations can be made stronger; how an idea can take on bone and sinew and become a real force to protect the peace. The Committee, under the former chairmanship of Ambassador [Joao Carlos] Muniz of Brazil, and the present chairmanship of Ambassador [Santi-

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 1 (U.S. delegation press release 1997).

² BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 420.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

ago] Perez-Perez of Venezuela, has done a useful and constructive job, and the United States has deemed it a privilege to be one of its members.

In completing its third report, which we are now considering, the Committee has taken another important step toward strengthening collective security under the aegis of the United Nations. The report is a useful supplement to the two previous reports of the Committee. Like its predecessors it is not the accomplishment of one or two states but rather of the entire Committee, whose members actively participated in its preparation. It is not too much to hope that the report will fortify our common determination to prevent or suppress breaches of the peace.

Review of Three Reports

The three reports of the Collective Measures Committee should be viewed as a composite unit. They constitute a broad blueprint of important guideposts and principles of collective security which, if they are followed and supported wholeheartedly by states, will help to insure the maintenance or the restoration of international peace and security in the future.

The major part of the first report of the Collective Measures Committee was devoted to the types of military, political, and economic and financial collective measures which might be applied by the United Nations in the event of a future threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The report also included suggestions on how such collective measures could be coordinated effectively and with a minimum of improvisation. The need for this kind of prior planning had been demonstrated by the difficulties encountered in Korea in organizing hurriedly the collective resistance against aggression. After analyzing the Korean experience in detail, the Committee developed a number of important principles which should greatly assist the United Nations to avoid unnecessary delays if it should ever have to take or recommend collective measures in the future. One of the most important of these was that there should be a central executive military authority responsible for the conduct of a future military operation under the aegis of the United Nations.

The second report of the Collective Measures Committee, which the General Assembly reviewed at its resumed Seventh Session in early 1953, expanded upon the first report. The Committee

gave particular attention to steps which states might take to set aside forces for possible United Nations service, to make available assistance and facilities, and to ready themselves legislatively and administratively. In its concern with methods which might be used to maximize contributions to the United Nations, the second report suggested the possibility of establishing an *ad hoc* negotiating committee to deal directly with states in securing contributions for possible collective action in the future. The Committee, in its second report, also included comprehensive lists of arms, ammunition, implements of war and other strategic items which would be of vital importance to the military operations of an aggressor. These lists should be of assistance to the Security Council and the General Assembly in expediting the application of any embargo which may be decided upon or recommended in the future.

In its third report the Committee has presented certain important principles of collective security for particular affirmation at this time in the belief that this would help to develop the common determination among states necessary to the effective application of any future collective measures by the United Nations. These principles do not ask anything impossible of states. Varying capacities of countries are recognized. While members are expected to accept their charter responsibility to unite their strength and efforts in the furtherance of charter principles, each state determines for itself, in accordance with its own constitutional processes and its own capacity, the contribution it can make to the common cause.

The first principle affirmed in this year's Committee report underscores the importance of maximum and prompt participation in any future collective measures by the greatest possible number of states. In our view, Mr. Chairman, building collective strength under the United Nations is a long-range project. It is therefore important for all states to give consideration on a continuing basis to the additional preparatory steps which they might take to place themselves in a position of readiness should the United Nations recommend or decide upon future collective measures. This principle is derived from the valuable lesson learned in Korea. Aside from the United States and the Republic of Korea, 15 members contributed the equivalent of two divisions to the United Nations action in Korea; over 40 states made contributions of a non-military nature; and an equal number joined in

the United Nations strategic embargo against the aggressor. While this marked a significant development in collective security, I think it is generally recognized that the burdens of collective resistance against aggression in Korea could have been shared more equitably. This is particularly true with respect to the contribution of manpower.

Maximum Contributions

The second principle emphasized in the Committee's third report stresses the importance of maximum and effective contributions of manpower. In the words of the report:

In the event that the collective use of force against aggression is decided upon or recommended, a primary objective shall be to secure the maximum contribution of effective military forces. States supporting United Nations collective measures should co-operate to this end not only by making their own contributions of forces but also by helping to provide logistic support to States which desire to contribute forces but are unable to provide adequately for the equipment, training or supplying of such forces from their own resources.

There are a number of reasons why certain nations were not able to contribute effective military forces in support of the United Nations action in Korea or could make only small contributions of manpower. The threat of aggression is global; it is necessary to remain vigilant and strong on many fronts. Some states therefore could make little or no contributions to United Nations action in Korea because they had important commitments to protect other crucial areas vital to the security of the free world. The economic position of a number of smaller states was another limiting factor. In still other instances certain nations wanted to contribute manpower but could not train, equip, or transport their forces, or were unable to maintain them in the field with the necessary logistic support or make reimbursement for such support. This inevitably had a discouraging effect on troop contributions in Korea.

The United States Government, at the highest level, has given serious consideration to the problem of developing the widest possible support for future United Nations collective actions which may be necessary. The policy of the United States is in accord with the second principle enunciated in the Collective Measures Committee's report. We believe that, while each nation involved in a United Nations effort to repel aggression should equip and supply its own forces to the

extent that it is able, the overriding consideration should be the maximum contribution of effective military forces. In the future, when any nation is willing to contribute effective forces to a United Nations collective action but is not able to provide logistic support, it is the belief of the United States that United Nations members should do everything they can, in accordance with their own constitutional processes and their capacities, to see to it that needed military equipment, supplies, and services are made available to such nations. The United States will do its part.

This principle should give further impetus to the development of collective security. It should help United Nations members to contribute to the common effort in accordance with their own capabilities and facilities and resources. It should encourage more nations to assume their fair share of the burdens of collective measures. We hope that it will stimulate countries to greater preparedness so that they will be able to participate promptly and effectively in any future collective measures.

The third principle in this year's report once again affirms the mutually supporting relationship between collective self-defense and regional arrangements or agencies on the one hand, and the more universal collective security system of the United Nations on the other hand. The report expresses this relationship in the following words:

Collective self-defence and regional arrangements or agencies constitute an important part of collective security. When action consistent with the Charter is taken in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence contemplated in Article 51, or to maintain or restore international peace and security within the framework of regional arrangements or agencies covered by Chapter VIII, the United Nations should take all appropriate steps, in conformity with the Charter, to make such action effective.

Under present world conditions the United States attaches great importance to collective self-defense and regional arrangements. They play an important part within the framework of the United Nations in organizing resistance to aggression, in creating conditions essential to peace and security, and in reducing international tensions. Member states have increasingly drawn together in voluntary partnerships to obtain for themselves the benefits and security which none of them could achieve alone. The oldest of such partnerships, the Organization of American States, has con-

tributed to peace and stability and to mutual understanding in this hemisphere and has thus realized one of the major purposes of the United Nations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an historic step forward toward achieving the unity and security of the free countries of Europe and North America.

Southeast Asia Treaty

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, recently signed at Manila, is a significant contribution to peace and security in that part of the world.⁴ In its preamble the signatories reaffirm their faith in the United Nations Charter. The objectives of the treaty are to promote stability and well-being in the treaty area; to strengthen peace and uphold democratic principles; to promote economic development in the area; to stand united against aggression; and to coordinate efforts for collective defense. The treaty and the Pacific Charter, also signed at Manila, proclaim the dedication of all the signatories to the principles of self-determination, self-government, and independence. One of the principal purposes of the charter is to promote these objectives.

The words spoken by Secretary Dulles at the opening session of the conference at Manila will indicate the spirit in which the United States went there to negotiate with others the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Secretary Dulles said:

We have come here to establish a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia. In so doing we are acting under the authority, and in accordance with the principles, of the United Nations Charter. What we do is directed against no nation and no peoples. We exercise what the charter refers to as the inherent right of collective self-defense.

The United States has itself no direct territorial interests in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, we feel a sense of common destiny with those who have in this area their life and being.

I should like now to make a brief comment on the resolution⁵ which the United States is cospon-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 104 dated Oct. 29. On Nov. 2, by a vote of 50-5, Committee I approved the draft resolution, thereby endorsing the report of the Collective Measures Committee, directing the committee "to remain in a position to pursue such further studies as it may deem desirable," and requesting that the Committee "report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly as appropriate." The resolution was approved by the General Assembly on Nov. 4 by a vote of 48-5-2.

soring with other members of the Collective Measures Committee. The resolution reflects the view of the Committee that it should remain in a position to pursue such further studies as it may deem desirable. This view in turn indicates the Committee's awareness of the important work it has performed in the past. It points up the contribution the Committee believes it could make in the future toward a better understanding and strengthening of collective security.

The United States Government shares this view with the other members of the Committee. We recognize that the Committee's three reports constitute a relatively comprehensive examination of the ways and means of strengthening the collective security system of the United Nations. Nevertheless, in these times of important changes in the technology of warfare, the concept of collective security needs constant and continuous reassessment. It may be that the Collective Measures Committee at some future time may find it necessary and desirable to undertake further studies in order to keep pace with the changes in collective security which we can all expect in this atomic era. The continued availability of the Committee will help to discharge the responsibility of the United Nations and of states in the field of collective security.

Treatment of Indians in South Africa

*Statements by Senator H. Alexander Smith
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S. VIEWS ON DRAFT RESOLUTION

U.S. delegation press release 1994 dated October 26

The General Assembly for the eighth time since 1946 has been asked to consider the problem relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. Unfortunately, this question, which is the subject of differences between the Union of South Africa on the one hand and the Governments of Pakistan and India on the other and which has been the subject of negotiations between governments, has perhaps

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Oct. 26 and in the General Assembly on Nov. 4.

been one of the most difficult for the United Nations since the adoption of the charter at San Francisco.

In the past, various approaches to the problem have been tried without success. Appeals have been sent by the General Assembly to the Governments of South Africa, India, and Pakistan to negotiate for a settlement. Third-party machinery, either in the form of a commission or the good offices of one individual designated by the Secretary-General, have also been included in past attempts. These attempts underscore the intrinsic difficulty of finding a satisfactory solution to a complex and deeply rooted political and sociological problem—one which involves the serious complaint that persons are being discriminated against because of race and color. The latest evidence before us that no perceptible progress has been made is the report of the Good Offices Commission,² comprised of the distinguished representatives of Cuba, Syria, and Yugoslavia. The Commission has reported that it has been unable to make any progress toward the development of a solution to the problem.

However, we have not lost hope that a mutually satisfactory settlement may ultimately be achieved. Complicated problems are rarely susceptible to easy and quick solutions. Like many other representatives here who are intimately acquainted with race relations problems in their own countries, what I will have to say concerning the basic American attitude is largely derived from our own experience in this field within the United States.

We realize full well, as others do, that translating ideals into realities in the field of human relations is not always as rapid as we might desire. We are a country of many strains, a melting pot of numerous groups, and a community of many religious beliefs. I am privileged to represent the State of New Jersey in the Senate of the United States. Among my constituents are Americans of many groups: Hungarian, Ukrainian, Polish, Greek, German, Italian, Irish, Negro, Slovene, and others. A substantial percentage of the total population of the State of New Jersey are foreign born or are of foreign-born parents. We have made progress, yet problems remain.

Many sincere and serious words have been

spoken by my distinguished predecessors on earlier United States delegations and by the honorable members of other delegations. I have found it instructive to study some of those speeches. One fact which is impressive is the number of times the different speakers have referred to a basic tenet found in one form or other in all leading religions in what we in America call the Golden Rule—"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Most of the delegates, including I, believe the successive delegates of the United States who have debated this question in the past sessions spoke with humility and deep awareness of the imperfections and frailties of their own peoples and their own governments. We are frank to admit our share of responsibility. At the same time, we have all drawn on some of our own national experience to point out the direction in which we all believe progress can and should be made in this matter of race relations.

There is in the United States the strongest attachment to the fundamental philosophy and constitutional principle on which our country was founded, such as the proposition that "All men are created equal" stated in our Declaration of Independence and the guaranties of the Bill of Rights contained in the first 10 amendments to our Constitution. A wealth of statements from our officials and leading citizens in all walks of life leaves no doubt as to the position of the United States Government and the overwhelming majority of the American people on the basic problem involved here. That position was highlighted in the great stride forward which was taken this year when the Supreme Court of the United States ruled as unconstitutional any segregation in the public schools on the basis of race, creed, or color.

In recalling that decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, it is pertinent to consider that there was a spread of 91 years between that decision and the Emancipation Proclamation of President Abraham Lincoln, which abolished the institution of slavery in the United States and freed the slaves. I mention this in no sense suggesting that a similar length of time will or should elapse before the Union of South Africa resolves its own problem in the spirit of the previous resolutions of the United Nations and of the charter itself but simply to reiterate the difficulty of the situation and as illustration that problems of human relationships are not solved overnight.

² U. N. doc. A/2723 dated Sept. 15, 1954.

It has also been pointed out in speeches at earlier Assembly sessions on this issue that a particularly disturbing element in the problem before us is what appears to be the direction of the Government's policy in the Union of South Africa. The charter proclaims the fundamental equality of man and recognition of the dignity of each individual human being. The charter places on member governments the obligation to promote respect for and observance of fundamental human rights.

I should like now to turn to the resolution before us which is being cosponsored by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras.³ The initiative of this group in seeking to make a constructive proposal on a problem which has escaped solution for years is noteworthy and commendable. The United States Government wishes to add its wholehearted expression of appreciation for these efforts.

The United States has considered the resolution before us. Operative paragraphs 1 and 2 stress direct negotiations. We believe they are constructive since they can help to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations between the parties. If there is to be progress, we believe it can come only to the extent that the parties are willing to confer and negotiate. The contact between the parties which has been broken on the Indian question needs to be reestablished.

However, the United States doubts whether paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution can advance the admirable purposes of operative paragraphs 1 and 2. The fact is that ever since 1950 the General Assembly has proposed to the parties that they utilize mediatory machinery established by the United Nations or under United Nations auspices. Every such suggestion has failed. South Africa has made it plain it is willing to negotiate but only outside the United Nations. We believe the time has come to test this avowal.

Paragraph 3 of the seven-power resolution parallels General Assembly resolution 511 (VI). The latter resolution authorized the Secretary-General, if the parties were unable to agree on the establishment of a three-man commission, to lend his assistance to them in negotiations and further, in his discretion and after consulting the governments concerned, to appoint an individual to ren-

der such assistance. When the Secretary-General explored the possibilities of this course of action with the parties, South Africa replied that, since it did not recognize the General Assembly's jurisdiction, it regretted it could not recognize the Secretary-General's competence to take this action. Consequently, the Secretary-General reported to the Assembly that after consultations with the parties he had concluded that the appointment of an individual to assist them in negotiations was not opportune.

Regarding paragraph 4, if there is to be some kind of mediator or individual rendering good offices, we are convinced that his efforts should be unhampered by any requirement for General Assembly consideration after a specified period. Inclusion of time-limit provisions in operative paragraphs 3 and 4 constitutes a practical and certainly a serious psychological handicap in mediatory efforts. He should be free to report at such time as he believes circumstances warrant. In any event, nothing would prevent the parties, if necessary, from placing the present question once again on the agenda. Paragraph 4, therefore, is in our view undesirable and unnecessary.

In line with these comments I have just made, the United States ventures to suggest a modification and adjustment of the joint draft resolution now before the committee. We suggest the replacement of operative paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 by a single operative paragraph reading as follows:

Suggests moreover, pending further consideration by the General Assembly, that the parties concerned should consider the selection of a Government, agency or person to facilitate contacts between them and assist them in settling the dispute;

Such a provision would give maximum encouragement to the parties to engage in discussions, with the assistance of a third-party mediator or good officer if the parties, in their discretion, believe that such assistance would be helpful. The provision would, at the same time, indicate that the General Assembly would return to a further consideration of this whole matter if the parties are unable to make progress with direct negotiations.

The United States is not at this time making a formal proposal for amendment of the joint draft resolution but earnestly commends to the sponsors and to the other members of this committee the suggestion I have just outlined.

³ U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.3/Rev.1 dated Oct. 25.

U.S. delegation press release 2007 dated November 4

We are considering once again the problem relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. It is a problem of great intrinsic difficulty, and for this reason I wish to express once again the appreciation of the U.S. Government for the efforts made by the Latin American sponsors in developing a resolution which has received the overwhelming support of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

It is our earnest hope that the parties concerned will do their utmost to resolve the issue in the spirit of that resolution.

The U.S. Government will vote in favor of the preamble of the resolution and the operative paragraphs 1 through 3. We will abstain on operative paragraphs 4 and 5 because, as we stated in the committee, we have serious doubts that the suggestions contained therein can contribute to the

overall purpose of the resolution. The United States will vote in favor of the resolution as a whole, since we are in full agreement with its conciliatory nature and in particular the objective of direct negotiations between the parties which it seeks to bring about.

Our belief is that progress can only come to the extent that the parties are willing to confer and to negotiate. We are hopeful that the expression of the General Assembly consensus here can help to create an atmosphere conducive to the negotiations between the parties.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I move pursuant to Rule 91 that each paragraph of the resolution be put to the vote separately.

Admission of New Members

*Statement by James J. Wadsworth
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

In his speech before the General Assembly on September 23, the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, remarked upon the disturbing fact that "the membership of the United Nations falls far short of representing the totality of those nations which are peace-loving, which are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the charter, and which are indispensable parties to many critical international problems."² He went on to say that "unless ways can be found to bring peace-loving, law-abiding nations into this organization, then inevitably the power and influence of this organization will progressively decline."

I am sure that the overwhelming majority of this committee share these views. The efforts that were made 2 years ago by a Special Committee on Membership, and this past year by the Good Offices Committee, to find ways and means of bringing an end to the present stalemate bear witness to the almost universal concern that no possible avenue to solution of this issue should remain unexplored.

It is certainly cause for dismay and regret that no new member has been admitted to the United Nations since Indonesia came into the organization in 1950. There is no dearth of qualified applicants. Some have been waiting for admission since as long ago as 1946. There are now 14 states

Resolution on Treatment of Indians in South Africa¹

U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.6 dated October 28

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at several sessions it has considered the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa and has adopted resolutions on that subject,

Having noted the report of the United Nations Good Offices Commission (A/2723),

1. *Expresses* appreciation of the work and efforts of the Good Offices Commission;
2. *Suggests* to the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa that they should seek a solution of the question by direct negotiations;
3. *Suggests*, moreover, that the parties concerned should designate a Government, agency or person to facilitate contacts between them and assist them in settling the dispute;
4. *Decides* that, if within the next six months following the date of the resolution that parties have not reached agreement on the suggestions made in the foregoing paragraphs, the Secretary-General shall designate a person for the purposes specified above;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its next regular session on the results obtained.

¹ Adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Oct. 28 by a vote of 47-1 (South Africa)-10, and by the General Assembly on Nov. 4, 45-1-11.

¹ Made before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 2 (U.S. delegation press release 1999).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 476.

that have been excluded from this organization by the actions of one member which has cast its veto a total of 28 times on the membership issue. The Soviet Union has not hesitated to veto the application of states for admission to membership even though it openly admits it is doing so on grounds other than failure to meet the qualifications of article 4 of the charter. The Soviet Union has done this despite numerous determinations by the General Assembly that each of the 14 applicants fully meets all qualifications for admission. Moreover, these vetoes have been cast in defiance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that a permanent member of the Security Council may not make its position on one applicant dependent upon favorable action on another applicant.

From the very birth of this organization it was always envisaged that membership would encompass all peace-loving states accepting the obligations of the charter and able and willing to carry them out. While article 4 of the charter set certain tests for admission, membership was understood to be open to all states meeting these tests. The United States has hoped that all states would qualify for membership both because of the view that the national interests of states make desirable their participation in the work of the organization and because of the larger interest of the organization itself in having present in a single forum representatives from every participant in international affairs.

Committee of Good Offices

These are the considerations that have prompted the General Assembly to try to find means for solving the membership problem. A new effort in this direction was made last year when the Assembly established a Committee of Good Offices on which were represented Egypt, the Netherlands, and Peru. Dr. Victor Belaunde of Peru served as the distinguished chairman of the committee. All of us are indebted to the three members of the Good Offices Committee for the service they performed in behalf of the United Nations during the past year. We know that they made every effort consistent with the principles of the charter to bring about a solution of the membership problem.

All of us share the disappointment which I am sure the Good Offices Committee itself felt when it was compelled to report to this session of the

General Assembly that it had been unable to make any progress toward achievement of a solution.³ At the same time the Good Offices Committee has not abandoned hope for an eventual solution. Likewise all of us here hope that sooner or later all those applicants that are eminently qualified for admission to membership in the United Nations, and who by their presence could add substantially to the weight and effectiveness of our deliberations, will take their rightful places beside us at the conference tables of the United Nations.

We share the view expressed here by others that the General Assembly should renew the mandate of the Good Offices Committee. The committee's continued existence would insure that the membership problem will be kept under review and that no opportunity will be lost. It will be a constant reminder to the 14 qualified applicants that the overwhelming majority of the United Nations wants them as members. It will help to keep the door open, even though the outlook for a change in the attitude of the Soviet world is not bright.

Fourteen Qualified Applicants

This committee has in the past reviewed in detail every facet of the membership problem, and I see no point in covering the same ground today. I must repeat, however, the view of my Government that the 14 qualified applicants, whose admission is blocked solely by the opposition of the Soviet Union, should immediately be admitted. There is virtually no disagreement as to their qualifications. Even the Soviet Union admits that most of them are qualified, but it has continued to insist that they can be admitted only if certain other applicants sponsored by the Soviet Union are also admitted. Moreover, with respect to the 5 Soviet-sponsored candidates for membership, it is not a matter, as has been suggested by the distinguished representative of Poland [Juliusz Katz-Suchy], of internal structure, policies, or ideology. It concerns whether they are states that are peace-loving and able and willing to fulfill charter obligations. The 14 states that meet the test of article 4 and which we believe should be admitted are: Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal and Viet-Nam.

It is unnecessary to discuss the qualifications of each one of these applicants because the General

³ U.N. doc. A/2720 dated Sept. 9, 1954.

Assembly has already determined all 14 to be fully qualified for admission and there have been no recent developments casting any doubt on their continued eligibility for admission.

The Australian delegation has proposed⁴ that separate action be taken at this session on the applications of Cambodia and Laos, on the ground that the settlement in Indochina achieved last summer at Geneva makes even more desirable their prompt admission to the United Nations. As I indicated by listing the 14 qualified applicants, my Government agrees that both states should be admitted. Our affirmative position on the Australian proposal does not mean that we do not equally desire the admission of all the other qualified applicants.

Naturally, in light of the past experience and the continued deadlock in the membership field as well as the discouraging position of the Soviet Union, it is hard to be optimistic as to the prospect of the admission of any new members no matter how highly qualified they may be or what special circumstances justifying their prompt admission may be adduced, as in the case of Laos and Cambodia. It is because of this that my Government has been giving serious study, which we intend to continue, to the possibility of arrangements whereby qualified applicants might participate in the work of the General Assembly to the maximum extent possible even though they have not formally been admitted to membership. While naturally all the applicants would prefer full membership, we believe the Assembly must continue to give thought to other ways of drawing them into our work, pending the day when they can be admitted to regular membership in the United Nations.

While these efforts continue, we should bear in mind the prospect of a charter review conference. If, by the time such a conference is held, a solution of the membership problem has not been found, there are likely to be proposals for amending the charter. In the interim, we believe that study should be given to the possibilities which a charter review conference may offer.

Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by repeating our unswerving determination to persist in exploring all possible avenues that might lead us to the goal that most of us seek so fervently—the seating of all qualified states as members of this great international body.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.4 dated Oct. 27, 1954.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

- Draft of Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Sixth Session. A/CN.4/L.48, July 1954. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-self-governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of France. A/2654, August 13, 1954. 70 pp. mimeo.
- Information from Non-self-governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of France. A/2654/Add.2, August 18, 1954. 37 pp. mimeo.
- Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal: Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. A/2701, August 19, 1954. 97 pp. printed.
- Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item proposed by France. Amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly; Proposal for a New Rule Concerning Corrections of Vote. Letter dated 16 August 1954 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations. A/2700, August 31, 1954. 2 pp. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

Proclamation Affirms Reciprocal Copyright Relations With India

At the Library of Congress on October 21, George V. Allen, Ambassador to India, and Gagannvihari L. Mehta, Indian Ambassador to the United States, participated in a brief ceremony and an exchange of notes relating to a new copyright arrangement between the two countries. Following are texts of the notes, a Department announcement, remarks made at the ceremony by Ambassador Allen, Ambassador Mehta, and L. Quincy Mumford, Librarian of Congress, and Proclamation 3076, which clarifies the right of Indian nationals to obtain copyright protection in this country and formalizes the protection accorded by India to United States citizens.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 600 dated October 21

A copyright proclamation signed by the President on October 21 and an exchange of diplomatic

notes between the Acting Secretary of State and the Indian Ambassador at Washington served to affirm the continued existence of reciprocal copyright relations between the United States and India. This copyright arrangement represents a strengthening of the basis for increasing cultural interchange between the two countries.

The diplomatic notes and the new proclamation clarify the right of Indian nationals to obtain copyright protection in this country subsequent to August 15, 1947, when the Indian Independence Act went into effect, and formalize the protection accorded by India to U.S. citizens, which was not affected by the transfer of power.

After August 15, 1947, in the absence of a formal agreement between the two countries, the U.S. Copyright Office delayed the registration of books and other artistic and literary materials of Indian nationals. The Copyright Office may now issue certificates of registration covering works of citizens of India.

A number of important Indian books and publications are presently pending registration and will be protected under the new arrangement. These include biographies, such as *The Story of Gandhi* by Krishna Nehru, and *Prison and Chocolate Cake* by Nayantara Sahgal, the daughter of Madam Pandit.

Among the works of fiction is a novel, *The Financial Expert* by R. K. Narayan, and the scientific treatises include *Mining, Processing, and Uses of Indian Mica* by Chand Mull Rajgarhia, a member of the Indian Ministry of Commerce, and *Introduction to the Embryology of Angiosperms* by P. Maheshwari, professor of botany at the University of Delhi.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

The Acting Secretary of State to the Indian Ambassador

OCTOBER 21, 1954

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today's date, in which you refer to the recent conversations held in New Delhi between representatives of our two Governments with respect to the copyright relations between India and the United States after August 15, 1947.

You state in your note that the legal obligation of India to extend the protection of its Copyright

Law to citizens of the United States was not altered by the transfer of power on August 15, 1947, since section 18 (3) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provided for the continuation, except as otherwise expressly provided, of all laws which existed immediately before the transfer of power. You state that similarly the legal obligations of India with respect to copyright were not altered by the creation of the Republic of India on January 26, 1950, since Article 372 (1) of the Constitution of India provided for continuation of all laws in force immediately before India became a Republic. You state that in view of this, your Government has instructed you to state its assurances that after August 15, 1947, as before that date, citizens of the United States have been and continue to be entitled to the benefits of copyright in India on substantially the same basis as citizens of India, including rights similar to those provided by section 1 (e) of title 17 of the United States Code.

I have the honor to inform you that with a view to affirming the continuance of copyright relations between our two countries, as established prior to the change in the legal status of India, the President of the United States of America has issued today a Proclamation, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, declaring and proclaiming, pursuant to the provisions of section 9 (b) of the said title 17 on the basis of the assurances set forth in your note, that after August 15, 1947, as before that date, the conditions specified in sections 9 (b) and 1 (e) of the said title 17 have existed and have been fulfilled with respect to citizens of India, and that citizens of India, after August 15, 1947, as before that date, have been entitled to all the benefits of the said title 17.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.
Acting Secretary of State

The Indian Ambassador to the Secretary of State

OCTOBER 21, 1954

EXCELLENCY: In accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honor to refer to the recent conversations held in New Delhi between representatives of our two Governments with respect to the copyright relations between India and the United States after August 15,

1947, the date of the transfer of power pursuant to the Indian Independence Act, 1947. It is my understanding, that, upon receipt of affirmative assurances that after August 15, 1947, as before that date, Indian law has granted to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as to its own citizens, your Government is prepared to have issued a Presidential Proclamation under section 9 (b) of title 17, United States Code, being the Copyright Law, to continue to grant the protection of that law to citizens of India after August 15, 1947, thereby providing for and affirming the continued existence of copyright relations between our two countries as established prior to the change in the legal status of India.

The legal obligation of India to extend the protection of its Copyright Law to citizens of the United States was not altered by the transfer of power on August 15, 1947. Section 18 (3) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provided for the continuation, except as otherwise expressly provided, of all laws which existed immediately before the transfer of power. Similarly, the legal obligations of India with respect to copyright were not altered by the creation of the Republic of India on January 26, 1950. Article 372 (1) of the Constitution of India provided for continuation of all laws in force immediately before India became a Republic. In view of this, my Government has instructed me to state its assurances that after August 15, 1947, as before that date, citizens of the United States have been and continue to be entitled to the benefits of copyright in India on substantially the same basis as citizens of India, including rights similar to those provided by section 1 (e) of the aforesaid title 17.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

G. L. MEHTA
Ambassador of India

REMARKS AT LIBRARY CEREMONY

Ambassador Allen

MR. AMBASSADOR: I am pleased to be here today to participate in this brief but significant ceremony.

The exchange of notes which has taken place between India and the United States today is an act which should lastingly affect the cultural re-

lationship of our two countries. These assurances of reciprocal copyright protection to be afforded by each country to nationals of the other demonstrate a mutual respect and appreciation for literary and artistic works and a desire to continue the beneficial exchange of intellectual materials.

This exchange of notes constitutes an important step in the history of Indian-American relations, for this represents a major agreement on cultural affairs between the United States and India subsequent to the Indian Independence Act of 1947.

I am gratified, Mr. Ambassador, by the feelings of understanding and friendship which underlie and make possible the exchange of these mutual assurances.

Ambassador Mehta

YOUR EXCELLENCY, It is particularly appropriate that on this occasion, when we are acting to affirm the continued existence of copyright relations between our two countries, we should meet here in the Library of Congress, in this storehouse of wisdom and knowledge, learning and scholarship, where lie enshrined the thoughts of men from the earliest times down to the present day. This copyright arrangement we are entering into today will assuredly strengthen the basis for increasing cultural interchange between the United States and India. We believe that the right to knowledge is one of the foremost rights of men, and I know you in this great country also believe in it with equal fervor. And it is, therefore, with feelings of especial gratification that I perform my pleasant task today. May the cultural ties between our two countries grow stronger and stronger, day by day.

Mr. Mumford

The Library of Congress as the registering agency for copyright in the United States is in a sense a guardian of the individual rights of authors, composers, and other creators of literary and artistic works in this country. We are proud today to observe the extension of this guardianship to the rights of citizens of India, whose privilege and responsibility it is to provide the world with a knowledge of their great culture.

However, the occasion for our meeting here today seems to me to have even greater signifi-

cance. Although, as I have indicated, copyright can be thought of in the legal sense of protection of property rights, I believe that there is a larger motivation behind the action we are witnessing. I refer to the desire on the part of our two governments to strengthen cultural exchange between our two countries. The freedom of men and of the expression of their ideas can only survive in an atmosphere of mutual trust. Today we have reaffirmed this trust between India and the United States and the deep interest which our two countries have in each other's culture.

PROCLAMATION 3076¹

WHEREAS section 9 of title 17 of the United States Code, entitled "Copyrights", as codified and enacted by the act of Congress approved July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 652, provides in part that the copyright secured by such title shall extend to the work of an author or proprietor who is a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation only:

"(a) When an alien author or proprietor shall be domiciled within the United States at the time of the first publication of his work; or

"(b) When the foreign state or nation of which such author or proprietor is a citizen or subject grants, either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as to its own citizens, or copyright protection, substantially equal to the protection secured to such foreign author under this title or by treaty; or when such foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the terms of which agreement the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party thereto."; and

WHEREAS section 1 of the said title 17 provides in part as follows:

"Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:

"(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition; . . . *Provided*, That the provisions of this title, so far as they secure copyright controlling the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, shall include only compositions published and copyrighted after July 1, 1909, and shall not include the works of a foreign author or composer unless the foreign state or nation of which such author or composer is a citizen or subject grants, either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United States similar rights."; and

WHEREAS section 9 of the said title 17 further provides: "The existence of the reciprocal conditions aforesaid shall be determined by the President of the United States, by proclamation made from time to time, as the purposes of this title may require . . ."; and

WHEREAS satisfactory official assurances have been received that after August 15, 1947, as before that date, the laws of India have granted to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as to citizens of India, including rights similar to those provided by section 1(e) of the said title 17:

Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Presi-

dent of the United States of America, do declare and proclaim:

That after August 15, 1947, as before that date, the conditions specified in sections 9(b) and 1(e) of the said title 17 of the United States Code have, as between the United States and India, existed and been fulfilled, and that citizens of India, after August 15, 1947, as before that date, have been and are entitled to all the benefits of the said title 17, except those conferred by the provisions embodied in the second paragraph of section 9(b) thereof regarding the extension of time for fulfilling copyright conditions and formalities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-first day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred (SEAL) and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-ninth.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

By the President:

HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.
Acting Secretary of State.

Agreement With West Germany on Publications Exchange

Press release 612 dated October 27

The Government of the United States and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on October 27 concluded an agreement on the exchange of official publications between the two countries. Following are the texts of the notes exchanged which constitute the agreement.

Secretary Dulles to Ambassador Krekeler

OCTOBER 27, 1954

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the conversations which have taken place between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to the exchange of official publications, and to inform you that the Government of the United States of America agrees that there shall be an exchange of official publications between the two Governments in accordance with the following provisions:

1. Each of the two Governments shall furnish

¹ 19 Fed. Reg. 6967.

regularly a copy of each of its official publications which is indicated in a selected list prepared by the other Government and communicated through diplomatic channels subsequent to the conclusion of the present agreement. The list of publications selected by each Government may be revised from time to time and may be extended, without the necessity of subsequent negotiations, to include any other official publication of the other Government not specified in the list, or publications of new offices which the other Government may establish in the future.

2. The official exchange office for the transmission of publications of the Government of the United States of America shall be the Smithsonian Institution. The official exchange office for the transmission of publications of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be the Federal Office for the International Exchange of Official Publications, Marburg/Lahn.

3. The publications shall be received on behalf of the United States of America by the Library of Congress and on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany by the Federal Office for the International Exchange of Official Publications, Marburg/Lahn.

4. The present agreement does not obligate either of the two Governments to furnish blank forms, circulars which are not of a public character, or confidential publications.

5. Each of the two Governments shall bear all charges, including postal, rail and shipping costs, arising under the present agreement in connection with the transportation within its own country of the publications of both Governments and the shipment of its own publications to a port or other appropriate place reasonably convenient to the exchange office of the other Government.

6. The present agreement shall not be considered as a modification of any existing exchange agreement between a department or agency of one of the Governments and a department or agency of the other Government.

Upon receipt of a note from you indicating that the foregoing provisions are acceptable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of the United States of America will consider that this note and your reply constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency

Dr. HEINZ L. KREKELER,
*Ambassador, Chargé d'Affaires of the
Federal Republic of Germany.*

Ambassador Krekeler to Secretary Dulles

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the conversations which have taken place between representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and representatives of the Government of the United States of America in regard to the exchange of official publications, and to inform you that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany agrees that there shall be an exchange of official publications between the two Governments in accordance with the following provisions:

[See U. S. note, Items 1 through 6.]

Upon receipt of a note from you indicating that the foregoing provisions are acceptable to the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will consider that this note and your reply constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of my highest consideration.

WASHINGTON, *October 27, 1954*

His Excellency

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
OF THE UNITED STATES

Washington, D. C.

U.S.-Libyan Base Rights Agreement

Press release 622 dated November 1

The U.S. Government has received formal notification from the Libyan Government that the Base Rights Agreement, which was signed by the two Governments in Benghazi on September 9,¹ has now been approved by the Libyan Parliament and has entered into force on October 30, 1954, following its ratification by Royal Decree of King Idris I.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 396.

The agreement sets forth the conditions for the utilization of U.S. military facilities in Libya, where the U.S. Air Force maintains a base at Wheelus Field near Tripoli. The agreement runs to the end of 1970 and is automatically renewable in the absence of 1 year's notification to the contrary by either party.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Viet-Nam, October 19, 1954.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543), as amended by protocol signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671 and 1859). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1, 1949. TIAS 2308.

Notification by Union of South Africa of extension to: Territory of South West Africa, October 5, 1951.

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Ratification deposited (with declaration): India, April 30, 1954.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), and exchange of letters. Signed at Washington October 22, 1954. Entered into force October 22, 1954; operative retroactively from April 10, 1954.

Trade and Commerce

Second protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). Opened for signature at Geneva November 8, 1952.¹

Signature: Burma, October 4, 1954.

BILATERAL

Egypt

Agreement relating to duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges on relief supplies and packages for Egypt. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo October 30, 1954. Entered into force October 30, 1954.

Ethiopia

Agreement amending the public health joint fund agreement of April 29, 1953 (TIAS 2904). Signed at Addis Ababa June 11, 1954. Entered into force June 11, 1954.

Germany

Agreement amending the agreement of September 9, 1952, relating to the use of the bombing range at Cuxhaven

(Sandbank). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn September 21 and 24 and October 15 and 18, 1954. Entered into force October 18, 1954.

Spain

Agreement amending the agreement of July 30, 1954, relating to the offshore procurement program in Spain. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid October 26, 1954. Entered into force October 26, 1954.

THE CONGRESS

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 83d Congress, 2d Session

Review of the United Nations Charter. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Proposals To Amend or Otherwise Modify Existing International Peace and Security Organizations, Including the United Nations. Part 7, Minneapolis, Minn., July 10, 1954. 171 pp.

Independent Management, Export-Import Bank. Hearing before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 9523, 9524, 9555, and S. 3589. July 14, 1954. 44 pp.

Increase of Duty-Free Allowance to American Tourists. Hearing before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 8352. July 21, 1954. 47 pp.

Military Construction, 1954. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil Functions and Military Construction of the House Committee on Appropriations. July 23, 1954. 42 pp.

Mutual Security Program. Report on the Mutual Security Program Covering Operations During the 6-month Period Ended June 30, 1954, with Letter of Transmittal from the President. H. Doc. 495, Aug. 20, 1954. 63 pp.

THE DEPARTMENT

Responsibilities Relating to Refugees and Displaced Persons

Department Circular 123 dated November 3

1. *Responsibilities for Functions Relating to Refugees, Displaced Persons, Migrants, Stateless Persons and Escapees*

1.1 Within the Office of the Assistant Administrator for the Refugee Relief Program in the Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs (SCA), the Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons has:

a. Responsibility for developing, coordinating and, in consultation with the concerned bureaus and offices of the Department, determining U.S. policies and positions on problems concerning refugees, displaced persons,

¹ Not in force.

migrants, stateless persons, and escapees, without regard to geographic origin or location, arising in the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and in regional organizations such as NATO, OEEC, and the Council of Europe, but excluding such policies and positions with respect to these matters arising in the United Nations, its organs, and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and in the administration of U.S. immigration laws.

b. Responsibility for providing advice, information, and assistance to bureaus and offices of the Department, U.S. missions abroad, and other Federal agencies on these matters.

c. Responsibility for promoting U.S. policy objectives in this field through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, for preparing and supporting requests for appropriations for U.S. contributions to the Committee, and for conducting liaison with the Committee.

d. Responsibility for providing basic policy guidance to the Foreign Operations Administration with respect to the escapee program.

1.2 The Office of International Economic and Social Affairs (OES) in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Io) has:

a. Action responsibility for preparing positions, with advice by the Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, to be taken within the United Nations, its organs, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and specialized agencies concerning refugees, displaced persons, migrants, stateless persons and escapees, and for promoting U.S. policy objectives in this field within these bodies.

b. Responsibility for liaison with the Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons with a view to securing coordination and avoiding duplication in the program of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and related programs of the United Nations, its organs and specialized agencies.

1.3 The Office of International Administration (OIA) in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs has responsibility for:

a. Reviewing and advising on fiscal, personnel, and other administrative aspects of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

b. Reviewing estimates for U.S. contributions to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; formulating or coordinating the formulation of U.S. payment policy and making contributions to that Committee in accordance with such policy; and initiating the allocation of funds from the Foreign Operations Administration for contributions to the Committee.

2. Designation of Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons

Mr. George L. Warren continues as the Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

The Department of State Biographic Register, May 1, 1954. Pub. 5553. Department and Foreign Service Series 37. 549 pp. \$1.75.

This publication contains biographies of certain personnel in the Department of State, U. S. Foreign Service, U. S. Information Agency, and Foreign Operations Administration.

The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954. Pub. 5609. International Organization and Conference Series II (Far Eastern), 4. 193 pp. 60¢.

A report, with list of participants, schedule of meetings, and documents, on discussions of Korea at the Geneva Conference.

List of International Conferences and Meetings, October 1, 1954. Pub. 5603. 13 pp. 15¢.

This list includes annotations regarding the background, agenda, and expected participation in certain conferences scheduled to convene during the last quarter of 1954.

A Report of the Fourth National Conference of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO. Pub. 5598. International Organization and Conference Series IV (UNESCO), 23. 75 pp. Limited distribution.

A report of the Commission and its affiliated organizations, as authorized by law, and its discussion of "America's Stake in International Cooperation," at the general conference held in Minnesota in 1953.

Telecommunications, New International Frequency List for Various Services in Bands Between 14 kc/s and 27 500 kc/s. TIAS 2753. Pub. 5356. 362 pp. \$1.

Agreement and Final Protocol between the United States and Other Governments—Signed at Geneva Dec. 3, 1951. Entered into force Mar. 1, 1952.

Passport Visa Fees. TIAS 2761. Pub. 5336. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, revising agreement of Oct. 10 and 18, 1949. Exchanges of notes—Dated at Karachi Aug. 16, Oct. 11, Nov. 19, Dec. 16 and 29, 1952, Mar. 19, and Apr. 8, 1953. Entered into force Apr. 8, 1953.

Fisheries Mission to El Salvador. TIAS 2763. Pub. 5348. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador, extending agreement of July 19, 1951, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador Aug. 18, and 28, 1953. Entered into force Aug. 28, 1953, operative retroactively Aug. 19, 1953.

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*632	11/9	Patterson to attend São Paulo fair.
*633	11/10	Trade talks with Cuba.
*634	11/9	Dulles: press conference transcript.
†635	11/10	Delegation to ILO meeting.
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637	11/10	Waugh: GATT conference.
†638	11/10	Patents agreement with Germany.
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640	11/12	Tariff negotiations involving Japan.
*641	11/12	Educational exchange.
†642	11/12	Shipping in Antarctica.
643	11/13	Surplus commodities for Japan.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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of
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*London and Paris Agreements
September–October 1954*

Publication 5659

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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his report of October 25, 1954, described the situation on European unity as of the beginning of September as follows: "At the beginning of September, things looked pretty dark. The plan for the European Defense Community had collapsed, and it looked as though the whole North Atlantic Treaty structure, its whole system, might be undermined and even swept away by political indecisions and uncertainties." Then came the Nine-Power Conference at London, September 28 to October 3, 1954, and the Conferences at Paris, October 20 to October 23, 1954.

The historic achievement of these Conferences is recorded in this 128-page publication, which includes the various agreed documents, together with the transcript of the report made by Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower, the Cabinet, and the American people on October 25, 1954.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 805

November 29, 1954



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DEC 28 1954

The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXI, No. 805 • PUBLICATION 5675

November 29, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Defense of Asia

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy¹

Since the days of the clipper ships, Americans engaged in foreign trade have always had a tremendous interest in, and close association with, the Far East. So I am happy over this opportunity to discuss with the members of the National Foreign Trade Council some of the problems which our country faces in that area today.

In a brief survey there are three aspects which demand our most urgent attention at the present time.

- First—Communist China's part in the increasing pressures on free Asian nations.
- Second—Factors which make free Asian nations particularly vulnerable to such pressures.
- Third—What the free Asian nations and their Western friends are doing—and can do—to render these pressures ineffective.

It will be helpful, I believe, to begin with an appraisal of the continuing effects upon surrounding Asian countries of the Communist conquest of China. For this conquest of China has involved far more than the disappearance behind the bamboo curtain of a population which the Communists estimate at over 580 millions. It has brought other dangers than those inherent in this vast increase of manpower that now can be ruthlessly expended in Communist aggression against the free countries of Asia.

China

Among the most significant and menacing results for the free Asian countries is the fact that

¹Address made before the National Foreign Trade Council at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 16 (press release 644 dated Nov. 15).

the fall of China has provided the Communist movements throughout Asia, for the first time, with a firm Asian base.

Prior to World War II, Asian Communist groups outside of China were isolated and fragmented and were sponsored and supported in different ways. The Communist groups in Indonesia and India, and to a certain extent in Indochina, had their inception through the proselytizing efforts of mother parties in Europe. Those in Japan and Korea were founded directly by the Comintern. Those in Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines were founded or largely supported from China or from the Chinese colonies abroad. The Communists in Burma were divided into various competing factions which grew out of resistance coalitions developed during the war and had little firm direction from any quarter.

Because the Kremlin was too remote to provide effective coordination and direction, the leadership of these local Far Eastern parties often struck out on their own tangents in order to insure the survival of local Communist movements. It was natural, therefore, that the Asian Communist movement was marked by factionalism, dissidence, and the problem of leadership. The parties had to rely on their own meager resources and sense of dedicated fanaticism, for significant external aid was not available. They were therefore capable of only limited political and subversive objectives of sabotage and harassment against reasonably stable administrative authority.

Into this chaotic situation the Chinese Communists have moved to provide, for the first time, firm regional direction and increased control over the lesser Communist parties in Asia. Their new and readily accessible Asian base provides objec-

tives, techniques, discipline, and the aggressive intention to translate Communist potentialities into actualities.

This Communist consolidation of a tremendous Asian base on the Chinese mainland has altered the power and influence of communism in each country of the region. No longer can each of the non-Communist East Asian countries easily manage its own problem of Communist subversion and bring its disloyal and subversive forces under control or to extinction. That was tragically demonstrated in Indochina. Each of the free Asian countries is now vulnerable in some degree to the expansion of Communist power and influence.

Moreover, just as Russia provided a protecting flank to the Communist groups operating in China, so Communist China can now provide a protecting flank to Communist groups operating in Burma, Thailand, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. And, in addition, since all of the free Asian countries are directly touched by Communist China in one or more ways—by common boundaries, the flow of trade, cultural affinities, the presence of overseas Chinese populations totaling about 10 millions—there are many channels through which the Communist influence can now be spread.

The tactics used by the Chinese Communists in assaulting free Asian countries are infinitely varied, ranging from direct Chinese Communist armed aggression with Soviet support and direction, as in Korea, to lavish exhibits at foreign fairs and widespread participation in foreign cultural events and sporting matches.

Vulnerabilities

For what reasons are the free Asian countries vulnerable to the Communist pressures which I have just described? There are many reasons, but I should like to single out and discuss briefly two reasons of major importance: first, the attitude of neutralism which prevails in much of the area; and second, the general economic condition of the free Asian countries.

When we speak of neutralism in the Far East, we are using a vague term to cover a variety of mental and emotional attitudes. Neutralism appears to be woven of several strands of political opinion which, while present to a greater extent in some free Asian countries than others, are prev-

alent throughout the entire area. They include (1) a tendency to underestimate the Communist threat; (2) a distrust of the motives of the Western nations; and (3) a fear of involvement in war and fear of offending neighboring Communist regimes, among other things.

Vulnerable as they are to Communist political and military pressures, the free Asian nations are, in the opinion of many experienced observers of the situation, even more vulnerable to Communist exploitation of real and alleged grievances of an economic nature—and of the political instability which usually accompanies economic instability. All of these free Asian countries, with the single exception of Japan, are underdeveloped countries, with the great bulk of the population earning their meager living at a great cost in effort on a tiny plot of land which they own, or rent, or cultivate for a landowner. Japan itself faces similar problems, and, although she is industrially developed, she also suffers because other Asian countries which need her machine products, technical skills, and wide variety of consumer goods are unable to purchase them in sufficient quantities.

As you well know, an underdeveloped country is one in which resources, both material and human, are not being used as fully as modern technology permits. In human terms this means that the inhabitants of such countries in Asia, on an average, have a life expectancy of only about half of that of people of highly developed countries. Their incomes average less than \$200 per year per person—in many countries considerably less than \$100—with all that this implies in terms of hunger, deprivation, and discomfort. There is a shortage of medical services, and health conditions are below standard. Their food supply is about a third less than that of developed countries. The opportunity to attend school is limited to a small minority. Only one person in four knows how to read and write. The supply of clothing and household furnishings is about one-fourth that of persons in developed countries.

Stated most simply, the basic economic problem of these areas is that per capita income is too low to enable the average Asian to acquire the minimum goods essential to sustain life and leave adequate savings. But such savings are essential to generate sufficient capital for investment purposes if economic progress is to be achieved.

This is true whether it is merely a question of the individual farmer buying fertilizer to increase his crop, or an enterpriser pooling the savings of many farmers and other workers to build a fertilizer plant. The problem is further complicated by the fact that underdeveloped countries have rapidly increasing populations.

Therefore, the growing of food and raw-material requirements for the economic development in the Far East will have to be obtained by the more effective utilization of existing physical resources. Better technology can assist importantly, but this will require larger investments in capital per worker. This means that a substantial amount of savings and investment is constantly necessary just in order to prevent a deterioration of the economy and a decrease in the standard of living. An even higher rate of saving and investment is necessary if the economy is to expand and improve.

But South and Southeast Asian economies generally lack an adequate number of the type of businessmen who are capable of mobilizing savings for use in innovating commercial and industrial enterprises and agrarian improvements essential to economic progress. Governments in this region have sought in many ways to substitute for the shortcomings in the private enterprise sector, but the results of both private and governmental endeavor have not generally been adequate to provide higher living standards, or even, in some cases, to prevent stagnation or to arrest decline.

The resulting poverty, hunger, disease, and lack of opportunity for personal self-development are not new problems, for they have been characteristic for centuries of the large underdeveloped parts of the Far East. What makes this so important today is that it has become a source of active political unrest.

The Communists seek to exploit these economic difficulties and gain converts by propaganda which paints a glowing picture of economic achievement in China and the U. S. S. R. Communist propaganda used in the underdeveloped countries also concentrates upon the agitation of economic grievances, particularly those of agrarian workers against landlords and government. The Chinese Communists are especially expert at this, for the skillful manipulation of agrarian grievances and the use of rural military bases were weapons which they used to bring about the fall of China.

Action

Now what do these factors favoring communism in the Far East add up to? Will the Communists succeed in disrupting and dividing more countries as they have done in Korea and in Indochina? However optimistic we may be, there is a long-run danger that, if these various Communist pressures are allowed to make headway, if nothing is done to ameliorate the causes of widespread local complaint and dissatisfaction, some of the non-Communist governments may decline in strength and cohesion.

The free Asian nations have already taken substantial internal measures, with varying degrees of success, to halt or curb Communist subversive action within their borders and to do what could be done to curtail the effectiveness of Communist pressures from outside sources.

There are many other things that have already been done. The United States, as you know, has mutual security pacts with Japan, Korea, and the Philippines and has pledged that its forces will defend Formosa and the Pescadores. The United States has been providing economic aid or military assistance or both to many of the free Asian countries. The Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development have made significant contributions to economic development and trade expansion in the area.

Another very important step already taken to improve the economic stability of the area is embodied in the Colombo Plan. The Colombo Plan was conceived initially in 1950 as an organization to focus attention on the economic development problems of the countries of South and Southeast Asia. It was designed to provide a framework within which international cooperative efforts can be made to promote sound and enduring progress in the area. To its original members—Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and British Borneo—other countries have now been added. The United States became a full member in 1951, and Burma, Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines have also joined, the last three only this year.

The Colombo Plan is actually a committee—a consultative committee for economic development in South and Southeast Asia. To this committee, important nations of the area discuss and analyze

the preparation and implementation of their individual plans for economic development, including financial requirements for carrying out the plans. Though there is a loose line of distinction between so-called contributing countries and recipient countries, all of the members are gradually becoming contributing countries to one another.

The United States and other free-world countries are also taking steps in the realm of international trade which should, if successful, serve to stabilize the economies of free Asian nations, including Japan.

On March 30, 1954, in carrying out the recommendation contained in the Randall Commission report that the trade policies of our country be liberalized, the President sent a message to Congress recommending a gradual and selective revision of our tariffs, through the tested method of negotiations with other nations. He expressed the belief that the United States should offer needed leadership in the reduction of trade and payments barriers that limit markets for our goods throughout the world.

In the same message the President said, "I may also recommend special provisions for negotiation with Japan in view of the economic problems of that country."

The economic situation in Japan, which was so ably discussed by Assistant Secretary of Commerce Anderson,² is quite different from that in the underdeveloped Asian countries, and that is why the President made this special reference to Japan in his message. Virtually devoid of exportable material resources and dependent upon imports for 20 percent of its food—and most of its industrial raw materials—Japan must trade to live. Notwithstanding a high level of United States expenditures, Japan last year incurred a deficit in its foreign payments of \$200 million. The critical problem revolves about the fact that Japan must somehow find markets to increase its exports by at least 75 percent to compensate for the further decline in our expenditures as United States forces are withdrawn from the area.

There is no single answer to the Japanese problem. In the long run, the economic development

² For the text of Mr. Anderson's address, entitled "Some Basic Factors in United States Foreign Economic Position," see Department of Commerce press release dated Nov. 16.

of free Asia holds out the most important possibilities. The United States has been and is continuing to assist the free nations of Asia in this endeavor. Japan's trade relationships with the United States are also of vital importance.

The United States has been supplying about one-third of Japan's imports but buying from Japan only one-third as much as it sells to Japan. A few days ago, we announced our intention to enter into multilateral negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with the primary purpose of expanding Japan's trading opportunities with the United States and other countries.³ The United States is taking the lead in this matter in recognition not only of the importance of trade between the United States and Japan but also of the necessity of United States leadership if other countries are to do their share in helping Japan to increase its trade. The enlargement of Japanese trade opportunities within the free world is of special importance also as a means of reducing undue Japanese reliance upon Communist Chinese markets with all the risks, both economic and political, which might follow from such reliance. By fostering economic stability in Japan we can help to retain on the free world's side the great industrial strength and technical skills of Japan which are so vital to the defense of Asia.

Still another development of momentous significance exists in the Manila Pact and Pacific Charter, which were signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, by eight free nations.⁴ The accomplishments at Manila did much to overcome various misunderstandings on the part of free Asian nations and provided vital assurances that the Communist threat to the area, either through armed aggression or subversion, would be effectively met. In the Pacific Charter, the signatories pledged themselves to uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, to strive earnestly by every peaceful means to promote self-government, and to secure the independence of countries whose people desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. Furthermore, it held out the prospect of collective action to promote higher standards of living for Asian nations and thus remove a major source of dissidence and unrest.

³ BULLETIN of Nov. 22, 1954, p. 767.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

There now remains the very important task of deciding in more detail how the Manila Pact and the charter will be implemented, should need arise, to assure cessation of aggression and subversion, and the important task of deciding how the crucial problem of economic development of the underdeveloped areas of free Asia can satisfactorily be met. The first of these problems is under study by the military experts and political leaders of the various nations concerned, including our own. The second—economic development—relates to much that these countries can themselves do to improve their economic position, such as establishing sound budget and fiscal policies, encouraging the owners of such available wealth and savings as do exist to invest them constructively, increasing technical skills and knowledge, increasing agricultural efficiency and promoting greater diversity of agriculture, and providing for more adequate electric power and transportation.

Yet, the most strenuous efforts along these lines will not adequately solve the basic problem of these countries, which is their inability to generate domestically the steady and increasing flow of investment capital necessary to provide for both a rapidly increasing population and the higher standards of living that their populations desire. Only such a flow of investment capital from the outside can provide the necessary stimulant to strengthen these economies. Unfortunately, the movement of foreign private investment capital to Asia since the war has been little more than a trickle compared with the area needs—in recent years less than \$25 million annually, slightly over half of which has been United States private investment. I have already mentioned several types of external government-to-government aid extended to these countries. This type of external aid, by effective utilization, has enabled countries in the area to initiate necessary development programs although not as rapidly as we or they believe necessary to improve moderately the living standards of the area.

When we stop to analyze the current situation in the Far East, I think we find from the American point of view a mixture of strength and weakness. In terms of surface naval strength and naval air force, the American position is predominant, but we are not so certain when it comes to naval strength below the surface. Here we are keenly aware of the Soviet buildup in submarine power.

In terms of land forces, the colossal manpower reservoir available to our adversaries reads in terms of hundreds of divisions compared with our present free-world strength of comparatively few divisions. In terms of straight airpower the situation is perhaps more nearly a matched one.

Role of Business Community

But I did not come here to discuss the military aspects of the Far East problem, even though the impact of military strength on our political and economic policies is of great importance. I personally feel that we are now in a phase where Communist efforts are directed into the classical fields of subversion and penetration by the various techniques which have become painfully familiar. And it is in that field I believe that the American business community and those of you especially who are engaged in foreign trade can be of great utility in the furtherance of American policy objectives. It has become obvious through the years that the Communist technique of indirect operation and projection of their efforts to dominate world areas has shown a reliance on indirection, using front organizations and unofficial representatives in various guises. Their economic and trade policies are weighted with political overtones. Their use of the trade channel in promoting their policies is notorious.

I hope I am wrong in thinking that some of the members of our business community have an easy-going belief that the projection of government policy is a matter restricted to official representatives. Perhaps if we took a harder look at this question we might conclude that it is the responsibility of every citizen. That is why an understanding of our policies and objectives by the business community is of such immediate importance.

Those of you in the business community who are in close touch with the Far East are in a unique position to promote understanding on two sides of the water. At home you can help us all to bear in mind the vital importance of expanding trade and establishing closer commercial links with this area. Abroad, you can seek to promote awareness of the fact that we are taking positive steps to aid in overcoming the problems the free-world nations of the Far East face, formidable as these problems may be. I would like to appeal to your membership to take an affirmative interest, as many of you do, in accomplishing these ends.

TEXT OF U. S.-FRENCH COMMUNIQUE

Press release 662 dated November 20

1. Following his talk with the President of the United States [on November 18], the Prime Minister of France met with the Secretary of State on Thursday, November 18, Friday, November 19, and Saturday, November 20. Officials of the two Governments were present. The conversations took place in a spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence and have brought out once again the fundamental unity of outlook of the two countries, and their unshakeable faith and determination in the cause of peace and freedom, which are shared by all other like-minded governments and by all the peoples of the world.

2. With regard to Europe, it was agreed that the early ratification of the Paris agreements by all countries concerned will strengthen the unity of the Western World. It should open the way for consideration of means of improving international relations, in accordance with the spirit and the goals of the Charter of the United Nations, both Governments being ready to enter, not into improvised debates intended mainly for propaganda, but into adequately prepared negotiations, carried on in good faith.

3. The Prime Minister reviewed hopefully the prospects for establishing increasingly fruitful relations between France and Germany as a basic contribution to the creation of a united and peaceful Europe, to which the United States also attaches great importance.

4. The understandings reached with regard to Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam in the talks of September 27-29¹ between representatives of the Governments of France and the United States in Washington were reaffirmed. Agreement was reached on coordinated procedures and periodic reviews required to carry out the policies of France and the United States in that area designed to assist the Associated States to maintain their freedom and independence.

The Chiefs of the diplomatic missions of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam in Washington have been informed of the exchange of views relating to their countries.

5. The Prime Minister reviewed the recent events in North Africa which created obstacles to the policy inaugurated by the French Government. He nevertheless expressed the hope that proposals already made would lead to a prompt solution. He stressed that external influences have affected the situation in North Africa and compromised the security of this region. The Secretary of State declared that he would give serious consideration to the matter.

ARRIVAL OF FRENCH PRIME MINISTER

Press release 653 dated November 17

Statement of Welcome by Vice President Nixon²

It is a very great privilege to extend on behalf of President Eisenhower a very warm welcome to you and to Mme. Mendès-France on the occasion of your visit to Washington.

We know you are no stranger to the United States. We recall that you were here in connection with the International Monetary Fund. But you come now in a different capacity, as the head of the Government of a nation that has been friend and ally of the United States of America since the time we became a country. As you are well aware, our two peoples and two countries have a tradition of friendship between them which has existed over a period of 175 years, and those bonds of friendship, I know, will continue to grow stronger through the years ahead. May I say that, since you assumed the present post that you have taken in your country, we in the United States have watched with great interest the work that you have done, the energy and capacity you have shown in dealing with the difficult problems with which you have been confronted. We, of course, have been particularly interested in the accords which were reached at the Paris Conference a few days ago, and we believe that the work that was done there by you, by the other people who represented our friends in the European community, by our own Secretary of State, has done a tremendous amount of good in creating a sound base for future peace among the nations and among the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

May I say, finally, that we know that your visit

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 534.

² Made at the Washington National Airport on Nov. 17.

here will be helpful. We know that the meetings that you will have with President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, with the other leaders of our country will be helpful in developing mutual plans for the future of our two countries, plans which will serve the cause of peace and friendship in the years ahead. And may we also say that, during the time that you are so busy during this trip, you will have the opportunity to see our Capital City and enjoy the very warm friendship that will be extended to you and to Mme. Mendès-France by the American people.

Response by the Prime Minister

In coming to Washington today at the invitation of your great President I am gratified by a desire that I have cherished for a long time. As Mr. Vice President said, I have spent many pleasant hours in your city in the past where I have a great number of warm friends, and both my wife and myself are happy to be here again.

In the next days I am looking forward to an exchange of views with your President. I shall also resume the talks with the Secretary of State, Mr. Foster Dulles, which we have held so fruitfully during the last few months during a series of meetings terminating in the London and Paris Agreements. I come to America in a spirit of optimism. I feel that France, and indeed the whole free world, is making steady progress on the road to peace. I am confident that, in concert with your great country and in concert with other allies, we can assure the safety and the development of our common civilization.

I appreciate the welcome shown me here today, and I wish to thank you, Mr. Vice President, for your very kind words. I expect to have an opportunity to talk not only officially but with the American people and with the American press. While I represent my Government in my official talks, I come here also as a French citizen expressing the feelings of friendship and confidence that have bound our peoples together for centuries.

The Significance of the London and Paris Agreements

by James B. Conant

*U.S. High Commissioner for Germany*¹

These have been months of momentous decisions—decisions which when fully consummated will affect the life of every one of us, of every Berliner, and of every resident of the Soviet Zone. Not much more than 2 months ago, we seemed to be at the brink of what could have easily become a tragedy for the Western World. Our plans for union, indeed our very future, seemed in jeopardy. Yet today our unity appears more assured, our future brighter than ever.

The turn of events is symbolized in the names of three cities: London, Paris, and Washington. In London the foundation was laid for a new union, in Paris we erected the structure, and in Washington we celebrated, as you might say, the *Richtfest*. A number of important constitutional

and technical steps will still have to be taken before the building is completed and inhabitable. But there can no longer be any doubt that we are on the way—and on the right way at that.

I was a witness to all three events. Those of us who took part in those critical sessions in London and Paris knew, as we might now state in retrospect, that the fate of the free world hung in the balance. I was deeply impressed by the foresight of the European leaders, by their sense of proportion, and by their resolve to bring the meetings to a successful conclusion. I shall never forget the historical moment when Britain's Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden announced the decision of Her Majesty's Government to enter the union of the continental countries.²

¹ Address made over Radio Station RIAS at Berlin on Nov. 9 (Hicog press release).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 525.

Looking back at these fateful days, I can only repeat the words of Secretary Dulles upon his return from London: "The fact that all of this was done . . . shows the vitality of the Atlantic community."

Now what does all of this add up to?

In my opinion, the agreements reached at London and Paris signify one of the greatest triumphs that the West has yet achieved in the face of a stubborn and vicious effort by a reckless opponent to deny this very success to the nations of the free world. It also constitutes one of the most telling defeats that the Soviet Union has suffered in the cold war. We have delivered a severe and, as I hope, a fatal blow to the Soviet objective of sowing distrust among the Western allies and of preventing them from closing their ranks. We have, beyond this, proved the fallacy and the futility of a policy which aims at conquest through division and corruption and which attempts to perpetuate the unnatural state of weakness by keeping mature and independent peoples forever disunited in open disregard of their national interests. Once this Soviet objective has been fully removed, the structure of a vital part of Soviet strategy may well become unhinged. In any event, when the Western European Union has become an accomplished fact, it will not only afford added strength to the Western nations but will compel the antagonists of the West to take the new situation respectfully into account when formulating their own plans.

Over the past few years you have heard or even used the reference to the Western "policy of strength." There has been a tendency to define strength as a formidable and ever-expanding arsenal of material and military power and to measure it in terms of sheer quantity. Actually it would be foolish and unrealistic to deny that, in an age of global tension and conflict, the accumulation and increase of the physical means of defense is indispensable to the acquisition of strength. However, there exists another kind of strength, and it is this kind of strength that became manifest at London and Paris. It is the strength that is embedded in the moral fiber of a nation. It encompasses those spiritual qualities which are known as courage, determination, and high purpose, including the will to sacrifice individual preferences to the common weal. Unless it is harnessed to these elements of spiritual and moral strength, physical power is meaningless, in fact may be wasteful and destructive.

But when physical power is united with moral strength and when this power is then made to serve the legitimate purposes of a community, we know that it will not be misused. That is the true meaning of the Paris protocols. The strength achieved through unity will in time afford protection not only to all members of the union but, as Secretary Dulles put it, to other nations as well. Those who denounce this new union either misunderstand or deliberately misrepresent the purpose and the character of the agreements. History will have to disabuse them of the preconceived and misguided notions.

Problem of German Reunification

Now you may well ask, but what about the urgent problem of German reunification? That is the problem which was discussed in great detail at the Washington meeting. As you know, in Washington the President of the United States and Chancellor Adenauer reaffirmed the view that "a reunited Germany in freedom is viewed by us as the legitimate demand of the German people." They agreed that this aim shall be achieved "by peaceful means." They expressed their conviction that there was a "necessity of continued efforts towards this goal." They agreed that "such efforts will be made by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany together with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France." And they finally stated their firm belief that "the strengthening of free Europe which will result from the recent London and Paris Agreements will aid our efforts to bring freedom and unity to all of the German people."³

This is indeed a message of high hope, which manifests our unshakable belief that right will triumph over might. True enough, it does not contain a time schedule. It would be both irresponsible and unrealistic to raise premature expectations through specific predictions. None of us can tell how soon the Soviet Union will be ready to recognize the justified demands of the German people for unity in freedom. We assume they would be prepared to hold so-called "free elections" on the model of October 17 for all of Germany. But the *Freiheit, die ich meine*—and you as well, I am certain—is not what the Soviets have in mind. It requires gradual and painstaking

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 8, 1954, p. 681.

ing efforts—and it will take time in coming. We shall have to take one step at a time. At London and Paris we took a decisive one. There is no doubt in my mind that we have come closer toward our common goal. Until the Western nations had achieved a measure of unity, we could hardly expect that Soviet policy would reflect appreciation of our growing strength.

But now that the Western World is on the way to an ever-closer unity, we may hope that the unity created will give birth to even greater unity and that, as a result, the area of freedom will progressively expand, until it will finally encompass all men to whom it is denied today but who will share it with us tomorrow.

In the meantime, my Government in close alliance with the British and French Governments will not relax their efforts to hasten the advent of freedom. We shall carefully explore all honest and realistic proposals for a settlement of the issues still outstanding, above all that of German reunification.

Assistance to Berlin

We shall continue to assist the people of Berlin. The United States, in association with the United Kingdom and France, has recognized the unique importance of Berlin to the Western World in the tripartite declaration first made in 1952 and repeated in a framework under conditions of growing strength at the London meeting in October.⁴ This statement says that "The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation." There is no area in the world which has been singled out in a statement so strong indicating the protection and support of this Government. Nowhere have words and acts been combined in such an effective way to bring about vigorous reconstruction in spite of all difficulties. This support will continue as long as needed. Thus, the city of Berlin, although an island surrounded by a Communist-dominated territory and although subject to pressures devised by the dictatorial police state, has been able to develop a vig-

orous and active economic, cultural, and political life.

United States support, taking the form not only of funds amounting to close to a billion dollars over recent years but also of active participation in the development of trade, the stimulation of production, and the improvement of industrial conditions, has brought about a large increase in employment and the doubling of production in less than 3 years. Berlin continues to be a haven for those fleeing oppression. In spite of a large influx of refugees which continues from day to day, Berlin has been able to find homes and employment and to absorb many persons coming from the East.

These accomplishments were made possible by the close cooperation of the brave people of Berlin and the Government of the United States.

May I ask you, in turn, to remain steadfast and patient in the face of all trials and tribulations and not to lose sight of the common aims which unite us across all frontiers and iron curtains. You are and you will remain a part not only of Germany but of the free world. It is your own free will alone that establishes your membership in the community of free nations. Your right to this membership is inalienable. Maintain it for yourselves and your children.

And to you in the East, I say: Keep alive your tried and tested allegiance to the West, just as we shall remain mindful of your fate until the day of reunification in freedom finally arrives.

Soviet Conference Proposal

Press release 648 dated November 16

At his news conference on November 16, Secretary Dulles was asked his views of the latest Soviet note proposing a multinational European conference and whether the United States has any intention of accepting the proposal. Mr. Dulles made the following reply:

I would say that the proposal bears on its face evidence that the Soviet Union does not expect it to be accepted because it would be totally impossible, from a purely physical standpoint, for the delegations of the number of nations involved to gather in Paris or Moscow on the 29th of November, which is less than 2 weeks from now. Therefore, as I say, I do not think that the Soviets

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 521. For text of a tripartite statement issued at Paris on Oct. 23, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 732.

themselves expected acceptance, and I do not think we shall surprise them in that respect.

Asked whether, in reality, the Soviet note did not forecast an attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to form an Eastern European Union as a counter to the Western Union, Mr. Dulles said:

The U.S. view has been that there already exists what the Soviets themselves have referred to as a monolithic system, and in fact we believe that such satellite countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany are, in fact, already incorporated very solidly into the Soviet-bloc system. No new action that I can think of would make their governments more servile than the governments which the Soviet Union has imposed upon them. It is, of course, always possible to devise a different form. That is a possibility, but, as far as the fact goes—the reality of their being part of the bloc which is infinitely more tied together and militaristic than the Western European countries—as far as that fact is concerned, there is no possibility of doubt about it.

Foreign Policy Review

Press release 647 dated November 16

At his news conference on November 16, Secretary Dulles was asked whether he favored a public review and discussion of foreign policy at this time. Mr. Dulles made the following reply:

I believe that there is no time when it is inadvisable to discuss and talk about foreign policy. In other words, I believe that foreign policy should not only be under constant review within the agencies of the Government, such as the Department of State and the National Security Council, but I believe that the public is generally entitled to know, subject to security requirements, what our views are about the international situation and be satisfied that we have adequate measures to meet it. Therefore, I am never afraid at any time to have a discussion of these matters. I have myself, I think, gone pretty far in talking about foreign policy. I have made frequent radio and television talks. I have these press conferences quite frequently at which I answer your questions about foreign policy. I do not think that there should ever be the impression that there is any blackout of discussion about foreign policy. I do not myself see any immediate emergency

which requires either that review or discussion should be on any different basis from what it normally is.

Asked whether he saw any need for a basic change in direction of our foreign policy, Mr. Dulles said:

I think our foreign policy has taken into account all necessary elements. Now, as I say, if the Communists make basic changes in policy, if their emphasis shifts from one line to another, that often calls for a corresponding shift on our part. It's like any game that you play. In football, if one side shifts to an unbalanced line, the other may have to make a shift to compensate for that. In that respect, foreign policy is flexible in that it takes account of the dispositions and the tactics of those who seek objectives which are incompatible with our own best interests. We don't know yet very clearly just what is behind the Soviet words. In a sense you may say that their soft words involve themselves some change of tactics. But one must look behind the words to see what the deeds are, and I don't perceive as yet any particular change in the actions, the conduct, the deeds of the Soviet Communists and their associates.

Bipartisanship in Foreign Policy

News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 646 dated November 16

There has been a great deal of discussion about bipartisanship in foreign policy. This is a principle to which I am dedicated.

Modern bipartisanship began at a meeting which I had with Secretary Hull 10 years ago. Almost continuously since then, I have practiced it.

I am profoundly convinced that, under the dangerous conditions of our time, our nation cannot be safe unless there is substantial unity on the fundamentals of our foreign policy. That is, of course, President Eisenhower's view, and, under his direction, I have sought to conduct foreign policy with the full knowledge and approval of the responsible representatives of both of our political parties. I am glad, as a Republican, to pay tribute to the Democratic cooperation I have received.

There is close bipartisan cooperation with the Congress. The President, who is constitutionally responsible for foreign policy, has set a notable

precedent in the number and intimacy of foreign affairs consultations between his administration and the congressional leaders of both parties. Tomorrow, another such meeting will be held at the White House.

Since being Secretary of State, I personally have had more than 80 meetings with congressional leaders or congressional committees, participated in by both political parties. This is about twice a week when I have been in Washington and Congress has been in session. I have asked my office to make available a list of these meetings.

I have had many more private consultations on an individual basis and, of course, many other Department officers have met with bipartisan congressional groups. Meeting with bipartisan committees which the Congress itself has established is, of course, the normal method of putting foreign policy matters onto a bipartisan basis.

In the case of important international conferences, there has always been participation, or prior consultation, on a bipartisan basis. We have continued the good practice of having bipartisan delegations to the U.N. General Assembly.

The last Democratic Under Secretary of State, David K. E. Bruce, has been serving as consultant, and advised me with respect to the great problem of European unity. He attended with me the Berlin, London, and Paris Conferences of 1954. He is one of many Democrats on whom I depend in the current conduct of foreign relations.

The foregoing, I think, clearly demonstrates the fidelity of this administration to the principle of bipartisanship in foreign policy. I speak not only for myself but also for the President in saying that we both welcome any procedures which will facilitate the practice of that principle, so as to assure a foreign policy so sound and so solidly based as to win respect at home and abroad.

U.S. and Korea Announce Initialing of Agreed Minute

JOINT STATEMENT

Press release 652 dated November 17

Following is the unofficial text of a joint statement issued at Seoul on November 17 by the United States Embassy and the Government of the Republic of Korea:

The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea and the American Ambassador to Korea announced the initialing today in Seoul of the agreed minute marking the culmination of talks which originated in Washington between President Rhee and President Eisenhower¹ and were continued by representatives of the two Governments in Washington and Seoul. The agreed minute was initialed by His Excellency Pyun Yang-tai, Foreign Minister, on behalf of the Republic of Korea and Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs on behalf of the United States Government.

The minute sets forth the broad area of agreement between the two Governments on matters of a political, economic, and military nature and reiterates the interest of the two Governments in the achievement of common objectives with respect to Korea. It strengthens the basis for mutually beneficial relations existing between the Korean and American Governments and further cements the friendship of the peoples of the two countries.

The American Government has agreed to an extensive program of economic aid and direct military assistance to Korea during fiscal year 1955. Detailed provision has also been made in the minute for American support of a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by appropriate military representatives of the two Governments. The United States reaffirms its intention, in the event of an unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea, to employ, as provided in the United States–Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, its military power against aggressors. The American Government also expresses its intention, subject to necessary congressional authorization, to press forward with an economic program for the rehabilitation of Korea.

The Republic of Korea Government, for its part, agrees to cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea, including possible efforts through the United Nations. It also accepts proposed levels and principles for a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment, consistent with economic stability and within available resources. In this connection, the Republic of Korea agrees to retain its military forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that Command continues to have

¹ BULLETIN of July 26, 1954, p. 123, and Aug. 9, 1954, p. 197.

responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless it is agreed otherwise.

In connection with the expanded program of American economic aid, the Republic of Korea agrees to take measures required to make the economic program effective, including the encouragement of private ownership of investment projects, the establishment of new procedures for conversion of dollars at a realistic exchange rate for United States forces, and for pricing of aid goods into the Korean economy at a similar rate in order to make the maximum contribution to the Korean economy. The Republic of Korea also expresses its intention to make a realistic effort to balance its budget and to continue to resist inflation. Both Governments agree that material for the aid program shall be procured wherever in non-Communist countries goods of the required quality can be obtained at the best price, it being an agreed objective that the maximum possible procurement for this purpose would be made in Korea.

This basic agreement between the Korean and American Governments, and the Mutual Defense Treaty which will become effective within the next few days, are important steps toward achieving the common objectives of the United States and the Republic of Korea. They will strengthen the framework of free-world cooperation and contribute to the security and welfare of the free peoples of Asia.

TEXT OF AGREED MINUTE

Press release 660 dated November 19

Following is the text of the Agreed Minute initiated at Seoul on November 17 by Korean Prime Minister Pyun Yang-tai and American Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs, together with appendix A covering the economic program:

Agreed Minute Between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea Based on the Conferences Held Between President Eisenhower and President Rhee and Their Advisers in Washington, July 27-30, 1954, and Subsequent Discussions Between Representatives of the Two Governments

It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the Republic of Korea to continue the close cooperation which has proved mutually beneficial and has played such an important part in the Free World's struggle against Communist aggression and its determination to remain free.

Accordingly,

It is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea to:

1. Cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea, including possible efforts through the United Nations to secure this objective;

2. Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless after consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual interests would best be served by a change;

3. Accept the force levels and principles set forth in Appendix B² which will permit the maintenance of an effective military program consistent with economic stability and within available resources;

4. Continue to encourage private ownership of investment projects;

5. Cooperate in procedures for administration of United States aid funds consistent with United States legislation and the practices applied generally in such programs;

6. Take the necessary measures to make the economic program effective, including those set forth in Appendix A.

Based upon the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it will create, it is the intention and policy of the United States to:

1. Continue its program of helping to strengthen the Republic of Korea politically, economically and militarily, with programmed economic aid and direct military assistance furnished during Fiscal Year 1955 to aggregate up to \$700 million. This amount would exceed by more than \$100 million the amount of assistance previously contemplated by the United States for Korea in Fiscal Year 1955. Of this total, programmed economic aid, including the CRIK [Civil Relief in Korea] carryover and the United States contribution to UNKRA [United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency], available for obligation in Fiscal Year 1955 would amount to approximately \$280 million (actual expenditures in Fiscal Year 1955 are estimated at approximately \$250 million);

2. Support a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment as outlined in Appendix B, including the development of a reserve system, in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by appropriate military representatives of the two Governments.

3. Consult fully with appropriate military representatives of the Republic of Korea in the implementation of the program for support of the Republic of Korea military establishment.

4. In the event of an unprovoked attack upon the Republic of Korea to employ, in accordance with its constitutional processes, its military power against the aggressor;

5. Subject to the necessary Congressional authorizations, continue to press forward with the economic program for the rehabilitation of Korea.

Appendix A: Measures for an Effective Economic Program

The Republic of Korea will undertake the necessary measures to make the economic program effective, including:

² Not printed.

1. with respect to exchange rates, the official rate of the Republic of Korea Government and the counterpart rate being 180 to 1, agreement to procedures as proposed by the United States for the conversion of dollars at a different and realistic exchange rate to cover hwan drawings of United States forces by sale of dollars through the Bank of Korea, and generally to price aid goods into the Korean economy at a similar rate, thereby providing for the maximum contribution to the Korean economy and to the Korean budget from the use of these resources. The operation of existing agreements with respect to hwan drawings by the United States will be suspended so long as the foregoing arrangements work out in practice to the mutual satisfaction of both Governments;

2. agreement that material for the aid program—not furnished from the United States in kind—will be procured wherever in non-Communist countries goods of the required quality can be obtained at the best price (it being the objective to perform the maximum possible procurement in Korea at competitive world prices);

3. provision of adequate information to the appropriate United States representatives concerning Korean plans for the use of their own foreign exchange; and

4. a realistic effort to balance its budget and continue to resist inflation (it will be the objective of both Governments to develop the budget of the Republic of Korea in a manner that will resist inflation).

Attack on U.S. Aircraft by Soviet Planes

U.S. NOTE OF NOVEMBER 7

Press release 631 dated November 8

Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen on November 8 delivered the following note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry:

NOVEMBER 7, 1954

The United States Government has been informed that a United States B-29 type aircraft was shot down over Japanese territory in the Hokkaido area on November 7 by two Soviet MIG-type aircraft.

The United States Government strongly protests this action. It will expect the Soviet Government to make all such moral and material reparations as lies within its power.

The United States Government will communicate further with the Soviet Government when the facts regarding human and material losses are more fully known.

U.S. NOTE OF NOVEMBER 17

Press release 651 dated November 17

The United States Embassy at Moscow on November 17 delivered the following note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry:

The United States Government refers to its note of November 7 to the Soviet Government concerning the shooting down of a U.S. B-29 type aircraft in the Hokkaido area of Japan by two Soviet MIG type aircraft on November 7 (local time) and to the Soviet Government's note of the same date on this subject.

The United States Government rejects as unfounded the account of the incident contained in the Soviet note of November 7. The attack was initiated by Soviet aircraft without warning and without any attempt to signal the pilot of the American aircraft. The United States aircraft did not at any time fire on the Soviet aircraft. As a result of the unwarranted and hostile act of the Soviet aircraft, the United States aircraft was destroyed, crashing near the village of Nokkegun on Hokkaido.

The United States Government again protests this latest incident in a long series of unprovoked Soviet attacks on American aircraft on peaceful missions. In this connection, the United States Government would observe that the Soviet Government has not yet replied to the United States Government's note of September 25, 1954, regarding the destruction of another American B-29 aircraft in approximately the same area and under the same circumstances.¹ That note also reiterated that the United States Government supports the Japanese Government's contention that the Habomai group is an integral part of the national territory of Japan. The United States Government further shares the deep concern of the Japanese Government that the Soviet Government not only continues illegally to occupy Japanese territory in the Habomai Islands but also carries out unprovoked attacks on U.S. aircraft lawfully in this region.

The United States Government requests that appropriate disciplinary measures be taken with regard to those responsible for this unprovoked attack and that all other possible steps be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents which

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 18, 1954, p. 579.

are in flagrant contradiction of recent statements by high Soviet officials that the Soviet Union seeks to abate international tensions. Such action by the Soviets would be in the mutual interest of the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. In the absence of appropriate action by the Government of the U.S.S.R. the United States Government will be impelled to provide the necessary defensive protection for United States aircraft engaging in these legitimate and peaceful missions and full responsibility for any consequences which ensue will devolve upon the Government of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government is also informed that the United States Government reasserts and reserves its rights with reference to the human and material losses incurred as a result of the Soviet action of November 7.

SOVIET NOTE OF NOVEMBER 7

[Unofficial translation]

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to state the following to the Government of the United States of America:

In accordance with established facts, on November 7 of this year at 1:20 p. m. local time (12:41 p. m. Vladivostok time) a four-motored military airplane of the B-29 type with identification marks of the military forces of the U.S. violated the state boundary of the Soviet Union in the region of Tanfilyev Island (Kurile Islands) and continued to penetrate into the air space of the U.S.S.R. in the direction of this island.

At the time of its flight over Tanfilyev Island the American airplane was met by two Soviet fighters with the purpose of indicating to it that it was within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and of proposing that it immediately leave the air space of the Soviet Union. Upon the approach of the Soviet fighters, the American airplane mentioned opened fire on them. In view of this unprovoked action by the American intruder, the Soviet airplanes were forced to open answering fire, after which the American airplane left the air space of the Soviet Union in a southwesterly direction.

The Soviet Government decisively protests to the U.S. Government this gross violation by an American military airplane of the Soviet boundary.

This is a new instance of a violation by American military airplanes of the state boundary of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government brought the attention of the U.S. Government to similar instances of violation, in particular in its notes of September 5² and 8³ of this year.

The Soviet Government notes with regret that instances of violation of the Soviet boundary by American military

airplanes which occurred earlier involved losses which were in no way justified, as was indicated in relevant notes of the U.S. Government.

The Soviet Government considers that the taking of measures for the prevention in the future of violations by American airplanes of the Soviet state boundary would be in the interests both of the Soviet Union and of the United States and expects that to this end appropriate instructions will be given by the U.S. Government to the command of the American military air forces.

Purpose of Rio Conference

Statement by Under Secretary Hoover¹

I am leaving today for Brazil, where there will be a Meeting of the Ministers of Finance or Economy of the American Republics and where I look forward to renewing many old friendships. This meeting, like the other regular meetings of the Western Hemisphere system, is an example of how our Republics can work together constructively as partners to solve our common problems.

At Rio de Janeiro the representatives of the people of the Americas will discuss international trade and economic development. Some of these problems are complex, yet upon their solution will depend much of the future progress for human welfare on our two continents.

If I may say a personal word, it is with special pleasure that I go to Brazil for this conference. My father first enunciated the Good Neighbor Policy when he visited South America in 1928. I feel confident that this conference will still further cement our relations as good neighbors and will mark a new era in our partnership to improve the social and economic well-being of all of our peoples.

Latvian Independence Day

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 656 dated November 18

On the occasion of the 36th anniversary of the declaration of Latvian independence, I would like to extend to the people of Latvia the best wishes and warmest sympathies of the American people.

During two decades of national independence Latvia gave impressive demonstration of the good

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 13, 1954, p. 365.

³ Not printed.

¹ Made at the Washington National Airport on Nov. 20 (press release 661).

fruits of her freedom. She won worldwide recognition and respect as an exemplary member of the family of free nations.

We know that the Latvian people retain their unshakable will to be free again. We are convinced they cannot indefinitely be deprived of their right to a government, an economic system, and cultural institutions of their own choosing. In withstanding Soviet oppression, the people of Latvia may rely on the irresistible force of moral principle and upon the united determination of many peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain to achieve a decent future for the presently enslaved nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

Distant Early Warning Line Authorized by U.S., Canada¹

On September 27, 1954, the Defense Departments of Canada and the United States issued a joint announcement on the progress being made in the development of a comprehensive jointly operated system for warning of the approach of hostile aircraft and for the control of interceptor aircraft.² Four main elements of a warning and control system now appear to be practicable, namely: the main control and warning radar installations in the populated part of Canada (the jointly operated Pinetree network) and in the United States, which are now in operation; a warning line north of the settled areas of Canada (the Mid-Canada line), being built by Canada; a warning line across the most northerly practicable part of North America (the Distant Early Warning line); and portions of the complete warning and control system in Canada to be extended to seaward on both flanks of the continent by the United States.

In the announcement of September 27, it was stated that the Canadian and United States Governments had agreed in principle that there was a need for a distant early warning line across the far northern part of North America and had directed that detailed planning for such a line should be initiated at once.

As a consequence of the progress which has been

¹ Released to the press by the Department of Defense on Nov. 19; released simultaneously by the Canadian Government.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 539.

made since the announcement last September, the two Governments have decided to proceed with the construction of the distant early warning line.

Experience has shown that projects of this nature can be carried out most effectively by vesting responsibility for all phases of the work of construction and installation in a single authority. In the joint statement of September 27, referred to above, it was announced that Canada had undertaken the responsibility for the construction of the Mid-Canada line. In the case of the Distant Early Warning line it has been agreed that, although both Canada and the United States will participate in the project, responsibility for the work of construction and installation should be vested in the United States.

U.S. Participation in Proposed International Finance Corporation

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

U.S./U.N. press release 2018 dated November 11

The announcement made today by the Secretary of the Treasury speaking for the Administration, favoring U.S. participation in a proposed International Finance Corporation, opens up new and constructive possibilities for members of the United Nations and other countries. This new approach to international economic development, if it is approved by the Congress, should make possible a new enterprise which would contribute substantially to the industrial progress of the less developed countries of the world. Such an institution would fill an important gap in the existing machinery devoted to this end.

Many member nations of the United Nations have been seeking channels for securing needed capital for the expansion of their economies. The International Finance Corporation, as envisaged by the Administration's proposal, would be a step forward in filling this need.

The purpose of an International Finance Corporation would be to supply capital to new industries and other enterprises without government guaranties. It would supplement the activities of the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank. Such an agency could stimulate private

investment by both foreign and local capital in enterprises locally controlled and operated.

The precise scope and function of such a new international agency must of course be determined by the participating nations—and at least 30 countries should participate if the idea is to succeed. In the view of the United States a corporation with authorized capital of \$100 million would be able to do big things. With success, the initial funds would grow by attracting new capital from private sources. As an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, it would benefit by the experience and the expert staff of the bank.

We welcome this initial step taken by the President and the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. We will listen with interest to the views of other delegations on this project, which can be of great benefit to the peoples of many nations.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF NOVEMBER 11

The Administration will ask congressional approval for the United States to participate in a proposed International Finance Corporation, which would be organized as an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The purpose of the corporation would be to stimulate private investment in underdeveloped countries by making loans without guaranty of member governments as is now required in loans by the International Bank.

This announcement was made today by Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey as Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. The time for submitting the proposal to the Congress will depend upon discussions with the International Bank and its members.

The corporation would be an intergovernmental body created by agreement open to signature by any member of the International Bank. The corporation's initial capital would be provided by member countries through subscriptions to its stock, but it would be empowered to sell its obligations and its portfolio securities in private capital markets to raise additional funds. The authorized capital of the corporation would be \$100 million. The subscription of each member country would

be in relation to the member's stock in the International Bank. The U.S. subscription would be approximately \$35 million. The charter would not come into effect until \$75 million had been subscribed by a minimum of 30 countries.

The proposed corporation would not directly provide equity financing. It would, however, be empowered to hold securities bearing interest payable only if earned, as well as debentures convertible into stock when purchased from the corporation by private investors. In that way it would operate in the area of venture capital without holding equity rights of control. It would not compete with either the International Bank or the Export-Import Bank.

Secretary Humphrey emphasized that the operations of such a corporation would of necessity have to be experimental and subject to review from time to time. Its success would depend upon its effectiveness in stimulating an increased international movement of private funds, Secretary Humphrey said.

Agreement With Turkey for Procurement of Grain

Press release 645 dated November 16

Assistant Secretary Henry A. Byroade, representing the U.S. Government, and Melih Esenbel, Director General for Turkish Internal Economic Affairs, on November 15 signed an agreement providing for the procurement of about 500,000 tons of wheat and feed grains urgently needed in Turkey to replenish the grain shortages caused by recent crop failures.

Starting immediately, the U.S. Government will, under the provisions of Public Law 480 (titles I and III) and Public Law 665, furnish Turkey with approximately 100,000 tons of wheat in exchange for chrome, an additional 100,000 tons purchased with Foa defense support funds, and 300,000 tons of wheat and feed grains sold by the Commodity Credit Corporation for Turkish lira.

The Turkish lira derived from the purchase of wheat with Foa defense support funds will be used for the Turkish armed forces, and those resultant from Ccc sales will be divided equally to meet U.S. obligations and to be loaned for the promotion of Turkish economic development.

U.S.-Cuban Discussions on Economic Relations

Press release 654 dated November 18

The delegations of the United States and Cuba on November 17 concluded conversations concerning economic and commercial relations between the two countries.¹ The conversations, which began on November 8, were initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba. Upon the conclusion of the conversations, both Governments summarized their views in the following memorandum.

In the course of the meetings held from the 8th to the 17th of November between delegations from the governments of the United States and Cuba, a preliminary study has been made of matters concerning the economic and commercial relations between both countries.

As previously agreed upon by both Governments, the purpose of these discussions was to gather all the necessary facts and to analyze them so that the United States and Cuban Governments might continue their efforts to find ways and means that will permit the economic relations between the two countries to develop in a mutually satisfactory manner. It was not the intention to endeavor to reach at this time definite agreements or solutions for all the matters which were to be discussed.

The Cuban delegation expressed the view in broad terms that a lack of balance exists in the trade relations between the two countries, pointing out that the advantages granted by Cuba give

¹ The delegates of Cuba were:

Amadeo Lopez Castro, Minister without Portfolio and President, National Development Commission, *chairman*
Arturo M. Manas, President, Cuban Institute of Sugar Stabilization

Joaquin Martinez Saenz, President, National Bank of Cuba

Joaquin Meyer, Ambassador in Charge of Economic Affairs, Ministry of State

Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Former Minister of Finance

The principal United States delegates were:

Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, *chairman*

Samuel W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs

Earl L. Butz, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Marketing and Foreign Agriculture

Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Harold M. Randall, Counselor for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, Habana

the United States a dominant position in the Cuban market which is not adequately compensated by the share allotted to Cuba in the United States market, particularly with regard to sugar. The Cuban delegation stressed that Cuba's increase in population and the need to provide employment for its people require the development of new industrial, agricultural and commercial activities to supplement sugar production, which by itself is not sufficient completely to satisfy the needs of the Cuban people.

Stating that Cuba's sugar exports to the United States are the main justification for the concessions granted to American agricultural and industrial products in the Cuban market, and underscoring Cuba's historical role in supplying sugar to the American market, the Cuban Delegation requested that Cuba be granted the right to supply 50% of the sugar consumption requirements of the United States. It also requested that 22% of Cuba's sugar exports to the United States be in direct consumption sugar, as originally established in the sugar legislation of 1934. It further requested that the Cuban share in the United States sugar market be regulated by an agreement which would give stability to the industry and complement the American domestic sugar legislation.

The U.S. Delegation confirmed the recognition by the Cuban Delegation that the Executive Branch has no authorization to commit the U.S. Congress to any course of action. It pointed out that since 1934 the Congress of the United States has enacted comprehensive legislation controlling production of sugar in the United States and the importation of sugar from foreign countries. The Cuban Delegation was assured that its views would be given detailed study by responsible officials of the Executive Branch in the light of the importance to Cuba of its participation in the American sugar market and the difficult situation that Cuba is facing regarding its overall sugar exports. The Cuban Delegation was also assured that Cuba's vital interest in the American market, as well as the substantial interest of the United States in its export trade with Cuba, would be taken fully into account.

The supply of Cuban minerals to the United States, particularly manganese, was the subject of careful study. The Cuban Delegation requested that, in view of the full cooperation given by Cuba to the United States during the war and also Cuba's strategic geographical position, the

United States take the appropriate measures to make possible the continued operation of Cuba's mines, thus preventing unemployment.

The U.S. Delegation recognized the contribution of the Cuban mining industry in World War II and during the Korean emergency. It likewise explained to the Cuban Delegation the operation of the mineral stockpiling program of the United States and the difficulties presented by this program to procurement for stockpiling of certain minerals.

Requests were also made by Cuba to facilitate its tobacco exports to the United States in order to overcome, at least in part, the difficulties which the agricultural and the industrial sectors of the tobacco industry are facing. Measures were also proposed by the Cuban Delegation to seek ways and means of facilitating the imports into the United States of Cuban fruits and vegetables, rum and other products, as well as to increase American tourism to Cuba.

In connection with the need to develop and diversify Cuba's economy, the Cuban Delegation informed the American Delegation that Cuba intends to undertake a technical revision of its Customs tariff. Attention was also paid to the great importance of promoting the investment of American capital in Cuba, and to this end the possibility was discussed of negotiating a convention to solve the problems of double taxation. The different matters concerning the regulation of the employment and the rendering of technical services by American citizens in Cuba in order to promote American investments were also considered within the framework of Cuba's legislation.

For its part, the United States Delegation brought up, among other things, the difficulties attending the operation of the rice agreement between the two countries, the claims of American citizens pending with the Cuban Government and problems arising from the operation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Cuban Delegation reiterated that Cuba will continue to develop its production of rice within the framework of its international obligations and to give preference to imports of rice from the United States at low rates of duty to the extent necessary to satisfy Cuba's import requirements. On the subject of claims the Cuban Delegation expressed the intent of the Cuban Government to arrange for prompt settlement of those claims which have

been adjudicated by the Cuban courts and explained the procedures established by Cuban laws leading to systematic liquidation of other categories of debts of the Cuban Government.

A general understanding was reached with regard to action which may be taken on a number of matters which have affected the trade between the two countries, including those having to do with the problems under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Each of the two delegations believes that these discussions, undertaken in an informal and friendly atmosphere, afforded the Governments of the United States and Cuba an opportunity to acquaint each other with its views on measures which might be taken to improve economic and trade relations between the two countries. Both parties have recognized throughout the discussions that many of the questions considered do not admit of easy or prompt solutions, but both have the feeling that a high degree of mutual comprehension has been achieved, pointing the way towards eventual progress in correcting the conditions discussed.

Mexican Payment Under Claims Convention

Press release 659 dated November 19

The Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Don Manuel Tello, on November 19 presented to the Secretary of State the Mexican Government's check for \$2,500,000 United States currency, representing the thirteenth annual installment due the United States under the Claims Convention concluded November 19, 1941. The Secretary of State requested the Ambassador to convey to his Government an expression of this Government's appreciation.

Under the terms of the convention, Mexico agreed to pay the United States \$40 million U. S. currency as the balance due from the Government of Mexico in full settlement of the following claims:

(a) All claims filed by the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Mexican States with the General Claims Commission, established by the two countries pursuant to the convention signed September 8, 1923;

(b) All agrarian claims of nationals of the United States of America against the Govern-

ment of the United Mexican States, which arose subsequent to August 30, 1927, and prior to October 7, 1940, including those referred to in the agreement effected by exchange of notes signed by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States on November 9 and 12, 1938, respectively; and

(c) All other claims of nationals of either country, which arose subsequent to January 1, 1927, and prior to October 7, 1940, and involving international responsibility of either Government toward the other Government as a consequence of damage to, or loss or destruction of, or wrongful interference with the property of the nationals of either country.

Payments heretofore made amount to \$36 million. With the present payment the balance remaining to be paid amounts to \$1,500,000.

Not included in the convention were claims based upon expropriation of petroleum properties. Payment on those claims was completed in 1947.

No Warships To Be Sent to Antarctica

Press release 642 dated November 12

The Governments of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom have informed the United States that they do not plan to send any warships south of latitude 60 this year.

The U.S. Government informed the other Governments that it does not plan to send any vessels to the Antarctic during the 1954-55 season other than the U.S. Navy ice breaker *Atka* which was announced by the White House on October 2.

The practice of exchanging information on Antarctic plans has grown up in recent years as a means of avoiding any misunderstanding which might affect the four interested Governments.

Import Quota Imposed on Barley and Barley Malt

White House press release dated October 18

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on October 18 issued a proclamation limiting imports of barley into the United States from all sources to 27,500,000 bushels dur-

ing the period October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, inclusive.

The President's action modified the recommendations of the Tariff Commission. In its report¹ the Commission recommended an 8 cents per bushel fee on imports in excess of 22,500,000 bushels. Other modifications are the 1-year period specified in the proclamation and an allocation of the total quota between Canada and all other foreign countries based upon imports during four marketing seasons, 1950-51 to 1953-54.

Concurrent with the President's action the Canadian Government, in an exchange of notes with the U.S. Government, indicated that it will take voluntary action during the period of the proclamation to limit exports to this country of feed barley to 3,500,000 bushels. Other Canadian exports within the Canadian share of the overall quota would consist of other kinds of barley, including malting barley and barley malt.

The President's action was based on the recent unanimous report on barley by the U.S. Tariff Commission. The Commission's investigation was made under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, which authorizes limitations on imports when imports are interfering with or threaten to interfere with domestic price-support or marketing programs. The proclamation applies to barley, hulled and unhulled, including rolled barley and ground barley, and barley malt.

The Tariff Commission's report resulted from an investigation requested by the President on August 20, 1954.²

NOTES EXCHANGED WITH CANADA ON OCTOBER 18

Text of Canadian Note

The Canadian Ambassador has the honor to refer to the recommendation which has been made by the United States Tariff Commission to the President to impose an additional duty of 8 cents per bushel on imports of barley and barley malt in excess of 22.5 million bushels in each year beginning the first of October, 1954 and to the representations already made by the Canadian

¹ Copies of the report may be obtained from the U. S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D. C.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 6, 1954, p. 340.

Ambassador to the Department of State with respect to that recommendation.

The Canadian Ambassador understands that the President intends to issue a Proclamation limiting imports of barley and barley malt into the United States to 27.5 million bushels for the year beginning the first of October, 1954. On that understanding Canada as the principal supplier is willing to undertake to limit exports of barley for feeding purposes to the United States during the same period to not more than 3.5 million bushels.

The Canadian Ambassador is therefore instructed to inform the Department of State that the Canadian Wheat Board under the powers conferred on it by the Canadian Wheat Board Act will take steps to insure that not more than 3.5 million bushels of barley purchased for feeding purposes will be exported from Canada to the United States during the year beginning the first of October, 1954.

The Canadian Ambassador wishes to express appreciation for the consideration that has been given by the United States authorities to the Canadian representations on this subject.

Text of U.S. Note

The Secretary of State is pleased to learn from the note dated October 18, 1954, of the Canadian Ambassador that the Canadian Government has decided to limit the export of barley for feeding purposes to the United States during the period beginning October 1, 1954 to September 30, 1955 to not more than 3.5 million bushels.

A copy of the Proclamation limiting imports of barley and barley malt into the United States is attached hereto.

PROCLAMATION 3075 ³

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as added by section 31 of the act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 773, re-enacted by section 1 of the act of June 3, 1937, 50 Stat. 246, and as amended by section 3 of the act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1248, section 3 of the act of June 28, 1950, 64 Stat. 261, and section 8 (b) of the act of June 16, 1951, 65 Stat. 72 (7 U. S. C. 624), the Secretary of Agriculture has advised me that he has reason to believe that barley, hulled or unhulled, including rolled barley and ground barley, and barley malt, are being or are practically certain to be imported

into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to barley pursuant to sections 301 and 401 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic barley with respect to which such program of the Department of Agriculture is being undertaken; and

WHEREAS, on August 20, 1954, I caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation under the said section 22 with respect to this matter; and

WHEREAS the said Tariff Commission has made such investigation and has reported to me its findings and recommendations in connection therewith; and

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said investigation and report of the Tariff Commission, I find that barley, hulled and unhulled, including rolled barley and ground barley, and barley malt, in the aggregate, are practically certain to be imported into the United States during the period from October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, both dates inclusive, under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said price-support program with respect to barley; and

WHEREAS I find and declare that the imposition of the quantitative limitations hereinafter proclaimed is shown by such investigation of the Tariff Commission to be necessary in order that the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of barley, hulled and unhulled, including rolled barley and ground barley, and barley malt will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said price-support program:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that the total aggregate quantity of barley, hulled and unhulled, including rolled barley and ground barley, and barley malt entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period from October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, both dates inclusive, shall not exceed 27,500,000 bushels, which permissible total quantity I find and declare to be proportionately not less than 50 per centum of the total average aggregate annual quantity of such barley and barley malt entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during the representative period from July 1, 1948, to June 30, 1953, both dates inclusive; and that, of the said permissible total quantity not more than 27,225,000 bushels shall be imported from Canada, and not more than 275,000 bushels shall be imported from other foreign countries.

For the purposes of this proclamation, 48 pounds of barley, hulled or unhulled, including rolled barley or ground barley, shall be considered equal to one bushel, and 34 pounds of barley malt shall be considered equal to one bushel.

The provisions of this proclamation shall not apply to certified or registered seed barley for use for seeding

³ 19 Fed. Reg. 6807.

and crop-improvement purposes, in bags tagged and sealed by an officially recognized seed-certifying agency of the country of production: Provided, (a) that the individual shipment amounts to 100 bushels (of 48 pounds each) or less, or (b) that the individual shipment amounts to more than 100 bushels (of 48 pounds each) and the written approval of the Secretary of Agriculture or his designated representative is presented at the time of entry, or bond is furnished in a form prescribed by the Commissioner of Customs in an amount equal to the value of the merchandise as set forth in the entry, plus the estimated duty as determined at the time of entry, conditioned upon the production of such written approval within 6 months from the date of entry.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and

caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighteenth day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen (SEAL) hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-ninth.



By the President

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Secretary of State.

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Transmitted to Senate¹

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 10, 1954.

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a copy of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the protocol thereto, both signed at Manila on September 8, 1954.²

I transmit also for the information of the Senate a copy of a declaration known as the Pacific Charter, which was drawn up at Manila and signed on that same date.² The charter proclaims the dedication of the signatory governments to the ideals of self-determination, self-government, and independence. It is a declaration of principles and does not require the advice and consent of the Senate.

There is further transmitted for the information of the Senate the report made to me by the Secretary of State regarding the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the protocol thereto. I concur in the recommendation of the Secretary that the "unanimous agreement" required by article IV, paragraph 1, for the designation of states

or territories, by article VII for the invitation to states to accede to the treaty, and by article VIII for a change in the treaty area is to be understood in each instance as requiring the advice and consent of the Senate.

The treaty is designed to promote security and peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific by deterring Communist and other aggression in that area. It is a treaty for defense against both open armed attack and internal subversion. Included in the treaty is an understanding on behalf of the United States that the only armed attack in the treaty area which the United States would regard as necessarily dangerous to our peace and security would be a Communist armed attack. The treaty calls for economic cooperation to enable the free countries of this area to gain strength and vigor not only militarily but also socially and economically.

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty complements our other security treaties in the Pacific and constitutes an important link in the collective security of the free nations of Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the treaty and protocol submitted herewith, and advise and consent to the ratification thereof subject to the understanding of the United States contained in the treaty.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

¹ Reprinted from S. Exec. K, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.

² For text of treaty and protocol and of the Pacific Charter, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

REPORT BY SECRETARY DULLES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 2, 1954.

THE PRESIDENT,

The White House:

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to the transmission thereof to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, a copy of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the protocol thereto, both signed at Manila September 8, 1954. There is also transmitted, for the information of the Senate, a copy of the Pacific Charter signed and proclaimed at Manila on the same date. The charter is a declaration of principles and does not require the advice and consent of the Senate.

At your request Senator H. Alexander Smith and Senator Michael J. Mansfield of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accompanied me to the Manila Conference as plenipotentiary delegates and signed, with me, the treaty, the protocol, and the Pacific Charter. I am greatly indebted to the contributions which they made to the successful negotiation of these instruments. This treaty is one in which the Executive and the Senate, through both political parties, cooperated all along the way.

The purpose of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is the creation of unity for security and peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific. Eight nations—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—participated in the negotiation as free and equal partners. It is a treaty for collective defense against both open armed attack and internal subversion. Although the United States has no direct territorial interest in Southeast Asia, we have much in common with the people and governments of this area and are united in the face of a common danger that stems from international communism.

As I stated in my address to the Nation on September 15,³ the unity envisaged by the treaty is something that the United States has long sought. In 1951, on behalf of the preceding administration, I negotiated security treaties with Australia and New Zealand, with the Republic of the Philippines, and with Japan. Since then a mutual de-

fense treaty with Korea has also been concluded, subject to exchange of instruments of ratification. Each of these treaties has a continuing role in the development of a Pacific security system, and each contemplated the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.

Like the earlier treaties, the Manila Pact is in full conformity with the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and is based on article 51, which recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. It is directed against no government, against no nation, and against no peoples.

The treaty consists of a preamble and 11 articles. The preamble sets forth the spirit and purposes of the treaty. It recognizes the sovereign equality of all the parties and reiterates their faith in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. Reaffirming the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, it declares the intention of the parties to strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of those countries whose people desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. Declaring publicly and formally their sense of unity, the parties give warning to any potential aggressor that they stand together in the area. The preamble expresses also the fundamental purpose of the treaty, i. e. the further coordination of efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security.

Article I contains undertakings similar to those in comparable articles of other security treaties. By its terms the parties reaffirm their solemn obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle by peaceful means any international disputes in which they may be involved, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. All of the parties to the treaty are members of the United Nations.

Article II incorporates in the treaty the principle of the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.), which requires that regional and collective security arrangements joined in by the United States be based on continuous self-help and mutual aid. The parties pledge themselves by such means not only to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack but also to prevent and counter sub-

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1954, p. 431.

versive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability. The treaty thus recognizes the danger of subversion and indirect aggression, which as we are keenly aware have been principal tools of international communism.

Article III recognizes the importance of free institutions and sound economies in achieving the objectives of peace and security. It is based on the realization that the opportunities of communism will diminish if through economic cooperation the free nations are able to develop their internal stability. The parties agree to cooperate in promoting economic progress and social well-being. This article does not commit the United States to any grant program. However, as I stated in my address of September 15, Congress had the vision to see this year that there might be special needs in Southeast Asia. By the Mutual Security Act, Congress has already provided certain funds which may be used to assist the free governments of Southeast Asia.

The article builds no economic walls against countries or territories not parties to the treaty. While a special relationship ought to prevail as between those countries which together assume serious commitments, the treaty countries are fully aware of the importance from an economic standpoint of such nations as Japan, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India, Formosa, and other areas in the Far East and South Asia area. Article III does not preclude our continued economic cooperation with these and other countries whose economic welfare is deemed important to the stability of the treaty area as well as to our own well-being.

Article IV contains some of the most important provisions of the treaty. It sets forth the measures by which the parties agree to take action against armed aggression and against the danger of subversion and indirect aggression.

Under paragraph 1 of that article each of the parties recognizes that—

aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

That language is based upon the Monroe Doctrine principle and follows the pattern of other United States security treaties in the Pacific. Each party

recognizes in article IV, paragraph 1, that the armed attack referred to therein would be dangerous to its own peace and safety.

In the case of the United States, only a Communist armed attack can bring that treaty provision into operation. The understanding of the United States in this respect is embodied in the treaty itself. It reads as follows:

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

This understanding reflects the special position of the United States as the only one of the signatories which does not have any territory in the treaty area. For the other signatories the treaty deals with any and all acts of aggression which might disturb the peace of the area. For the United States, however, it is expressly stipulated that the only armed attack which the United States would regard as necessarily dangerous to our peace and security would be a Communist armed attack. Recognition that Communist armed aggression in Southeast Asia would in fact endanger the peace and security of the United States, and call for counteraction by the United States, is based on the realization that the spread of international communism poses a threat to the United States as it does to the entire free world.

The language of paragraph 1 also provides for designation, by unanimous agreement, of other states or territories an armed attack against which will result in bringing certain of the treaty provisions into operation. I recommend that you inform the Senate that this provision is to be interpreted as requiring the advice and consent of the United States Senate to any agreement making such a designation.

The agreement of each of the parties to act to meet the common danger "in accordance with its constitutional processes" leaves to the judgment of each country the type of action to be taken in the event an armed attack occurs. There is, of course, a wide range of defensive measures which might be appropriate depending upon the circumstances. Any action which the United States might take would, of course, be in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Provision is made in the final sentence of the paragraph for reporting the measures taken against armed aggression to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the obligation of the parties under article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The danger from subversion and indirect aggression is dealt with in paragraph 2 of article IV, which meets this difficult problem more explicitly than any other security treaty we have made. It provides for immediate consultation by the parties whenever any party believes that the integrity of the treaty area is threatened by other than armed attack. The threat may be to the territorial inviolability or integrity, or to the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area or any other state or territory to which paragraph 1 of the article may from time to time apply. The paragraph contains no obligation beyond consultation, but the purpose of consultation is to agree on measures to be taken for the common defense. In its understanding with reference to article IV, paragraph 1, the United States affirms that in the event of any aggression or armed attack other than Communist aggression it will observe the consultation provisions of article IV, paragraph 2.

Paragraph 3 affirms the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples proclaimed by the treaty signatories in the Pacific Charter. It states the understanding of the parties that, except at the invitation or consent of the government concerned, no action shall be taken on the territory of any state designated under paragraph 1 or on any territory so designated.

To facilitate implementation of the treaty, article V establishes a Council, on which each party is to be represented. The Council will provide for consultation with regard to military and other planning as the changing situation in the treaty area may require.

No material changes in the military planning of the United States will be required by our participation in the Council. At present, United States plans call for maintaining at all times powerful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing. As I explained at the Manila Conference, the responsibilities of the United States are so vast and farflung that we believe we would serve best not by earmarking forces

for particular areas of the Far East but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power plus strategically placed reserves.⁴ The Conference accepted that viewpoint, recognizing that the deterrent power we thus create can protect many as effectively as it protects one. However, other treaty members may deem it desirable to make their contribution toward strengthening the defense of the area by specific force commitments for that purpose.

Article VI makes clear that the obligations of the parties under the treaty do not affect in any way their obligations under the United Nations Charter. It recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. Each party declares that it has no existing international obligations in conflict with the treaty and undertakes not to enter into any international engagements in conflict with it.

Article VII takes into account that not all countries whose interests now or in the future may be bound up with the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty are in a position to become parties at this time. It accordingly provides that the parties, by unanimous agreement, may invite any other state in a position to further the objectives of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the area, to accede to the treaty at a later date. I recommend that this article be interpreted as requiring the advice and consent of the Senate for the United States to join in the "unanimous agreement" required for the invitation of new parties.

Article VIII defines the "treaty area" as the general area of Southeast Asia, including the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. Provision is made for amendment of the treaty area by unanimous agreement. On the part of the United States, I recommend that Senate advice and consent be required for such agreement.

Article IX assigns to the Republic of the Philippines the customary duties as depositary of the treaty. Paragraph 2 provides that the treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The association of the

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 391.

United States in collective arrangements "by constitutional process" was recommended by the Vandenberg resolution and has been the basis for all of our security treaties.

Paragraph 3 of article IX provides that deposit of ratifications by a majority of the signatories shall bring the treaty into force between the states which have ratified it. With respect to each other state it shall come into force on the date of deposit of its ratification.

According to article X the treaty has indefinite duration, but any party may cease to be a party 1 year after its notice of denunciation has been given. It is hoped that the cooperation for peace and security which is the objective of this treaty will be permanent. However, since the conditions in the treaty area are subject to fluctuation, a flexible provision in respect to duration seems desirable.

Article XI is a formal article regarding the authentic language texts of the treaty.

The protocol extends the benefits of articles III and IV to the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam. The Indochina situation was considered by some of the treaty signatories as creating obstacles to these three countries becoming actual parties to the treaty at the present time. By designating them as states or territories for the purposes of article IV, the protocol assures that armed attack or indirect aggression against Cambodia, Laos, or the territory under Vietnamese jurisdiction will bring into operation the obligations of the parties under that article. It thus throws over those new nations a certain mantle of protection. The protocol also extends to those countries eligibility in respect of the economic measures, including technical assistance, contemplated by article III. It thus recognizes that economic progress and social well-being in these areas are essential to the

economic welfare of the whole area and a vital force in combating the opportunities of communism.

In addition to the treaty and protocol, there was also drawn up and signed at the Manila Conference a declaration known as the Pacific Charter. The charter was the idea of President Magsaysay of the Republic of the Philippines, who emphasized the importance of making clear that the treaty signatories were seeking the welfare of the Asian peoples and were not promoting "colonialism." As I said in my opening address to the Conference, one of communism's most effective weapons is to pretend that the Western Powers are seeking to impose colonialism on the Asian people. I said then that we must make abundantly clear our intention to invigorate independence.

The Pacific Charter proclaims certain basic principles in relation to the right of peoples to self-determination, self-government, and independence. It dedicates all the signatories to uphold these principles for all countries whose people desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. In the Pacific Charter the West and the East have joined in a pledge of fellowship that supports and invigorates the basic principles which underlie the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and protocol.

In view of the importance of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and protocol as a deterrent to Communist and other aggression and as a bulwark in the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific area, it is hoped that the treaty including the understanding of the United States contained therein, together with the protocol, will be given early and favorable consideration by the Senate.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

Weather Service for International Civil Aviation

SIMULTANEOUS SESSION OF THE COMMISSION FOR AERONAUTICAL METEOROLOGY AND THE METEOROLOGY DIVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, MONTREAL, JUNE-JULY 1954

by Delbert M. Little

The safe, regular, and efficient operation of a worldwide network of international air routes by air carriers of the United States and other nations necessitates international standardization of procedures for supplying weather information for such operations and periodical consultation between states in regard to their common problems arising from the needs of this continually developing mode of transportation.

Weather information is just as essential for modern high-speed aircraft operating at high levels as it was for the earlier types of aircraft. As new aircraft are developed and introduced into civil operation, the character of the weather service required for the successful commercial operation of civil air transportation changes, but the requirement for service persists and, in fact, creates more difficult problems for national weather services. Coupled with the much greater frequency of flights, which itself creates special problems of meteorological workload at the various international aerodromes, there is naturally a constant demand from operators for more accurate and detailed information which will enable their improved equipment to be utilized with maximum efficiency, e. g. by making landings as a routine under weather conditions which had to be regarded as marginal or worse with earlier equipment. The introduction of jet aircraft, operating at very high speeds, at levels for which meteorologists have very little data imposes stringent requirements in regard to the speed at which information is to be developed and supplied and thus creates further problems for the aviation meteorologist.

An aircraft is unaware of the existence of frontiers. Its operational characteristics remain the same whether it is taking off from a U.S. international aerodrome or from an aerodrome in an "underdeveloped" country thousands of miles away, and it requires the same weather data, supplied in the same form, from both places. The problems associated with the provision of weather service to civil aircraft are therefore truly international in character and can be resolved only through the machinery of international conferences, where the various administrations can pool their experiences. In consultation with the representatives of operators, they can evolve procedures which are internationally agreed as both practicable and adequate to meet aeronautical requirements and can formulate agreed programs for the solution of technical problems so far unresolved.

The first attempt to organize international study of the problems of weather service for international civil aviation and the development of internationally agreed procedures for supplying such service was made by the former International Meteorological Organization, a nongovernmental association of directors of national weather services. This organization established an International Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology, which developed, in 1939, "General Regulations for the Meteorological Protection of International Air Navigation." During World War II, there was considerable development of aviation, par-

ticularly of long distance and transoceanic flying, and, when the International Civil Aviation Organization was provisionally established in 1944, it undertook the revision of the existing regulations of the International Meteorological Organization.

When the Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology resumed activity in 1946 after the cessation of hostilities, it was agreed that the further development of the international regulations should be a joint undertaking of both the ICAO and IMO and that the Meteorological Division of ICAO, the representative body of that organization primarily concerned with aviation meteorological problems, should meet simultaneously with the CAeM of IMO as necessary to discuss such development and associated technical problems. Two such simultaneous sessions were held in 1947 and 1950 and resulted in the promulgation by ICAO and IMO of joint "Specifications for Meteorological Services for International Air Navigation," together with a large number of recommendations addressed to the respective members of the two organizations designed to further the development of improved methods for supplying weather service for international civil aviation.

Formation of WMO

In 1951 the World Meteorological Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations, replaced the former IMO. This organization established a Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology (CAeM) to continue work on the lines of the former Commission of the IMO. The ICAO and WMO agreed that the machinery of simultaneous sessions of the two constituent bodies should be continued, together with the arrangements for joint promulgation of international standards and recommended practices in regard to the provision of meteorological service and joint development of recommendations to their respective members in regard to aviation meteorological matters.

The first such simultaneous session of the two bodies, constituting the First Session of the CAeM of WMO and the Fourth Session of the Meteorology Division of ICAO, was held in the ICAO headquarters at Montreal from June 15 to July 14, 1954, by invitation of the Council of ICAO. The following states and territories were represented at the conference, in their capacities as members of one or both of the two organizations:

Australia	Ireland
Belgium	Italy
Brazil	Lebanon
British Caribbean Territories	Netherlands
British West African Territories	New Zealand
Burma	Norway
Canada	Portugal
Denmark	Spain
Dominican Republic	Sweden
Egypt	Switzerland
Federal Republic of Germany	Syria
France	Thailand
India	United Kingdom
Iran	United States
	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Observers representing the following three non-governmental international organizations participated in the conference:

International Airline Navigators' Council
International Air Transport Association
International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Association

The United States was represented by the following delegation:

D. M. Little, Chairman and delegate
A. H. Nagle, Vice Chairman and delegate
Capt. J. R. Abbott, Alternate delegate
W. L. Halnon, Alternate delegate
Maj. C. D. McCarty, Alternate delegate
L. Harmantas, Alternate delegate
N. E. Johnson, Alternate delegate
J. M. Bowman, Alternate adviser

Although the major portion of the work was done in simultaneous meetings of the two bodies, the CAeM, with the agreement of ICAO, held several separate meetings to deal with matters not on the agenda for the simultaneous meetings. As a result of the discussions in these separate meetings, the Commission arranged for the drafting, or recommended publication by WMO, of manuals on aerodrome meteorological office practice, meteorological observing and reporting duties at aerodromes, and meteorological observing in aircraft and also arranged for the preparation of guidance material on meteorological aircraft reconnaissance observing techniques. The publication of such manuals by the WMO is regarded as an important step toward the raising of the level of meteorological service to international civil aviation. It will make available, in a practical form, to new mete-

orological services, or services still in the course of development, the know-how and experience of larger and more developed services and provide a means of insuring that the international requirements as regards weather service for aviation, specified by the Wmo and Icao, are met in the most effective manner.

The Commission also recommended, for promulgation by the Wmo, comprehensive recommended standards for the qualifications and training of meteorological personnel employed in the application of meteorology to aeronautics, again with the object of insuring the provision of an adequate level of aviation information to air carriers of the United States and other nations. It also reviewed the meteorological training specified for aeronautical personnel (pilots, navigators, etc.) and recommended certain improvements in the prescribed curriculum for consideration by Icao.

The Commission further recommended the provisional international adoption of the code for reporting of sea ice by aircraft provisionally used by U.S. aircraft on sea-ice reconnaissance. It also reviewed the organization of Wmo and its possible future work program, from the point of view of the advancement of aviation meteorology, and made a number of suggestions for consideration at the Second Congress of Wmo (1955).

Work of the Simultaneous Session

The agenda for the simultaneous session, which was the predominant activity, covered a wide field. The major item, from the organizational aspect, was the revision of the Icao-Imo "Specifications for Meteorological Services for International Air Navigation" to bring them up-to-date and to put them in a form suitable for promulgation both by Icao, as an annex to the Convention for International Civil Aviation and "Procedures for Air Navigation Services—Meteorology," and by Wmo, as the Wmo Technical Regulations for Aviation Meteorology, the object being to arrive at joint texts which would serve both purposes.

The work of the simultaneous session was divided between two committees, each of which was broken up into two subcommittees, as follows:

- Subcommittee A-1: Dealt with the development of the texts referred to above.
- Subcommittee A-2: Reviewed the figure codes and forms of plain-language mes-

sage employed in aeronautical meteorology for communication of meteorological information by radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony, and developed requirements for certain new codes and observing practices.

Subcommittee B-1: Dealt with special technical problems such as the development of methods of providing service for high-speed, high-level jet operations, clear air turbulence, ice-accretion on aircraft, pressure-pattern navigation, and the use of airborne radar equipment for giving meteorological warnings to aircraft. It also examined the problem of improving observing networks, including the utilization of automatic weather stations, observations of atmospheric electrical discharges, and ground radar.

Subcommittee B-2: Made a thorough study of the aeronautical requirements for climatological statistics and climatological studies and developed proposed regulations and models for such summaries and studies, discussed the difficult problem of improving the supply of meteorological personnel for employment at international aerodromes, revised the training material used by Icao technical assistance missions, and dealt with other matters in connection with Icao publications.

The results of the work of the simultaneous session are contained in 69 recommendations made by the CAeM and the Meteorology Division either to Icao, to Wmo, or to both organizations.

Three of these deal with the review of the Imo-Icao "Specifications for Meteorological Services for International Air Navigation" and their re-

casting, in part, as a new annex 3 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Organization and as Icao "Procedures for Air Navigation Services—Meteorology," this material to be promulgated also by Wmo, as part of its Technical Regulations and, in part, as supplementary material promulgated by Wmo alone. A complete draft of the annex material was prepared.

Time did not permit of more than the preparation of a draft revision of the remainder of the "Specifications" material; the completion of this draft (and the separation of it into PANS-MET material and material to be promulgated by Wmo only) was delegated to the Icao Secretariat and the President of the Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology. All of the material referred to above will shortly be circulated to contracting states of Icao and members of the Wmo for comment, and a final revision will be made early in 1955 by the Icao Air Navigation Commission, in consultation with Wmo, for submission to top levels in Icao and Wmo for formal approval.

Needs of High-Level Aircraft

In drafting the procedures material referred to above, account was taken of the requirements of the high-speed, high-level aircraft which will be operating on international civil air routes in the near future, but it was considered that additional measures were necessary to insure efficient service to such aircraft. Recommendations were adopted stressing the need for regular upper-air observations up to at least the 100-mb. level and for eventual standardization of levels for which high-level charts should be prepared; outlining the requirements of a high-level forecast code; and calling for the establishment of special high-level forecast centers and for a sufficiently rapid system for communicating essential meteorological information to such aircraft in flight.

Attention was drawn to the need for further study and exchanges of view concerning jet streams and high-level forecasting problems in general. The preparation of a series of upper-wind and temperature charts covering the whole

world was also proposed. The issuance by the Wmo of manuals or monographs on the jet stream, automatic weather stations, sferics (atmospheric discharges), mountain waves, and the use of ground-weather radar was recommended. Studies of the methods of determining mean winds over a route and of calculating flight time (Icao), of the differences between winds computed by different meteorological offices (Wmo), and of a variety of other subjects were also proposed.

A number of the recommendations deal with the question of atmospheric turbulence. The necessity for more study and research on turbulence was stressed, and intensification of the cooperative investigation of clear-air, high-level turbulence, initiated in 1951, under which states send all reports of such turbulence encountered by aircraft to the U.S. Weather Bureau for study and investigation, was called for. A special study was made of gust structure, aimed at developing a specification of gusts which will adequately reflect the parameters which influence the controllability of aircraft during landing. The need for improved ice-measuring equipment for aircraft and for further study of the ice-accretion problem was emphasized in other recommendations.

Considerable attention was given to the question of improving meteorological observation networks on a worldwide basis, and guidance was given, in a number of recommendations, to Icao and Wmo regional bodies concerned with this problem, which it is hoped will result in improvement of the present situation.

The variety of subjects covered in these 69 recommendations is illustrative of the continuing close interlocking of meteorology and aviation and of the important role of weather service in facilitation of safety and efficiency in civil air transportation.

• *Mr. Little, author of the above article, is Assistant Chief (Administration) of the Weather Bureau and served as Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the simultaneous session of the Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology of the WMO and the Meteorology Division of ICAO.*

Continuation of Debate on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Following are the texts of statements made on November 8, 12, and 15 in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representatives Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and C. D. Jackson during the debate on the joint draft resolution relating to atomic energy.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE

U.S. delegation press release 2012 dated November 8

I am obliged to you for your courtesy and for that of the other members whose names are inscribed, and I shall only take 2 minutes. I would like to do so to clear up the points which were raised by the Representative of the Soviet Union this morning.¹ I'd like to do so one by one.

He asked why the present United States proposal, to use his words, "narrows down the volume and scope of economic assistance." Mr. Chairman, the United States proposal does not have that effect. The United States has no policy to reduce technical assistance but, as the President has made clear, to increase it. We are anxious that the abundant electric resources which can be developed as a result of atomic energy be realized as rapidly as possible. We must, however, sound a note of caution against any idea that we shall wake up tomorrow with those abundant resources actually in existence.

The Soviet Representative then spoke about the relationship of the international agency to the General Assembly and the Security Council. When the agency is set up, presumably the agreement between it and the United Nations will work out any relationship that may be desirable or necessary to the General Assembly and the Security

Council. We may perhaps be forgiven for hoping and for expecting that it will not be a relationship in which the Security Council veto paralyzes the agency.

The Soviet Representative referred to my statement that in the near future the international agency would be able to carry out only part of the work which it ultimately will carry out, the part which would be most suitable. My statement on this matter was entirely clear, and in all candor, Mr. Chairman, I think it was entirely honest. For example, I outlined the training courses which the United States is developing. It will be impossible for the United Nations agency in its first year to work out as elaborate a program of training as that. If we turned over the full matter of training to the international agency in its first year, it would turn out that we would have no training either by the agency or by the United States. The same holds true as to other programs which the agency will ultimately carry out. There is so much to be done that it will be a number of years before the agency is able to carry out fully the programs which we visualize for it. We do not expect the agency to develop from birth to adolescence and full maturity in 1 month or even 6 months.

Then, Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Representative asked what measures we propose to take to reduce the potential destructive force of world atomic energy. This is basically a disarmament problem, and we have just unanimously agreed to a procedure for dealing with this problem by the Disarmament Commission.² President Eisenhower made it clear last December that his proposal was not a disarmament proposal. He hoped, however, that this experiment in international cooperation would make it easier to make genuine

¹ Andrei Vyshinsky spoke on Nov. 8 in reply to Ambassador Lodge's opening statement of Nov. 5; for text of the latter and of the joint draft resolution, see BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 742.

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 664, and Nov. 15, 1954, p. 750.

progress in reaching agreement on disarmament.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is pleasing to hear the Representative of the Soviet Union say that I was wrong in claiming that the Soviet attitude is essentially negative, which are the two words that I used. He can prove me wrong by supporting the pending resolution, and I hope he will do so. He can also prove me wrong by starting to negotiate, and I hope he will do that too.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE

U.S. delegation press release 2021 dated November 12

I just wish to make a few brief remarks now, because on Monday, [November 15], or whenever the next meeting is, I will, of course, reply in extenso to all the points that have been raised by the Representative of the Soviet Union. What I am about to say now is not to be considered as a definitive reply to him. Moreover, at the next meeting, I will ask Mr. C. D. Jackson of New York, who is a delegate of the United States of America at this General Assembly, also to make some observations, and we will do so completely and I think with clarity and candor.

I would like to say now that the Soviet Representative appears to be concerned about support of this proposed program by the United States Congress and also by resistance from the American businessman. He should really set his mind at rest. When President Eisenhower made his proposal last December, we may be sure he took all these factors into account. As a matter of fact, far from opposition or delay in the Congress, this body at its last session, at the request of President Eisenhower, amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to have the law conform to the proposal which President Eisenhower made. The amendments which the Congress made are what make possible our making available materials and information outside of the country. There is also no evidence of any resistance from the business community in this country.

I am constrained to observe that once again the Soviet Representative has used press articles as sacred evidence of our official policy. It is a thing that he does very often. He did it again today. And once again I must point out that we have a free press in America which speaks for itself and not for the Government.

Let me add also what is obvious, I am sure, to

all of you, that this is not a disarmament proposal. There is no country in the world that is more eager for disarmament than the United States, and we have proved it on every occasion. The disarmament issue was in this Committee a little while ago, and it was referred to the Disarmament Commission, which is the expert body created just for that purpose. And no one can say that this Assembly has been indifferent to the question of disarmament. But to complain that this proposal for the peaceful uses of atomic energy is not a disarmament proposal is just like complaining because the man who grows your food, let us say, out on the farm, isn't also the same man who builds your house. They are two different things.

Also, we have not said that we refused to have any connection with the Security Council. I remember what I did say. I said that I might be forgiven the hope that this matter would not get bogged down in the veto. I did say that. And I still do hope that. Frankly, I take no joy in the veto. If the Soviet Representative gets any delight out of the veto, he is entitled to it. He has it heaped up and overflowing. He has used it 60 times. We have never used it at all. It is the veto that has atrophied and paralyzed the legal power of this organization. It hasn't destroyed the organization because the organization has become an extremely powerful engine for affecting world public opinion. So the organization is very important. It is certainly the Soviet veto that has paralyzed the legal power of it. To say that the veto is the motor of the Security Council—I don't understand Russian, but that's the translation I got over these earphones—that the veto was the motor, if you please—if that is the motor, then the motor is stalled.

Let me repeat what we said at the beginning. We want to do this thing—do it and not get bogged down in vetoes, not get entangled up in parliamentary devices. A great deal of the speech that we have just heard was, I think, what the French call “la poudre aux yeux”—a magnificent display of forensic fireworks but very little substance to them, which I think we shall be able to show after we have examined the speech in detail and responded to it throughout.

The Soviet Representative's remarks about alleged changes in our proposal are particularly remarkable when you consider that his Government has had 10 long months in which to accept the

original wording. Today he is criticizing the new wording because it is not old. When it is old, I suppose he would be criticizing it because it wasn't new. Really, this would be amusing if it were not tragic to hear this very evident plan to delay and delay and delay.

What does the Soviet Union want? What will the Soviet Union accept? What will your Government give that will come anywhere near matching what we have offered? I think those are fair questions.

I am glad, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Representative said that he was warmly supporting the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. I hope this means that he isn't merely supporting their development inside of the Soviet Union. I hope this means that he will vote for the pending resolution and make the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy available to the whole world.

STATEMENT BY C. D. JACKSON

U.S. delegation press release 2022 dated November 15

I greatly appreciate the honor of being able to address this important Committee on this important subject.

I also appreciate the generosity of the Chief of the United States delegation, Ambassador Lodge, for asking me to participate in this historic debate.

Needless to say, I am not a scientist; I am not even an expert in atomic matters. I am just an American who was privileged during 1953 and 1954 to work with the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission on the evolution of United States thinking on the subject of "Atoms for Peace."

Therefore, I would like to address myself today to the particular point in Mr. Vyshinsky's speech of last Friday [November 12] which I feel is within my terms of reference. That is the point in which he assumes he knows what has gone on in the minds of the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of "Atoms for Peace."

Last Monday [November 8] Mr. Vyshinsky asked—"Can you tell us why it is that the present United States proposal for the organization of international cooperation in developing peaceful

uses of atomic energy *narrows down* the volume, scope, and form of such cooperation as compared to previous proposals, and especially in relation to the technical and economic assistance to be offered underdeveloped countries?"

On the basis of my special knowledge of this area, I can say that the objectives of the United States today, November 15, are the same as they were on November 5, 1954, when Ambassador Lodge spoke before this Committee; are the same as on September 23, 1954, when Secretary of State Dulles spoke before the General Assembly; are the same as on March 19, 1954, when Secretary Dulles delivered a memorandum to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington; and are the same as on December 8, 1953, when President Eisenhower addressed the Eighth General Assembly.

But to leave the argument at that would simply be pitting my word against Mr. Vyshinsky's, and that is not the basis on which the argument should be left.

So let us take it out of the area of say-so and put it in the area of simple arithmetic.

The first item, the first figure, in the column is what President Eisenhower said last December 8, and I crave your indulgence for a fairly long quotation, because I know that it is important that the President's carefully thought-through statement should be presented in full context. I quote—

I therefore make the following proposals:

The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. . . .

Undoubtedly initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.

The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would

be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing—it would be proud to take up with others “principally involved” the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

Of those “principally involved” the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would:

First—encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had all the material needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate;

Second—begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles;

Third—allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war;

Fourth—open up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress toward peace.

Atomic Energy Act Amended

The second figure in the column was inscribed on August 30, 1954, when at the request of President Eisenhower the Congress of the United States amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to permit the United States to share this priceless boon in accordance with the President’s proposal.

Then I would like to add the next figure to the column—from the speech by Secretary of State Dulles before the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23, 1954. And I quote—

The United States remains ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union. But we shall no longer suspend our efforts to establish an international atomic agency.

The United States is determined that President Eisenhower’s proposal shall not languish until it dies. It will be nurtured and developed. We shall press on in close partnership with those nations which, inspired by the ideals of the United Nations Charter, can make this great new force a tool of the humanitarian and of the statesman, and not merely a fearsome addition to the arsenal of war.

The United States is proposing an agenda item which will enable us to report on our efforts to explore and develop the vast possibilities for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. These efforts have been and will be directed primarily toward the following ends:

(1) The creation of an international agency, whose initial membership will include nations from all regions of the world. It is hoped that such an agency will start its work as early as next year.

(2) The calling of an international scientific conference to consider this whole vast subject, to meet in the spring of 1955, under the auspices of the United Nations.

(3) The opening early next year, in the United States, of a reactor training school where students from abroad may learn the working principles of atomic energy with specific regard to its peacetime uses.

(4) The invitation to a substantial number of medical and surgical experts from abroad to participate in the work of our cancer hospitals—in which atomic energy techniques are among the most hopeful approaches to controlling this menace to mankind.

I would like to make perfectly clear that our planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As our proposals take shape, all nations interested in participating, and willing to take on the responsibilities of membership, will be welcome to join with us in the planning and execution of this program.

I would now like to add another figure to the column—namely, Ambassador Lodge’s speech before this Committee on November 5, 1954, in which Ambassador Lodge added to what had been said by the President and by the Secretary of State the following very specific contributions by the United States:

1. The establishment, early in 1955, of a reactor training school, to instruct between 30 and 50 scientists and engineers from overseas in the theory of atomic power and the application of that theory for the production of electrical power.
2. The establishment, in 1955, under the auspices of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, of courses in industrial medicine, industrial hygiene, radiological physics, and the theory and use of radiation instruments.
3. Opening our atomic biology and medical centers in 1955 to foreign students for courses in these subjects.
4. Inviting cancer specialists from all over the world to visit, inspect, study, confer, and advise on the application of atomic energy to the cure of cancer.
5. The establishment in 1955 of special courses for foreign students, under the sponsorship of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in the vast field of radioisotope tracer techniques in industry, agriculture, and medicine.

6. Offering complete cumulative atomic libraries to requesting nations.
7. Endorsing and supporting in 1955 an international scientific conference on atomic energy, to study and ascertain the fields, areas, and nations where this boon can be of earliest value.
8. The reiteration of the desire of the United States for the creation of an international atomic energy agency under the aegis of the United Nations.

If a line is drawn under this column of figures and the total added, how can any United Nations representative of good will state that the present United States proposal *narrows down* the volume, scope, and form of the United States proposal? Is it not superabundantly clear that each one of these events, far from narrowing the scope of the original proposal, added to and elaborated upon its predecessor?

Change of Method Adopted

There has been a *change* in the proposal—but a change of *method*, not of scope—a change deliberately adopted by the United States and its associates in order to speed up the implementation of the proposal after 10 months of silence from the Soviet Union.

The change is very simple.

The President's plan, presented last December, called for a United Nations agency which would have the responsibility for the *physical custody* and the *protection* of an international pool of fissionable material. And in this connection I would recall one important sentence spoken by President Eisenhower—"Of those 'principally involved', the Soviet Union must, of course, be one." During the past 10 months, the Soviet Union—however "warm" its "approval" of the President's proposal—proved itself unwilling to be the very important "one."

Therefore, the United States, consulting with the other nations willing and eager to participate, realized that the bricks, and steel, and concrete, and real estate, and scientists, and technicians, and instruments, and workers, and guards required to set up and maintain the physical custody of the fissionable material would not only entail a great delay in getting the plan into operation but would also be needlessly expensive to the United Nations. These producing and processing nations do not

feel they need this complicated and expensive machinery, and they can move faster without it.

So instead, the international agency is now proposed as a clearinghouse to receive, study, and supervise the exchange between those who want and those who want to give.

I cannot conceive how this subtracts anything from the grand total enumerated earlier. Actually it adds to the column in terms of time and economy.

I was greatly interested last Friday to hear Mr. Vyshinsky detail for us the contributions of Russian scientists to the discovery and development of atomic power. We would not only be the last to deny the tremendous international scientific contributions in this field, but also I thought that we had made this point extremely clear.

However, in his dissertation, Mr. Vyshinsky failed to mention a Russian scientist for whom the United States not only has a profound scientific respect, but also a scientist whose theories Mr. Vyshinsky has very skillfully proved time and time again. I refer to the great Dr. Pavlov—the man who gave us the conditioned reflex, and proved it with a dog, a bell, and a bowl of food. By the time Dr. Pavlov had perfected his experiment, the bell rang, the dog drooled saliva, but there was no food.

In a very interesting way, Mr. Vyshinsky repeats that famous experiment. He rings his oratorical bell—he raises all his pre-arranged doubts about the United States having "narrowed" its proposal—but there is no Soviet contribution to "Atoms for Peace."

As for my Government, I would ask you to consider the simple arithmetic of what the United States is prepared to offer to the world.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE

U.S. delegation press release 2023 dated November 15

During last week's valuable debate, some questions occurred. The first, I believe, was raised both by the Representative of the Soviet Union and the Representative of China. It asked whether the pending proposal was narrower than that of the President's of last December 8. This has been dealt with by my colleague Mr. Jackson.

Next, the Soviet Representative made an interesting statement concerning the past and present role of the Soviet Union in connection with

nuclear physics. His survey of the developments of peaceful uses of atomic energy in the Soviet Union seemed to stress Russian accomplishments prior to World War I. But it did point to the successful development of an electric power plant with a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts. We congratulate the Soviet Union on this achievement, although it is a long way from the building of a 5,000-kilowatt pilot plant to the achievement of abundant electrical power through the use of atomic fuel.

The status of Soviet atomic-power technology was described with commendable modesty in an article in the Soviet magazine *Communist* in April of this year, by A. Nesmeyanov, who said that Soviet scientists must strive "to make atomic energy available for extensive utilization in industry and in transport." Then the article continues: "The advancement of atomic energy into wide peaceful practice is undoubtedly a matter of a complete epoch."

Without going into the question of how long a "complete epoch" is, it can be set down that one of the ways to speed up the epoch of atomic industrial power is to broaden the exchange of information. We therefore express the hope that the Soviet Union will make public as soon as possible the design for its 5,000-kilowatt atomic power plant. We in the United States have published our designs for various power reactors, copies of which the Soviet Union surely already possesses. If the Soviet Union will put out similar publications, as I think General Romulo [of the Philippines] suggested, they will certainly interest us all and will facilitate international cooperation.

The Soviet Representative spoke also of other kinds of atomic progress, notably in the production and use of radioisotopes. It would be interesting to learn what the Soviet program is for exportation of these isotopes for the benefit of other countries.

As to membership in the agency, we still believe that the door should be left open so that all states can assume the responsibilities and secure the benefits of participation. Now we are accused by the Soviet Representative of seeking special privilege and engaging in exploitation. Let me say that the only "special privilege" we claim is the "privilege" of helping as many countries as we can in this field, and the only "exploitation" we have in mind is the "exploitation" of atomic energy for peace.

Agency's Relationship to U.N.

As to the agency's relationship to the United Nations, we have not changed our view that the agency should be under the aegis of the United Nations. As we have indicated in the joint resolution, we contemplate that an appropriate relationship with the United Nations will be worked out once the agency is established. As I said in my opening statement, it would not be practical to spell out the possible relationships at this time until we know better just exactly what the agency will look like when it comes into being. We agree with the Soviet Representative that the resolution to be passed by this Committee should not prejudge the nature of the relationship between the agency and the United Nations. We have not done so in our draft resolution. We agree with him that this is a matter which must be negotiated both among the states which will be forming the agency and between the agency, once it is established, and the United Nations. I shall deal later with the problem of the relationship of the agency to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Let us remember that here are eight nations who are intending to give up fissionable or raw materials which are exceedingly valuable both for the peacetime development of these nations and for their security. Every member of the legislative bodies of these countries, whether he sit in the Belgian Parliament or in the Canadian Parliament or in the French Assembly or in the Portuguese Government or in the Legislature of the Union of South Africa or in the House of Commons in London or in the United States Congress in Washington—every member of these bodies would be faithless to his trust if he did not scrutinize closely the treaty which will come before him. Many of you in this room have been members of legislative bodies. These are concerns which we understand and respect.

Also, the offer which we are making today is made possible by the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act which was enacted at the last session of Congress. This law broadens what we can do now over what we could have done last year. It was at their last session, for example, that Congress authorized us to share information and materials. Obviously, as a practical matter we must stay within the law.

I said on November 5 that the International Atomic Energy Agency would act as a clearing-house for requests for allocations of fissionable

materials to projects approved by the agency. The Soviet Representative interpreted my remarks as follows: "If plans or projects for the use of atomic materials to be cleared through the international agency from one state to another in accordance with agreement are made contingent on approval by the international agency, then that means that the international agency will have the right to approve or not approve the plans of states concerned in the use of fissionable materials for peaceful ends." That is not a correct interpretation of our proposal. The agency would concern itself only with fissionable materials specifically earmarked for agency projects by the contributing states. It would have no control over the use of any other fissionable material. Any contributing state would remain free to transfer fissionable materials to another state without securing the consent of the agency.

There are other problems. Many states, for example, will have interests in this organization and sometimes these interests will need to be harmonized. It will be difficult to negotiate and secure agreement upon even a simple organization. The more complicated the organization and the more intricate the negotiations, the longer will be the delay in spreading the benefits of atomic energy. The more we attempt here to fasten a fixed course onto these negotiations, the greater the danger that we shall create unnecessary and even insuperable obstacles in the way of rapid progress. We think that the best way, if not the only way, for us to render a service to the world in this field is to begin by simplifying the organization, by simplifying the negotiations, by concentrating on what is feasible—what is doable—by getting down to work with the least possible delay.

The Soviet Representative renewed his attempt to chain any progress in international cooperation in developing peaceful uses of the atom to concurrent progress in connection with a disarmament program, although he no longer insisted that other states must first agree on an unsafeguarded paper prohibition of the use of atomic weapons before his Government would join the negotiations in the field of peaceful uses.

President Eisenhower, last December, made it clear that, while his proposal was not a disarmament proposal, he recognized that agreement on it might bring peace nearer and thus bring disarmament nearer, because, of course, disarmament and

peace were not one and the same thing. The President hoped that his proposal would "open up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress toward peace."

This Committee does not need to be reminded of the importance of disarmament or of the vast physical and mental burdens it would lift. Still less do we need to be reminded, after 8 years' debate, how difficult it is to disarm when mutual trust is lacking.

Disarmament is one element in the building of peace. At least one other element is a new world outlook which may get us into the habit of working together and thus, eventually, in trusting each other. We think that this Atoms for Peace proposal will lead the world away from war because it is a new prism through which we can look at the problems of the world. It is a new place at which to begin.

We must therefore not bog down one proposal by tying it onto another. There already exists a separate framework for disarmament. We here propose a framework for the parallel discussions of the peaceful uses of the atom. We anticipate that genuine progress in either discussion will eventually facilitate progress in the other. We agree with the Representative of the Soviet Union when he says that the proposals of the March 19 memorandum³ do not, in themselves, result in the reduction of the potential force of atomic weapons. We agree with him on that. Neither do they increase it. But they would certainly result in economic and social benefits to many areas of the world. And we, in our partnership with the other negotiating powers, are determined that progress in making the atom available for peace shall not be further delayed.

The Soviet Representative contended that the exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful uses inevitably implies an increase in the supply of fissionable weapon-grade materials; that the non-dangerous materials diverted to peaceful uses could become dangerous; and that industrial reactors would produce radioactive effluents or by-products which could be used for military purposes. He thereby implied that the agreement for

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 480.

peaceful uses of atomic energy must include an agreement to eliminate atomic weapons. The distinguished Representative of Sweden⁴ also alluded to this problem. We believe, however, that it is not necessary to solve the entire problem of international control of atomic energy and the elimination of atomic weapons before we can have peaceful projects utilizing atomic fission consistent with international security.

Let me reaffirm the belief of the United States, as stated in the published correspondence with the Soviet Union contained in Document A/2738, that ways can be devised consistent with international security for developing the peaceful uses of the atom and for safeguarding against the diversion of materials to warlike purposes. For one thing, there are forms of peaceful utilization in which no question of weapon-grade material arises at all. In the activities proposed for the immediate future as described in my speech before this Assembly on November 5, for example, weapon-grade materials would not be involved in any way.

The problem of radioactive by-products suggested by the Soviet Representative can also be dealt with.

Interlocking Safeguards

As for insuring against diversion of materials from power-producing reactors, this problem is part of the general question of the various interlocking safeguards which are necessary to see to it that fissionable materials provided for or produced in connection with peaceful uses of atomic energy are utilized only for such purposes and are not diverted to improper uses. This is one problem which must be considered in the course of negotiations to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the various powers negotiating, particularly those actually producing fissionable materials, will obviously make clear their views on this matter. It is theoretically possible, as the Soviet Representative suggested, to build power reactors that will increase the supply of fissionable weapon-grade materials, but it is not inevitable. We believe that, as power-producing reactors are designed and built in the future, the ingenuity of the scientists and statesmen will find ways of assuring that materials are not diverted to warlike industries.

⁴ Rickard Sandler.

Remember that the spread of nuclear materials through the work of the international agency, for the purpose of establishing atomic power plants, would not in any degree complicate the problem of insuring the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. That problem already exists as a part of the disarmament question, and the great powers have been discussing it for years. The international control organ, when established, could function perfectly well in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency. But, in the meantime, we want to get on with the business of helping to bring atomic energy to the service of mankind. Nothing we do to this end need complicate the problem of disarmament control.

The Soviet Representative has also sought to link disarmament and the peaceful uses of the atom by insisting upon the paramount role of the Security Council in this field. The Security Council, under the charter, has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly likewise has responsibilities in this field. If a situation arises in connection with the peaceful uses of the atom in any country or group of countries which endangers international peace and security, it would be a matter of concern both to the Security Council and the General Assembly and would doubtless be dealt with by the United Nations as are other situations of this nature. Thus, it is possible and indeed probable that in the interests of international security there will be some relationship between the agency and the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

But the Soviet Representative harked back to the General Assembly resolution of February 14, 1946, creating the original United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, a body which no longer exists. This was the commission which was to make specific proposals for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes. Since the primary objective of this commission was to deal with atomic disarmament, the commission, of course, was to report and make recommendations to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. The Soviet Representative now seems to suggest that the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose functions will be wholly different, should be saddled

with the same requirement—and thus be made subject to the veto.

The truth is that the purpose which this defunct commission was designed to achieve has, by a recent resolution (and many other previous ones), been referred to the Disarmament Commission, which is the body to which the United Nations now looks for action on disarmament.

Questions have been asked by certain other members as to the nature of the participation of underdeveloped countries in the agency. I believe this was referred to in the speech by the Representative of Pakistan.⁵ The memorandum handed to the Soviet Ambassador by the Secretary of State on March 19 contained a provision that the highest executive authority in the agency should be exercised by a board of governors of limited membership representing governments. The memorandum went on to suggest that in determining the composition of the board of governors it might be desirable "to take account of geographic distribution and membership by prospective beneficiaries." In other words—and I stress this point—our plans contemplate representation on the agency's board of governors of the underdeveloped countries which will also be participating in the agency.

Another question relates to the participation in the agency of states other than those which are conducting the negotiations for its organization. The Secretary of State, in his opening address to this Assembly on September 23, made the United States position on this entirely clear. For example, he said:

I would like to make perfectly clear that our planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As our proposals take shape, all nations interested in participating, and willing to take on the responsibilities of membership, will be welcome to join with us in the planning and execution of this program.

That continues to be the United States position.

We have never contemplated a closed organization of contributing states. Nor have we contemplated confronting other governments with a *fait accompli* in the creation of this agency. As we have indicated in the seven-power resolution, we have undertaken to inform the members of the United Nations as progress is achieved in the establishment of the agency. Moreover, I can give a further assurance in this regard. The govern-

ments engaged in the current negotiations intend to consult those governments which indicate an interest in participating in the agency before the agreement establishing the agency is submitted for ratification. Views expressed by the governments so consulted will, of course, be seriously taken into account.

This, then, is our program. We want above all to find the quickest way to create this agency. That is what the seven-power resolution is designed to promote. We are pressing on with our negotiations on an urgent basis and ask nothing more than the cooperation and good will of other governments so that by the next session of the General Assembly we shall be able to discuss accomplishments and concrete results of international cooperation in putting the discoveries of atomic science at the service of man.

U.S. Offer of Fissionable Material

Now, Mr. Chairman, just as I began this prepared statement which I have just concluded, I received a message from Washington, the substance of which I now lay before you. I hope it will once and for all remove from the minds of all any confusion as to how specific the United States Atoms for Peace proposal is, whether or not the scope of our proposal has been narrowed. Here is the message.

I have just been authorized by the President of the United States to state to you that the Atomic Energy Commission has allocated 100 kilograms of fissionable material to serve as fuel in the experimental atomic reactors to which the Secretary of State and I have previously referred and which are to be situated in various places abroad. This amount of fissionable material is enough to activate a considerable number of these reactors throughout the world.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Governing Body of International Labor Office

The Department of State announced on November 10 (press release 635) that the United States would be represented at the 127th session of the Governing Body of the International Labor Of-

⁵ Mohammad Mir Khan.

fice, opening at Rome, Italy, on November 16, by the following delegation:

U.S. Government representative

J. Ernest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Department of Labor

U.S. Government substitute representative

Arnold Zempel, Executive Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

U.S. Government adviser

Otis E. Milliken, Officer in Charge of Social Affairs, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

The Governing Body, which meets three or four times a year, is responsible for the general supervision of the International Labor Organization (ILO). It also selects items for the agenda of the International Labor Conference, considers proposals relating to the Organization's budget, and determines the time, place, and agenda of ILO committee meetings and regional conferences.

At its 127th session, the Governing Body will review the reports of its committees; receive the report of the Director General; determine the date, place, and agenda of the 39th (1956) session of the International Labor Conference; and discuss other related matters.

General Conference of UNESCO

The Department of State announced on November 11 (press release 639) the membership of the U.S. delegation to the eighth session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at Montevideo, Uruguay, from November 12 to December 11. Delegates from the 72 member states of this specialized agency of the United Nations will attend the General Conference, where decisions will be made on UNESCO's biennial program and budget for 1955-56.

The U.S. delegation consists of the following:

Acting U.S. representatives

Albert F. Nufer, *Chairman*, American Ambassador to Argentina

Samuel M. Brownell, *Vice Chairman*, U.S. Commissioner of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Elizabeth E. Heffelfinger, member, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Wayzata, Minn.

Athelstan F. Spilhaus, Dean, Institute of Technology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.

Congressional adviser

Hugh Scott, U.S. House of Representatives

Principal adviser

Walter M. Kotschal, Director, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

Robert C. Angell, Chairman, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

John D. Connors, Director, Department of Education, American Federation of Labor, Washington, D. C.

Ralph W. Hurdy, Vice President, National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, Washington, D. C.

Henry R. Hope, Chairman, Fine Arts Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.

David E. Kaufman, Attorney at Law, Philadelphia, Pa.

Carol C. Laise, Department of State

Guy A. Lee, Department of State

Max McCullough, Executive Secretary, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO; Director, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State

Charles R. Norberg, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.

David Persinger, Department of State

James Simsarian, Department of State

Francis B. Stevens, Department of State

Edward G. Truellood, Counselor, American Embassy, Montevideo, Uruguay

Hoyt N. Ware, American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Argentina

One of the major questions to come before the General Conference will be a proposal to remodel UNESCO's extensive programs in the fields of education, natural and social sciences, the arts, humanities, and mass communication by channeling these activities into a limited number of special projects. The draft program submitted by the Director General and the Executive Board of UNESCO contemplates a reduction of the number of projects to be undertaken in the next 2 years, with a majority of these geared to specific short-term projects in the fields of fundamental education, compulsory education, public libraries, reading material for new literates, and research on the arid zones.

Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy, Inter-American Economic and Social Council

The Department of State announced on November 18 (press release 657) that Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey had been designated U.S. delegate and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy, convened as the Fourth Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, opening at Quitandinha, Brazil, on November 22.

International trade, economic development, transportation, and organizational problems will be among the matters discussed at the meeting.

Others in the U.S. delegation are as follows:

Alternate delegates

Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State, *Vice Chairman*

Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, *Coordinator*

Special congressional advisers

Alexander Wiley, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

Homer E. Capehart, Chairman, Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate

George A. Smathers, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate

Senior advisers

Samuel W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs

Clarence C. Brooks, Foreign Service Officer (Retired)

Glen E. Edgerton, President and Chairman of the Board, Export-Import Bank of Washington

James S. Kemper, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil

Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Advisers

Hawthorne Arey, Assistant Director and Vice President, Export-Import Bank of Washington

Willis Armstrong, Acting Director, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

Rollin S. Atwood, Director, Office of South American Affairs, Department of State

Henry W. Balgooyen, New York, N.Y.

Edward G. Cale, Director, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State, *Deputy Coordinator*

David L. Campa, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

James C. Corliss, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

John S. deBeers, Chief, Latin American Division, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Graves B. Erskine, General, USMC, Retired, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Dennis A. Fitzgerald, Deputy Director for Operations, Foreign Operations Administration

Isaiah Frank, Deputy Director, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State

Lloyd A. Haskins, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C.

Gabriel Hange, Administrative Assistant to the President
Franklin P. Holcomb, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

William Lodwick, Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Gerald C. Mann, Dallas, Tex.

Lewis C. Mattison, Deputy Assistant Director for American Republics, U.S. Information Agency

Teodoro Moseoso, Administrator, Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Richard P. Momsen, American Chamber of Commerce, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Charles P. Nolan, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

Walter C. Sauer, Chief, International Tax Staff, Department of the Treasury

George H. Willis, Director, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

George Wythe, Director, American Republics Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Postal Matters

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, provisions regarding airmail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.

Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, October 2, 1954; Mexico, October 4, 1954.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952.¹

Accession deposited: Norway, November 2, 1954.

BILATERAL

Egypt

Agreement relating to development assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo November 6, 1954. Entered into force November 6, 1954.

El Salvador

Agreement for a cooperative program of productivity, pursuant to general agreement for technical cooperation of April 4, 1952 (TIAS 2527). Signed at San Salvador August 31, 1954.

Entered into force: October 27, 1954 (the date notification was given the United States of publication of the agreement in the *Diario Oficial* of El Salvador).

Korea

Mutual Defense Treaty. Signed at Washington October 1, 1953. Senate advice and consent, with understanding, given January 26, 1954. Ratified by the President February 5, 1954.

Entered into force: November 17, 1954 (date of exchange of ratifications).

¹Not in force.

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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the
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of
State

*London and Paris Agreements
September—October 1954*

Publication 5659

45 cents

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his report of October 25, 1954, described the situation on European unity as of the beginning of September as follows: "At the beginning of September, things looked pretty dark. The plan for the European Defense Community had collapsed, and it looked as though the whole North Atlantic Treaty structure, its whole system, might be undermined and even swept away by political indecisions and uncertainties." Then came the Nine-Power Conference at London, September 28 to October 3, 1954, and the Conferences at Paris, October 20 to October 23, 1954.

The historic achievement of these Conferences is recorded in this 128-page publication, which includes the various agreed documents, together with the transcript of the report made by Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower, the Cabinet, and the American people on October 25, 1954.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 806

December 6, 1954



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The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXI, No. 806 • PUBLICATION 5683

December 6, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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Progress Toward European Security

by Livingston T. Merchant

*Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

It was with the greatest pleasure that I accepted the invitation with which you honored me to meet with you tonight to mark this 104th anniversary of the Treaty of 1850 between Switzerland and the United States. I feel that in doing so we are commemorating something just as real, far older, and more fundamental—something of which this treaty of friendship is a symbol. This is one of our oldest treaties, which is a reflection of the historic and traditionally close friendship between our two countries, a friendship which springs from our common dedication to the principles of democracy and peace. And then there is a particular, personal pleasure in seeing honored at this dinner my old and good friend, Charles Bruggmann, who has represented his country with such distinction for so many years in Washington.

On this occasion I can think of no more fitting opening than to extend to you President Eisenhower's personal greetings which he asked me to convey. Addressed to the American Society for Friendship with Switzerland, the President's message reads:

I welcome this opportunity to send to the members of the American Society for Friendship with Switzerland my sincere good wishes. You are to be warmly congratulated for your work to strengthen the long-standing friendship between the United States and Switzerland. The peoples of both nations will never cease in their ardent devotion to democracy or their tireless service to the cause of just peace. Your efforts should therefore enjoy continuing success in the years to come.

Peace—which is at the heart of this message—is in the minds of all of us in these troubled times. The peace we seek is not peace by capitulation.

¹ Made before the American Society for Friendship with Switzerland at New York, N. Y., on Nov. 23 (press release 665).

Nor is it the kind of peace to be bought on the installment plan by successive acts of appeasement. The peace of which the President speaks, and for which this Government has worked and will continue to work, is a peace founded on equity and honor. This is the only kind of peace that can endure.

Now why is it that we of the free world are troubled and frustrated in our quest for peace?

We and our friends have no desire other than to live in peace, to attend to our own affairs, and to devote all our efforts to the material and to the spiritual advancement of our life in freedom.

The fact is that the threat that overhangs us all resides in the character of the Soviet Government and particularly in its actions since the end of the Second World War. Where we all too quickly demobilized our military strength, the Soviets retained their armies on a war footing and indeed have steadily built up their strength in conventional and in atomic preparations. Moreover, the Kremlin has never ceased to reiterate its fundamental conviction that in the long run communism will triumph over capitalism on every continent and that meanwhile what they describe as this historic movement must be assisted and promoted by sabotage, by subversion, and by vicious political warfare directed against the countries of the free world.

The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 was a shocking but important educational event for the West, and following that we on our side began to draw closer together. The Brussels Treaty among Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg was signed in March of 1948, and then in April 1949 the United States and 11 other nations of the Atlantic Community signed the historic North

Atlantic Treaty. These developments took place against the menacing backdrop of the Soviet blockade of Berlin from June of 1948 to May of 1949.

Soviet Imperialism

Our aims are defensive and our purposes are peaceful. It is the record and not just the theory of the imperialist—one might more properly say the colonialist—policy pursued by Moscow which has compelled us to draw together in collective security arrangements.

This Soviet policy of imperialism has brought under the Communist yoke hundreds of millions of formerly free peoples and vast areas of territory in Europe and in Asia. It has made available to the Communist conspiracy the resources and the manpower of a domain that reaches from Central Europe to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the 40th parallel of latitude. This increase in territorial aggrandizement is immense, and there are no indications that the craving of the Communist leaders for power has in any way been dulled.

This combination of the power potential of the Communist bloc and its aggressive purpose has a grave significance for the United States. Although we enjoy a substantial technological superiority, although we possess an industrial plant of great power, and although we are richly endowed with natural resources, the United States alone cannot hope to match the power which could in time be marshaled by the empire now subject to Communist control. And if that can be said of the United States, it certainly applies to any other single free nation.

We are dealing then with a direct threat to the security of this country. It is and has been obvious that we must take those steps needed to protect our national security. We have built up our own defenses and we have joined with other free nations who are similarly threatened and who are willing to make sacrifices in order to remain free, so that the combined strength of this free coalition possesses a power potential that outmatches any that can be mustered by the Communist sphere.

It was for this purpose that the North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated and brought into effect 5 years ago.

Now, let me briefly describe the recent steps which we have taken to strengthen further our collective security arrangements in Europe.

Propositions Regarding Germany

We and our friends in Europe have long accepted three propositions with respect to that great and vital nation, Germany. First, no one can indefinitely hold in the status of an occupied country a proud and industrious people. To attempt to do so inflames all the resentments on which militant nationalism feeds. Secondly, the effective defense of Western Europe, as has been agreed by all our military leaders, requires a defense contribution from Germany itself. Finally, and I believe most important, if Western Europe is once and for all to rid itself of the threat of recurrent internecine wars, then Germany and its neighbors, and particularly France, must be bound together in a new relationship which so weaves together their economies, their defense arrangements, and their institutions as to make another war within the Western European family not merely unthinkable but actually impossible.

It was to achieve all these purposes that the Treaty of Bonn and the treaty for the European Defense Community were signed in May of 1952. A great enterprise fell to the ground when the European Defense Community Treaty was rejected last August 30. It cannot be denied that this result was a blow of most serious proportions to all those who had labored to bring about the unity of Western Europe and to bulwark its defenses.

But, in a matter of days and to the surprise of many, the West showed the energy and the resolution and the imagination which have made it great. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, in quick succession visited Brussels, Bonn, Rome, and Paris, developing, as he traveled, a concept of enlarging the Brussels Treaty by bringing Germany and Italy in as members and greatly modifying its structure. This also would pave the way for restoration of German sovereignty and Germany's admission to NATO. Our own Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, made a flying visit to Bonn and to London to consult with the German and British leaders.

On September 28, less than a month after the failure of the EDC, the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, and the United States—nine powers in all—met in London. Within a week they worked out agreements in principle to achieve this developing design. At that London Conference the climax was reached in declarations

by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden—statements extraordinary for their dramatic values and for their significance.²

Decisive Statements by U.S. and U.K.

Because the United States role in Europe is necessarily dependent upon agreement among the European nations themselves, Secretary Dulles had deliberately refrained from taking to London any “made in America” proposals. His statement was nonetheless a vital contribution. It was a lucid description of the American position with regard to the unity and defense of Europe. He said, in effect, that if arrangements were agreed upon at London that provided for the continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe, then the United States would be disposed to renew its pledge to maintain in Europe such elements of its armed forces as may be necessary or appropriate—necessary or appropriate, that is, to contribute its fair share to the common defense of the North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists.

Sir Anthony Eden then announced a shift in British policy of historic importance. In a dramatic statement he disclosed the readiness of Great Britain to make a permanent commitment of troops to the Continent in an integrated European force. I think everyone at the conference table was moved, as I was, by his phrase: “Ours is . . . an island story.” Then Sir Anthony gave this pledge: Britain was prepared to abandon its traditionally insular policy and to align itself with the other Brussels Treaty powers by maintaining four divisions of ground forces and tactical air strength permanently on the Continent.

These two statements were decisive. The principles of Western European Union, which were agreed upon at London, provide for the entrance of a sovereign Federal Republic of Germany into NATO and for a German defense contribution. Safeguards are provided against a resurgence of German militarism, and these are reinforced by the British commitment of troops and air contingents to the Continent. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is being tightened administratively, and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Alfred Gruenther, is being given added authority and responsibility.

That Conference ended on Sunday, October 3d,

with the signature of the Act of London.³ For the next 3 weeks experts labored literally night and day to translate agreements in principle into precise texts. Then on October 21 the same Nine Powers reassembled in Paris. On the 23d the full North Atlantic Council met. On that Saturday were signed the protocols and agreements⁴ which, when ratified and in force, will mark the completion of the labors of the past years to achieve Western unity and collective defense.

Although the revised Brussels Treaty lacks the broad supranational features of the European Defense Community Treaty, it does provide a framework within which European unity can develop. Moreover, it has the great asset of British membership, which the Epc had not.

Let me also recall one other feature of the revised Brussels Treaty which, I think, has escaped general attention. This is the provision for limitations on military forces, on stocks of weapons, and on the production of arms.

Communist propaganda promptly attacked the agreements as aggressive in intent and a threat to the peace of Europe. But, I submit, no body of men who have aggression in mind are going to sit around discussing and agreeing on the manner in which forces should be limited or stocks of arms controlled and their manufacture restricted. That attitude is in itself incontrovertibly defensive. The motivating purpose is to arrive at a defensive force that is adequate but minimum. And this must be just as apparent to the Communists as to anyone else.

The agreements reached at the London and Paris Conferences were, beyond doubt, a shock and a disappointment to the Soviet rulers. One did not need to be a soothsayer to prophesy that they would seek to delay and, if possible, prevent the ratification of the agreements that emerged from those conferences. Soviet propaganda was stepped up and became more shrill.

Transparent Soviet Diplomacy

Then, 10 days ago, the Soviet Government addressed to 23 European countries and to the United States a note proposing that a conference be held in Moscow, or Paris, on November 29, little more than 2 weeks from the date of the despatch of the

³ *Ibid.*, p. 515.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 719.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 523 and p. 525.

note—a conference to consider the security of Europe. This note did not even attempt to disguise its purpose—to delay the ratification of the agreements concluded among the 14 members of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Federal Republic of Germany in Paris. Indeed it was almost frivolous in its transparency. To anyone who has even the slightest acquaintance with the amount of preparation and the extent of the physical arrangements necessary to hold a conference of this size and importance, the date suggested was ludicrous. Belatedly, last Saturday [November 20], Mr. Molotov attempted to retrieve this clumsiness by offering to postpone the date, if ratification of the Paris agreements was similarly postponed.

This Soviet proposal is no novelty. It contains nothing new nor any surprises. Last February, at the Four Power Conference in Berlin, I listened to Mr. Molotov propose a general European treaty on collective security, to which all European states, “irrespective of their social systems,” could become parties.⁵ But Mr. Molotov’s proposal of February and its reiteration last week completely miss the point. Security in Europe—or for that matter throughout the world—cannot be achieved by the exercise Mr. Molotov suggests. As Mr. Dulles was quick to point out at Berlin, the Soviets as well as we—in fact 60 nations—have subscribed to and signed the United Nations Charter and by that subscription and signature renounced the use of force against the political independence and the territorial integrity of other states. There is nothing wrong or lacking in the wording of this great charter. We would be hard put to it to improve on it as a collective nonaggression treaty.

The sense of insecurity in the world springs not from any lack of precision in the United Nations Charter but from the fact that some of the parties to it have not lived up to the obligations which, by signing it, they accepted. It is a lack of trust and confidence in the purposes and intentions of the Soviet Union and its satellites which accounts for the sense of insecurity in the world today.

It is that record—testified to by the rape of Czechoslovakia, the satellization of the other East-

ern European countries, the Berlin blockade, and culminating in the cruel, crude aggression against the Republic of Korea in June 1950—which has forced us to look to our defenses, rather than to place our trust exclusively in solemn agreements recorded on paper.

In so far as Europe is concerned, we have, I think, a right to be proud of what we have built within the Atlantic Community. Our unity is great, and it will continue to grow. Our defenses are respectable, and, by the necessary exertions, they will be further developed to the point where a lightning aggression in Europe need no longer be feared as it has rightly been in the past.

But it is not enough to draw together and assure our defenses. We must continue in our unflagging willingness to explore by peaceful negotiation any safe and reasonable prospect of reducing tensions. In Europe the sources of these tensions are well known. Principally they are these: first, the continued division of Germany; second, the unjust retention of Austria in occupation status more than 10 years after the Soviets agreed that with the war’s end Austria would be considered a liberated and not an enemy country; and, finally, the undiminished military establishment of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites—or “colonies” might be a better word.

In numerous conferences—the last at Berlin early this year—we have sought the solution of these first two great problems. We have made fair and reasonable propositions. We have demonstrated our willingness to compromise where principle was not involved. In the United Nations we have patiently searched for a road to disarmament on which the Soviets would join our company.

The results so far have all been negative. It may be, however, that once the Paris accords are ratified and in force a more solid basis for negotiation will exist. It would be folly to succumb to obvious stratagems designed to delay the achievement of the position of strength which ratification of the Paris agreements will bring. But thereafter and if evidence should develop, through diplomatic channels which are always open, that there is a serious intention on the other side to reach agreement on the problems which lie at the root of tension in Europe, then a new and more hopeful prospect might open up for all of us.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1954, p. 269, and Mar. 15, 1954, p. 401.

Protocols on German Occupation and Accession to NATO Transmitted to Senate¹

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 15, 1954.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith for the consideration of the Senate a certified copy of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, to which are annexed five schedules, and a certified copy of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, also signed at Paris on October 23, 1954.² I request the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of these two documents.

In addition, I transmit for the information of the Senate a number of related documents. These include a report made to me by the Secretary of State on the present agreements; the Final Act of the Nine Power Conference held at London, September 28–October 3, 1954, with annexes;³ 3 resolutions adopted by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954; 4 protocols to the Brussels Treaty signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, together with the text of the Brussels Treaty signed on March 17, 1948; a declaration dated October 23, 1954, of the states signatory to the Brussels Treaty inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the treaty; a resolution on the production and standardization of armaments adopted by the Nine Power Conference at Paris on October 21, 1954; the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic

of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; the Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; certain letters relating to the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, dated October 23, 1954, together with the texts of letters exchanged in 1952 referred to therein; and a statement on Berlin made by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom in Paris on October 23, 1954.

I know the Senate is aware of the very great importance of these agreements to the security of the United States and to the cause of peace and freedom in the world as a whole. The agreements represent the culmination of a joint effort, extending over several years, to promote closer cooperation in security matters among the nations of Western Europe and to find a way of associating the great potential strength of the Federal Republic of Germany with that of the free world in a manner which will ensure freedom and equality for the people of Germany and at the same time will avoid the danger of a revival of German militarism. The Congress of the United States has recognized on several occasions that the effectiveness of the entire Atlantic relationship depends to a very great extent upon the attainment of these objectives, and last summer the Senate adopted a resolution (S. Res. 295, July 30, 1954)⁴ expressing the sense of the Senate that steps should be taken to restore sovereignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

It was hoped that these objectives would be accomplished through the treaty constituting the European Defense Community, together with the

¹ Reprinted from S. Exec. L and M, 83d Cong., 2d sess.

² For texts of these two protocols and of the other principal documents signed at the Paris Conference, see BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 719.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 284.

Bonn conventions of May 26, 1952,⁵ which were designed to terminate the occupation regime in the Federal Republic. But the treaty constituting the European Defense Community failed of ratification, and the conventions, being dependent on the treaty, could not be brought into effect. Accordingly, it became necessary to devise a set of alternative arrangements by which the nations of the North Atlantic Community might pursue their common security objectives, and these new arrangements are embodied in the present agreements.

In accordance with these arrangements, the Federal Republic will be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and, along with Italy, to the Brussels Treaty. Furthermore, important changes will be made in the military arrangements under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the basic nature of the Brussels Treaty to which Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are already parties. These changes will have the effect, not only of placing certain agreed controls on European armaments, but also of strengthening and reinforcing both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the new Brussels Treaty Organization, the Western European Union.

In NATO, the powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, will be strengthened in the fields of assignment and deployment of forces, inspection, and logistical organization. In addition, the principle of integration of units may be carried to lower echelons than is now the case. These measures are desirable in their own right because they increase the general effectiveness of NATO forces. At the same time, they create a degree of mutual interdependence among national forces assigned to NATO that will effectively limit the ability of any one nation to take independent military action within SACEUR's area of command.

The Brussels Treaty is modified so as to establish a new Council for Western European Union, and promotion of European integration becomes a new purpose of the treaty. The Council is given important powers in the fields of controlling forces and armaments. The continental forces of the Brussels Treaty countries are set at specified

limits, conforming, for those countries which would have been members of the European Defense Community, to the limits set by the EDC Treaty. These limits cannot be changed except by the unanimous consent of the Council. In addition, the United Kingdom has agreed that it will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe forces of the level presently committed there. Further safeguards are provided in the armaments field. The Federal Republic has renounced the right to manufacture atomic and certain other weapons. Major types of conventional weapons will be subject to control. An Agency for Control of Armaments is to be set up for the purpose of enforcing these arms limitations.

It has also been agreed that the occupation regime must be brought to an end and the Federal Republic will assume the full authority of a sovereign state in its external and internal affairs. This will be accomplished by the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, which amends the conventions which were placed before the Senate in 1952 and brings them into effect as amended. The amendments are designed principally to bring the Bonn conventions into harmony with the new arrangements for a German defense contribution and with German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁶ The greater part of the conventions has been left unchanged. They will provide, as before, for the revocation of the occupation statute, the abolition of the Allied High Commission, and the settlement of numerous problems arising out of the war and the occupation. The convention regulating the status of Allied forces in Germany will continue until it is replaced by new arrangements based on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, supplemented by such provisions as are necessary in view of the special conditions with regard to forces stationed in the Federal Republic. New arrangements will also eventually have to be concluded on the support of foreign forces in the Federal Republic. Of the special rights retained by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in the original conventions, those relating to Berlin and to Germany

⁵ For a summary of the Bonn conventions, see *ibid.*, June 9, 1952, p. 888; for texts of the conventions and of the EDC treaty, see S. Exec. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

⁶ For the complete text of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation, including the five amending schedules, see *London and Paris Agreements*, Department of State publication 5659, p. 63.

as a whole will be kept on the same terms as before, and the right to station forces in Germany will, after German admission to NATO, be exercised with the consent of the Federal Government insofar as the Federal territory is concerned.

Of the four conventions which are to be amended by the protocol and placed in effect as amended, only one (the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany) was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The other conventions were in the nature of implementing administrative agreements, for which the Senate recognized that formal approval was unnecessary and, furthermore, was undesirable, inasmuch as they might require technical revision from time to time to meet changing conditions. Approval of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany will not change the nature of those related conventions.

While the arrangements embodied in these agreements are complex, their purposes are simple. The Federal Republic is placed on a basis of full equality with other states. The military strength of the Federal Republic will be combined with that of the other countries in the Atlantic community in such a way that the development and use of the German military contribution will be in accordance with the common need. The Federal Republic will be fully associated with the Atlantic community through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and with the European community through membership in the Western European Union established under the Brussels Treaty. Both of these organizations will be strengthened internally. The procedures and institutions which are the subject of these agreements make it inevitable that the states involved will act closely together in the matters most important to their security. This concert of action will, I am convinced, foster the spirit of cooperation and desire for continuing association which have been evident in the free nations and which are essential for their future safety and welfare.

One of the principal specific consequences of the new arrangements will be the addition of a substantial increment of German resources to the Atlantic defense system. At the same time, I want to emphasize the fact that these agreements are founded upon the profound yearning for peace

which is shared by all the Atlantic peoples. The agreements endanger no nation. On the contrary, they represent one of history's first great practical experiments in the international control of armaments. Moreover, their fundamental significance goes far beyond the combining of strength to deter aggression. Ultimately, we hope that they will produce a new understanding among the free peoples of Europe and a new spirit of friendship which will inspire greater cooperation in many fields of human activity.

I urge the Senate to signify its approval of this great endeavor by giving its advice and consent to ratification of the protocols on the admission of the Federal Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and on the termination of the occupation regime. I hope these instruments may be studied with a view to enabling the Senate to act promptly on these matters when it meets for its new session in January.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

SECRETARY DULLES' REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1954.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to the ratification thereof, (1) a Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, to which are annexed five schedules; and (2) a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954.

II

The protocols above referred to are a part of a series of interconnecting arrangements designed to solidify the security structure of Western Europe. Because of such interdependence, I also submit herewith the other arrangements, although they do not themselves require Senate action. I recommend that these documents, which are listed in the annexed schedule, be submitted to the Senate for its information.

III

The foregoing arrangements, when they become operative, will, in combination, establish basically new conditions in Western Europe. They will realize a result for which the United States has long hoped.

The two world wars of this century have made it evident that western civilization, with its dedication to human liberty, cannot survive if the members of the western world continue to make war on each other. Already they have so expended their blood and treasure in fighting that they have gravely depleted their strength, and they have brought upon themselves the moral condemnation of all humanity because of their failure to establish, even as between themselves, a peaceful order.

Realization of the foregoing brought the Western European nations to seek such a measure of unification, particularly in terms of military establishments, as would make it hereafter both militarily impractical and politically unlikely that their military forces would be used against each other, or indeed against anyone else for other than clearly defensive purposes.

The need for this coincides with new dangers born out of the expansionist policies of Soviet Russia, inspired by the worldwide ambitions of Soviet communism and backed by a vast Red military establishment. This creates for Western Europe a threat which can only be effectively deterred by the achievement of a large degree of practical unity among the European nations themselves, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and, we hope, a unified Germany.

It was originally sought to achieve these objectives by the establishment of a European Defense Community, consisting of six continental countries—Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. They would have created an international organization having supranational powers in defense matters. This would have constituted a hard and dependable core at the critical center of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This plan had been proposed on October 24, 1950, by Mr. Pleven, the then French Minister of Defense. After about a year and a half of negotiation, it was embodied in two interconnected treaties—the Bonn Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany of May 26, 1952,

designed to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic, and the Paris Treaty of May 27, 1952, designed to establish the European Defense Community.

The Bonn convention was signed by the United States, and on July 1, 1952, the United States Senate advised and consented to its ratification. The Senate at the same time consented to an extension of the North Atlantic Treaty area to include that of the European Defense Community, the significant addition being Western Germany. However, the Bonn convention and the related Paris Treaty never became effective because they were not ratified by all the signatories.

This failure to realize the European Defense Community and to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany created a highly dangerous situation. It seemed that Europe might be doomed to continue divisions which would be disastrous both because such divisions would perpetuate the cycle of recurrent war as between the Western European countries themselves, and because a divided Europe would automatically be dominated by Soviet despotic power.

IV

I desire at this point to refer to the action which the United States Senate took on July 30, 1954. It was then predictable that the French Chamber of Deputies might fail to ratify the Bonn and Paris Treaties, above referred to, and the consequences of that failure could measurably be foreseen. In anticipation of that situation there occurred consultations between the Executive and the Senate, as a result of which the Senate, by a vote of 88 to 0, adopted a resolution which asked you in your discretion and within the limits of your constitutional powers to seek—

to restore sovereignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

This act of cooperation between the Executive and the Senate, and the unanimous bipartisan action of the Senate itself, had a steadying and sobering effect at a time when there was much confusion and division of counsel. The Senate action enabled me, as your representative, to speak with authority in the subsequent negotiations which I conducted on your behalf.

The forward-looking "advice" thus given by the

Senate in pursuance of its constitutional prerogative has in fact been successfully transmuted into Executive action. The first protocol referred to in I above will "restore sovereignty to Germany" and the second protocol referred to in I above will "enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security."

V

The Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany is not linked to the entry into force of the arrangements for a German defense contribution, as was the case of the original Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic. It could come into force before it becomes possible to bring the arrangements for the German defense contribution into force. If there is an intervening period, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States will retain their existing powers in the field of disarmament and demilitarization in the Federal Republic. These powers will be exercised through a Joint Commission, consisting of representatives of the three powers and the Federal Republic, who will function by majority vote. These arrangements will be reviewed at the end of 1954 in light of the situation then existing with regard to the entry into force of the protocol and, at the same time, the four Governments will review the exercise of the controls with a view to permitting preparation by the Federal Republic for its future defense contribution.

In addition to the differences above mentioned, several changes of substance have been made in the Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic, as concluded in 1952. However, these changes neither increase the obligations of nor diminish the benefits to the United States as against those reflected in the Bonn convention which was approved by the Senate on July 1, 1952. The changes, which are significant primarily from the standpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany, may be summarized as follows:

(1) In article 2 of the convention as originally concluded, the three powers retained their rights relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, to Berlin, and to Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement. These powers were to be held in reserve for special use, related to the Soviet position in Eastern Ger-

many, and were not intended for exercise in ordinary German affairs, either domestic or foreign. It seemed preferable, therefore, that insofar as the territory of the Federal Republic was concerned, the arrangements for the stationing of foreign forces should be put on a contractual basis. Accordingly, the forces in the Federal Republic after the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defense contribution will be governed by a separate convention under the terms of which the Federal Republic agrees to the stationing of forces of the same nationality and effective strength as may be stationed in the Federal Republic at that time. Any increase in the effective strength of these forces may be made only with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic.

The German representatives recognized that the three powers should preserve their rights to protect the security of forces stationed in the Federal Republic until the Federal Government itself were able to take the necessary measures. This depends on the Federal Government obtaining new legislative powers. The termination of the general right of the three powers in this field will not affect the right of a military commander, if his forces are imminently menaced, to take such immediate action (including the use of armed force) as may be appropriate for their protection and as is requisite to remove the danger.

(2) A second change in the Convention on Relations relates to the Arbitration Tribunal to be established for the settlement of disputes arising between any one of the three powers and the Federal Government. Under the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal as originally concluded, the Tribunal was given power to take action directly on legislative and administrative measures or judicial decisions applicable within the Federal Republic. These powers, which are not normal to a body created to arbitrate disputes between sovereign states, have been eliminated from the charter.

(3) A third change in the Convention on Relations relates to the situation which will arise on the reunification of Germany. The Convention on Relations as concluded in 1952 provided for its review in the event of reunification (art. 10). The new protocol provides for review of the convention and the related conventions not only in the event of actual reunification of Germany, but also in case an international understanding is reached

with the participation and consent of the four Governments parties to the conventions on steps toward bringing about the reunification of Germany. The Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in Germany will also be subject to review in these circumstances. There must, of course, be agreement by all the signatory governments to any changes made in the conventions.

(4) Changes have also been made in the related conventions. These changes for the most part involve bringing the conventions up to date by eliminating clauses referring to the EDC Treaty, by taking into account the lapse of time since the conventions were concluded, and by taking into account progress made toward the completion of certain Allied programs in Germany. They also alter certain clauses in the conventions which were not felt to be in harmony with the status of equality being accorded the Federal Republic. Finally, the arrangements for the financial support of foreign forces stationed in Germany have been brought into harmony with more recent agreements with the Federal Republic in this field.

The related conventions were executive agreements implementing the Convention on Relations. For these, Senate action was unnecessary and, furthermore, recognized by the Committee on Foreign Relations to be undesirable, inasmuch as it was foreseen that they might require technical revision from time to time to meet changing conditions. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (Ex. Rept. No. 16, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), stated:

Some of the technical provisions in the [related] conventions are temporary in nature and as the situation in Germany changes, it may be necessary to make modifications in them from time to time. Under such circumstances it would seem impractical to require resubmission of the conventions to the Senate before each such modification could go into effect.

The ratification of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany will not change the nature of those related conventions.

VI

The arrangements for the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic do not affect the status of Berlin. In a declaration made by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France at the London Nine

Power Conference of September 28–October 3, 1954, they reaffirmed the declaration made by them in Paris on May 27, 1952, that they would maintain armed forces in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required and that they would treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves. In addition, the three powers issued a statement in Paris on October 23, 1954, in which they affirmed their determination to insure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation and stated that they had instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the German authorities in the city with a view to implementing these principles jointly and to the fullest degree possible.

VII

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty Providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, referred to in I above, has no precise counterpart in the documents which were submitted to the Senate in 1952, although, as mentioned, there was then a protocol, approved by the Senate, which extended the treaty area to include that of the EDC. It was, however, not then contemplated that the Federal Republic of Germany would itself become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. The German defense contribution would have been made solely through the European Defense Community. Under the arrangements now contemplated, it is essential that the Federal Republic of Germany should become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A protocol to that effect was signed in Paris on October 23, 1954, by the representatives of the 14 nations now parties to that treaty, and is one of the two documents referred to in section I hereof which it is recommended should be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The protocol is framed so that its entry into force is tied to that of the other arrangements relating to German participation in the common defense.

VIII

One of the documents above referred to in section II hereof, is a resolution concerning the powers of the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR) approved by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954. The general effect

of this resolution is to strengthen the role of SACEUR over the forces under his authority. One result of these changes will be to enhance the effectiveness of the NATO forces in Europe, with consequent benefits to the entire NATO effort. Increasing the authority of SACEUR will also mean that the national forces assigned to SACEUR will become integrated and interdependent to an extent that will minimize the possibility of individual nations exercising an independent military initiative in Europe.

IX

Another of the resolutions of the North Atlantic Council suggested to be submitted to the Senate for its information is that of October 22, 1954, which took note of an exchange of declarations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on October 3, 1954, in London and associated all members of the North Atlantic Treaty with the tripartite declaration issued by the three Governments last named.

In its declaration, the Government of the Federal Republic declares that it has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in article 2 of the charter. The Federal Republic also declares that, upon its accession to the North Atlantic and Brussels Treaties, it will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the treaties. In particular the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic.

In the tripartite declaration, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France respond appropriately to this declaration, reaffirming in relation to this situation the principles of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, condemning the use of force as between nations.

X

A major element in the new arrangements signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, are the four protocols designed to modify the Brussels Treaty. This treaty, signed on March 17, 1948, by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, was the first major step toward

the military integration of postwar Europe, antedating the North Atlantic Treaty by more than a year. Under the terms of the Brussels Treaty all countries were pledged to give full and immediate military assistance to any party against which aggression might occur. The treaty also provided for consultative machinery for the development of common defense plans. With the advent and growth of NATO, the organizational machinery under the Brussels Treaty became relatively inactive, but the treaty remained in full force and has now afforded a basis for realizing certain major political and security objectives.

The first of the protocols will bring about several important changes in the Brussels Treaty. First, it provides for the accession of Germany and Italy to the Brussels Treaty so that the membership will correspond to that of the proposed European Defense Community, plus the United Kingdom. Second, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty will be transformed into a new "Council of Western European Union" for the purposes of strengthening peace and security and promoting unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Western Europe and closer cooperation between them and with other European organizations. Special provision is made for votes by two-thirds majority or simple majority on specific questions. Provision is made for close cooperation between the Brussels Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There is a clause stating the undesirability of duplicating the work of the military staffs of NATO and stipulating that the Council and its Agency for the Control of Armaments will rely on the military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

The second protocol is concerned with the size of the forces of Western European Union. It provides that the total strength and number of formations of the land and air forces of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands placed under SACEUR shall not exceed those laid down in the special agreement annexed to the European Defense Community Treaty. The forces of the United Kingdom under SACEUR shall not exceed those presently under SACEUR command, and Luxembourg's forces shall be set at one regimental combat team. Naval forces are to be set by the NATO annual review process. Any increase in the agreed maxi-

mum forces will be subject to the unanimous approval of all parties to the Brussels Treaty.

An important feature of this protocol is the commitment by the United Kingdom to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, i. e., four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force or such other forces as SACEUR regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of a majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers. The protocol provides that this undertaking does not bind the United Kingdom in case of an acute overseas emergency. It further provides that if maintenance of forces on the Continent at any time places too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions under which the United Kingdom forces are maintained.

This commitment is in addition to the commitment implicit in the United Kingdom's membership in the new Council of Western European Union.

The third protocol relates to the control of armaments. It is concerned both with armaments which are not to be manufactured in the Federal Republic and those which are to be controlled within the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland. The prohibited arms, which the Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the right to produce, are atomic, biological, and chemical weapons and guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic bombing aircraft. Unanimous vote of the Council of Western European Union is required to give Germany the right to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. A two-thirds majority of the Council can give Germany the right to produce guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic aircraft, provided that SACEUR recommends that Germany be given this right.

The armaments subject to control throughout the territory of the six Continental countries include both the weapons which are prohibited and a number of other major weapons. These include mines, tanks, large artillery and ammunition therefor, aircraft bombs and most types of military aircraft.

A fourth protocol creates an Agency for the

Control of Armaments. With respect to controlled items, the Agency is to exercise its control over stocks of armaments rather than over production. It will also ensure that prohibited items are not produced in Germany.

The United States will give the Council of Western European Union information with respect to military aid to be furnished to the forces of the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland of Europe. This information will be transmitted to the Agency for Armaments Control by the Council. The United States retains full authority to determine the allocation of United States military assistance.

The Agency does not have responsibilities with respect to the production and procurement of armaments or with the allocation of military equipment. However, the Brussels Treaty countries did agree in a resolution approved at Paris October 21, 1954, that they would convene a Working Group in Paris January 17, 1955, to consider proposals for development of rationalized production programs.

XI

The arrangements which I have discussed impose no treaty engagements and obligations upon the United States other than those incident to restoring to the Federal Republic of Germany sovereign powers which the Allies had assumed after the defeat of the Nazi Government; and the acceptance of the Federal Republic as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, the prospective attitude of the United States toward the whole arrangement is a matter of profound, even decisive, significance.

In this connection, I made a statement at the London Conference at its meeting of September 29, 1954, the full text of which is reproduced in an annex to the final act of the London Conference, transmitted herewith. By that statement I sought to make clear the desire of our Nation to encourage and support measures which unify and strengthen Western Europe, whereas we would be disposed to draw away from a Europe which persisted in divisions and weakness. In this connection I said that if new arrangements were made by the Western European countries, which, in replacement of the European Defense Community, provided unity and strength, so that the hopes which we had placed in EDC could reasonably be transferred

to these new arrangements, then I would recommend to you, Mr. President, that you should make a declaration of policy comparable to that which you offered, after consultation with congressional leaders, in connection with the prospective European Defense Community Treaty, including an expression of intention by the United States—

to maintain in Europe such elements of its armed forces as may be necessary or appropriate to contribute our fair share of what is needed for the common defense of this North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists.

I was careful to point out that such a declaration would constitute no more than a policy declaration and that it would not be a legally binding commitment. I pointed out:

under our constitutional system, the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and, as such, has the right to determine their disposition. One President of the United States is not constitutionally able to bind his successor in this matter. Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the Armed Forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice he gets from his military advisers.

I nevertheless pointed out that basic and fundamental policies were, as a practical matter, not likely to be altered and that our policy to cooperate with a Western Europe which was itself acting effectively to make itself united and strong was, I felt, basic and fundamental United States policy, as both the Executive and the Congress had clearly made manifest.

In pursuance of the statement which I made in London, I expect, Mr. President, to make a recommendation to you as thus indicated, if the arrangements which were entered into at Paris have been, or appear likely to be, realized. I understand that you would be disposed to act favorably on such a recommendation.

XII

It is evident that the foregoing agreements, if they come into force and are implemented, will have far reaching and benign consequences.

They will fulfill the aspirations of the people of the Federal Republic of Germany for a position of equality in the family of free nations.

They will increase substantially the defensive potential of the Atlantic alliance.

At the same time, they will afford protection against excessive militarism as a tool of aggressive

nationalism. This protection will go not only to the members of the Atlantic alliance, but to all.

They will offer strong assurances against a renewal of fratricidal strife among the free nations of Europe and will afford a framework of practical cooperation which should encourage further advances toward political and economic unity among the Western European states.

Because of the importance to this Nation of achieving these results, I recommend, Mr. President, that you request early consideration by the Senate of this matter, and, in particular, the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the two documents of treaty status which the United States has signed, namely, the protocol which will restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and the protocol which will admit the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

SCHEDULE

(1) The Final Act of the Nine Power Conference held at London, September 28-October 3, 1954, with annexes; (2) three resolutions adopted by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954; (3) four protocols to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, together with the text of treaty itself; (4) a declaration dated October 23, 1954, of the states signatory to the Brussels Treaty inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the treaty; (5) a resolution on the production and standardization of armaments adopted by the Nine Power Conference at Paris on October 21, 1954; (6) the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; (7) the Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; (8) certain letters relating to the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, dated October 23, 1954, together with the texts of letters exchanged in 1952 referred to therein; and (9) a statement on Berlin made by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom in Paris on October 23, 1954.

An agreement on the Saar was also signed at Paris by the French Republic and the Federal

Republic of Germany on October 23, 1954. When an authentic English translation of this agreement is obtained, it will be made available to the Senate for its information.

U.S. Protests Sentencing of Americans by Chinese Communists

INSTRUCTION TO CONSUL AT GENEVA¹

Press release 666 dated November 23

The American Consul General at Geneva is being instructed to make the strongest possible protest to the Chinese Communists through the channels established there for exchange of information on Americans in China regarding the sentencing of 11 U.S. Air Force personnel and 2 American civilians to prison sentences ranging from 4 years to life for alleged espionage.

The American Consul General is being instructed to emphatically protest the imposition of jail sentences upon the 11 Air Force personnel ranging from 4 to 10 years on trumped-up charges of being espionage agents. The American Consul General is being instructed to point out that these men, despite the terms of the Korean truce, have already been held in Chinese Communist custody for almost 2 years, despite our repeated representations for their release.

He is being instructed to protest the sentencing of the two civilians to life and 20 years, respectively, on similar trumped-up charges as a most flagrant violation of justice. These men, John Thomas Downey and Richard George Fecteau, were civilian personnel employed by the Department of the Army in Japan. They were believed to have been lost on a flight from Korea to Japan in November 1952.

How they came into the hands of the Chinese Communists is unknown to the United States but the fact of their detention was obviously known by the Chinese Communists and was deliberately

concealed by them when the possible repatriation of Americans was discussed at Geneva in June of this year. The American Consul General is being instructed to point out in the most vigorous terms that despite these previous discussions the Peiping broadcast of today is the first word we have had that they are held by the Chinese Communists.

The U.S. Government will continue to make every effort to effect the release of these men who have been unjustly "sentenced" to further periods of imprisonment.

The continued wrongful detention of these American citizens furnishes further proof of the Chinese Communist regime's disregard for accepted practices of international conduct.

U.S. NOTE OF NOVEMBER 26

Press release 673 dated November 26

The United States on November 26 delivered through the Foreign Office at London the following note to the Chinese Communist regime's chargé d'affaires there, and also requested that the note be delivered directly to the Chinese Communist regime through the British chargé d'affaires at Peiping.

On the same date Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, transmitted a copy of the note to the Secretary-General with the request that it be circulated to U.N. members.

The United States Government vigorously protests the wrongful action of the Chinese Communist authorities in sentencing on November 23rd eleven members of the United States Armed Forces and two American civilians employed by the Department of the Army to terms of imprisonment on political charges which are without foundation. These Americans were in planes which were attacked over the recognized combat zone in Korea, or over international waters, in the course of the Chinese Communist aggression against Korea. Their detention is in patent violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

The sentencing of the members of the United States Armed Forces to penitentiary terms in these circumstances is grossly contrary to the substance and spirit of all recognized international standards as to the protection of prisoners of war. The maltreatment of the two civilian American citizens, whose names were willfully and deceitfully withheld by the Chinese Communist representa-

¹ Consul Franklin C. Gowen on Nov. 24 requested a meeting with the Acting Chinese Communist Consul General at Geneva, Shen Ping. The latter did not consent until after the Peiping regime had rejected the U.S. note of protest of Nov. 26. The meeting took place on Nov. 29, at which time Mr. Gowen carried out this instruction.

tives at Geneva last June from the list of American civilians held in Chinese Communist jails, is equally reprehensible.

The United States Government calls upon the Chinese Communist authorities to release these unjustly detained American nationals forthwith, in accordance with the provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement and in conformity with the elementary precepts of justice and humanity.

The Chinese Communist authorities are under an obligation to redress in so far as possible the wrong they have inflicted on these American na-

tionals and their families. The United States Government reserves the right to claim compensation as may be determined appropriate, and to demand the punishment of the Chinese Communist officials responsible for the denial of the rights of these persons.

The Chinese Communist authorities should bear in mind that the long list of Chinese Communist outrages against American nationals, which the American people have borne with restraint thus far, is significantly extended by the Chinese Communist announcement of November 23rd.

Presentation of Claim Against U.S.S.R. in 1953 Plane Attack

The Department of State announced on October 9 (press release 566) that Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen on that date delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office at Moscow a note from the United States Government to the Soviet Government preferring a formal diplomatic claim against the Soviet Government on account of the destruction of a B-50 aircraft by Soviet aircraft off Cape Povorotny in the international airspace over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953. The note demands that the Soviet Government pay damages in the sum of \$2,785,492.94 and invites the Soviet Government, in the event that the Soviet Government denies liability, to join in submitting this dispute to the International Court of Justice. It likewise demands the release of any survivors of the B-50.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on October 11 transmitted the note to the president of the Security Council with the request that it be circulated to members of the Council.¹

On January 26, 1954, following an intensive investigation of the attack on the B-50 aircraft, the United States Government delivered to the Soviet Government a note² requesting certain detailed information with respect to the attack and the var-

ious allegations made by the Soviet Government in prior notes. Among other things, the Soviet Government had alleged that it had evidence to refute the United States Government's contention that the B-50 did not fly over Soviet territory and was attacked by Soviet fighters in international airspace over the Sea of Japan. The Soviet Government was requested to produce this evidence. The Soviet Government having failed to reply to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, the United States Government delivered to the Soviet Government another note on May 25, 1954,³ inquiring when a reply might be expected to the note of January 26, 1954. The Soviet Government has made no reply or acknowledgment whatever to either note.

The October 9 note charges that the B-50 was shot down without warning in international airspace over the Sea of Japan. It takes note of the possibility that the Soviet Government may have information of the fate of the missing crew members and again demands that the Soviet Government provide such information as it has and make provision for the prompt return of any survivors whom it may still be holding or of whose whereabouts it may be informed.

¹ U.N. doc. S/3304 dated Oct. 12.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1954, p. 409.

³ Not printed here.

The Government of the United States of America refers again to the destruction on July 29, 1953 by Soviet military aircraft of a United States Air Force B-50 type aircraft off Cape Povorotny in the international air space over the Sea of Japan. On January 26, 1954, following an intensive investigation and study of the incident, the United States Government delivered to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a note requesting certain detailed information with respect to the incident and with respect to the various allegations made by the Soviet Government in prior notes of July 30, 1953,⁴ August 4, 1953⁵ and August 26, 1953.⁶ The Soviet Government having failed to reply to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, the United States Government, through its Embassy at Moscow, transmitted another note on May 25, 1954 to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiring when a reply might be expected to the note of January 26, 1954. The Soviet Government has made no reply or acknowledgement whatever to either note, although far more than sufficient time has elapsed to enable the Soviet Government to make a reply or to state its intentions with respect to such reply. The United States Government must conclude, therefore, that the Soviet Government is fully aware that it is not in a position to make a responsive or adequate reply to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954.

This circumstance, the United States Government concludes, reinforces and confirms the essential accuracy of the findings of fact resulting from the United States Government's own investigation and study, as well as of the statements made in the various communications of the United States Government to the Soviet Government on this subject, particularly the United States Government's note of August 4, 1953.⁶

The United States Government therefore takes this opportunity to place solemnly upon the record the facts relevant to the Soviet Government's liability and to prefer against the Soviet Government a formal international diplomatic claim for damages as set forth below.

I

The United States Government is prepared to prove by evidence in an appropriate forum, and it charges, the following:

1. Early in the morning of July 29, 1953 a four-engine aircraft of the United States Air Force, of the B-50 type, was duly dispatched from its base in Japan by United States Air Force authorities to perform a routine navigational mission in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan, returning to base in Japan upon completion of the mission. The officers and crew were instructed prior to departure that under no circumstances was the aircraft to fly closer to the Soviet-held land mass than twelve nautical miles.

Upon its departure the B-50 type aircraft had on board a crew of seventeen persons, all members of the United

States Air Force and all nationals of the United States. They were, as the Soviet Government was informed in the United States Government's note of August 4, 1953, the following:

Stanley Keith O'Kelley - Captain - Serial No. AO 776002
 John Ernst Roche - Captain - Serial No. AO 2029268
 Edmund Joseph Czyz - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2072656
 Lloyd Clayton Wiggins - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 695999
 James Gordon Keith - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2092926
 Warren John Sanderson - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2066184
 Robert Elbon Stalnaker - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 761337
 John Cyrus Ward - Captain - Serial No. AO 865270
 Francisco Joseph Tejeda - Major - Serial No. AO 726704
 Frank Ernest Beyer - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2093286
 Francis Luther Brown - Master Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 053497
 Donald Wayne Gabree - S. Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 333787
 Roland Edgar Goulet - A/1C - Serial No. AF 12 323933
 James Edwin Woods - A/2C - Serial No. AF 24413122
 Charles Joseph Russell - A/2C - Serial No. AF 13 351658
 Donald George Hill - S. Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 353976
 Earl Wilbur Radelin, Jr. - A/2C - Serial No. AF 14 370732

The B-50 aircraft proceeded on a course of approximately 315 degrees from the Japanese Island of Honshu. When it arrived in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan at a point approximately 50 miles from the coastline, the aircraft turned to the right and proceeded on an easterly heading, flying at an altitude of approximately 20,000 feet, the crew carrying out the instructions given them as above stated.

The aircraft had reached a point in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Povorotny, flying on a heading of approximately 95 degrees at an altitude of 20,000 feet when suddenly, at approximately 6:15 in the morning local time and without any prior warning whatever, Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft intercepted and fired upon the United States aircraft. One MIG-15 type aircraft commenced the interception and firing by coming up from below and to the left of the B-50 and shooting the No. 1 engine, rendering it inoperative. One or more additional MIG-15 type aircraft thereupon appeared behind the B-50, directed fire on the No. 4 engine and upon the right wing and other portions of the aircraft, and set the No. 4 engine on fire. When the Soviet MIG-15 aircraft appeared from behind, shooting at the B-50, one or more of the personnel on board the B-50 aircraft opened fire in self-defense against the oncoming attacking MIG-15 aircraft, but to no avail.

Immediately upon being hit, the B-50 aircraft dived sharply, losing altitude rapidly. The shots from the rear attack tore off the right wing and the tail section and caused the aircraft to disintegrate. The component parts of the B-50 then hit the water, at approximately the same position at which the interception and attack took place.

⁴ BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 206.

⁵ Not printed here.

⁶ BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 206.

The total time which elapsed between the commencement of the attack until the component parts of the aircraft hit the water was approximately two minutes.

Upon the B-50's first becoming disabled, in consequence of the actions of the MIG-15 aircraft against it, the members of the crew of the B-50 were directed by the aircraft commander, Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, to abandon the aircraft and to seek safety by bailing out of the aircraft. The United States Government is informed and believes that, apart from First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, all members of the crew above named bailed out of the aircraft, or parachuted, into the Sea of Japan, all coming down at points within the area of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Povorotny.

The United States Government finds, and charges, that all the actions of the MIG-15 type aircraft above described were taken upon the deliberate and willful orders of competent Soviet authorities.

When the B-50 failed to return to its base at the time required for its return, and could not be otherwise accounted for, the competent United States authorities commenced and conducted a meticulous and thorough search of the area by aircraft and by surface vessels of the United States Government and with the assistance of a naval vessel of the Australian Government in the area. The search of the Sea of Japan off Cape Povorotny succeeded in the sighting in the international waters of several survivors and disclosed the active presence in the same area of Soviet PT-type boats, trawlers and aircraft. One of the search aircraft dropped a lifeboat to a group of survivors but only Captain John E. Roche, the co-pilot, was able to reach the lifeboat and get into it. Intermittent fog hampered the rescue efforts and no other personnel could be rescued by the United States and Australian surface vessels. When the weather in the area cleared up, by dawn of July 30, 1953, no evidence of survivors, other than Captain Roche, could be seen in the international waters of the Sea of Japan by the air or surface rescue craft.

2. The United States Government finds, and charges, that in direct consequence of the Soviet Government's actions above described, the following took place:

a. The B-50 aircraft was totally destroyed.

b. First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, navigator situated in the nose of the aircraft, was thrown from his position and mortally wounded, so that he was unable to bail out from the aircraft, and died.

c. Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, the aircraft commander, although he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical injuries and shock and of his exposure for approximately twenty hours in the Sea of Japan.

d. Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, flight engineer, although he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical injuries and of shock and of long exposure in the Sea of Japan.

e. Captain John Ernst Roche, the co-pilot, was thrown headlong into the body of the aircraft, suffering numerous bodily injuries and shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft but he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft. He suffered further shock and expo-

sure in the Sea of Japan from approximately 6:17 in the morning local time, July 29, 1953, to approximately 4:20 in the morning local time July 30, 1953. He was rescued from the waters of the Sea of Japan by a search vessel of the United States Navy.

f. The remaining thirteen members of the crew have not so far been accounted for. The United States Government finds, however, that all of them suffered bodily injury and shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft. It finds further that a number, if not all, of them successfully parachuted to the surface of the Sea of Japan in the area above described in which the attack and destruction of the B-50 took place. It must conclude that these persons were either picked up alive by surface vessels of the Soviet Government in the area in which they hit the water, or that in due course, dead or alive, they were carried by the prevailing currents to Soviet-held territory and into the Soviet Government's custody. Those dead, the United States Government finds and charges, were brought to their death by the injuries caused in the course of the attack on the B-50 aircraft, by shock and by exposure in the waters of the Sea of Japan. Those that were alive when they came into the custody of the Soviet Government, the United States Government finds and charges, suffered in addition injuries and anguish caused by their long detention by the Soviet Government, by the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government with respect to their whereabouts and their condition or to permit them to communicate with United States Government authorities.

These conclusions are based on the following considerations:

(1) As the United States Government has previously indicated, personnel on board search craft of the United States Government observed at least twelve Soviet PT-type boats, at least one armed trawler-type Soviet naval vessel, and Soviet aircraft, proceeding at high speed to and from the area of the scene of the incident. Other surface vessels of Soviet nationality were in the vicinity. These observations were made as late as 3 o'clock in the afternoon local time July 29, 1953. In view of the failure of the Soviet Government to make responsive reply to questions of the United States Government in its note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States Government is confirmed in its conclusion, and it charges, that these Soviet craft picked up survivors and portions of the disabled B-50 aircraft.

(ii) The prevailing currents of the Sea of Japan at the positions above mentioned and at the date of the incident, which are well known to the Soviet Government, move toward the coast, in a northerly and northwesterly direction at a rate of approximately 0.7 to 1.1 knots. Even if the Soviet Government did not have these crew members in custody, dead or alive, earlier, it must have become aware of their arrival in Soviet territorial waters or on Soviet soil by August 1, 1953.

3. The B-50 aircraft at the time of the attack upon it and its destruction, and the navigational and flying equipment thereon, were in efficient and good working order. Each member of the crew was efficient and experienced in the performance of his task. In particular, Captain O'Kelley, the aircraft commander, was an efficient and experienced pilot; Captain Roche was an efficient and experienced co-pilot; First Lieutenant Czyz, First Lieutenant Wiggins and First Lieutenant Keith were efficient and experienced navigators.

II

The United States Government finds as a result of its investigation that in its notes above mentioned the Soviet Government willfully and knowingly made material mis-

statements of fact for the purpose of creating an untrue record and of misleading the United States Government. These misstatements of fact are most explicitly made in the Soviet Government's note of August 26, 1953 on this subject, which substantially reiterates the misstatements contained in the Soviet Government's earlier notes on the same subject:

1. The Soviet Government states that the B-50 aircraft at about 6 a. m. local time "violated the state boundary of the USSR, at first in the region of Cape Gamov, and continued the flight over the territory of the USSR at Askold Island not far from Vladivostok". But the Soviet Government has refused, although duly requested, to state where the boundary, which it claims, runs in this region. The United States Government must therefore conclude, as it has found, that the B-50 aircraft at no time crossed into territory of the Soviet Union in this area but, on the contrary, flew entirely in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan.

2. The Soviet Government states that two Soviet fighter aircraft approached the B-50 with the intention of showing the B-50 that it was within the boundaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with the intention of suggesting that the B-50 leave the air space of the Soviet Union. This statement must be characterized as false, as well as misleading, since the first intimation which the crew of the B-50 had of the approach of any aircraft was the destruction of the No. 1 engine on the B-50 by fire directed from one of the Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft, which had appeared without any warning whatever to the left and from below the B-50 aircraft. This fact and the shooting which immediately followed directed by MIG-15 type aircraft coming up without warning from behind the B-50 aircraft conclusively demonstrates that it was the intention of the MIG-15 interceptors, and of the competent Soviet authorities who dispatched them and controlled their actions, to give the crew of the B-50 aircraft no warning whatever but, on the contrary, to effect the B-50's destruction without any warning or opportunity to the crew to disengage or to defend themselves.

3. The Soviet Government's statement permits the implication that the interception of the B-50 by Soviet aircraft took place within the air space over Soviet territory. This statement is false also. As has been stated above, the interception as well as the attack took place approximately forty miles south of Cape Povorotny and in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan.

4. The Soviet Government states that fire was first opened by the B-50, being directed against the intercepting Soviet aircraft. This statement is false. As the United States Government has stated above, the B-50 aircraft did not open fire until after two firing passes had been made by the Soviet intercepting aircraft. The first MIG-15 type aircraft, which as stated above without warning destroyed the No. 1 engine, flew away unscathed. When immediately thereafter one or more MIG-15 type aircraft appeared from behind, the MIG aircraft were firing and the gunners on board the B-50 were compelled in self-defense to open fire against the MIG aircraft so firing upon the B-50.

5. The Soviet Government states that the attack took place at 6:12 in the morning local time. The United States Government charges that this statement is untrue and is known by the Soviet Government to be untrue. The United States Government has found that the interception and attack took place not earlier than 6:15 in the morning local time, if not later. By this time the B-50 aircraft, as the Soviet authorities well knew, had reached a point approximately forty miles off the Soviet land mass at its closest proximity.

6. The Soviet Government states that one of the Soviet aircraft was seriously damaged by fire from the B-50 in consequence of which the Soviet aircraft was compelled to fire upon the B-50. This statement is misleading as well as false. Even if, contrary to fact, the B-50 gunners had opened fire on the MIG aircraft appearing from the rear, the destruction of the No. 1 engine by the MIG aircraft which appeared first and the hostile attitude of the MIG aircraft appearing in the rear would have justified the B-50 gunners in opening fire on the MIG aircraft.

7. The Soviet Government states that after the Soviet aircraft fired on the B-50 the B-50 "departed in the direction of the sea" and that the Soviet authorities have no further information regarding the American military aircraft. This statement must be characterized as false as well as misleading. As stated above, within seconds after the Soviet aircraft hit the right wing and fuselage the B-50 disintegrated and fell into the sea. The pilots of the Soviet aircraft could not but have seen the consequence of their actions and reported it to the competent Soviet authorities. The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government admits that the pilots upon returning to base, if not earlier, reported what they had done and what had happened.

8. The Soviet Government indicates that it has "verified data", presumably including reports of ground observers as well as the testimony of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft involved, and that these data "refute the statement that the American airplane B-50 did not violate the boundary of the USSR and was attacked by Soviet fighters over the Sea of Japan". The Soviet Government, although duly requested in the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, has failed and refused to produce these supporting data. The United States Government is compelled to conclude that such data as exist do not support the Soviet Government's conclusion and that these statements are therefore false.

9. The Soviet Government states that, contrary to the allegations contained in the United States Government's notes, there were no Soviet surface ships on July 29, 1953 in the area of the Sea of Japan in which the shooting incident took place, and it further implies that the weather conditions of fog and darkness were such that the observations of the crews of search craft reported in the United States Government's notes were not in fact made. These statements, as above indicated, are false and misleading. The weather, during the hours of daylight, was in fact foggy but at the low altitudes at which the search aircraft flew, and on the surface of the sea at which the naval craft proceeded, there was as the Soviet Government well knows intermittent visibility permitting the ob-

servations which were made and which were reported by the United States Government.

10. The Soviet Government states that "as a result of investigation, it has been confirmed that the Soviet authorities have no information concerning the crew of the American bomber B-50". For the reasons above stated this statement must be characterized as false and misleading.

III

The United States Government finds and it charges that the foregoing actions of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft and of the competent Soviet authorities made the Soviet Government guilty of deliberate and willful violations of international law, on account of which it has become liable to the United States Government for damages and other amends:

1. Since the Soviet Government has evaded the questions in the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States Government declares that the limit of the territory of the Soviet Government in the area of the incident extends no further than three nautical miles from the mean low water mark of the shore line of the Soviet-held land mass in this area, following the sinuosities of the coast and the sinuosities of each of the Soviet-held islands. While the United States Government in instructions to its personnel has prohibited any overflying aircraft or seagoing craft from coming closer than twelve miles to Soviet-held territory in traversing the international waters of the Sea of Japan or the air space above, the United States Government takes this opportunity again to inform the Soviet Government that it does not recognize the claim of the Soviet Government to territorial waters in excess of three miles from its coast. In the opinion of the United States Government there is no obligation under international law to recognize claims to territorial waters in excess of three miles from the coast.

2. In the circumstances of the case it was the duty of the Soviet Government to make every effort, following the wrongful destruction of the B-50 aircraft, to search for and pick up members of the crew, dead or alive, to cooperate with all other searching aircraft and surface craft in such search and rescue operations and promptly to turn over to authorities of the United States Government rescued personnel, the bodies of any dead personnel picked up and any portions of the aircraft salvaged, or to make arrangements for their prompt delivery to the United States Government. The failure of the Soviet Government to do so constitutes violation of international obligations.

3. It was the duty of the Soviet Government to make truthful statements to the United States Government in the notes above mentioned which the Soviet Government delivered to the United States Government in connection with this incident. The willful making of false or misleading statements in these circumstances constitutes a violation of international obligation.

4. The continued detention of survivors by the Soviet Government, and the failure of the Soviet Government immediately upon receipt of information at any time from its own sources of the observation of bodies of any of the

crew members, constitute violations on the part of the Soviet Government of international obligation.

5. Any shooting by the crew of the B-50 at the MIG aircraft, in the circumstances of the case, was lawful as an exercise of the right of self-defense. The B-50 having been fired upon and hit without prior warning, the crew of the B-50 were justified in the exercise of self-defense in shooting at the approaching MIG aircraft.

IV

The United States has suffered the following items of damage in direct consequence of the foregoing illegal acts and violations of duty and international legal obligations, for which the Soviet Government is liable, and the United States Government demands that the Soviet Government pay the following sums on account thereof:

1. United States Air Force airplane B-50 type No. 47-145A and equipment thereon, amounting in total to \$1,468,908.56.

2. Damages to the United States by the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government \$491,584.38.

3. Damages to Captain John Ernst Roche, a national of the United States, for injuries to him, \$25,000.00.

4. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States, for the deaths of Captain Stanley Keith O'Kelley, Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, \$150,000.00.

5. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States, of the remaining thirteen crew members for all injuries resulting from the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government, including the wrongful deaths of such crew members or the wrongful and unlawful detention by the Soviet Government of such members of the crew as survived, \$650,000.00.

The United States Government declares that its demand for compensation on account of the members of the crew who survived does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the withholding of those crew members from return to the United States, or the suppression by the Soviet Government of information regarding their whereabouts or welfare, or the making of false statements by the Soviet Government with respect thereto. The United States takes this opportunity again to demand that the Soviet Government forthwith provide the information in this regard which the United States Government has already requested, and make provision for the prompt return of any crew members whom it may still be holding or of whose whereabouts it is informed, and in the interim to provide such crew members with the maximum degree of care and comfort and facilitate access to them by appropriate representatives of the United States Government. The United States Government further declares that such demand for compensation with respect to members of the crew whose bodies came into the custody of Soviet authorities but who were no longer alive does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government of such facts or to turn over such bodies to the United States Government. The United States Government further reserves the right to make additional demand upon the Soviet Government for amends or other actions on account of its conduct on

or since July 29, 1953 with respect to such survivors or such dead crew members.

Furthermore, the United States Government has not included in its demand for damages, specified above, any sum on account of items of intangible injury deliberately and intentionally caused to the United States Government and to the American people by the wrongful actions of the Soviet Government. In this regard the United States Government had determined to defer to a future date the formulation of the kind and measure of redress or other action which the Soviet Government should take which would be appropriate in international law and practice to confirm the illegality of the actions directed by the Soviet Government against the United States Government and against the American people.

The Government of the United States calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly to make its detailed answer to the allegations and demands made in this communication.

Should the Soviet Government in its answer acknowledge its indebtedness to the United States on account of the foregoing and agree to pay the damages suffered and to comply with the demands as above set forth, the United States Government is prepared, if requested, to present detailed evidence in support of its calculations of damages suffered and alleged. If, however, the Soviet Government contests liability, it is requested so to state in its answer. In the latter event, the Soviet Government is hereby notified that the United States Government deems an international dispute to exist falling within the competence of the International Court of Justice and that the United States Government proposes that that dispute be presented for hearing and decision in the International Court of Justice. Since it appears that the Soviet Government has thus far not filed with that Court any declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the United States Government invites the Soviet Government to file an appropriate declaration with the Court, or to enter into a Special Agreement, by which the Court may be empowered in accordance with its Statute and Rules to determine the issues of fact and law which have been set forth herein.

The Soviet Government is requested to inform the United States Government in its reply to the present note of its intentions with respect to such a declaration or Special Agreement.

Albanian Independence Day

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 671 dated November 27

November 28 marks the anniversary of the two historic events most cherished by the Albanian people: the first proclamation of Albanian independence in 1443 and the reemergence of Albania as an independent nation in 1912.

The traditional friendship of the United States for the people of Albania has sprung from a natural American sympathy with Albanian aspirations for liberty. Since World War I, this sympathy has expressed itself in important actions of support by the United States for the sovereign independence of the Albanian nation and for the welfare of its people. Whenever contacts between Americans and Albanians occur, we are reminded that the Albanian people retain a keen appreciation of past evidences of U.S. interest and that, in consequence, a special bond of understanding between the peoples of the two countries has been firmly established.

The present sufferings of the Albanian people under Communist oppression and their strong desire to be rid of this alien yoke are matters of deep concern to the United States. The American Government and people recognize the right of the Albanian people to a sovereign national status, to genuinely democratic institutions, and to a government of their free choice. During the past few years, the United States has noted with satisfaction declarations by official spokesmen of the neighboring countries in support of a free and independent Albania. Americans look forward to the ultimate resumption by Albania of its rightful place in the community of nations, and the U.S. Government will not cease its advocacy of this goal.

Economic Cooperation in the Americas

*Statement by George M. Humphrey
Secretary of the Treasury¹*

I am happy to participate in this Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Economy. Many of us have met on other occasions, most recently at the annual meetings of the International Bank and International Monetary Fund 2 months ago.² I am delighted to extend my acquaintance with you and to meet with you here.

Just before leaving Washington we discussed with President Eisenhower the views of the United States delegation on the problems we shall discuss here. He emphasized to us his deep interest in this historic meeting and asked that we convey a personal message to our colleagues here. With your kind permission I shall read it:

I am very pleased to send greetings and best wishes to the Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Economy of the American family of nations, convened in Rio de Janeiro, the capital of our great sister nation, Brazil. I am happy to send this message through our Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Humphrey, who, as Chairman of the United States Delegation, speaks for our nation and will authoritatively present our policies.

I am confident that this conference will advance still further the unique relationships which have developed among the peoples and nations of this hemisphere. As those relationships evolved and grew, the people of the United States learned to call their own attitude toward their sister nations the policy of the good neighbor. Today, the bonds which unite us as sovereign equals who are working side by side for the betterment of all of us—nations and citizens—have elevated this neighborly relationship to one of genuine partnership.

No longer is it sufficient to maintain the mutual respect and cordiality of neighbors, useful and pleasant as that

is. In the world of today, the well-being and the economic development—as well as the security—of all peace-loving nations are so closely interrelated that we must be partners. If this is true in the larger context, it is especially true among the American republics where we share the same traditions and many of the same favorable circumstances for progress.

As the conference discusses a wide variety of measures for economic and financial cooperation in this hemisphere, and endorses those that are sound and durable, I earnestly hope that the meeting as a whole may join with the delegation of the United States in common dedication to the policy of the good partner.

To this may I add my best wishes for the success of the conference and warm personal greetings to each of its members.

Let me say that every member of the United States delegation shares those convictions.

While this gathering was called in response to a resolution of the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas earlier this year, this Conference is in reality the realization of a desire expressed repeatedly throughout the rise and development of the inter-American system. It is the desire to strengthen the continental economy so as to benefit all the nations that share the hemisphere.

That desire was first manifested in the act of the United States Congress that convened the first Pan American Conference in Washington 65 years ago. The same desire created the Pan American Union, which has now become the Organization of American States. Today it finds expression in the statutes of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council which provide that it shall “promote the economic and social welfare of the American nations through effective cooperation among them for the best utilization of their natural resources.”

We are not gathered here, then, because of an

¹Made before the Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Economy at Quitandinha, Brazil, on Nov. 23 (Treasury Department press release).

²For a statement made by Mr. Humphrey at a joint session of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and Fund, see BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 548.

emergency situation, nor is this meeting an impulse of the moment. It is not an isolated or disconnected event in inter-American relations; but it is a new endeavor, one more step in the search for economic cooperation and solidarity toward which your countries and mine will continually strive.

We have come here with the same spirit of cordial solidarity with which the delegates of our nations arrived in this city of proverbial hospitality for the Third Pan American Conference. To describe it I shall borrow the eloquence of a great fellow countryman, Elihu Root, at that time Secretary of State, who said:

I bring from my country a special greeting to her elder sisters in the civilization of America. . . . There is not one of all our countries that cannot benefit the others; there is not one that cannot receive benefit from the others; there is not one that will not gain by the prosperity, the peace and happiness of all.

And so it is today. Our country is part of the inter-American system; our Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, recently affirmed that this is the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

We take our places with pride in this association of states which has established the complete equality of all members, has consecrated the principle of nonintervention, and has built a juridical system that has put an end to war among American nations.

We have bound ourselves, moreover, by pacts that stipulate that an attack on one American nation is an attack on all of them, and that any threat to the political integrity of one is a threat to all.

Our presence here at this Conference is a declaration that we also consider economic solidarity as part of the common defense.

None of us expects that we can at this meeting solve all of the economic problems of a hemisphere. But we can confidently expect that 21 nations, each motivated by a deep and brotherly interest in the welfare of every other, can accomplish enough here to convince us all that our efforts were richly rewarded, that our accomplishments justify our looking forward to future meetings.

We all have our own ideas as to how the economic interests of the entire continent could be promoted. We in the United States naturally subscribe to those principles that in our own country have proved effective in raising the living standards of the people and promoting the prosperity of the Nation. We shall present them here

with the same friendly frankness with which we are ready to listen to the opinions of other delegations.

No one of us alone has the wisdom and experience necessary to solve all our problems. That is what this Conference is for: to exchange ideas, to draw closer together, to arrive at a promising and practical basis for cooperation, and to pave the way for constructive steps toward our goals.

It is with that spirit that my country's delegation has come to this Conference. We look forward with great interest to hearing your views, and we welcome the opportunity to lay before you our ideas on the problems that now engage our mutual attention.

But we shall never lose from sight the hemispheric interest, the welfare of the American family of nations, the need to fortify the inter-American system that past generations have bequeathed to us and that it is our duty to pass on, intact and improved, to future generations. When we shall have finished our work here, it should be possible to speak of this meeting in the same words as those used by a great American, the Baron of Rio Branco, in commenting on the Third Pan American Conference, when he said:

Here concessions represent conquests of reason, amicable compromises or compensations counselled by reciprocal interests.

We would first hope for a clear definition of the economic goals toward which we shall press. We are profoundly aware that we are here not so much as representatives of political entities; instead we are here as the spokesmen for 330 millions of men, women, and children whose problems, whose sufferings, and whose aspirations must constantly be present in our thoughts and in our deliberations. When we speak of economic development, international trade, and the other subjects of our agenda, we must be mindful that each is significant only in so far as it has a direct relation to our peoples, to their families, to their homes, and to their work.

I believe that we are capable of putting into words here at this meeting just what it is that our people would have us accomplish, and I believe that we can adopt that definition as our goal. It seems to us that the men and women of the Americas, living as they do among our mountains, on our plains, and along our seacoasts, are united and clear in their aspirations. They do not ask the

impossible, but they do demand of us, who as government officials are their servants, that we promote those conditions which will give maximum assurance that everywhere in our Americas man has an opportunity to better himself, give his children even greater opportunities, and enjoy meanwhile those freedoms which we have achieved in the Americas and which are denied to so many millions elsewhere in the world.

I believe that we must face another problem in which our people are vitally interested. All of us are exposed to an insidious disease that stealthily robs us of our strength. It is the evil of inflation which makes the prices of food, of clothing, of all the necessities of life climb upward in a grim spiral which again and again snatches away the benefits of progress.

Our goal must be twofold—to unite our efforts to achieve the kind of economic development that means higher living standards for our people, and to take those wise and prudent measures which will avoid the evil of inflation. If here we make progress toward these goals, we shall have earned the gratitude of our people.

This is a goal that is achievable in the Americas. God has endowed this hemisphere with abundant and varied natural resources, with vast and fertile lands that are capable of affording an ever better life to our rapidly multiplying peoples. There is peace throughout our hemisphere. In a troubled world ours is a situation so privileged, so favorable, that it becomes our duty to examine critically the responsibilities that must accompany such advantages. Each of us singly and all of us jointly must strive to accomplish those things which will best and most effectively employ these lands and those resources to benefit our peoples.

Our agenda is admirably fashioned to help us appraise not only our place today on the road which has already brought us so far toward our goal, but also the measures which we can take jointly and severally to hasten our progress on that road. It is our conviction that to accomplish this purpose two basic principles should underlie all our thinking. The first is our belief that the road which will lead most surely and most directly to the goals which we seek is that of the vigorous free enterprise system. This system in its modern form builds new industries, new enterprises, and opens new areas to development. And it does all these things without endangering those free insti-

tutions which are the very foundation of the social and human progress which we have achieved in this hemisphere.

The other is our belief that we as governments should reduce to a minimum the scope and the duration of our own intervention in the fields of commerce and industry. We best serve our people when we encourage them to produce the goods and services required for our progress, when we stimulate them to bring new regions and new resources into productive use, rather than when we compete with them or otherwise take over the functions of private enterprise. Government intervention deprives the people of the full benefits of their earnings. Experience has demonstrated that almost without exception, in my own country and elsewhere, such intervention lowers production and raises costs.

We shall support and defend the right of every state to define its own economic course. Our own belief in the principles I have stated derives from the fact that wherever they have been applied in the Americas and elsewhere in the world they have brought improvement in the lives of our peoples, improvement that can be measured in terms of lower costs; greater per capita income; higher production; improvement that is visible in new factories, industries, and increased agricultural production; and intensified conversion of idle and undeveloped natural resources into jobs and usable wealth. These are the marks of vigorous, expanding, and self-reliant economies. These are the economic ends that we pursue.

The detailed discussion of each agenda item is the function of our committees. I would like, however, to say a word or two regarding our views on some of the more vital ones.

U. S. Views on International Trade

The first is international trade. We intend to the utmost of our ability to maintain a strong, healthy economy in the United States. This will insure a growing volume of trade with your countries at a steadily increasing level of demand. This will help sustain a high level of demand for the world's goods and so foster trade on a mutually beneficial basis. My Government is convinced that a strong, stable, and expanding international trade is the best single guaranty of economic strength in our hemisphere.

We are happy to see that our trade with each

other is a most important and growing factor in the international commerce of every American State. It is in the interest of each of us that this wholesome interchange be strengthened and expanded. For your economic development you count heavily upon markets in the United States for your products. We value just as highly the strong markets which you afford for our own agricultural and manufactured exports. We hope to see our inter-American trade, which has increased so greatly in recent years, further expanded and the markets available to producers in all our countries strengthened by the gradual elimination of those artificial barriers that hinder access to them. Such a trade policy will increase mutually beneficial trade. This emphasis on expanding trade opportunities continues to be a fundamental part of President Eisenhower's foreign economic program, which it is his announced intention to press in the forthcoming session of the Congress in January.

Our tariffs on imports from Latin America are low. Two-thirds of all our imports from this area are on the free list, and tariffs on the remaining third are among the lowest in the world.

We have also made marked progress in freeing imports into the United States from unnecessary and cumbersome customs requirements. Our Congress passed customs simplification acts in 1953 and again in 1954. The first authorized the Treasury to eliminate many technical requirements which were a burden on imports. The act passed this year continued this program and also directed the Tariff Commission to undertake a study of our complicated tariff classification structure with a view to its clarification.

These congressional steps have been accompanied by an intensive management-improvement program and by administrative simplification within the framework of existing law, both contributing to speedier customs action. We are continuing our efforts along these lines and plan to submit to the next Congress further legislative proposals consistent with the President's program of last March. As an example of the progress we are making, just a few weeks ago we announced a further relaxation of requirements for consular invoices^a—an action made possible by the 1953 simplification act.

The problem of international trade is closely related to that of prices. We are aware of your intense and very understandable interest in this problem as it relates to the prices for your products sold in world markets. We share that interest, not only because of the importance to you of adequate and stable prices but also because our own producers suffer when the prices of their exports fluctuate widely.

Our experience convinces us that if we as governments follow policies which will give our producers everywhere maximum assurance that consumption of their products will enjoy a steady and healthy growth and that their access to international markets will be facilitated, then we will have gone far toward solving this basic problem of prices which so concerns us all.

Financing Economic Development

The subject of financing for economic development is one of the most important which we shall consider. My Government has devoted much study to its policies in this field and, within the framework of the general principles to which I have referred, has reached certain decisions of whose nature you are already aware and whose effect we believe will prove to be far reaching.

When we speak of the great need for economic-development financing in this hemisphere, what we are really saying is that throughout our countries there are profitable and attractive opportunities for the establishment of productive enterprises that will provide steady employment to our people, that will provide more of the goods and services which we need for higher standards of living, and that will diversify our economies. These opportunities cannot be converted into realities without capital, technical knowledge, and experience. As governments, we owe it to our people to promote those conditions which will help make available the capital and technical knowledge required.

I think that every one of us here can agree that in this field our greatest opportunity and our greatest responsibility lies in creating in our several countries those conditions which will give maximum access to the great reserves of private-investment capital that are available throughout the world. The reason is obvious. The aggregate amount of private capital that is available today in

^a *Ibid.*, Nov. 22, 1954, p. 779.

your countries, in mine, and in the rest of the world is many times greater than any that we as governments could possibly provide. Economic development in those countries which have successfully established access to the world's supplies of private capital is going ahead with a rapidity that is astonishing.

We all recognize that the movement of private capital cannot be forced; that private investors of all nationalities enter only where the circumstances are attractive. So numerous are the investment opportunities throughout the free world today that he who seeks investment capital must compete for it. But here again the position of Latin America is privileged and fortunate. Throughout your countries there are challenging and attractive opportunities for new investments such as are found only in young and rapidly developing economies. These factors give you very real advantages in competing for investment capital.

It is easy to understand, therefore, why the American States whose governments have established those conditions which have always proved attractive to private investors everywhere in the world have experienced little difficulty in finding ample supplies of capital, both domestic and foreign. This has been demonstrated so dramatically that there can be no longer any doubt but that in this favored area of the world, where nature has done its part so well, each government can, if it will, attract a volume of private investment that will compare most favorably with that of any other area of the world.

One of the things which our governments must do to encourage free enterprise is to insure that those projects necessary for economic development, but for which private capital is not reasonably available, are adequately supported by public investment. We view this as a necessary support to an economy which relies principally upon private enterprise as supplementing and encouraging, rather than as displacing, free enterprise. I am sure that each government will shoulder as much of its burden as it reasonably can, but we agree with you that substantial foreign lending will be necessary if we are to achieve our goals in this hemisphere. We shall do our part generously and loyally in meeting that need.

To that end we have reviewed the whole scope of our public-lending policies and have arrived at certain changes which we consider significant.

Changes in U.S. Lending Policies

The first relates to the United States Export-Import Bank, whose activities are to be intensified and expanded.

This past summer, the Congress of the United States by specific legislation increased the lending authority of the bank from \$4½ billion to \$5 billion, in anticipation of its increased lending activity. In his report to the Senate on this legislation, Senator Capehart, Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, stated:

The Export-Import Bank has played an important role in our foreign economic policy and must continue to do so on an activated scale. Promotion of trade among the free nations of the world, and in particular, with the nations of the western hemisphere, is of utmost importance to the common welfare, the common defense, and the solidarity of the free world.

Within the last few months the Export-Import Bank has authorized loans of \$130 million to nations in this hemisphere, and other important loans are under consideration. The loans which have been authorized will help two important Latin American cities develop municipal waterworks systems and will make possible the development of one of the world's largest copper deposits. The bank has made loans to finance the sale in Latin America of machine tools, of aircraft, of electric equipment, of textile equipment, and of wheat. It has facilitated the development of sulphur production. The range of its activities has been as wide and varied as the production process itself, from the extraction of basic materials to the fabrication of complex industrial products. Since its organization the Export-Import Bank has authorized loans in excess of \$2¼ billion to Latin America.

Within the past few weeks, the Export-Import Bank has opened up new sources of credit for the countries of Latin America that wish to import equipment from the United States. With the assistance of lines of credit from the Export-Import Bank, United States exporters will be able to offer medium-term credit on equipment of a productive nature. This program will be in addition to long-term capital and should help to accelerate the flow of trade and ease temporary credit problems.

In addition, a large New York bank announced last week that it proposes to form a multimillion dollar export financing company. The Export-Import Bank will also participate in this new

venture. This enterprise will add further to the supplies of medium-term credit available to Latin American importers of capital goods.

In the field of economic development, of course, the International Bank has a primary role to play in helping to promote the economic growth of the American Republics. Most of the countries represented here were founding fathers of the International Bank. Your countries and my own participated in its establishment, and we have contributed importantly to its personnel and capital. The International Bank is our common institution. It was established to carry the major burden of financing reconstruction and development loans at a governmental level. While the International Bank in the early postwar years was primarily concerned with reconstruction, it has accelerated the tempo of its operations and has, more recently, concentrated its major efforts on economic development. The International Bank has financed a steady succession of high-priority development projects in Latin America. The total now exceeds \$500 million for the last 5 years. Its first development loan was in Latin America, and today its investment in this hemisphere is greater than in any other developing area. Its loans have been made primarily for basic facilities and public works on which further fruitful investment depends: for electric power, for transportation, and for communication facilities. The loans of the International Bank are important not only in themselves but in their secondary effects. Electric-power installations, new road and communication systems, new port facilities, all have encouraged new industries and lowered costs. Development is a cumulative process, setting in motion innumerable individual efforts with multiplying effect.

In his report to the Conference, Eugene Black, President of the bank, states:

It is my personal judgment that, given a continuance of present trends in Latin America, there is every reason to expect expanded lending activity by the bank in that area during the period which lies ahead. The bank has the resources to do so and it has the will to do so. The extent to which it may be able to translate its will into action depends largely on conditions within the control of the Latin American countries themselves.

At the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank last September, representatives from many of the American Republics

strongly urged support for the establishment of an international finance corporation to encourage private investment. The subject has been under study for several years.

Proposed International Finance Corporation

The matter has been given most careful consideration by the United States Government, and we are going to ask the Congress to support United States participation in such a corporation.⁴ We have in mind an institution organized as an affiliate of the International Bank, with an authorized capital of \$100 million to be contributed by those members of the International Bank who wish to subscribe.

The corporation would be able to make loans without the guaranty of member governments. It would not directly provide equity financing. It would, however, be empowered to hold securities bearing interest payable only if earned, as well as debentures convertible into stock when purchased from the corporation by private investors. In that way it would operate in the area of venture capital without holding equity right of control. It would not compete with the International Bank or the Export-Import Bank, and indeed it would facilitate private investment.

If the international finance corporation is established, we shall then have three major financial institutions to help promote economic development. We shall have the Export-Import Bank that has had a long history of useful work in Latin America and whose activities are to be intensified. We shall have the International Bank, in which we are partners, to help finance basic resource development. We shall have an international finance corporation in which we would work together to assist and encourage private enterprise.

In the spirit of the resolution on private investment and taxation adopted at the Caracas Conference, the United States continues to explore feasible measures to remove tax impediments to increased foreign investments. The administration and the Congress, as well as numerous private groups in the United States, have given the matter intensive study. This has disclosed the complexity of the problems involved. In the light of this experience, the administration will again sub-

⁴ For the Treasury Department's announcement of Nov. 11, see *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 814.

mit to the Congress proposals with respect to the reduction of taxation of foreign income along the general lines recommended by the President last year. We trust these proposals will find acceptance by the Congress.

We desire to complement these unilateral legislative steps with bilateral tax treaties. To that end, we are prepared to explore with individual countries the possibilities of the tax treaty as a medium for creating a more favorable tax climate for international trade and investment. For example, one of the matters which might be considered in treaty discussions is how the United States might give recognition to tax concessions made to foreign capital by the country where the investment is to be made. Under proper safeguards, we would be prepared to recommend giving credit for general foreign income taxes which are waived for an initial limited period as we now grant credit for taxes which are imposed. Such a measure as this will give maximum effectiveness to your own laws designed to encourage new enterprises.

Our agenda includes the subject of programing. Individual nations will no doubt continue to develop their overall approaches to their own economic-development problems. If any such nations wish to exchange views on their plans with other nations undertaking similar development plans, it may well be that this organization can provide such a meeting place.

We recommend that each of us expand and further diversify our joint activities in the vital field of technical cooperation. The interchange of people under this program draws us closer together and provides a better understanding of each other's problems. Through technical cooperation we pool our accumulated experience and knowledge to utilize the human and natural resources available to us as we seek to match resources against our needs. The enormous mutual benefits already produced by our efforts in this field justify our confidence in its future expansion.

We approach our talks here together with a sense of mission, which I am sure is common to us all. The challenge of the years ahead is a tremendous one. How we meet it may determine our place in history. We have great faith and confidence in the peoples and the lands that share this hemisphere. The human and physical resources are here out of which to build a glorious future.

The President of my country has very rightly called us partners in this great enterprise. He has declared the policy of our Government to be that of the good partner.

I know that the American States can be good partners, determined to work for the betterment of all our people. If we are energetic and practical, I am confident that we stand on the threshold of a great tomorrow. As good partners we can make this coming together at Rio a momentous one in the bright and lengthening record of inter-American relations.

U.S.-Yugoslav Economic Talks

Text of Joint Communiqué

Press release 663 dated November 22

Mutually beneficial informal discussions on economic matters which have been under way since November 12 between representatives of the Yugoslav and United States Governments, were concluded today.

The Yugoslav delegation was under the leadership of General Svetozar Vukmanovic, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, assisted by Mr. Stanislav Kopeck, Counsellor in the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Kiro Gligorov, Deputy Director of the Yugoslav Federal Planning Institute. The Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Leo Mates, also was present.

For the American side, the talks were conducted by Mr. Harold Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration; Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr.; Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thorsten Kalijarvi; and Dr. D. A. Fitzgerald, Foreign Operations Administration Deputy Director.

During the talks, a broad informal exchange of views took place on many aspects of Yugoslavia's economic situation. Particular attention was directed to Yugoslavia's balance of payments position, its supply of wheat and raw materials, and its foreign debt burden. The talks have led to an increased understanding on the part of the representatives of the two countries of their mutual problems, and it is anticipated that further consideration of these matters will be carried forward in Belgrade.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During November 1954

ILO Metal Trades Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva	Oct. 25-Nov. 6
Bogotá International Exposition	Bogotá	Oct. 29-Nov. 21
UNESCO Executive Board	Montevideo	Nov. 1-15
UNESCO Budget Committee	Montevideo	Nov. 1-10
U. N. ECAFE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East.	Bangkok	Nov. 1-6
Fao Working Party on Afforestation and Reforestation	Geneva	Nov. 5-6
1st World Conference of Printing Enterprises	São Paulo	Nov. 6-13
14th International Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy	Luxembourg.	Nov. 7-12
International Philatelic Exposition	São Paulo	Nov. 7-17
Fao European Forestry Commission: 7th Session	Geneva	Nov. 8-13
Meeting on Fur-Seal Investigation	Tokyo	Nov. 8-24
U. N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources	Bangkok	Nov. 8-13
Fao Meeting on Economic Aspects of the Rice Situation	Rangoon	Nov. 11-20
Customs Cooperation Council	Brussels	Nov. 15-18
ILO Governing Body: 127th Session	Rome	Nov. 16-19
ICEM <i>Ad Hoc</i> Subcommittee on Draft Rules and Regulations	Geneva	Nov. 22-24
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee	London	Nov. 22-29
International Sugar Council: Executive Committee	London	Nov. 23-29
International Sugar Council: 3d Session	London	Nov. 24-25
ICEM Subcommittee on Finance: 6th Session	Geneva	Nov. 25-26

In Session as of November 30, 1954

U. N. General Assembly: 9th Regular Session	New York	Sept. 21-
ICAO Air Navigation Commission: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 21-
ICAO Air Transport Committee: 23d Session	Montreal	Sept. 27-
ICAO Council: 23d Session	Montreal	Sept. 28-
GATT Contracting Parties: 9th Session	Geneva	Oct. 28-
U. N. Ecosoc: Resumed 18th Session	New York	Nov. 5-
UNESCO General Conference: 8th Session	Montevideo	Nov. 12-
ICAO Airworthiness Panel Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 15-
International Trade Fair	São Paulo	Nov. 15-
ICAO Special European-Mediterranean Communications Meeting	Paris	Nov. 16-
IA-Ecosoc: 4th Extraordinary Meeting (Ministers of Finance or Economy).	Quitandinha (Brazil)	Nov. 22-
ILO 8th International Conference of Labor Statisticians	Geneva	Nov. 23-
Caribbean Commission: 19th Meeting	Port-of-Spain (Trinidad)	Nov. 29-
ICEM Intergovernmental Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	Nov. 30-

Scheduled December 1, 1954-February 28, 1955

U. N. High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees: 5th Session.	Geneva	Dec. 6-
Fao 4th World Forestry Congress	Dehra Dun (India)	Dec. 11-
NAC Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Dec. 16*-
Inter-American Seminar on Secondary Education	Santiago	Dec. 29-
U. N. Ecosoc Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 4-
Who Standing Committee on Administration and Finance	Geneva	Jan. 10-
U. N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Trade: 1st Session	Hong Kong	Jan. 10-
Pan American Highway Congress: Permanent Executive Com- mittee.	Mexico City	Jan. 13-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 24, 1954. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: ILO, International Labor Organization; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; U. N., United Nations; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; Fao, Food and Agriculture Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; Icao, International Civil Aviation Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Ecosoc, Economic and Social Council; IA-Ecosoc, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; NAC, North Atlantic Council; Who, World Health Organization.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled December 1, 1954–February 28, 1955—Continued

U. N. Ecosoc Commission on International Commodity Trade: 1st Session.	New York	Jan. 17
Who Executive Board: 15th Meeting	Geneva	Jan. 18–
U. N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 24–
International Pacific Halibut Commission	Seattle	January
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission	Vancouver	January
U. N. Ecosoc Fiscal Commission: 5th Session	New York	January*
U. N. Trusteeship Council: 15th Session	New York	January*
GATT Tariff Negotiations With Japan	Geneva	Feb. 1–
ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 7–
U. N. Ecosoc Transport and Communications Commission: 7th Session.	New York	Feb. 7–

The Problem of Defining Aggression

*Statements by Charles H. Mahoney
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

A REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

U.S. delegation press release 1979 dated October 15

The problem of whether to define “aggression,” and, if so, how, is as old as the United Nations Organization and older. The word “aggression” appears more than once in the charter and is a key word in relation to the powers and responsibilities of United Nations political organs for preserving world peace.

At the charter conference of San Francisco in 1945, the question of whether to define the term “aggression” in the constitutional instrument of this Organization was directly debated. The considered opinion of the conference was that this should not be done, and it was not.

Since 1945 the General Assembly has several times come back to survey the problem of definition. The present series of debates began 4 years ago this autumn. At that time the General Assembly referred to the International Law Commission a draft definition of aggression proposed by the Soviet Union and asked the Commission to “formulate its conclusions as soon as possible.” In the succeeding year the Commission met, and

accepted its assignment as a request to make an attempt to define aggression and report back. When it came to the point of substantive discussion, the Commission had before it a report by Mr. Spiropoulos,² in which it was concluded that: “A ‘legal’ definition of aggression would be an artificial construction,” which could never be comprehensive enough to comprise all imaginable cases of aggression, since the methods of aggression are in constant process of evolution.

After consideration of various proposals, the Commission took as the basis of definition a draft by Mr. Alfaro,³ but this formula, as submitted to final vote, was rejected 7 to 3 with one abstention. A proposal to make further attempts was defeated 6 to 4 with one abstention. At a later point the Commission inserted into the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind a statement including acts of aggression and threats thereof as such offenses. After debate of the Report of the International Law Commission, the Sixth Assembly Session, by a small majority, recorded the view that it was “possible and desir-

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) on Oct. 15, Nov. 4, and Nov. 8.

² Jean Spiropoulos, Greek representative on Committee VI.

³ Ricardo Alfaro of Panama.

able . . . to define aggression by reference to the elements which constitute it."

A new debate on the question of definition was held at the Seventh Session of the General Assembly 2 years ago. As requested by the Assembly, the Secretary-General presented a most thorough report discussing the whole question.⁴ Various formulas were put forward by the delegations to the Assembly. No general agreement on any formula was reached, and the whole matter was referred to a Special Committee. That Committee, which met in 1953 and whose report is contained in document A/2638, likewise reached no agreement. The report is a most interesting synthesis of the very conscientious work done by the representatives of the 15 member states selected to serve on the Committee.

In listening to the statements of the distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union, Panama, and Cuba, and to the introductory statements by you, Mr. Chairman,⁵ and by the distinguished rapporteur of the Special Committee,⁶ we were vividly reminded of the difficulties and pitfalls that lie across the path of efforts to define aggression. The experience of the United Nations in coping with this matter shows that, in repeated attempts, it has not been possible to reach general agreement on any word formula to define the term. When the charter was drafted, the considered judgment of the international community was that it would be wiser not to attempt an a priori paper definition. The United States has not been persuaded of the wisdom of any other course.

Dangers in Paper Definitions

There are obvious dangers in a priori paper definitions. A formula may be intended as a complete statement of what constitutes aggression, and yet the formula may fail to include mention of one or more types of conduct which would in fact be aggressive. In this way a potential aggressor would be effectively invited to pursue paths which seemed unwittingly to have been licensed by the community of nations.

A definition of aggression may expressly disclaim to be all-inclusive and complete. Yet it may

nevertheless give an emphasis to the specified types of conduct which would be unbalanced and perhaps harmful to the general cause of keeping world peace. New events are constantly changing the world we live in; emphasis on one set of elements given properly and truly today may be false in another year.

Some of the suggestions already made in this Committee for a general definition accompanied by a list of examples of acts constituting aggression would necessarily entail emphasis on the acts listed. Who can say with certainty now what acts should be selected for the listing? If, on the other hand, an effort is made to be complete, we have again the problem of inadvertent omissions. The general definition itself would leave still unelaborated such concepts as self-defense and action inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. It is actually to be feared that the mixed type of definition would carry the disadvantages of both the general type and the enumerative.

The United States has also a certain distrust of setting up a priori categories into which future actions and situations are to be classified as they arise. This seems particularly true where the United Nations Organization is still relatively young and where the law of the United Nations is still in a relatively early stage of development. We have a much larger confidence in the soundness of empirical development of law, with the rules growing out of the actual cases and with any re-statements or codifications of law held in abeyance pending an adequate practical experience.

It is also impossible to escape the realization that aggression is not simply the admixture of certain predefined elements in given proportions. To determine the occurrence of aggression is to make a total value judgment on the whole complex of facts and circumstances in an actual situation.

A realization of this led the founders of the United Nations to deal with the problem of aggression not by word formulas but through the living processes of the United Nations political organs. The Security Council was created for the purpose of applying international law standards, including those of the charter, to events in the real world. This is the meaning of article 39, which lays down that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken

⁴ U.N. doc. A/2211 dated Oct. 2, 1952.

⁵ F. García Amador of Cuba.

⁶ Salah A. Tarazi of Syria.

in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

Position at San Francisco

Joseph Paul-Boncour, rapporteur of Committee III/3 at San Francisco, had the following to say on this problem:

A more protracted discussion developed in the Committee on the possible insertion in paragraph 2, Section B, Chapter VIII, of the determination of acts of aggression.

Various amendments proposed on this subject recalled the definitions written into a number of treaties concluded before this war but did not claim to specify all cases of aggression. They proposed a list of eventualities in which intervention by the Council would be automatic. At the same time they would have left to the Council the power to determine the other cases in which it should likewise intervene.

Although this proposition evoked considerable support, it nevertheless became clear to a majority of the Committee that a preliminary definition of aggression went beyond the possibilities of this Conference and the purpose of the Charter. The progress of the technique of modern warfare renders very difficult the definition of all cases of aggression. It may be noted that, the list of such cases being necessarily incomplete, the Council would have a tendency to consider of less importance the acts not mentioned therein; these omissions would encourage the aggressor to distort the definition or might delay action by the Council. Furthermore, in the other cases listed, automatic action by the Council might bring about a premature application of enforcement measures.

The Committee therefore decided to adhere to the text drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks and to leave to the Council the entire decision as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.

In today's world we must keep in mind that the General Assembly also may have responsibilities with respect to acts of aggression. This was made clear by the resolution “Uniting for Peace” (377(V)) adopted at the Fifth Session of the Assembly.

Thus, both the General Assembly and the Security Council are in a position where their success in safeguarding international peace and security can be jeopardized by adoption of a definition of aggression. As matters stand under the charter in the absence of a paper definition, there can be no question that, as the Sixth Session of the General Assembly observed in its resolution previously quoted, “the existence of the crime of aggression may be inferred from the circumstances peculiar to each particular case.”

There is this year an additional factor which my

delegation believes should influence us not to proceed now with the effort to crystallize and harden an abstract definition of aggression. That is the appearance of the term “aggression” in a memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom and France to a subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission on June 11, 1954.¹ The memorandum dealt in part with a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons and suggested a declaration prohibiting their use “except in defense against aggression.” We have noted a Soviet proposal in the First Committee of the present General Assembly to refer this suggestion back to the Disarmament Commission for further study and clarification.² The Commission will doubtless resume its work and take up again the consideration of matters ranging across the whole field of disarmament, including the joint United Kingdom-France suggestion of June 11 to which I have referred. In these circumstances it seems to my delegation the part of wisdom to refrain here from any action on abstract definitions of aggression which could conceivably prejudice the possible success of negotiations on disarmament.

I have taken some time to review the history of this problem of defining aggression and some of the considerations which seem relevant to the United States delegation because this history and these considerations all point to a conclusion: no constructive purpose would be served at this time by the preparation of a formula to define aggression. The General Assembly should now consider that it has explored to the limits of usefulness the possibilities of defining aggression by a word formula prepared today for possible applications in the future.

PROPOSALS BY IRAN AND PANAMA, CHINA

U.S. delegation press release 2006 dated November 4

The U.S. delegation has listened with interest to the extended and thorough general debate which has taken place in this committee on the question of defining aggression. That general debate now being ended, it is time for the committee to address itself to the resolutions before the committee. I would like to make a few observations on some of the proposals which are before us.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 182.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1954, p. 625.

The draft resolution of the U.S.S.R.,⁹ introduced at the outset of this discussion, has been before the members of the committee for a sufficient length of time that a number of speakers have had an opportunity to refer to it in their statements during the general debate. Indeed, we think the Soviet draft has been adequately discussed, and I do not propose to make any further comments on it at this time.

There have been circulated at the last stage of the general debate two new draft resolutions, one of which appears to have been discussed with certain delegations outside the committee room for a number of days and has been referred to in our committee debate; the other is a draft resolution introduced by the delegate of China. I should like to comment on these two drafts.

The first, introduced by Iran and Panama,¹⁰ commences with a paragraph of preamble which quotes a paragraph of preamble from General Assembly Resolution 599 (VI) of 3 years ago. It might conceivably have been appropriate at that time for the General Assembly to express itself in favor of defining aggression in order both to promote international peace and security and to develop international criminal law. These are somewhat separate undertakings and would, of course, require different treatment and procedures. Now, however, we find in the draft resolution of Iran and Panama that the two purposes are kept joined together as the result of what seems to be an automatic and insufficiently considered quoting from the resolution of the Sixth Assembly. This paragraph of preamble in the draft resolution now before us introduces an element of confusion as to whether the definition proposed by Iran and Panama is a definition of aggression relating to the international obligations of states, relating to criminal responsibilities of individuals, or both. The matter seems not to have been thought through.

The next paragraph of preamble in the draft resolution introduced by Iran and Panama speaks of "directives" to "such international bodies as may be called upon to determine the aggressor," and the operative portion of the draft resolution begins with the dogmatic expression "declares." Under the charter, it is clear that the General As-

sembly cannot give directives to the Security Council; it cannot even bind future sessions of the Assembly itself. If the "international bodies" in question include criminal tribunals, it is perfectly clear that no jurisdiction or directives can be given to them other than by a treaty duly ratified.

It would appear that paragraph 1 in the operative part of this draft resolution states a general definition of aggression which purports to be exclusive. This feature is misleading and unfortunate. It has the effect, among other things, of putting aside the elements of subversion and indirect aggression and the economic aspects of aggression.

The same operative paragraph in the draft resolution introduces the possibility of conflict with article 2, paragraph 4 of the charter. The draft resolution bars "any use of armed force by a State against another State for any purpose other than the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations." Article 2, paragraph 4 sets up a different standard. It reads:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The second operative paragraph of the draft resolution introduced by Iran and Panama states an enumeration of acts to be considered as "aggression in all cases." This provision embodies the cardinal disadvantages of an enumeration by stating that certain acts shall constitute aggression regardless of the whole picture in a given situation. It is possible that the introductory phrase in the second operative paragraph—"In accordance with the foregoing definition"—could be interpreted to mean that the listed acts were only examples of the general definition, although this is by no means clear from the drafting. If that were true, the resolution proposed by Iran and Panama would be of the mixed type of definition. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, we think, disposed definitively of this type of definition in his statement of November 1. The listing in the draft resolution of Iran and Panama also does not provide for the contingency foreseen in the Paraguayan proposal, which took account of the possibility that a state might be unable to suppress the activities of armed bands.

⁹ U.N. doc. A/C.6/L. 332 and Rev. 1.

¹⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.6/L. 335 and Rev. 1.

The resolution introduced by China as revised¹¹ contains a first operative paragraph that purports to state a general definition. The statement appears as an exclusive definition, although it is quite obviously incomplete in representing the different forms which aggression might take. This first statement also begs the question by stating "that aggression is the unlawful use of force by a State against another State, whether directly or indirectly." The rest of the first operative paragraph in the Chinese draft carries the usual disadvantages of a mixed type of definition. It also includes some rather vague terminology such as "fomenting civil strife."

It may be intended that paragraph 2 in the operative part of the Chinese draft modifies both parts of paragraph 1, although the relationship between these paragraphs is not clear. In any event, the enumeration contained in paragraph 1 in its present form lends itself particularly to the uses of distortion and propaganda. My delegation is unclear as to the meaning and effect of paragraph 3.

During the course of the general debate, some suggestions have been made for the setting up of a special committee, subcommittee, or working group to harmonize the different views and produce a single text. My delegation does not believe this would be a fruitful procedure. It would add even greater length to the time the United Nations has devoted to consideration of the aggression problem. Indeed, we think it would waste time. There has in fact occurred a great deal of group discussion among delegations to see if agreement could be reached on a common text. We do not see how a prolongation of that process, formalized by a vote of the committee or the Assembly, could be productive. It is evident that we do not face a problem simply of expressing agreed ideas in language that will be generally acceptable. The differences are of substance and are fundamental, as indicated by the distinguished delegates of Ecuador and Costa Rica.

We believe this committee should now proceed to vote on the resolutions which are before the committee. We would urge again that no paper formula be adopted. As the distinguished representative of New Zealand stated, any formula to emerge from this debate could only be the lowest common denominator of possible definitions and

could be really satisfactory to very few if any countries. The United States will vote against all of the proposed definitions and hopes that the General Assembly will now conclude that the subject matter of defining aggression has been explored to the limits of usefulness.

PROPOSAL BY LEBANON, SYRIA, AND YEMEN

U.S. delegation press release 2013 dated November 8

Since my delegation last spoke, a formal joint proposal has been tabled by Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.¹² It is proposed that the General Assembly create another Special Committee to draft a definition of aggression and report back next year. We have considered this course of action in all of its aspects and wish simply to reaffirm our conviction that it is not likely to serve a useful purpose.

There has been no lessening of the difficulties surrounding our subject as the result of the work of the previous Special Committee or of this committee. This point has been very clearly and forcefully made by a number of speakers. In matters of this kind attitudes strongly supported become the more strongly entrenched by unremitting reiteration. For one who looks to some solution in the future, whether near or distant, it is submitted that a breathing spell and a chance for calm reconsideration, not the prolongation of wornout exchanges, should offer the best hope.

An additional reason argues very strongly against the joint proposal. Next year the Assembly will have before it the question of charter review—the problem of reassessment of 10 years' experience in world organization. If, as my Government hopes, a review conference is held, that review will provide an opportunity for surveying in perspective the whole field of international peace and security. It may furnish fresh insights into particular areas, such as aggression and the questions of whether or how it might be apprehended in definition form. At a later time, governments will have the benefit of knowing what developments may have taken place respecting charter review and disarmament and would undoubtedly wish to take these developments into

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/C. 6/L. 336/Rev. 1

¹² U.N. doc. A/C. 6/L.337. The resolution as amended was approved on Nov. 10 by a vote of 33-3 (Australia, Brazil, U.S.)-14.

account in approaching again the question of defining aggression.

With the future holding possibilities of developments within the United Nations affecting the question of defining aggression, and with the past a vivid reminder of the probable sterility of another Special Committee at this stage, we respectfully urge that the question now be let alone for a time. To repeat the unsuccessful experiments of the past is not in anyone's interest. To create a Special Committee because a majority does not want to stop considering the problem of

defining is completely unnecessary. It could be counterproductive and might be understood as a face-saving rather than a hopeful step. From the point of view of what will promote sound development of the United Nations, we believe that constructive thinking and cooperation by governments in closely related fields will be the best preparation for any further consideration of the aggression problem. The United Nations has not made headway in repeated efforts concentrated directly on the problem. We think it is time to take another tack.

Principles Involved in Human Rights Covenants

Statements by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S. VIEWS ON DRAFT COVENANTS

U.S. delegation press release 2001 dated November 2

I have delayed participating in this debate until today because of the desire of the committee—a very understandable desire—to hear the views of governments which have not been represented in the Commission on Human Rights and because the position which my Government has taken toward the draft covenants² is already well known.

Having said this, Mr. Chairman, I should like to place in the record the views of my Government on several of the major issues that involve important matters of principle. I shall not deal with the many details in the draft covenants which my Government believes are not satisfactory for one reason or another.

My Government is of the view that a deficiency of the draft covenant on civil and political rights lies in what we consider to be the serious imper-

fections in the guaranties of the rights included. In too many instances in this draft covenant the affirmative statement of the right is undermined by additional provisions which permit the national legislatures to ignore the guaranties in exceptional circumstances which are broadly and loosely defined. For example, the right to liberty of person in article 9 is made subject to exceptions on such grounds as are established by law. The right to freedom of thought and religion in article 18 is made subject to broad limitations prescribed by law. Similar exceptions are provided for in article 19 with respect to freedom of expression and in article 21 with respect to freedom of association.

Danger to Freedom of Expression

At least two articles in the covenants as presently drafted constitute a real danger to the vital principle of freedom of expression. Article 14 of the draft covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights states that "education shall encourage . . . the suppression of all incitement to racial and other hatred. . . ." Article 26 of the draft covenant on civil and political rights reads:

¹ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Nov. 2 and Nov. 8.

² For texts of the drafts, completed at the tenth session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Feb.-Apr. 1954, see U.N. doc. E/2573, annex I.

"Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hostility that constitutes an incitement to hatred and violence shall be prohibited by the law of the state." Most of us in this room would not hesitate to condemn advocacy of national, racial, or religious hostility of any kind. Yet all of us ought to hesitate before accepting the concept of totalitarian control of all forms of expression that is implied in these two articles. Who can define the words "hostility" or "incitement" or "hatred" precisely enough for a treaty?

Another article which raises an important question of principle is article 1 in both covenants on self-determination. I do not wish at this time to discuss the larger issues of self-determination, except to reaffirm the devotion of my Government to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of all nations and peoples. It is the third paragraph of article 1 on self-determination to which my delegation takes strong exception. This paragraph states the right of self-determination in economic affairs far too rigidly. The second sentence of this paragraph completely ignores the rights that foreign nations may have in a state by virtue of treaties, commercial agreements, and general international law. It may even be interpreted to sanction the right of government to expropriate private property without any compensation whatsoever. This third paragraph, if included in the covenants, could undermine what individual investors, governments, and the United Nations have been doing in recent years to encourage the flow of private capital into the underdeveloped countries. The danger of this third paragraph is not merely that it would probably prevent many governments from ratifying the covenants but rather that it would discredit the United Nations and weaken support for the organization in many countries.

Serious Omissions

As other speakers have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, several important articles have not been included in the draft covenants. One right that is conspicuous by its absence is the right to own property. In the Commission on Human Rights last winter, we discussed the incorporation of article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the draft covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. I regret very much that the Commission did not decide to include the language of

article 17 in the draft covenant. The right to own property is an important human right, essential to the complete development of human liberty, and it was so recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Failure to include this essential right in the covenant might well be regarded as a retrogressive step, a weakening of the Universal Declaration.

Another important omission relates to part IV of the covenant on civil and political rights, concerning implementation. This series of articles fails to provide that the proposed Human Rights Committee should not duplicate the work of other organs of the United Nations, and of the specialized agencies. In fact, such an article was deleted by the Commission on Human Rights at its ninth session. As a result, without such a provision, the jurisdiction of the proposed Human Rights Committee might seriously overlap that of other organs of the United Nations system.

A number of other representatives have referred to the difficult question of reservations. As members of this committee know, my Government does not believe that in the present political atmosphere in international affairs the use of treaties can be a productive method for promoting respect for human rights, and it has decided not to sign or ratify the covenants. The exact nature of the reservations article is therefore not as significant for us as it otherwise might be, but, because widely divergent points of view have been expressed, it might be useful to state briefly the position of my Government on this important article and the reasons for it.

From the standpoint of competent legal draftsmanship it would be our view that the two covenants should contain an article which would clearly provide for the effect to be given to reservations. In view of the broad humanitarian objectives of the covenants, we would suppose that the article on reservations should be a liberal one, permitting reservations to the substantive articles of the covenants. At the same time, we would think that reservations should not be permitted to the implementation provisions of either of the covenants. The implementation provisions of each covenant constitute a carefully worked out system, the effective functioning of which would be seriously jeopardized if it were made possible for states desiring to become parties to the covenants to make reservations to them.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, may I say that as I have listened to this general debate, I have been struck by the different interpretations which different speakers have placed upon the same words in one article or another of the draft covenants. A number of representatives, for example, have expressed differing views as to what is meant by the right of self-determination. The spokesmen for the Moslem faith do not seem to be in complete agreement with regard to the article on freedom of religion. Most important of all, the representative of the Soviet Union has given a meaning to some of the words of the draft covenants that is entirely different from the meaning that most of us in the free world would give them. Anyone who listened carefully to the statement of the Soviet representative, anyone who has participated in the debates of the Human Rights Commission, anyone who is familiar with the structure of Soviet society knows that in Soviet terminology the word "democracy" means "communism"; the word "freedom" means "freedom to act only in the interests of communism"; the word "right" means "not individual rights but the right of the collectivity as determined by the Communist Party"; and that "self-determination" as Stalin has made clear is subordinate to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

These are the general observations, Mr. Chairman, which the United States delegation wishes to make in this first reading of the draft covenants. I have made these observations because I believe that the committee is entitled to hear the views of every member of the United Nations and because I desire to express again the continuing determination of the United States Government to promote human rights and to oppose restrictions upon those rights. We in the United States have been moving forward over the years, through legislation, through decisions of our courts, and—most important of all—through the development of public opinion. We in the United States earnestly desire to see human liberty made secure in our own country and everywhere else in the world. We believe that much can be done in the United Nations to accomplish these ends. We will continue to do everything we can—here at home, in our relations with other countries, and in the United Nations—to promote the cause of freedom.

U.S. delegation press release 2014 dated November 8

I tried, Mr. Chairman, in my earlier statement to suggest how difficult it is to reach agreement on an interpretation of the various articles of the two draft covenants, and I illustrated this by several different examples. The reply of the delegate of the U.S.S.R. [A. A. Fomin] has proved my contention, because it would appear that the problem of defining these terms is obviously difficult.

Before going over the specific examples I gave and the sources from which I based my remarks, I would like to refer to the disagreement of the representative of the Soviet Union with my remarks about the two articles in the draft covenants which refer to incitement to hatred and violence. The Soviet representative did not convince me that these two articles are not a threat to freedom of expression. I do hope that the committee will give very careful thought to this problem.

In illustrating the difficulties that arise in reaching agreement over the interpretation of different articles, I said in my first statement that when the Russians use the word "democracy" they mean "communism." I will give you two authorities:

(1) Lenin in *Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution*: "The Soviet system represents the maximum of democracy for the workers and peasants and the rise of a new type of democracy of world historic importance, viz., proletarian democracy or dictatorship of the proletariat."

(2) Stalin "On the Draft Constitution of 1936" in *Problems of Leninism* (two separate quotations): "The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly democratic constitution in the world," and "I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, it is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit . . ." Conclusion: Real democracy equals Soviet communism equals dictatorship of the proletariat.

I said that the word freedom in the U.S.S.R. means "freedom to act only in the interest of communism." This is the clear connotation of article 125 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., which grants certain freedoms "in conformity

with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system. . . ." To give a recent example to show that these limitations are real, I quote from the Resolution of the Presidium of the Board of the Union of Soviet Writers, cited in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, August 17, 1954, which after severe criticism concludes:

. . . The magazine *Nory mir* had laid down a policy which contradicts Party instructions in the sphere of belles-lettres. . . . The errors committed . . . recall particularly clearly the Party's instructions concerning the duty of workers in the art of socialist realism—namely, to be guided in all artistic work by the policy of the Party and the Soviet state. . . .

I said that the word "right" means not individual rights but the right of the collectivity as determined by the Communist Party. This statement contains two ideas, that the Soviet concept of rights is collective and that the Communist Party is what determines these rights.

The whole tradition of Soviet development supports this statement. You will look in vain in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. for limitations on the power of the state in favor of the individual. Even more indicative is the terminology of the collective rights that *are* included. In the articles on duties, the wording is "It is the duty of *every citizen*. . . ." In the articles on rights, the wording is "*Citizens* of the U.S.S.R. . . ." There is more than a technical difference in this wording, for the official Soviet theory is that the interests of the states and the individual never diverge. How the U.S.S.R. claims to have achieved this utopian state was made clear in an article on "Soviet Ideology and its Superiority Over Bourgeois Ideology" in *Partiinaya Zhina* in September 1947: "This correlation [of the individual and social interests] is possible only on the basis of the subordination of personal interest to the social." Who determines what the social interest is? The Communist Party, a small, disciplined, doctrinaire group which rules the U.S.S.R. with an iron grip. Its hold on Soviet society was described by Stalin in "Three Basic Slogans of Party on Peasant Question" as follows:

The Government passed completely and entirely into the hands of one Party, into the hands of our Party, which does not share and must not share the guidance of the state with any other party. This is what we mean by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is all very logical. By definition there is no conflict between the individual and society. But

if there should be, individual rights are subordinate to the collectivity. The society, of course, is subject to the Party, which is, in turn, subject to the dictates of a few individuals at the top in accordance with the principle of centralism.

The last point I made was that the principle of self-determination was subordinated by the U.S.S.R. to the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The quotation from Stalin to which I referred comes from Stalin's speech to the XIIIth Congress of the Russian Communist Party. It speaks for itself:

There are instances when the right to self-determination comes into conflict with another, higher right—the right of the working class which attained power to fortify its power. In such cases, it must be stated frankly, the right of self-determination cannot be and must not serve as an obstacle to the realization of the right of the working class to its own dictatorship. The first must recede before the second.

I think that this disagreement on self-determination is very relevant to our debate, Mr. Chairman, and we will be glad to take up the Soviet position on self-determination in detail at a later date.

In my intervention all I have tried to do is to point out constructively some of the difficulties that exist on interpreting what is meant by different words. We have tried to be helpful and have found it useful to hear the views of other delegations and to hear constructive criticism.

U.S. Position on U.N.'s Technical Assistance Program

U.S./U.N. press release 1998 dated November 1

Following is the text of a letter from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to V. A. Hamdani, chairman of the Negotiating Committee, Extra-Budgetary Funds.

Since the inception of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the United States has given it strong support. For the first three years of the program the United States contributed a total of \$36,000,000, or approximately 60 per cent of all funds pledged, to the central fund. For 1954 the dollar amount of our pledge increased to \$13,861,809, although our percentage share of the central fund was reduced

to approximately 57 per cent. The full amount of the U.S. pledge for calendar year 1954 has been appropriated by the U.S. Congress and is available for contribution to the program.

The United States recognizes the importance of technical assistance in promoting the economic development of the underdeveloped countries and has been providing technical assistance bilaterally as well as supporting the UN technical assistance program. It has also contributed generously to the other special UN programs which are aimed directly or indirectly at economic development or at alleviation of economic distress.

The Congress of the United States has made clear that it does not wish the Executive to make pledges to the UN technical assistance program until funds have been appropriated. The United States is not in a position at this time to make a pledge for calendar year 1955. The President has authorized the U.S. Delegation to state that he is prepared to request from the Congress funds for a U.S. contribution to the calendar year 1955 program. He hopes that the UN technical assistance program will continue to operate at least at its present level and in the future will obtain increasing support from all governments.

The fact that the President is prepared to make a request for funds does not constitute a pledge and is not to be so considered. I am authorized to make this statement, however, to indicate the President's continuing interest in this vital UN program.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

The Department of State announced on November 24 (press release 667) that the U.S. Government would be represented at the Eighth Session of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, to be held at Geneva, from November 30 to December 4, by the following delegation:

United States representative

Scott McLeod, Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State

Alternate United States representatives

Chauncey W. Reed, House of Representatives

Ben F. Jensen, House of Representatives

Dorothy D. Houghton, Assistant Director, Office for Refugees, Migration and Voluntary Assistance, Foreign Operations Administration

Christopher H. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Principal adviser

George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

Richard R. Brown, Director, Office of Field Coordination, Eiseapee Program, Foreign Operations Administration, Frankfurt, Germany

Frank W. Fletcher, President, Fletcher-Wilson Coffee Co., Nashville, Tenn.

William R. Foley, Committee Counsel, Committee on Judiciary, House of Representatives

Dayton H. Frost, Chief, Intergovernmental Refugee Program Division, Foreign Operations Administration

Walter H. Jones, New Jersey State Senator, Trenton, N.J.

Abba P. Schwartz, former legal adviser to Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Washington, D.C.

Nick Stepanovich, former adviser to War Department on visa matters, East Chicago, Ind.

During the week immediately preceding the convening of the Eighth Session, two subcommittees will hold meetings. The *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee on Draft Rules and Regulations meets November 22-24, and the Subcommittee on Finance will hold its Sixth Session on November 25 and 26.

The purpose of the Intergovernmental Committee is to facilitate the movement out of Europe of migrants and refugees who would not otherwise be moved. The majority of the persons moved by the Committee are going from Greece, Italy, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands to Australia, Canada, the United States, and Latin America. As of October 31, 1954, a total of 265,752 persons had been moved in resettlement overseas by the Committee. The 24 member governments of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela.

The draft provisional agenda includes (1) general report of the Director, (2) revised report on budget and plan of expenditure for 1954, (3) proposed budget and plan of expenditure for 1955 and 1956, and (4) action to be taken for the prolongation of the existence of the Committee beyond December 31, 1954, if the constitution has not entered into force. In this last connection, it may be noted that 13 of the 24 governments, including the United States, have accepted the constitution.

The Seventh Session of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was held at Geneva, April 26–May 1, 1954.

Caribbean Commission

The Department of State announced on November 26 (press release 672) that the U.S. Government would be represented at the nineteenth meeting of the Caribbean Commission at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, from November 29 through December 4 by the following delegation:

United States Commissioners

Robinson McIlvaine, *Co-Chairman*, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Department of State

Arturo Morales Carrion, *Under Secretary of State*, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

José Trias Monge, *Secretary of Justice*, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

David Victor Bornu, *Vice President*, Virgin Islands National Bank, St. Thomas

Advisers

Frances McReynolds Smith, *Office of Dependent Affairs*, Department of State

William P. Maddox, *American Consul General*, Port-of-Spain

The Caribbean Commission is an international advisory body resulting from expansion of the original Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. It serves to coordinate activities of the four member governments, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in their efforts to improve the economic and social well-being of Caribbean inhabitants.

Among the principal agenda items for discussion at the nineteenth meeting are a proposed work program and budget for 1955; a proposed schedule of technical conferences for 1956; a study on customs barriers and trade liberalization in the Caribbean; reports on conferences and meetings held

since the eighteenth meeting of the Commission (Belize, British Honduras, May 19–24, 1954); progress reports on technical assistance projects, such as a Caribbean training program in Puerto Rico, a Caribbean cooperatives training center in Puerto Rico, and a survey of the potentialities of bagasse, tropical timbers, and rice straw in the manufacture of fiberboard, pulp, and paper; and the status of preparations for the sixth session of the West Indian Conference to be held at San Juan, May 1955.

TREATY INFORMATION

Agreement With West Germany Relating to Patents

Press release 638 dated November 10

The Department of State announced on November 10 that the U.S. Government and the Government of the German Federal Republic have agreed to apply and consider operative the agreement between the United States of America and Germany relating to patents signed at Washington, February 23, 1909. This was done on the understanding that this action will not affect any rights in the Federal Republic of Germany to which U.S. nationals may otherwise be entitled, and will be without prejudice to the previous status of any provision of the agreement which may have remained operative or may have again become operative since the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the United States of America. The agreement is also applicable in the Western sectors of Berlin. This action was taken to clarify the status of the agreement in the light of the effects of World War II.

The agreement provides that national treatment shall be accorded to citizens of one country where the provisions of law of the other country impose disabilities or restrictions for the nonworking of a patent. The agreement further provides that the working of a patent in one country shall be considered as equivalent to its working in the other country.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending Article 45 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (TIAS 1581) which provides for the permanent seat of ICAO. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, October 25, 1954.

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (TIAS 1581), providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in three years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, October 25, 1954.

Germany

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 1953. TIAS 2792.

Accession deposited: Australia, September 29, 1954.

Notification by United Kingdom of extension to: Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, October 1, 1954.

Japan

Agreement regarding the status of the United Nations forces in Japan. Signed at Tokyo February 19, 1954. Entered into force June 11, 1954. TIAS 2995.

Acceptance deposited: Union of South Africa, October 27, 1954.

Postal Matters

Convention, Final Protocol, and Regulations of Execution of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 25, 1946. Entered into force January 1, 1947. TIAS 1680.

Agreement relative to money orders, and Final Protocol. Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 25, 1946. Entered into force January 1, 1947. TIAS 1682.

Agreement relative to parcel post, and Final Protocol. Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 25, 1946. Entered into force January 1, 1947. TIAS 1681.

Ratification deposited: Panama, September 8, 1954.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement amending the agreement of November 5 and 18, 1948, as amended (TIAS 2749) relating to relief supplies for China. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei July 12 and October 26, 1954. Entered into force October 26, 1954.

Germany

Agreement concerning the treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights of December 8, 1923, as amended (44 Stat. 2132 and 49 Stat. 3258). Signed at Bonn June 3, 1953. Entered into force October 22, 1954.

Proclaimed by the President: November 5, 1954.

Libya

Agreement relating to the granting of wheat to alleviate famine conditions in Libya. Effected by exchange of notes at Benghazi October 30 and November 3, 1954. Entered into force November 3, 1954.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of June 7, 1949 (TIAS 1949) relating to construction and equipping of hospi-

tals for veterans and the provision of medical care and treatment of veterans by the Philippines, and the furnishing of grants-in-aid thereof by the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila October 6, 1954. Entered into force October 6, 1954.

Turkey

Agreement relating to the exchange of commodities and the sale of grain, with annex. Signed at Washington November 15, 1954. Entered into force November 15, 1954.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment

Morehead Patterson as United States Representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations, effective November 4.

Designations

Charles F. Baldwin as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Economic Affairs, effective November 1.

John F. Rieger as General Manager of the Refugee Relief Program, effective November 10.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Cultural Relations. TIAS 2798. Pub. 5313. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington Apr. 9, 1953. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1953.

Relief From Double Taxation on Profits From Operation of Aircraft. TIAS 2858. Pub. 5303. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Belgium. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 18, 1953. Entered into force July 18, 1953.

Economic Cooperation. TIAS 2859. Pub. 5304. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and France, amending agreement of June 28, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Paris Sept. 11, 1953. Entered into force Sept. 11, 1953.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 2870. Pub. 5322. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of South Africa, amending agreement of May 23, 1947. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 21 and Nov. 2, 1953. Entered into force Nov. 2, 1953.

¹ Not in force.

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to November 22 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 566 of October 9 and 638 of November 10.

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663	11/22	U.S.-Yugoslav economic talks.
†664	11/21	Arrival of Austrian Chancellor Raab.
665	11/23	Merchant: Progress toward European Security.
666	11/23	Instruction to Consul at Geneva.
667	11/24	Delegation to Migration Committee meeting.
†668	11/26	Communique on Raab visit.
*669	11/26	Byroade to be Ambassador to Egypt.
*670	11/26	Allen to be Assistant Secretary.
671	11/27	Dulles: Albanian Independence Day.
672	11/26	Delegation to Caribbean Commission meeting.
673	11/26	Protest note to Communist China.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 807

December 13, 1954



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The Department of State bulletin

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December 13, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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The Courage To Be Patient

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ¹



I want to talk for just a moment, with your indulgence, about 13 American prisoners.² And you cannot possibly talk about them in any isolated sense.

The world is in an ideological struggle, and we are on one side and the Iron Curtain countries are on the other.

This struggle we now are in we call the "cold war." The great hope of mankind is that we can find methods and means of progressing a little bit, even if by little steps, toward a true or real peace and that we do not go progressively toward war.

Now, on our side we must make certain that our efforts to promote peace are not interpreted as appeasement or any purchase of immediate favor at the cost of principle. We

must, on the other hand, be steady and refuse to be goaded into actions that would be unwise.

To fit this incident into the global picture, let me remind you, these prisoners have been held by the Chinese for 2 years, so their selection of a time of announcement was, of course, a deliberate act. In fact, we find little evidence in all of the actions of the Communist states that indicates any haphazard actions on their part. Everything they do is deliberate and well thought out.

Now, I do not mean to say that everything in Russia is completely coordinated with everything that is happening in China. I do say that, when one of these governments permits anything to happen or makes any announcement, it does it deliberately and with a deliberate purpose.

If this is a deliberate attempt out there, as it appears to be, to goad us into some impulsive action in the hope of dividing us from

¹ Made at a White House news conference on Dec 2.

² For texts of U.S. protests in the case of the Americans imprisoned by Communist China, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1954, p. 856.

our allies, breaking down and destroying all the work that has been going on over the past years to build up a true coalition of free governments, then it certainly makes a mockery of the softer tone that has been used in Russia toward Western Europe at times lately, even approaching the tone of blandishment.

We must not forget what the aims of communism have always been, announced by themselves: to divide the free world, to divide us among ourselves as the strongest nation of the free world, and, by dividing, to confuse and eventually to conquer, to attain through those means their announced aim of world domination.

Now, for us there are two courses, and here I should like, in a way, to talk a little bit personally: in many ways the easy course for a President, for the administration, is to adopt a truculent, publicly bold, almost insulting attitude.

A President experiences exactly the same resentments, the same anger, the same kind of sense of frustration, almost, when things like this occur to other Americans, and his impulse is to lash out.

Now, I want to make quite clear that, when one accepts the responsibilities of public office, he can no longer give expression freely to such things; he has got to think of the results. That would be the easy way for this reason: those actions lead toward war.

Now, let us think of war for a second. When this nation goes to war, there occurs automatically a unification of our people.

Traditionally, if we get into trouble that involves war, the nation closes ranks behind the leader, the job to do becomes simply understood—it is to win the war. There is a real fervor developed throughout the nation that you can feel everywhere you go. There is practically an exhilaration about the affair.

The great Lee said, "It is well that war is so horrible; if it were not so, we would grow too fond of it," because in the intellectual and spiritual contest of matching wits and getting along to see if you can win, there comes about something, an atmosphere is created, and an attitude

Possible Blockade of Red China

Press release 684 dated December 1

At his news conference on December 1 Secretary Dulles was asked under what changed conditions the United States might consider a blockade of Red China. Mr. Dulles replied:

I said in my speech in Chicago¹ that we think it our duty to exhaust all methods short of warlike action in an effort to sustain the rights of our nation and of our citizens. Now, if those methods fail, then we would have to reconsider the situation. Personally, I have a good deal of confidence that those methods will not fail, but it is not possible to predict with any certainty.

Asked whether such a blockade would be taken up through the United Nations, Mr. Dulles replied:

The United Nations Charter contains provisions that under certain circumstances the Security Council can ask for a blockade of a recalcitrant nation. That is a possibility. Of course, that possibility is considerably dimmed by the fact that the Soviet Union sits on the Security Council, and it would be my guess, at least, that it would veto such a proposal.

Asked how serious the possibility of a naval blockade is after peaceful methods have been exhausted, Mr. Dulles replied:

I don't think I could say how serious the possibility is. I merely wanted to make clear in the speech that I made at Chicago night before last that, while we were loyally going to try, in accordance with our charter obligations, to settle this dispute by peaceful and nonviolent means, if those efforts fail and we don't get adequate cooperation from other members of the United Nations, then we would feel disposed to re-examine the whole situation without commitment as to what we might do. I wanted to negative the idea that we were precipitately going to rush into warlike action. On the other hand, I did not want to close any doors against possible future developments. I don't anticipate that matters will reach a point where that would be deemed appropriate national conduct. But, on the other hand, one can never tell, and I did not want to slam any doors unnecessarily.

¹ See p. 890.

is created to which I am not totally unfamiliar.

But, ladies and gentlemen, I have also had the job of writing letters of condolence by the hundreds, by the thousands, to bereaved mothers and to bereaved wives and others who have lost dear ones on the battlefield.

Now, that is a very sobering experience, and

it means that, if we are going ever to take such a fateful decision as leads us one step toward war, let us by no means do it in response to our human emotions of anger and resentment. But let us do it after we have prayerfully considered it and found, as Wilson expressed it, "no other means of protecting our rights."

Let us recognize that we owe it to ourselves and to the world to explore every possible peaceable means of settling differences before we even think of such a thing as war.

And the hard way is to have the courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single avenue open to us in the hope even finally of leading the other side to a little better understanding of the honesty of our intentions. And there is no question, they honestly, in certain instances, do question our intentions. They do not believe always, or at least universally, that we are peaceably inclined.

We have got a job of our own yet to do. As well as demanding action from others, we must have the courage and the patience to keep after this kind of thing.

Now, I just want to say one word about the idea of blockade. It is possible that a blockade is conceivable without war. I have never read of it historically.

A blockade is an act in war intended to bring your adversary to your way of thinking or to his knees. In fact, in the rules of war that were studied in my former life, there was clearly established the conditions that must prevail before you could legally proclaim a blockade. You couldn't, even if you were a belligerent, merely say, "We blockade Antarctica," or any other country. You had to make the blockade effective, and you were not justified in stopping

anyone's ship unless you had the means present at the spot to make that blockade effective, indicating that the word "blockade" is, so far as I know, an act of war, a part of war.

I have not checked this idea with the constitutional lawyers, but I believe it to be true. So far as I am concerned, if ever we come to a place that I feel that a step of war is necessary, it is going to be brought about not by any impulsive individualistic act of my own, but I am going before the Congress in the constitutional method set up in this country and lay the problem before them, with my recommendation as to whatever it may be.

In the meantime, I have got one thought that I must express: At least 11 of these soldiers, by the Communists' own propaganda and testimony made public, were in uniform. They were soldiers captured in the Korean war.

Consequently, they were to be treated as prisoners of war under the terms of the armistice.

Moreover, those men were there in conformity with obligations incurred under the United Nations and were there, in fact, in accordance with the specific request and resolution of the United Nations.

How the United Nations can possibly disabuse itself of a feeling of responsibility in this matter, and retain its self-respect, I wouldn't know; and so I think that the United States does not stand alone, merely indicating that we are yet far from exhausting all of our resources. I mention only one of those that is available to us.

So far as the honor of the United States is concerned, I merely hope that I shall not live long enough to find myself accused of being insensitive to the honor of the United States and the safety of her men and soldiers, no matter where we send them.

The Goal of Our Foreign Policy

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

Ten days ago at the White House I discussed our foreign policy with the congressional leaders of both parties, Republicans and Democrats. Afterward the President told me he thought it would be a good idea for me to report also to the American people.

It is not easy to compress the whole story into a short talk. But I shall do my best.

Let me begin by emphasizing the goal of our foreign policy—it is to enable you and me and our children to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty. That purpose is back of everything we do.

The task is not an easy one, for international communism threatens both peace and liberty, by many means, at many places.

Coexistence

One ever-present danger is the danger of being fooled into dropping our guard before the peril is really past.

The international Communists are masters at the trick of using words which mean one thing to them and another thing to us.

It took us time to learn that the word “democracy” means, to Communists, a dictatorship—what they call “dictatorship of the proletariat.”

It took us time to learn that the word “peace” means, to international Communists, a world of conformity—conformity with a pattern of conduct prescribed by Moscow.

Now the tricky word is “coexistence.” To us it means tolerance of differences. It remains to be seen what it means to international Communists.

¹ Made before the National 4-H Club Congress at Chicago, Ill., on Nov. 29 (press release 674).

It is true that the Russian Communists have recently talked more softly. But it is equally true that the Chinese Communists have talked and acted with increasing violence. They break their armistice agreements and they outrage the elemental decencies of international conduct.

Perhaps international communism is trying by a new way to divide the free nations. They seek to be soothing in Europe. They are provocative in Asia.

Our Nation will react, and react vigorously, to the outrages against our citizens but without allowing ourselves to be intemperately provoked into action which would be a violation of our international obligations and which would impair the alliance of the free nations. What has happened is a challenge to us, and indeed to all who want peace, to find ways, consistent with peace, to sustain international rights.

We have agreed, by the United Nations Charter, to try to settle international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace is not endangered. Therefore, our first duty is to exhaust peaceful means of sustaining our international rights and those of our citizens, rather than now resorting to war action such as a naval and air blockade of Red China.

Of course, we look anxiously for signs of real change in the attitude of international Communists. We hope that the day will come when they will renounce the effort to rule the world by methods of force, intimidation, and fraud. When that new day dawns, we shall greet it eagerly. But we want to be sure that we do not mistake a false dawn for the real dawn.

There is still a vast Russian military establish-

ment, far in excess of any defensive needs. The Chinese Communists are still aggressive. There is still, in every free country, a Communist apparatus seeking to overthrow the established order.

Therefore, we must remain vigilant. We must have policies to meet both the military risk and the subversive risk, and we do have such policies.

Defense of U.S. Against Armed Attack

There are some people in the United States, and there are more in other lands, who contend that it is wrong to be ready and able to fight. They say that the true peace-lovers should be unarmed and neutral.

We have tried that, and it did not work.

We were unarmed and neutral in 1914 when the First World War came. The aggressors felt that they could count us out.

We were unarmed and neutral in 1939 when the Second World War came. Again the aggressors thought they could count us out.

The Korean war came after we had largely disarmed and withdrawn our troops from Korea, and the aggressors thought that they would be unopposed.

Today we take a different view. We believe that the greatest contribution we can make to peace is to be ready to fight, if need be, and to have the resources and the allies to assure that an aggressor would surely be defeated. That does not mean being truculent or provocative or militaristic. It does mean seeking peace not only with the heart but also with the mind.

In that mood, we make military preparations which, we believe, will deter war. That requires, basically, that a potential aggressor shall not think that aggression is a paying proposition. He must know that he cannot destroy the United States by sudden attack and that we have the capacity to counterattack.

So we are developing continental defense in a major way. It will consist of an elaborate series of early warning systems and interceptors which apply the latest scientific knowledge. These should enable us to knock down a very high percentage of any Red bombers engaged in hostile missions against the United States.

Then we have our Strategic Air Command which is capable of delivering retaliatory blows against vital parts of the Soviet Union. These blows, we calculate, would do damage far in excess of that

which Red planes could inflict upon the United States.

You may ask what foreign policy has to do with this. My answer is: everything. Our continental defense system depends on Canada. And the free nations cannot have effective retaliatory power to deter aggression without airfields in widely scattered places.

Therefore, a vital part of our foreign policy is to have friendly relations with many other countries so that we can work together for our common defense.

I can report that we *do* have such friendly relations and that, as a result, we can make it unprofitable for any nation to attack the United States.

Defense of Others Against Armed Attack

Of course, we could not have that relationship if we thought only of ourselves. The relationship must be for the common good. So the common defense includes many areas outside the United States.

It is particularly important that the great oceans should be dominated by free and friendly nations. We have made this clear by a series of security treaties. The Atlantic area is covered by the North Atlantic security treaty. The Pacific area is covered by a series of treaties, some still in process of consummation, which cover Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Ryukyus (Okinawa), Formosa, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and parts of Southeast Asia.

To back up these treaty words, there are local forces. In some cases the local forces which seem necessary are larger than the local governments can support. If so, we help out. That, however, is not a "handout." It is something called "foreign aid," although I dislike that phrase. The correct and better phrase is "mutual security."

Western Europe, with its vast industrial power, is a prize of first order to any who seek world domination. So it requires special protection. It gets it by NATO. But NATO needs, at its core on the Continent, a greater measure of unity, with German participation. That was the purpose of the historic agreements made last month at London and Paris. These agreements should end the constant warring of European nations against themselves and at the same time provide Western Eu-

rope with effective defense. The prospect of European unity is reinforced by the recent Trieste settlement between Italy and Yugoslavia and the prospective Saar settlement between France and Germany.

In addition to local defense within treaty areas, there is striking power by air or sea. Such mobile forces are needed to deter attack because an aggressor would have a great advantage if he could attack a single locality with assurance of safety against retaliation. We must have the capacity to respond at places and by means of *our* choosing.

This, however, does not mean that any local war would automatically be turned into a general war with atomic bombs being dropped all over the map. The essential thing is that we and our allies should have the means and the will to assure that a potential aggressor would lose from his aggression more than he could win. This does not mean that the aggressor has to be totally destroyed. It does mean a capacity to inflict punishing damage. We believe that we and our allies have the power to do that. We also believe that so long as we do have that power it is unlikely that there will be armed attack upon the areas covered by our security arrangements.

There are some areas in the world which are not covered by special collective security arrangements. That is notably the case with reference to portions of Asia.

However, there are trends toward collective security in this area. For example, Turkey and Pakistan have started to create a northern tier of defense, which would block off the rich oil fields of the Middle East from easy seizure by the Soviet Union. The recent liberation of Iran from the grip of the Communist Tudeh Party, the subsequent oil settlement, and the settlement of the Suez base controversy all open up new possibilities of strength in this part of the world.

In all cases the United Nations provides an overriding shield against open aggression. This is not negligible—as Korea showed. And it is our policy to support vigorously the United Nations.

In the various ways I have outlined, the free nations are largely protected against the danger of armed attack.

The peoples of the world seem to sense this fact. That is why it is now generally felt that there is less danger of world war than seemed to be the case a few years ago.

Meeting Subversion

Let me turn now to the danger which comes from subversion. This danger is great. International communism has had great experience in fomenting political disorder. These successes are not merely measured by governments actually taken over—nearly a score—but by divisions and obstructions which Communists promote within the free world.

A first concern to us in this connection is the situation in the American Republics. The Latin American countries are in no great danger from open armed attack, but they are vulnerable to Communist subversion. We dealt with this matter at the conference which the American nations held at Caracas last March. They there adopted a declaration to the effect that it would be dangerous to the peace and security of all of the American nations if international communism should gain control of the political institutions of any one of them.²

That was a momentous declaration. It may serve the needs of our time as effectively as the Monroe Doctrine served the needs of our nation during the last century. It made clear that collective action to eradicate international communism is not an act of intervention but an act to uproot intervention.

The principle of this Caracas Declaration had a special bearing on the situation in Guatemala. There international communism had in fact got control of the Government. The American States were about to meet with reference to this danger when the Guatemalan people themselves backed loyal elements who cut out the cancer of communism. The Communist-directed President of Guatemala ignominiously fled, and the leader of the liberation movement is now the President of Guatemala.

This Caracas Declaration, and the demonstration that the American States take it seriously, greatly protect this hemisphere against Communist subversion. The Communists know that if they should get control of the political institutions of an American State they can expect the other American States to be against them. Therefore, there is less incentive to seek control than has been the case heretofore.

The American nations are also trying to achieve sounder economies. There is now taking place at

² BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1954, p. 638.

Rio an economic conference. We hope and believe that this conference will stimulate sound measures to develop the economies and lift up living conditions. It will give practical meaning to President Eisenhower's "good partner" policy.

In Asia and Africa the dangers of subversion are great. In these continents there are countries without self-government, many of their political institutions are not yet firmly rooted, the economies are weak, and the governments often are insecure. The situation in Viet-Nam is particularly precarious today, and in North Africa the situation is troubled.

Some of the Asian nations which have recently won independence need help. But they are afraid to take it from the West because they fear that means a rebirth of Western colonialism. So they remain exposed to a brand of communism which breeds the most ruthless colonialists in history.

It must be made clear that the Asian and Western nations can work together as equals. We took a big step in that direction at the Manila Conference of last September. There both Western and Asian participants joined in a "Pacific Charter," which proclaimed their dedication to the independence and self-government of all peoples everywhere, able to discharge those responsibilities.³

That was an important step toward laying the ghost of Western colonialism, which still so frightens some free Asian countries that they hesitate to accept helpful association with the West.

Economic Policies

There is also need for economic policies which will help to develop all underdeveloped countries. In the Communist countries developments are achieved through a system of forced labor akin to slavery. Living standards are kept very low, and the people are forced to work very hard. In this way, heavy industry is developed. It is a cruel system and is primarily for war purposes. It does, however, have a certain fascination for the peoples of undeveloped countries who feel that their own economies are standing still.

In a free society it is normal that the developed countries lend money to the underdeveloped countries. Our United States, in its early days, was partially developed by European capital. Today

it is the United States which has the most capital available to help to develop other countries. We must find a way to put it to work. This is good business, for provident loans are usually repaid and experience shows that we all profit from an environment of prosperity.

I should mention in this connection President Eisenhower's plan for putting atomic energy to peacetime purposes. This plan, when announced at the United Nations last December, stirred a tremendous response. For nearly a year we tried to get the Russians to contribute to the plan. I personally discussed it several times with Mr. Molotov. However, they refused. Then this fall we said we would go ahead with others, leaving the Russians out. Now it seems that, after all, they want to come along.

By this Eisenhower plan our Nation reappears in its historic role. We have discovered new possibilities for human welfare and are putting our knowledge at the peaceful service of all mankind.

The Captive Peoples

There is one final aspect of our policies to which I would allude. We believe, as Abraham Lincoln said, that our Declaration of Independence promises "liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope for the world for all future time."

Today a third of the human race is in fearful bondage to Communist dictatorships. But we do not regard that as immutable.

There is, we know, vast human discontent among the 800 million people whom international communism rules. That comes from the enslavement of labor, the suppression of religion and of individual initiative, and the national humiliation of the satellite countries.

Liberation normally comes from within. But it is more apt to come from within if hope is constantly sustained from without. That we are doing in many ways.

A significant recent development has been the Soviet change of policy toward Yugoslavia. In 1948 Yugoslavia broke free from the grip of international communism and reasserted its own nationalism.

Until recently the Yugoslav Government and nation were threatened and reviled by the international Communists of neighboring Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Now, however, the Soviet Union treats Yugoslavia with deference while

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

it continues to treat with contempt the puppet governments of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. That may embolden the satellites to demand a measure of independence.

Developments clearly portend the change, at some time, of the absolute rule which international communism asserts over the once free nations of Europe and Asia.

Conferences

Our policies do not exclude international conferences, even with those who are hostile to us. In that way we ended the Korean war. The scope of conferences with the Soviet Government is necessarily limited by our attitude toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we will not make any deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.

Also, we do not want to talk with the Soviet representatives when their only purpose is to divide the free nations and prevent their taking necessary measures for their own security.

We had one such meeting at Berlin last January and February. The ostensible purpose was to unify Germany and to liberate Austria. In fact, the Soviet Foreign Minister only sought to block the plans for Western European security.

We do want to find out whether the Soviet Union will sign the Austrian treaty and whether, after the London and Paris accords are ratified, it will talk seriously about uniting Germany. That is the purpose of a note we delivered to the Soviet Government today.⁴

We are also, of course, deeply interested in the limitation of armaments. A principal purpose of the London-Paris accords is not merely to create defensive strength in Western Europe but to limit and control that strength so that it can never be an aggressive force. There opened today at Moscow a so-called "security conference" where the Soviet leaders will talk to their puppets and they in turn will respond as ordered. We shall see whether the Soviet Union takes this occasion to match the West by imposing reasonable limits on military establishments in that part of Europe which it controls.

There is often a tendency on the part of free peoples to see their own faults and weaknesses and to exaggerate the strength and successes of others. Of course, we should subject ourselves to

constant self-criticism. That is the way to betterment.

We need not, however, feel that we are now failing in the great struggle which has been forced upon us. We are entitled to be confident because we are strong in ourselves and strong in the good partnership we have with our allies.

The reality of the matter is that the United States, by every standard of measurement, is the world's greatest power not only materially but spiritually. We have national policies which are clear and sound. They fit a civilization based on religious faith. They are strongly implemented but at a cost we can afford to live with. They have evolved on a nonpartisan basis, and, in broad outline, they are overwhelmingly backed by our people. Such policies, I am supremely confident, will peacefully prevail.

Mutual Defense Treaty With Korea Enters Into Force

Press release 650 dated November 17

The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea entered into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification by Secretary of State Dulles and Korean Ambassador You Chan Yang in Washington on November 17.¹

The treaty was signed in Washington on October 1 of last year. It was approved by the United States Senate on January 26, 1954, and by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on January 15, 1954. It was ratified by President Eisenhower on February 5, 1954, and by President Rhee on January 29, 1954.

The treaty is a defense treaty dedicated to peace. It is intended to deter aggression and thus to help maintain peace and security in the Pacific area. It constitutes another step in the development of a Pacific security system, complementing earlier treaties which have entered into force with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan. It is in full conformity with the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The text of the protocol of exchange of instruments of ratification is as follows:

¹ For text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 204, and Jan. 25, 1954, p. 131, footnote 2.

⁴ See p. 901.

The undersigned, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and Dr. You Chan Yang, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Korea to the United States of America, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, and having met together for the purpose of exchanging the instruments of ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington on October 1, 1953, and the respective instruments of ratification of the treaty aforesaid having been compared and found to be in due form, the exchange thereof took place this day.

The ratification of the Government of the United States of America of the Treaty recites and is subject to the understanding contained in the resolution of January 26, 1954 of the Senate of the United States of America advising and consenting to ratification of the Treaty, the text of which understanding was communicated by the Government of the United States of America to the Gov-

ernment of the Republic of Korea and which reads as follows:

"It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea."

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, they have signed the present Protocol of Exchange.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the English and Korean languages, this seventeenth day of November, 1954.

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the Republic of Korea:

YOU CHAN YANG

U.S. and Republic of China Sign Mutual Defense Treaty

JOINT STATEMENT

Press release 681 dated December 1

At his news conference on December 1, Secretary Dulles read the following joint U.S.-Chinese statement, which was released simultaneously at Taipei.

The United States of America and the Republic of China have concluded negotiations for a mutual security pact. The treaty will follow the general pattern of other security pacts which the United States of America has concluded in the Western Pacific.

The treaty will recognize the common interest of the parties in the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores and of the Western Pacific islands under the jurisdiction of the United States. It will provide for inclusion by agreement of other territories under the jurisdiction of the parties. It is directed against threats to the security of the treaty area from armed attack and provides for continuing consultation regarding any such threat or attack.

This treaty will forge another link in the system of collective security established by the various collective defense treaties already con-

cluded between the United States and other countries in the Pacific area. Together, these arrangements provide the essential framework for the defense by the free peoples of the Western Pacific against Communist aggression.

Like the other treaties, this treaty between the United States and the Republic of China will be defensive in character. It will reaffirm the dedication of the parties to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CHIANG

The following message from President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China was transmitted to Secretary Dulles on December 1 by Ambassador V. K. Wellington Koo.

Press release 683 dated December 1

The successful conclusion of the negotiations for the Treaty of Mutual Security marks another forward step in our joint efforts to strengthen the common cause of our two countries against Communist aggression. A necessary link in the chain of Far Eastern defense has now been forged. Please accept my felicitations for your new contribution to world security.

Purpose of Treaty With Republic of China

Press release 686 dated December 1

At his news conference on December 1, Secretary Dulles was asked a series of questions relating to the purpose of the treaty with the Republic of China. Asked to clarify the provision for the inclusion of other territories, Mr. Dulles replied:

The provision [article VI] is comparable to the provision in the Korean treaty. Where there is a country which we recognize and which claims rightful sovereignty over more territory than it actually controls, there we adopted the practice of providing by the treaty that it can be extended to other territory, and in the Korean treaty we provide that initially it only covers the area which is south of the armistice line but that it can be extended to other territory at a later date. The provision is comparable in this respect with regard to the Republic of China. That has reference not only to these offshore islands but possibly to other territory which might come under the effective control of the Republic of China.

Asked whether the legal position of the coastal islands is different from that of Formosa and the Pescadores, Mr. Dulles replied:

The legal position is different, as I think I pointed out in my last press conference, by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore, the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory.

Asked whether the treaty recognized on our behalf the claim of the Republic of China to sovereignty over the mainland of China, Mr. Dulles replied:

It does not deal specifically with that matter one way or another.

Asked whether we currently recognize that claim, the Secretary replied:

We recognize the Republic of China as the only lawful Government of China, just as we recognize, and the United Nations recognizes, the Government of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea. We recognize the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany as the only lawful government of Germany. Our position is similar in these respects.

Asked whether, under this extension provision, if the Republic of China did make a successful landing and controlled some territory on the Chinese mainland, this treaty would be extended to cover that, Mr. Dulles replied:

Not automatically. It could be extended by a fresh agreement.

Asked about the position of the United States with respect to the offshore islands, Mr. Dulles replied:

The position on the offshore islands is unaffected by this treaty. Their status is neither promoted by the treaty nor is it demoted by the treaty. As I have said several times, the injunction to our armed forces is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. Now, whether or not in any particular case the defense of these offshore islands by reason of the nature of those islands or the nature of the attack against them is such that it is deemed part of the defense of Formosa, that would be a matter which on the first instance at least the military people would advise, and the President would probably make the final decision.

Asked whether the treaty changes the status quo, the Secretary replied:

Yes. Because it puts Formosa and the Pescadores in precisely the same category, as far as their treaty relationship to the United States is concerned, as the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. It makes it clear beyond a peradventure of a doubt as far as we are concerned that Formosa and the Pescadores are not on the bargain counter for international trading.

If any people have felt, because Formosa was the only portion of the so-called offshore island chain

which was not covered by treaty, that that omission indicated that perhaps we were willing to make some deal which might return Formosa to Communist China, or something of that sort, this makes it perfectly clear that those islands are not for trade or bargain or anything else. This makes it clear that they are tied by treaty to the United States in the same way, as I say, as these other areas, such as Korea and Japan, that we have our security treaties with.

We will have a series of security treaties which cover the entire area that runs beginning with northern Japan down through Korea, and our position in the Ryukyus under the Japanese peace treaty, and Formosa and the Pescadores. In addition, we have the treaty with the Philippines, we have a treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and we have the negotiated treaty, subject to ratification, with portions of Southeast Asia. They are all now in a similar status as far as their security relationship to the United States is concerned.

Asked whether the purpose of the treaty is more diplomatic than military, Mr. Dulles replied:

It has a diplomatic purpose, which I have outlined, and which is very considerable. From a purely military standpoint, it changes the situation in this respect, perhaps, that the authority of the President to use there the armed services of the United States, which originally derive from the Korean war, may be tending to become obsolete from the lapse and passage of time, and the conclusion of the armistice in Korea.

This gives the Congress of the United States, through the Senate, an opportunity to indicate that it shares the view that this area is important from the standpoint of the peace and security of the United States. In that respect it clarifies the position from the standpoint of defense, from the standpoint of internal constitutional considerations.

Asked whether this treaty also is designed to bring further stability to this area, Mr. Dulles replied:

I hope that that will be the result. I think that many people have had a question, including the Chinese Communists, as to whether we were really serious about the defense of Formosa. I think it

now takes it out of the realm of speculation and I hope out of the area of probing, and will tend, I think, to stabilize conditions there. Certainly that is our hope.

Asked whether there is any understanding in connection with this treaty that the Chinese Nationalists before attacking the mainland must consult with us and act only by agreement with us, Mr. Dulles replied:

We expect that there will be worked out practical arrangements so that neither will take action in this area which would jeopardize the other and that we would in general act in an agreed pattern of conduct. Having undertaken to defend the islands, we would not expect, nor would the Chinese Nationalists expect, to act rashly in a way to jeopardize the islands. We anticipate that under the operative clause of the treaty there will be a good deal of consultation and agreement as to just how the situation is handled.

Asked the difference between having this treaty with Formosa and having Formosa included in the Southeast Asian treaty, Mr. Dulles replied:

Well, from the standpoint of the United States there is no particular difference. It was not practical to bring about actually the inclusion of this area in the Southeast Asian treaty area because of the fact that some of the parties to that treaty were not prepared to take that step. But the legal situation created is substantially the same, as far as the United States is concerned.

Asked whether the treaty provides or envisages any change in our military relationship, any expansion of the Military Assistance Advisory Group there, or any military base rights on Formosa, Mr. Dulles replied:

It will provide that we can by mutual agreement have base rights on Formosa. The provision in that respect will be similar to that in the Korean treaty.

Asked whether an attack on Nationalist Chinese ships would be considered an attack on China, Mr. Dulles replied:

That is not provided in the treaty. The treaty in that respect is, as I say, quite similar to the treaties that have already been made in that area.

It is quite like the Korean treaty. There is no specific reference, as far as I now recall, to an attack upon ships or upon aircraft.

Asked whether the treaty provided that, if Communist China attacks Formosa, the United States will counterattack on the mainland, Mr. Dulles replied:

That would be a probable result. I have made clear a good many times, including my talk night before last, that we believe that, if there is an attack, there must be a certain liberty, by mobile forces, to retaliate at the places and means of our choosing. That principle we have enunciated with reference to our various treaties. We did in connection with the Southeast Asia treaty. That is a general principle which is applicable to our policy and tactics at the present time.

We would take retaliatory action. Now the scope of that I would not want to foresee. As I said in my talk the other night, that retaliatory action is not necessarily general war. It does not mean every local attack becomes a general war with atomic bombs being dropped all over the map. It is a retaliation of sufficient severity to make it clear that the aggressor cannot gain by his attack more than he loses. I think that is the important principle to establish. It is the same principle that we have in our own community life. We don't have a death sentence for every crime. We try to fit the penalty to the crime, and that would mean that a retaliatory action would presumably be limited in scope with regard to the gravity of the offense.

Asian Pact

Press release 685 dated December 1

At his news conference on December 1 Secretary Dulles was asked whether consideration was being given, now that negotiations for a security pact with the Republic of China had been concluded, to tying all the Pacific pacts into one overall Asian pact. Mr. Dulles replied:

I have often expressed the hope that these treaties could develop in a more comprehensive manner. There are very great difficulties in the way of accomplishing that. The biggest step forward was taken at Manila by the Southeast Asian treaty, where a group of eight countries came together. Otherwise it has seemed impractical to operate except on a bilateral basis, except in the

case of Australia and New Zealand, which is on a trilateral basis. But the differences between the different areas are so considerable and the lack of homogeneity is such that it is not easy to bring them together. We can bring them together with us, but it is much harder to bring them together as between themselves. There are very considerable differences, as you know, which exist as between Korea and Japan and between certain other countries that we have treaty relations with and the Republic of China, so that it is hard to tie it all together at the present time. All I can say is that we have that as a goal and I think that we are going steadily in that direction.

STATEMENTS AT SIGNING

Press release 689 dated December 2

Secretary Dulles

It is a great pleasure to welcome Foreign Minister Yeh, Ambassador Koo, and the members of his staff here this afternoon for the signing of this Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. I wholly concur in what President Chiang Kai-shek said in his message to me yesterday, that "a necessary link in the chain of Far Eastern defense has now been forged." It is my hope that the signing of this defense treaty will put to rest once and for all rumors and reports that the United States will in any manner agree to the abandonment of Formosa and the Pescadores to Communist control. The signing of this treaty is not only an expression of the good will and friendship existing between the Governments of the United States and of Free China but also of the abiding friendship of the people of the United States for the Chinese people.

Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh

It has been my privilege and honor to be associated with Mr. Dulles in the making and signing of this Treaty of Mutual Defense between my country and the United States of America. I am happy to recall that throughout the negotiations for this treaty, conducted at Taipei and Washington, we have been guided by the principle of mutuality and the spirit of friendly cooperation.

It is the hope of my Government that this treaty will serve to promote the common cause of freedom, particularly at this juncture of the world situation.

TEXT OF TREATY

Press release 691 dated December 2

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China

The Parties to this Treaty,

It affirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either

of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third Year of the Republic of China.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

GEORGE K. C. YEH

Rejection of Charges of Interference With Soviet Commercial Vessels

Press release 676 dated November 29

U.S. Note of November 29

Following is the text of the U.S. reply to the Soviet note of August 4, 1954, delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 29.

A careful investigation of the charges contained in the referenced note has been made by the United States military authorities. This investigation has shown that no American military aircraft operating over the high seas of the Pacific Ocean, the area designated in the note, has engaged in hostile or provocative acts towards Soviet commercial vessels.

The incidents mentioned in the note apparently refer to the identification by United States naval aircraft of commercial vessels operating on the high seas around the Island of Formosa. The United States denies that the identification of shipping by United States naval aircraft is a violation of the freedom of commercial navigation on the high seas, as asserted in the Soviet note, or otherwise is illegal or in violation of international law.

Identification of all vessels in this area is made in order to detect the presence of ships whose mission might be hostile to the Seventh Fleet of the United States Navy. The Seventh Fleet was ordered by the President of the United States on June 27, 1950 and again on February 3, 1953 to patrol the waters around Formosa in order to prevent an attack on that island. The mission of the Seventh Fleet has been and will continue to be to contribute to the security of the Far East. The United States reaffirms its intention to devote its efforts to the maintenance of peace and stability in that area and hopes that the Soviet Government will direct its own efforts and influence to the same end.

Soviet Note of August 4

[Unofficial translation]

In connection with the illegal detention of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse* by a warship in the vicinity of the Island of Taiwan, in waters controlled by the U.S. Navy, it is

impossible not to call attention to the fact that over an extended period of time American military aircraft have systematically made flights over Soviet commercial vessels sailing the open sea around Taiwan.¹ Appearing in dangerous proximity to Soviet vessels, these airplanes fly over vessels at low altitude and sometimes circle above them for an hour.

Such provocative acts by American military aircraft constitute a clear violation of the freedom of commercial navigation in the open sea and bear witness to U.S. military authorities' complete disregard for the generally accepted norms of international law.

Moreover, it is completely evident that actions of this nature by American military aircraft are also intended for signalling so that warships may attack Soviet merchant vessels. In particular, evidence of this is furnished by the circumstances connected with the seizure of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse* on June 23 in the vicinity of Taiwan.

1. On June 11 at 1303 hours, in the South China Sea at a point with coordinates 14 degrees 27 minutes north latitude and 115 degrees 27 minutes east longitude, and again at 1505 hours at a point with coordinates 14 degrees 40 minutes north latitude and 115 degrees 38 minutes east longitude, an American military airplane twice circled at low altitude the Soviet vessel *Mikhail Kutuzov*. On June 12 an American airplane circled the same vessel several times at a point with coordinates 16 degrees 29 minutes north latitude and 117 degrees 29 minutes east longitude.

2. On June 14, southeast of Taiwan at a point with coordinates 21 degrees 16 minutes north latitude and 121 degrees 44 minutes east longitude, two American military aircraft for a period of an hour circled the Soviet vessel *Mikhail Kutuzov* at altitudes of from 60 to 400 meters.

3. On June 16 at 1857 hours, east of Taiwan at a point with coordinates 25 degrees 00 minutes north latitude and 123 degrees 49 minutes east longitude, an American airplane circled the Soviet vessel *Kemerovo* at an altitude of 30 meters.

4. On June 23 at 1000 hours, in the South China Sea at a point with coordinates 8 degrees 00 minutes north latitude and 109 degrees 14 minutes east longitude, an American airplane several times circled the Soviet tanker *Leningrad* at low altitude. On June 24 at 1130 hours, an American airplane seven times circled the same vessel at an altitude of 60 meters at a point with coordinates 11 degrees 53 minutes north latitude and 112 degrees 58 minutes east longitude.

5. On June 24 at 0530 hours, in the vicinity of Taiwan at a point with coordinates 24 degrees 30 minutes north latitude and 127 degrees 05 minutes east longitude, an American airplane made several circles over the Soviet tanker *Apsheron* at low altitude.

Similar flights over Soviet merchant vessels by American military aircraft are also being made in other regions of the Far Eastern seas and the Pacific Ocean.

Drawing the attention of the Government of the United States to the impermissibility of such illegal acts by American aircraft with regard to Soviet merchant vessels sailing the open sea, in particular in the vicinity of the Island of Taiwan, the Soviet Government expects that necessary measures will be taken by the Government of the United States to terminate violations by American military aircraft of the freedom of commercial navigation on the open seas.

¹For texts of U.S. notes rejecting the charges of the Soviet Government in connection with the *Tuapse*, see BULLETIN of July 12, 1954, p. 51, and July 26, 1954, p. 131.

U.S. Reply to Soviet Proposals on European Security

U.S. NOTE OF NOVEMBER 29

Press release 675 dated November 29

Following is the text of the United States reply to the Soviet notes of October 23 and November 13, delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 29. Parallel notes were delivered by the British and French Governments.

The United States Government, in consultation with the French and British Governments, with the other NATO Governments and with the German Federal Government, has considered the note of October 23 in which the Soviet Government proposed a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four powers in November. They have at the same time, in consultation with the interested governments, considered the Soviet Government's note of November 13 proposing a conference "on the question of creating a system of collective security in Europe."

The United States Government is disappointed to find that, except for a suggestion for the hurried convocation of a European conference on November 29, neither of the Soviet notes contains any new proposal, whether on Germany, Austria or European security, which has not already been considered by the Western powers at the Berlin Conference.

The Soviet note of November 13 is openly and explicitly aimed at delaying or preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements. The United States Government for its part is resolved to bring the Paris agreements into force as soon as possible and they do not intend to be deflected from this course. The United States Government does not believe that the cause of European security can be served by the destruction of defensive associations between states inspired by the ideal of a common civilization. It would in no sense further

security to replace such associations by new organizations which would leave fundamental divergencies unresolved and would thus constitute no more than a deceptive facade. The United States is convinced that the Paris agreements provide the basis for the solution of some of the most difficult problems confronting Europe and that far from making the question of European security more difficult to solve they will serve its promotion and contribute to the cause of peace.

The unity which is being built up in the west is far broader in its scope and significance than a purely military alliance. The association of the western nations is based on their common civilization and traditions. The achievement of a close union in all fields is a deeply rooted aspiration of their peoples. It is a development of great importance in the history of Europe and is gaining in strength and purpose. By settling old rivalries and forming new ties it will promote the cause of peace in a region which in the past has given birth to so many wars.

Since the end of the war rearmament in the countries of the Soviet Bloc, including the Soviet zone of Germany, has been centrally imposed, massive and unrestricted, thus compelling the western powers to strengthen their common defense. Under the Paris agreements, however, they have of their own free will accepted a system of controls, limitations and prohibitions to be applied to their forces and armaments. This system is designed to prevent any member nation from having independent recourse to the threat or use of force.

As regards Germany, the United States Government has noted that the Soviet Government states that a settlement of the German problem is of decisive importance for ensuring security in Europe. In previous notes, the United States Government has emphasized that free all-German elections

are the essential first step in the process of German reunification in freedom. In its note of October 23 the Soviet Government has given no indication of its view on this point nor of its attitude towards the practical plan for the holding of early elections, which was put forward by the Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom at the Berlin Conference. Nor has the Soviet Government advanced specific alternative proposals. The United States Government awaits a precise indication of any concrete proposal which the Soviet Government may now have to make concerning both the timing and nature of the free all-German elections which are the essential first step for the re-establishment of a united Germany.

As regards Austria, the United States Government can see no justification for the continued denial to that country of the freedom and independence promised her by the four powers in the Moscow Declaration of 1943. The governments of the United Kingdom, United States and France expressed themselves ready at the Berlin Conference to sign the Austrian State Treaty with the Soviet text of the previously unagreed articles. The Austrian Government for its part made it plain that it concurred in this view, and this remains its position. There should therefore be no further obstacle in the way of the signature of the treaty and the termination of the occupation and the withdrawal of all foreign forces as prescribed therein. The United States Government notes with disappointment that the Soviet Government nonetheless propose a meeting at Vienna to "consider the remaining unsettled questions relating to the draft state treaty and other questions connected with the conclusion of this treaty." The United States Government is at a loss as to the nature of the questions referred to by the Soviet Government. If the Soviet Government wishes to furnish the necessary clarifications, the United States Government suggests that this could appropriately be done in exchanges between the Ambassadors in Vienna. Meanwhile, the United States Government for its part reaffirms its desire as expressed in the note of September 10¹ to proceed as soon as possible to the signature of the Austrian State Treaty.

The United States Government has on many

occasions given proof of their desire to settle questions in dispute by negotiations conducted in a spirit of mutual respect for the essential interests of all the participants. They remain convinced that this is the best way of promoting the cause of peace. This cause would be ill-served by a conference ending in failure. In order that negotiations may be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success, they consider that a basis of agreement should have been carefully prepared and established in advance. The essential basis for a useful conference whether on Germany, Austria or the remaining aspects of European security does not, in their view, at present exist.

In order to establish such a basis and to deal with the foregoing questions in due order, the United States Government proposes the following:

- (1) Agreement to sign the Austrian State Treaty;
- (2) Clarification by the Soviet Government of its position on the question of free elections in Germany which are the essential first steps to German reunification;
- (3) Exchanges through diplomatic channels on any other European questions of common interest which might suitably be examined at a later four-power meeting, in particular, questions relating to European security;
- (4) A meeting of the four-power Ministers as soon as it should appear that there is a real prospect of finding solutions and after ratification of the Paris agreements by the countries concerned;
- (5) Should it thereafter appear useful, a wider conference of European and other interested powers to consider the remaining aspects of European security.

SOVIET NOTE OF OCTOBER 23

[Unofficial translation]

In connection with the note of the U.S. Government of September 10, 1954, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following:

The Government of the U.S.S.R. in its note of July 24 proposed to the U.S. Government and also to the Governments of France and England to convene an all-European conference for the consideration of the question of creating a system of collective security in Europe.² On August 4 the Government of the U.S.S.R. proposed to the Governments of the United States, France, and England to discuss this question in preliminary fashion at a confer-

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 397.

² *Ibid.*, p. 398.

ence of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four powers and also to continue at this conference the consideration of the German question.³

In order to assist in the solution of the problem of security in Europe, the Soviet Government introduced a draft "all-European treaty concerning collective security in Europe,"⁴ expressing at the same time readiness to consider also other proposals on this question.

In this draft it is proposed to create in Europe a system of collective security which would insure safeguarding of the peace by uniting the efforts of all interested European States regardless of their social and governmental systems. The basis of the Soviet draft all-European treaty was the principle of collective action by its participants against threats and armed attack on any state participating in the treaty and also the principle of cooperation in the economic field. This means that any attempt at aggression on the part of any state would immediately entail the application of collective sanctions against the aggressor.

By the same token the Soviet draft all-European treaty contains real guarantees of the security of France and Poland, England and the Soviet Union, of all the large and small states of Europe. At the same time it creates the most favorable conditions for the reestablishment of the national unity of Germany and for the free and peaceful development of the German state.

No state which is actually striving for the strengthening of peace in Europe can have an unfavorable attitude toward cooperation with other European States in the creation of an effective system of all-European security. As regards the Soviet Government, it proceeds, as before, from the fact that only joint efforts of the European States are capable of insuring security in Europe.

While expressing its objection to this Soviet draft, the U.S. Government did not, however, make any proposal of its own concerning the insuring of collective security in Europe but, on the contrary, as is evidenced by the facts of the recent period, continues to go along the path of forming military groupings in Europe.

At the same time the U.S. Government again came to the defense of the North Atlantic military bloc, which is alleged to have defense purposes, although numerous facts bear witness to the aggressive character of this grouping in its present form. That this military grouping is directed above all against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies is not hidden by the military leaders of the North Atlantic bloc. Attempts contained in the note of September 10 to justify the creation of this bloc by references to the presence in Eastern Europe of a "heavily armed Soviet grouping" are completely groundless since such a grouping does not exist. The fact that at the present time plans for the remilitarization of Western Germany and its inclusion in the North Atlantic grouping are being prepared only confirms the fact that the case is one of further reinforcement of the aggressive character of this grouping.

In these circumstances the Soviet Government considers

it necessary again to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that the creation of military groupings cannot assist in the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. The creation of such groupings of European States directed against other European States leads to the further increasing of international tension and is in direct contradiction to the interests of strengthening the peace in Europe. Taking this course and refusing to participate in the organization of a system of collective security in Europe, the U.S. Government assumes responsibility for the consequences of such a policy, which is inconsistent with the interests of security in Europe.

For insuring security in Europe the settlement of the German problem has decisive importance. This means that the most important and urgent problem is the reestablishment of a unified Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

One must not defer the resolution of the problem of the unification of Germany, which still remains divided into two parts set off one against the other. The interests of national security of the European States, as well as the interests of the German people itself, require the resolution of the question of the unification of Germany in such a manner that the peoples of Europe will be assured that a unified Germany will not fall into the hands of mortal enemies of peace—the German militarists and revanchists—but will firmly enter upon a course of peaceful development and reestablishment of good neighborly relations with other countries.

As before, the Soviet Government considers that the holding of free all-German elections is essential for the reestablishment of a unified Germany. At these elections the German people must be able to express their free will in order that a unified Germany will be reborn as a peace-loving and democratic state.

At the Berlin Four-Power Conference, agreement was not reached on the holding of all-German elections for the reestablishment of a unified Germany. This was prevented chiefly by plans for creating a European Defense Community which provided for the remilitarization of Western Germany and its inclusion in this military grouping. The rejection by the National Assembly of France of the treaty for the establishment of a European Defense Community opened up possibilities for a reconciliation of the positions of the four powers on the question of unification of Germany and the holding for these purposes of all-German elections.

The Soviet Government expresses its readiness again to consider, taking into account the new circumstances noted above, the proposals for holding all-German elections which were introduced at the Berlin Conference by England and were supported by the United States and France. At the same time the Soviet Government assumes that the pertinent proposals of the Soviet Union will also be taken into consideration.

The Soviet Government considers that there are possibilities of reaching agreement among the powers on this question if one proceeds from the indisputable fact that the chief problem is the unification of Germany on peace-loving and democratic foundations.

In this connection the Soviet Government considers it

³ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1954, p. 269, and Mar. 15, 1954, p. 401.

necessary especially to draw attention to those new plans for the remilitarization of Western Germany and its inclusion in a military grouping of certain Western States which became known after the conference of the nine countries in London which ended on October 3 and also in connection with separate conferences which are taking place at the present time in Paris.

In spite of obligations which were assumed by the United States, France, and England, together with the Soviet Union, concerning preventing the restoration of German militarism, according to separate agreements in London and Paris there must be created in the very near future a West German army of 500,000 men with its own sizable air force, tank formations, and military staffs. The heavy industry of West Germany, and above all of the Ruhr, is again being reorganized for the mass production of armaments. Those same generals who created the Hitlerite army, and together with Hitler carried out aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, the Soviet Union, and England, will lead the armed forces of the West German States. Under such conditions the present formal pledges of the Bonn Government regarding the limitation of numbers of the West German army and its armaments cannot be taken seriously. As recent experience shows, the German militarists and revanchists, having proceeded with the creation of their own corps and divisions, will stop at nothing to achieve an increase in the numbers and armaments of their army.

The London decisions open the way to the reestablishment of German militarism. After that the hands of West German militarists and revanchists will be freed to carry out their aggressive policy in Europe. West Germany is thus turned into a dangerous hotbed of new war in Europe.

The London decisions foresee the inclusion of a remilitarized West Germany in the military grouping of the West European States, set off against other European States. This time, in place of the earlier projected military grouping of six Western European States—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg—there is foreseen a military grouping of these same states with the participation of England. It would be a deception of public opinion to allege that the London plan of creating new military forces would better serve the interests of the security of the peoples of Europe than the plan which miscarried of creating the European Defense Community.

The London plan also envisages the inclusion of West Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which opens the way for German militarists to have a direct influence on the further strengthening of the aggressiveness of the North Atlantic forces. Only very recently the National Assembly of France recognized West German participation in the North Atlantic bloc as inadvisable, considering it inconsistent with the interests of security of France. All the more inconsistent with the interests of security in Europe is the inclusion of a remilitarized West Germany in the North Atlantic grouping as is envisioned by the London agreement.

These decisions, which free the hands of German militarists, are dictated by aggressive circles of the powers

which aim at a world domination on the basis of carrying out the notorious "policy of strength."

The London agreements are also inconsistent with the restoration of sovereign rights of the German people. In fact, these agreements lead not to termination of the occupation regime, as they like to contend, but to leaving occupation troops in West Germany until the year 1998, that is, until the end of the present century. West Germany would remain bound to conditions of the enslaving "Bonn Treaty."

All this shows that the London decisions, leading to the reestablishment of German militarism and the involvement of West Germany in aggressive military groupings, radically contradict the interests of maintaining peace and intensify the threat of a new war in Europe. If these decisions are implemented, Western Germany can no longer be considered a peace-loving state, which would make impossible for a long period the reestablishment of German unity. The measures mapped out in London and Paris in regard to Western Germany are in direct contradiction also to the proposals of the Governments of England and France, submitted at the United Nations this June and supported by the U. S. Government, on the question of a general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.⁵

At the present time in the United Nations there are being considered not only the French-English proposals but also proposals of the Soviet Government on the question of reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the Soviet Government has proposed accepting as the basis for an appropriate international convention the above-mentioned proposals of France and England. Thus there is observed a rapprochement of the positions of the parties on this important question. The U. S. Government in its note of September 10 states its desire to contribute to the decision of the question of disarmament. It is impossible, however, at one and the same time to propose a general reduction of armaments and to carry out the remilitarization of West Germany. Such actions are incompatible. Recently, as is known, it has been possible to achieve a certain relaxation of tension in international relations. The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that all peace-loving peoples are interested in a further relaxation of international tension. Meanwhile, the London decisions not only do not contribute to this but on the contrary will lead to a sharpening of the international situation. At present time the situation is as follows:

Either the four powers who bear special responsibility for the solution of the German problem will do everything in order to begin examination of and decide the most urgent question—the question of the reestablishment of the unity of Germany in which the German people are so interested and along with them all peace-loving peoples of Europe; or if matters reach the point of reestablishment of German militarism and the involvement of West Germany in aggressive military groupings, then the German nation for a long time will remain torn in two, and from a remilitarized West Germany there will be created a direct threat to peace in Europe.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 182.

With a view to assisting the settlement of the German question, the Soviet Government submitted at the Berlin Conference a proposal concerning the withdrawal of occupation troops, with the exception of certain strictly limited contingents, from the territories of East and West Germany.* This proposal was connected with the conclusion of a peace treaty and with the proposal concerning all-German elections. Agreement was not reached there on this question. Desiring to assist in bringing about a rapprochement of both parts of Germany and in solving the problem of its reunification, the Soviet Government proposes to the Governments of the United States, France, and England to consider the immediate withdrawal of occupation troops from the territories of East and West Germany. Such a decision would contribute to further reduction of international tension and strengthening of peace in Europe.

Together with a decision on this question there arises the necessity for the U. S. S. R., the United States, France, and England, with the participation of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, to reach agreement concerning the size, disposition, and armament of all types of German police in East and West Germany. This would put an end to all anxiety in regard to rearmament, in East as well as West Germany. It is known that on the part of East Germany there is no objection to this proposal and no objection to the verification on the spot of the actual situation at the present time. Refusal on the part of West Germany to accept this proposal could mean only a desire to accelerate the carrying out of plans for rearmament.

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Soviet Government submits for the consideration of the U. S. Government, as well as the Governments of France and England, a proposal for the convocation this November of a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, France, England, and the Soviet Union for the consideration of the following questions:

1. The reestablishment of the unity of Germany on peace-loving and democratic bases and the carrying out of free all-German elections.
2. The withdrawal of occupation troops of the four powers from the territory of East and West Germany.
3. The convocation of an all-European conference to examine the question of the creation of a system of collective security in Europe.

As for the conclusion of a state treaty with Austria, as is known, the Soviet Government on August 12 in a note to the Austrian Government proposed that a conference of the Ambassadors of the United States, France, England, and the Soviet Union in Vienna should, together with representatives of the Austrian Government, undertake consideration of the remaining unsettled questions connected with the conclusion of this treaty with Austria.

In its reply, the Austrian Government on October 12 communicated its willingness to take part in the above-mentioned conference. However, the Soviet Government is unaware of the point of view of the United States or of the Governments of France and England on this question. The Soviet Government would like to know if

the Governments of the three powers agree that their Ambassadors could take part in the conference in Vienna for the examination of questions connected with the conclusion of a state treaty with Austria.

SOVIET NOTE OF NOVEMBER 13

[Unofficial translation]

On October 23 agreements were signed in Paris concerning West Germany. The signing of these agreements was preceded by a meeting of the nine countries in London, participants in which agreed on separate measures regarding the German question.

The Paris agreements, in contravention of existing international agreements on Germany, make provision for the reestablishment of militarism in West Germany, the creation of West German armed forces, and the inclusion of West Germany in military groupings of certain states set off against other states of Europe.

In West Germany an army is being created which in the near future is to number 500-520 thousand men and which will have at its disposal large air and tank units and also its own military staffs. Already German militarists do not hide the fact that they regard the strength of the West German army established in accordance with the London and Paris agreements only as a base for development of still more numerous armed forces.

The West German army is being created under the leadership of those German generals who led the Hitlerite army during the years of the Second World War and who were accomplices of Fascist aggression and of the propagation of the bloody Hitlerite "New Order" in European countries.

The London and Paris agreements untie the hands of West German militarists and revanchists also for unlimited production of armaments. The armed forces of West Germany also will be permitted to have atomic weapons among their armaments, which greatly increases the threat of destructive atomic war in Europe.

The agreements make provision for the inclusion of a remilitarized West Germany in a new military grouping now being formed as the so-called Western European Union and also in the North Atlantic bloc, the aggressive character of which the Soviet Government has repeatedly pointed out.

All this is evidence that in regard to West Germany a course is being followed which is compatible neither with the task of strengthening the peace in Europe nor with the task of restoring German unity. The realization of the London and Paris agreements would mean that the unification of Germany by carrying out free, all-German elections would be sacrificed to present plans for the restoration of German militarism—that fatal enemy of the peoples of Europe including the German people itself.

With the aim of facilitating the solution of the question concerning the restoration of German unity, the Soviet Government put forth a proposal to examine the question of immediate withdrawal of occupation troops from the territory of East and West Germany. At the same time the proposal was also put forward that the number and

* *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1954, p. 228.

armament of all forms of German police both of West and of East Germany should be determined. As before, the Soviet Government considers that carrying out these measures would contribute to a lessening of tension in Europe.

The London and Paris agreements are incompatible with the French-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Aid of 1944 and with the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 concerning cooperation and mutual aid after the war, which envisage taking collective measures with the objective of preventing new aggression on the part of Germany.

The Soviet Government has already drawn the attention of the states which bear the responsibility for settling the German problem to the serious danger connected with the rebirth of militarism in West Germany and with drawing the latter into military groupings. The formation of such military groupings of various states, set off against other European States, inescapably leads, as historical experience has shown, to aggravation of relations between them and, in the final reckoning, to war. Thus it was on the eve of the First World War when two mutually antagonistic military coalitions of powers were set up. Thus it was also on the eve of the Second World War, when under the aegis of Hitlerite Germany an aggressive military grouping was formed, setting itself off against other states, which in the course of the war were forced to unite their strength to turn back Hitlerite aggression.

In order to avoid such a situation, whereby Europe periodically becomes an arena of bloody and devastating wars, bringing to peoples of European States many millions of human losses and colossal material destruction, the necessity arises for creating a system of security in Europe in which all European States would be participants regardless of their social and state structure. Creation of such a system of all-European collective security would give a lasting foundation for peaceful cooperation of all European States and would guarantee their national security by their assuming obligations to settle differences arising among them by peaceful means and, in case of the development of a threat to the peace or a breach of peace, to take united action, including military action, against the aggressor.

The creation in Europe of an effective system of collective security based on the united efforts of all European States would facilitate settling the German problem. In this event there would be eliminated the now existing basic obstacle to the reestablishment of German unity which is expressed in plans for transforming West Germany into a militaristic state and including it in aggressive military groupings.

With the aim of facilitating the achievement of an appropriate agreement between the interested states, the Soviet Union early this year at the time of the Berlin Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., the United States, England, and France introduced proposals regarding basic principles of an "all-European treaty of collective security in Europe." Proposals for creating in Europe a system of collective security met with favorable reaction on the part of a num-

ber of European States. They also met with support in wide public circles both of those European States whose governments have not yet expressed their attitude toward the idea of collective security in Europe and of those states whose governments had refused to support proposals which have been advanced up to now. As is known, it has not been possible to reach necessary agreement on this important problem between the interested countries. Moreover, the interests of insuring the security of European peoples require that the course of affairs in Europe not proceed along the ruinous path of restoring German militarism and of forming in Europe military blocs of states set one against the other but along the path of creating a system of all-European security based on the consideration of the lawful interests of all states of Europe, large and small.

Plans of reestablishing German militarism and of including remilitarized West Germany in military groupings which were prepared by the London and Paris conferences cannot help but complicate the situation in Europe. The realization of these plans will inescapably cause a sharpening of relations between European States, a strengthening of the armaments race, and a significant increase of the burden of military expenditures for the peoples of Europe. In this connection it will be absolutely natural if peace-loving European peoples are forced to take new measures for insuring their security.

In order to prevent the indicated complication of the situation in Europe, which would increase the danger of war, all measures must be taken to assist in establishing a system of collective security in Europe and thus in lessening tension in international relations.

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Soviet Government considers that the necessity has arisen for calling without further delay a conference of all European States which wish to participate, and also the United States, on the question of creating a system of collective security in Europe.

Recognizing the special responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security borne by states which are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the Soviet Government considers it desirable for the Chinese People's Republic to send its observer to this conference.

It goes without saying that each state participating in the above-mentioned conference should be able to introduce proposals which it considers necessary in connection with the question being discussed.

The Soviet Government proposes that such a conference be convened on November 29 of this year at either Moscow or Paris.

Postponement in convening this conference would be inexpedient inasmuch as consideration of ratification of the Paris agreements is beginning in December in certain European countries. Such ratification would complicate the whole European situation in a major degree and would undermine the possibilities of settling the unresolved European problems and first of all the German problem.

The proposal for calling at Moscow or Paris on November 29 an all-European conference on the question of creating a system of collective security is shared also

by the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, with which the Soviet Government has had appropriate consultations.

Similar notes have been sent by the Government of the U.S.S.R. to all European States with which the U.S.S.R. has diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union proceeds on the assumption that the invitation could be sent to the

European States with which the U.S.S.R. does not have diplomatic relations by the Governments of France, England, or the United States which have diplomatic relations with such countries.

The Soviet Government will be grateful to the U.S. Government for a communication regarding its participation in the all-European conference mentioned above.

Report to U.N. General Assembly on Austria

On November 19 the U. S., French, and British representatives to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General the following report from their Governments to the General Assembly on the results of efforts made since 1952 to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian State Treaty.

U.N. doc. A/2798 dated November 22

On 20 December 1952, the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 409th plenary meeting, recalling the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, whereby the Governments of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (joined later by France) recognized that Austria should be re-established as a free and independent State, expressed its concern that negotiations towards the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty which had been under way since 1947 had failed to bring about the proposed objective. The Assembly, therefore, addressed an earnest appeal to the Governments concerned to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian Treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in its sovereignty. The General Assembly also expressed its hope that the solution of this problem would "constitute an important step towards the elimination of other areas of disagreement and therefore towards the creation of conditions favourable to the accomplishment of world peace."¹

¹ For text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 68.

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have been working constantly since 1946 to obtain an acceptable Austrian State Treaty. They consider that the time has now come to report to the General Assembly on the results of the efforts made since 1952 to implement the Assembly's resolution.

In January 1953 the three Governments, in notes addressed to the Soviet Government,² welcomed the Assembly's resolution and proposed that a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies be held at an early date, for the purpose of concluding an Austrian Treaty. The reply of the Soviet Government, dated 27 January 1953,³ stated that the "Soviet Government considers it necessary to call attention to the fact that both the raising of the Austrian question in the United Nations as well as the resolution adopted on this question are illegal." They added that they were prepared to take part in a meeting of representatives of the four Powers on the Austrian question, provided that the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France were prepared to withdraw their proposal for an "abbreviated Treaty"⁴ and to negotiate on the basis of the draft

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 260.

⁴ It will be recalled that in 1952 the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, finding the Soviet Government unwilling to complete the work carried out on the Austrian State Treaty since 1947, submitted a very brief draft treaty which eliminated the unsettled questions of the longer version, and yet included all the essential elements needed to restore Austria's independence. [Footnote in the original.]

State Treaty which had been the subject of the earlier abortive discussions. The three Governments felt it inappropriate to impose prior conditions, as proposed by the Soviet Government, regarding the scope of the new discussions. Nevertheless the three Governments reiterated their readiness to discuss any proposition which would lead to the end of the occupation.⁵ The Soviet Government continued at meetings of the Deputies on 6 and 9 February 1953, to insist on the preconditions previously stipulated and declined to negotiate on substance. They declined an invitation to a meeting of the Treaty Deputies on 27 May 1953 on the pretext that such a meeting (of which over 260 had already been held) could be called only by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The three Western Deputies denied this and reiterated that they were prepared to accept any treaty in terms which would ensure Austria's political and economic independence.⁶ On 11 June 1953, the three Governments then asked the USSR to state what kind of an Austrian settlement it was prepared to conclude.⁷ The Soviet Government ignored this request and again limited itself to a demand for withdrawal of the "abbreviated Treaty". The Soviet Government also, in notes addressed to the three Governments on 4 August,⁸ stated that "a possible successful solution of the German problem could also facilitate the solution of the Austrian question," thus apparently suggesting that hope of an Austrian Treaty must be deferred until other unrelated conditions had been met, a proposition which the three Governments were bound to oppose. On 17 August they invited the USSR to attend a meeting of the Treaty Deputies, scheduled for 31 August, and declared their preparedness not to introduce the abbreviated Treaty for consideration on the understanding that no extraneous issues would be raised.⁹ The Soviet Government chose not to attend this meeting. In late November 1953 the three Powers made yet another attempt to persuade the Soviet Government to join a discussion of the Austrian problem, offering to do so in a Foreign Ministers conference, or in a Deputies meeting, or, if the Soviet Government

should prefer, to give prompt and careful consideration to any Soviet proposals made through diplomatic channels.¹⁰ This invitation remained unanswered.

It was not until the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Berlin, between 25 January and 18 February 1954, that negotiations were resumed on the Austrian Treaty.¹¹ The Austrian Foreign Minister participated in these discussions. He declared Austria's readiness to pay, if necessary to achieve freedom, the price imposed by the Treaty, including surrender to the Soviet Union of most of Austria's petroleum resources in addition to other assets. He appealed, however, for alleviation of the burdens of the Treaty, especially of article 35, and particularly asked that Austria should be allowed to pay the Soviet Union \$150 million in goods instead of cash.

The Soviet Foreign Minister granted this latter request but at once made fresh stipulations. The main ones were:

(I) That the withdrawal of occupation troops stationed on the territory of the respective Zones of Austria should be postponed pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Germany. (At the same time, it was proposed that all Allied troops should be withdrawn from Vienna).

(II) That Austria should undertake not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against any Power which participated with its armed forces in the war against Germany and in the liberation of Austria.

The Austrian Government and the three Governments objected to the proposals of the Soviet Government, which would make the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty dependent on the unconnected problem of a settlement in Germany and impose the burden of continued foreign occupation on the Austrian people for an indefinite future. They also pointed out that the second proposal contained conditions which had both military and non-military implications and should not be imposed on any sovereign State. They considered that Austria should be free to decide her own international relations in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The Austrian Government gave assurances during the Conference that Austria would not enter into any military alliance but also em-

⁵ BULLETIN of Feb. 16, 1953, p. 260.

⁶ *Ibid.*, June 8, 1953, p. 815.

⁷ *Ibid.*, June 22, 1953, p. 873.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 352.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1953, p. 282.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1953, p. 745.

¹¹ *Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions*, Department of State publication 5399, pp. 175-208.

phasized that they could not accept, as a condition of reaching agreement upon the State Treaty, that occupation troops should remain in Austria until the signing of a German Peace Treaty.

In an effort to obtain agreement, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France expressed their willingness to conclude the Treaty by accepting the versions of the unagreed articles supported by the USSR up to that time.

The Austrian Government, as a final concession, offered, if it were agreed by the four Governments, to accept an extension of the period for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Austria provided that that extension was for a definite period and that such a concession would enable the Treaty to be concluded. They suggested that the date of withdrawal should be fixed at the latest at 30 June 1955.

The Soviet Government proved unwilling to accept any of these proposals. Accordingly, no Treaty could be concluded during the Berlin Conference. The three Governments, however, made clear their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the Soviet Government were prepared to agree to the restoration of Austrian sovereignty and independence, which would of necessity include the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

Exchanges of correspondence since the Berlin Conference have failed to indicate any change thus far in the Soviet attitude which would permit the withdrawal of all occupation forces and conclusion of a Treaty. In a note of 7 May 1954, to the Soviet Government¹² the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France again urged conclusion of an Austrian Treaty as a means of eliminating sources of international tensions. The Soviet Government, in a note of 12 August addressed to the Austrian Government, rejected the latter's proposal for a five-Power committee to consider alleviating Austria's occupation burdens. The Soviet Government instead suggested convocation of a committee to examine the unresolved questions pertaining to the Austrian Treaty and other related questions, but again referred to the Soviet proposals made at the Berlin Conference and failed to indicate a willingness to withdraw its troops from Austria, a fundamental requirement for the restoration of Austria's free-

dom and independence. On 10 September the three Western Powers sent a further note to the USSR¹³ in which they renewed their offer made at Berlin in February to conclude the Treaty by accepting the versions of the unagreed articles supported by the USSR up to that time. The Austrian Government, in replying on 12 October to the Soviet note of 12 August, said that it was prepared to participate in new treaty discussion but pointed out that the withdrawal of all occupation forces would be requisite to the conclusion of a Treaty.

The Soviet Government, in notes addressed to the Western Powers on 23 October,¹⁴ ignored the offer contained in the Western notes of 10 September to sign the Austrian Treaty but instead referred to the same proposal made in its note of 12 August to the Austrian Government for a conference of Ambassadors in Vienna for "examination of questions connected with the conclusion of a State Treaty". These new notes also contained no indication of the Soviet Government's willingness to withdraw its occupation troops from Austria which, as previously stressed by the Austrian Government and the three Western Powers, is requisite to conclusion of an Austrian Treaty.

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France deeply regret that their efforts to conclude a Treaty and to grant Austria its freedom and independence in compliance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution have been unavailing. The three Governments will continue to seek means whereby Austrian independence may be re-established and will continue to press for the earliest possible conclusion of a just and acceptable State Treaty. Further progress depends upon the attitude of the Soviet Government.

U.S., Austria Review Prospects for Austrian State Treaty

Following is the text of the communique issued on November 26 at the conclusion of the visit to Washington of Chancellor Julius Raab of Austria, November 21-25, together with a statement released by the White House on November 22 and

¹² BULLETIN of May 17, 1954, p. 756.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 397.

¹⁴ See p. 902.

statements made by Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Raab on the occasion of the latter's arrival.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 26

Press release 668 dated November 26

The visit of the Federal Chancellor of Austria, Julius Raab, to Washington has provided a most welcome opportunity for high officials of the United States to become personally acquainted with the Chancellor and to review with him the international situation as a whole. Matters of mutual interest to the governments of Austria and the United States were discussed. These discussions which began with the Chancellor's talk with the President of the United States and Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on November 22 have been cordial, informative, and constructive.

The prospects for a Treaty for Austria were reviewed and it was agreed that both governments would continue with determination to work together for a State Treaty which would provide for the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Austria at an early and fixed date. It was noted that the United States, Great Britain, and France had on November 18 [19] submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations a report of their efforts to achieve an Austrian Treaty.

The Chancellor reviewed the political and economic situation existing in Austria today. The stability and progress achieved by Austria, in spite of the devastations of war and the burdens imposed by the continued occupation of the country, were recognized by the representatives of the United States as being a remarkable and concrete proof of the courage, resourcefulness and fortitude of the Austrian coalition government and its people. The Chancellor outlined his plans and hopes for the further development of Austria's hydroelectric potential for the mutual benefit of Austria and neighboring states. Further development of these plans will be followed with great interest by United States authorities.

The Chancellor held useful conversations with the Departments of State and of Defense on the question of further alleviating the burden of occupation by the release of requisitioned housing presently held by the United States authorities in Austria. Plans to this end now under consideration in the Department of Defense were reviewed.

The question of claims by American citizens

against the Austrian government stemming from the Nazi occupation of Austria was discussed. It was agreed that a prompt and just settlement of these claims should be sought.

The discussions held during the Chancellor's visit re-emphasized the friendly relationship which exists between the governments of Austria and the United States. By this visit the ties which link the people of Austria to the people of the United States have been further strengthened.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 22

The President had a very friendly and cordial meeting at noon today with the Federal Chancellor of Austria, Julius Raab. The discussions were in the nature of a broad review of the international situation with particular attention to the prospects for a State Treaty for Austria. This meeting followed a meeting between the Chancellor and the Secretary of State.

Present at the meeting between the President and the Chancellor were the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant; the Director of the Political Department of the Austrian Foreign Office, Dr. Josef Schoener; the Austrian Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Karl Gruber; and the United States Ambassador to Austria, Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr. The meeting was followed by an official luncheon at the White House given by the President in honor of Chancellor Raab.

Further conversations regarding matters of mutual interest to the Governments of Austria and the United States will be held by Chancellor Raab with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of Foreign Operations Administration, as well as with officials of the Department of State.

ARRIVAL OF CHANCELLOR RAAB

Press release 664 dated November 21

Secretary Dulles' Statement

On behalf of President Eisenhower and indeed all of the American people, I welcome you here to the Nation's Capital. As I know that you have already learned, the American people have the greatest sympathy and admiration for your country. We have sympathy because, a small country, the first victim of Hitlerite aggression, you were early promised an independence which unhappily

has not yet been realized. And we have admiration because in spite of all the difficulties which would have discouraged a lesser people, your nation has struggled valiantly and has achieved for itself a position of independence and self-respect in the world which we all greatly respect and admire. Therefore, the American people, Mr. Chancellor, greatly welcome your presence here and the opportunity to express to you personally those sentiments which I have so inadequately put today. We are happy that you will be not only in Washington but will visit other parts of the United States, so that you will see something of us and we in turn will have a greater opportunity to see something of you. We look forward, therefore, with much anticipation to your visit here in Washington and to other parts of the United States.

The Chancellor's Response

May I take the liberty first to thank you personally for the very kind welcome which I have found here in Washington. I have with great pleasure accepted the invitation of the President, namely, in order to convey to him the thanks of the Austrian people, for without the help of the United States, Austria would not today enjoy the standard and the position which is hers in the economic and the political field. We Austrians are living in the center of Europe, and we have to fulfill a very important task there. The Austrian people with great diligence and great labor have started to rebuild their homeland. In the United States we recognize a power which provides the foremost guaranty of the liberty of mankind, and we, a small country over there in Europe, also have to do our duty.

Monroe Doctrine Expresses Inter-American Attitude

*Remarks by Edward J. Sparks
Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs¹*

One hundred thirty-one years ago, what has come to be known as the "Monroe Doctrine" was contained in a message to Congress from Presi-

dent James Monroe. In a few words it set forth what has been the consistent United States policy in a highly important aspect of this country's foreign relations.

In the period since 1823 there has been a tremendous transformation in the political and economic conditions of the areas of the world with which the Monroe Doctrine is concerned. The United States is no longer a small, inexperienced nation seeking to maintain its ability to continue democratic development in a largely hostile world. The United States is today, rather, a leader of the free world.

The threat to the security and independence of the Americas now comes from only one source—Communist imperialism. Latin America is no longer an area newly freed from colonial domination by Europe but, rather, a group of 20 sovereign republics bound together, along with the United States, in the Organization of American States for their mutual protection and development.

The doctrine which President Monroe enunciated in 1823 may be said to set forth two major aspects of United States policy. The first was that we would consider any attempt by any European power to impose on the independent countries of Latin America the colonial domination from which they had freed themselves, as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.⁷ This declaration against the extension of the European domination in this hemisphere has long come to express a truly inter-American attitude. Collective security against aggressive attack on the territory, sovereignty, or political independence of any American State is formalized in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro of 1947, as well as in the Charter of the Organization of American States, which was adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá in 1948.

The second part of the Monroe Doctrine was directed against the designs of Czarist Russia and the so-called Holy Alliance, which were then plotting to impose despotic political systems on parts of the hemisphere which had just won their independence from Spain. President Monroe said that such attempts were dangerous to our peace and safety.

In commenting on the Tenth International Conference of American States at Caracas earlier

¹ Made at the opening of Monroe House at Washington, D. C., on Dec. 2 (press release 688).

this year, the Secretary of State said that the threat which stems from international communism is a repetition in this century of precisely the kind of danger against which President Monroe made his declaration 131 years ago.

At the conference in Caracas, in March of this year, the essence of this second part of the Monroe Doctrine also was set down in a multilateral declaration of the American States.

In the "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention" adopted at Caracas, the American Republics stated that:

the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.

Thus, a statement in 1823 by President Monroe concerning foreign intervention into the political affairs of other nations of the New World has come, in essence, to be incorporated into the hemisphere-wide doctrines of the American Republics.

That we should be addressed today by my distinguished friend, Dr. José Mora, Ambassador of Uruguay and President of the Council of the Organization of American States, is fitting proof of the extent to which the principles enunciated by President Monroe have come to be accepted as the policy of all of the American Republics.

Dr. Holleran Appointed to Cultural Council of OAS

On November 30 the President appointed Dr. Mary P. Holleran, Dean of Faculty of Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va., to be the U.S. representative on the Inter-American Cultural Council of the Organization of American States (press release 687 dated December 2). The Inter-American Cultural Council was established under the Charter of the Organization of American States "to promote friendly relations and mutual understanding among the American peoples, in order to strengthen the peaceful sentiments that have

characterized the evolution of America, through the promotion of educational, scientific, and cultural exchange."

Argentina and Paraguay To Restrict Tung Oil Exports to U.S.

White House press release dated November 22

The President announced on November 22 that he has been advised by the Secretary of State that the Governments of Argentina and Paraguay have undertaken to restrict their exports to the United States of tung oil and the equivalent in tung nuts to a total of 21.8 million pounds in the case of Argentina and 2.6 million pounds in the case of Paraguay, during the marketing year ending October 31, 1955. Imports from other sources, the President said, are not expected to be significant, bringing anticipated total imports to approximately 25 million pounds, in contrast to 43.1 million pounds of imports during the last marketing year.

It is estimated that U.S. consumption of tung oil during the current crop year will be about 50 million pounds. Domestic production for the same period is estimated at about 17 million pounds. On the basis of these estimates, consumption of tung oil in the United States during the present marketing year would exceed supplies by about 8 million pounds and there would be a corresponding reduction of 8 million pounds in the tung oil stocks held by the Commodity Credit Corporation.

In making this announcement the President stated that in the light of these developments he would not now act on the recommendations made by the United States Tariff Commission in its September 30, 1954, report on tung nuts and tung oil.¹

The President stated that he was pleased that the joint effort and cooperation with the Argentine and Paraguayan Governments has produced such a hopeful approach for dealing with the problem of excessive supplies of tung oil, which has been causing increasing concern in this country. This spirit of cooperation is essential, the President said, if we and our friendly neighbors and allies are to meet our individual and common needs as we proceed toward our mutual goal of expanding levels of world trade and investment.

¹Copies of the Tariff Commission report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

President Assigns Functions Under Foreign Aid Programs

White House press release dated November 6

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on November 6 issued an Executive order providing for the administration of the foreign aid programs authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

The order assigns Presidential functions under the act to other officers of the Government in a manner generally similar to that heretofore obtaining under earlier law. Principally, the President, by this order:

1. Delegated to the Secretary of Defense the military assistance functions under the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

2. Delegated to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration the administration of assistance programs under the act, other than military assistance.

3. Made the Secretary of State responsible for international agreements and foreign policy guidance in respect of the various assistance programs and for making contributions to international organizations.

4. Assigned to the Secretary of Commerce duties under the act respecting the facilitation and encouragement of travel abroad and the drawing of the attention of private enterprise to opportunities for investment and development in other free nations.

5. Allocated to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration the funds appropriated to carry out functions under the act administered by them, respectively.

6. Prescribed procedures to coordinate the activities carried on abroad by various agencies under the act.

7. Delegated to the Secretary of State authority to control the import and export, other than by government agencies, of arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

The President also directed a letter of instructions to the heads of agencies directly affected by the Executive order.

MEMORANDUM TO AGENCY HEADS¹

I have today signed an Executive order which is designed to carry out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

My letter of June 1, 1953, regarding the organization of the executive branch for the conduct of foreign affairs, continues to represent my instructions on the subjects discussed in that letter. This letter supplements my previous letter and the Executive order signed today.

The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration is responsible for coordinating all operations of the foreign assistance programs. He should establish appropriate machinery to achieve this coordination and to assure that all aspects of the mutual security program are consistent with and further the attainment of foreign policy, military policy, and financial and monetary policy objectives. This should include provisions for the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury to receive adequate reports on the operations and projected plans with respect to each program under the Mutual Security Act.

The delegation to the Secretary of State of responsibility for negotiations with foreign governments is intended to give recognition to the central responsibility of the Department of State in this area. Other agencies directly concerned with the substance of the negotiation must continue to carry substantial responsibility in such negotiations, however. Moreover, it is assumed that these other agencies will conduct day-to-day discussions with representatives of the foreign governments in implementing basic agreements reached with such governments. Such discussions, of course, must be in conformance with the foreign policy responsibilities of the State Department and of the chiefs of our diplomatic missions.

The Director of the Foreign Operations Admin-

¹ Addressed to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, and Commerce, the Directors of the Foreign Operations Administration, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the U.S. Information Agency, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

istration will coordinate the implementation of the statutory requirement that a certain minimum amount of the Mutual Security funds be used to finance the export and sale for foreign currencies of surplus agricultural commodities. He shall coordinate this surplus disposal program with that under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. He shall consult with the interagency committee established by the President to assist in the administration of that Act, but I am looking to the Director for the successful implementation of this important part of our mutual security program.

The Secretary of Commerce is designated as the officer to carry out the program to encourage travel. This assignment in no way diminishes the responsibilities of the Department of State or the Foreign Operations Administration to operate exchange and technical assistance programs, nor does it affect the responsibility of the Department of State to carry on diplomatic negotiations with other countries regarding the removal of legal barriers to international travel and similar matters.

The responsibility of finding opportunities for investment and development abroad under the Mutual Security Act is delegated to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration. The Secretaries of State and Commerce are to continue their regular work through the Foreign Service relating to finding opportunities abroad. The Secretary of Commerce shall be responsible for the regularized publishing and circularization to American business of opportunities abroad, but the Director may continue his normal, direct contacts with individual business firms that arise as a result of his other functions under the Act, such as making investment guarantees and promoting economic development. The Departments of State and Commerce and the Foreign Operations Administration should make arrangements for appropriate consultation and cooperation in respect of their programs relating to encouraging American private investment abroad.

The arrangements described above and in the Executive order issued today are to continue in effect during fiscal year 1955 or until other arrangements for the administration of foreign aid functions are prescribed by the President after further study has been given to this problem in the executive branch of the Government.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10575²

Administration of Foreign-Aid Functions

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

PART I. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS AND FUNDS

Section 101. *Foreign Operations Administration.* (a) Exclusive of the functions otherwise delegated, or excluded from delegation, by this order, and subject to the provisions of this order, there are hereby delegated to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration all functions conferred upon the President by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and by the Mutual Defense Assistance, Control Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 644; 22 U. S. C. 1611-1613c).

(b) Subject to sections 103 and 107 (b) of this order, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration shall administer sections 402, 505, and 201 of the Act. In determining upon the furnishing of assistance on terms of repayment pursuant to sections 201 (a) and 505 of the Act, and upon the amounts and terms of such assistance, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration shall consult with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems in respect of policies relating to such assistance and terms. Whenever assistance on terms of repayment, under the said section 505, involves funds available under chapter 1 of Title I of the Act, the said Director shall consult with the Secretary of Defense with respect to the amounts and terms of such assistance. The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration shall also consult the said Council with respect to policies concerning the utilization of funds in the Special Account provided for in section 142 (11) of the Act and concerning such other matters as are within the cognizance of the Council pursuant to section 4 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act.

(c) Pursuant to section 527 (c) (2) of the Act, it is directed that the authority made available to the Director of the United States Information Agency with respect to his functions by section 2 of Executive Order No. 10477 of August 1, 1953 (18 F. R. 4540), and by Executive Order No. 10522 of March 26, 1954 (19 F. R. 1689), subject to the provisions of law applicable in connection with such authority, may be utilized by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration with respect to his functions.

(d) It is hereby directed that the Office of Small Business provided for in section 504 (b) of the Act shall be in the Foreign Operations Administration.

Section 102. *Department of Defense.* (a) Subject to the provisions of this order, there are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Defense:

(1) The functions conferred upon the President by chapter 1 of Title I of the Act, exclusive of (i) those so

² 19 Fed. Reg. 7249.

conferred by section 105 (b) (3) of the Act, (II) so much of those so conferred by section 106 (b) of the Act as consists of determining that a nation or international organization may make available the fair value of equipment, materials, or services, sold thereto or rendered therefor, at a time or at times other than in advance of delivery of the equipment, materials, or services, and (III) the functions reserved to the President by section 107 of this order.

(2) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 142 (7) and 511 (e) of the Act.

(3) So much of the functions conferred upon the President by sections 142 (10), 511 (b), 527 (a), 528, and 529 (a) of the Act as relates to other functions under the Act administered by the Department of Defense.

(b) The Secretary of Defense is hereby designated to make, with respect to equipment or materials procured for military assistance, the determinations provided for in section 107 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1955 (68 Stat. 1224).

(c) The Secretary of Defense (1) shall exercise the responsibility and authority vested in him by the Act and the responsibility and authority delegated to him by this order subject to coordination by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and (2) shall keep the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration fully and currently informed of all matters, including prospective action, relating to the utilization of funds under the Act, the establishment of priorities under section 524 (b), of the Act, and the furnishing of military items under chapter 1 of Title I of the Act.

Section 103. *Department of State.* (a) There are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State:

(1) The functions conferred upon the President by the laws referred to in section 101 (a) of this order with respect to negotiating and entering into international agreements.

(2) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 105 (b) (3), 405 (a), 413 (b) (2) and (3), and 529 (b) and (c) of the Act.

(3) The functions conferred upon the President by section 504 (a) (2) of the Act so far as they may relate to countries in which the Foreign Operations Administration does not have missions or employees.

(4) So much of the functions conferred upon the President by section 535 (a) of the Act as consists of requesting the cooperation of the United Nations, its organs, and specialized agencies or other international organizations in carrying out the purposes of the Act.

(b) The functions conferred upon the President by section 414 of the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State. In connection with the carrying out of the said functions the Secretary of State shall consult with appropriate agencies of the Government. The designation by the Secretary of State of articles which shall be considered as arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, under the said section 414 shall require the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.

(c) The Secretary of State shall be responsible (1) for making the United States contributions under the Act to,

and formulating and presenting with the assistance of the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration the policy of the United States with respect to the assistance programs of, the international organizations referred to in sections 132 (c), 306, 405 (a) and (c), 406, and 407 of the Act, and (2) for making the United States contribution under section 408 of the Act to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the United States' share of the expenses of the Organization.

(d) All functions under the Act and the other statutes referred to in sections 101 (a), 102 (b), and 105 (a) of this order, however vested, delegated, or assigned, shall be subject to the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States.

(e) The maintenance of special missions or staffs abroad, the fixing of the ranks of the chiefs thereof after the chiefs of the United States diplomatic missions, and the authorization of the same compensation and allowances as the chief of mission, Class 3 or Class 4, within the meaning of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (22 U. S. C. 801 *et seq.*), all under section 526 of the Act, shall require the approval of the Secretary of State.

Section 104. *Department of Commerce.* (a) There is hereby delegated to the Secretary of Commerce so much of the functions conferred upon the President by section 413 (b) (1) of the Act as consists of drawing the attention of private enterprise to opportunities for investment and development in other free nations.

(b) The Secretary of Commerce is hereby designated as the officer through whom shall be carried out the functions provided for in section 416 of the Act.

Section 105. *United States Information Agency.* (a) The functions conferred upon the President by section 1011 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 6), as amended, are hereby delegated to the Director of the United States Information Agency and shall be carried out in consultation with the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

(b) The United States Information Agency shall perform the functions provided for by law with respect to publicizing abroad the activities carried out under the Act.

Section 106. *Allocation of funds.* (a) Funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the President shall be deemed to be allocated without any further action of the President as follows:

(1) Funds for carrying out chapter 1 of Title I of the Act are allocated to the Secretary of Defense, but, for the purposes of the second sentence of section 110 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1955 (68 Stat. 1224), such funds shall be available only when and in such amounts as they have been apportioned, for use, by the Bureau of the Budget.

(2) All funds for carrying out the Act except those for carrying out chapter 1 of Title I of the Act are allocated to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

(b) The said funds may be allocated by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, respectively, to any agency, department, establishment, or wholly-owned corporation of the Government for obligation or expenditure thereby consistent with

applicable law, subject, however, to the provisions of section 107 (a) (2) hereof. The utilization of funds without regard to the existing laws governing the obligation and expenditure of Government funds as authorized by section 411 (b) of the Act shall be limited as far as practicable and shall in any event be confined to instances in which such utilization is deemed (1) to further the more economical, efficient, or expeditious carrying out of functions under the Act, and (2) to obviate or mitigate hardship occurring with respect to personnel administering functions under the Act in connection with the administration of these functions or with respect to the families of personnel by reason of the duties of the respective heads of families under the Act.

(c) The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration shall allocate funds to the Department of State for the contributions referred to in section 103 (e) of this order.

Section 107. Reservation of functions to the President.

(a) There are hereby excluded from the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions of this order:

(1) The functions conferred upon the President by the Act with respect to the appointment of officers required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the transmittal of periodic or special reports to the Congress, and the termination or withdrawal of assistance.

(2) The functions conferred upon the President with respect to findings, determinations, certification, agreements, directives, or transfers of funds, as the case may be, by sections 104 (b), 105, 132 (a), 141, 401, 403, 404, 410, 501, 503, 521, and 522 (b) of the Act, and by sections 103 (b), 104, 203, and 301 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951.

(3) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 101, 107 (a) (2), 415, 525, 533, and 545 (d) of the Act and, subject to Part II hereof, the functions so conferred by section 523 (b) of the Act.

(4) The functions conferred upon the President by section 121 of the Act, including all of the functions so conferred with respect to waiving specific provisions of section 142 of the Act, but otherwise excluding so much of the functions conferred upon the President by the said section 121 as may relate to assistance for the support of forces and other expenditures within Indo-China and either is financed from the unexpended balances of appropriations made pursuant to sections 304 and 540 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, or is within an obligational limitation of \$150,000,000 additional to the said unexpended balances.

(5) So much of the functions conferred upon the President by section 409 (d) of the Act as may relate to funds allocated to the Department of Defense by this order.

(b) The President shall hereafter determine the portions of the sum of \$350,000,000 provided for in section 402 of the Act and the portions of the sum of \$200,000,000 provided for in section 505 (b) of the Act which shall be applicable to funds allocated pursuant to the Act to the Foreign Operations Administration and the Department of Defense, respectively.

PART II. PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION ABROAD

Section 201. Functions of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. (a) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country, as the representative of the President, shall serve as the channel of authority on foreign policy and shall provide foreign policy direction to all representatives of United States agencies in such country.

(b) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country, as the representative of the President and acting on his behalf, shall coordinate the activities of the representatives of United States agencies (including the chiefs of economic and technical assistance missions, military assistance advisory groups, foreign information staffs, and other representatives of agencies of the United States Government) in such country engaged in carrying out programs under the Act, programs under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, and the programs transferred by section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 (67 Stat. 642); and he shall assume responsibility for assuring the unified development and execution of the said programs in such country. More particularly, the functions of each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall include, with respect to the programs and the country concerned, the functions of:

(1) Exercising general direction and leadership of the entire effort.

(2) Assuring that recommendations and prospective plans and actions of representatives of United States agencies are effectively coordinated and are consistent with, and in furtherance of, the established policy of the United States.

(3) Assuring that the interpretation and application of instructions received by representatives of United States agencies from higher authority are in accord with the established policy of the United States.

(4) Guiding the representatives of United States agencies in working out measures to prevent duplication in their efforts and to promote the most effective and efficient use of all United States officers and employees engaged in work on the said programs.

(5) Keeping the representatives of United States agencies fully informed as to current and prospective United States policies.

(6) Prescribing procedures governing the coordination of the activities of representatives of United States agencies, and assuring that such representatives shall have access to all available information essential to the accomplishment of their prescribed duties.

(7) Preparing and submitting such reports on the operation and status of the programs referred to in the introductory portion of this subsection as may be requested of the Secretary of State by the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, or the Director of the United States Information Agency, with respect to their respective responsibilities.

(8) Recommending the withdrawal of United States personnel from the country whenever in his opinion the interests of the United States warrant such action.

(c) Each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission

shall perform his functions under this part in accordance with instructions from higher authority and subject to established policies and programs of the United States. Only the President and the Secretary of State shall communicate instructions directly to the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.

(d) No Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall delegate any function conferred upon him by the provisions of this Part which directly involves the exercise of direction, coordination, or authority.

Section 202. *Referral of unresolved matters.* The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country shall initiate steps to reconcile any divergent views arising between representatives of United States agencies in the country concerned with respect to programs referred to in the introductory portion of section 201 (b) of this order. If agreement cannot be reached the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission shall recommend a course of action, and such course of action shall be followed unless a representative of a United States agency requests that the issue be referred to the Secretary of State and the United States agencies concerned for decision. If such a request is made, the parties concerned shall promptly refer the issue for resolution prior to taking action at the country level.

Section 203. *Further coordination procedures and relationships.* (a) All representatives of United States agencies in each country shall be subject to the responsibilities imposed upon the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in such country by section 523 (b) of the Act and by this part.

(b) Subject to compliance with the provisions of this part and with the prescribed procedures of their respective agencies, all representatives of United States agencies affected by this part (1) shall have direct communication with their respective agencies and with such other parties and in such manner as may be authorized by their respective agencies, (2) shall keep the respective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions and each other fully and currently informed on all matters, including prospective plans, recommendations, and actions, relating to the programs referred to in the introductory portion of section 201 (b) of this order, and (3) shall furnish to the respective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions, upon their request, documents and information concerning the said programs.

PART III. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 301. *Definition.* As used in this order, the word "functions" embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, and discretion.

Section 302. *Prior orders.* (a) This order supersedes Executive Order No. 10476 of August 1, 1953 (18 F. R. 4537).

(b) The reference in section 3 (c) of Executive Order No. 10560 of September 9, 1954 (19 F. R. 5927), to Part III of Executive Order No. 10476 shall after the date of this order be deemed to be a reference to Part II of this order.

(c) Except to the extent inconsistent with law or with

this order, and except as revoked, superseded, or otherwise made inapplicable before the time of issuance of this order, (1) all determinations, authorizations, regulations, rulings, certificates, orders, directives, contracts, agreements, and other actions issued, undertaken or entered into with respect to any function affected by this order shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modified, or revoked by appropriate authority, (2) each reference in any Executive order to any provision of law repealed by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 shall be deemed also to refer to the corresponding provision, if any, of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

Section 303. *Effective date.* Without prejudice to anything done under proper authority with respect to any function under the Act at any time subsequent to the approval of the Act and prior to the approval of this order, the effective date of this order shall be deemed to be the date of the approval of the Act.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 6, 1954.

Licensing of Munitions Shipments

A schedule of fees effective January 1, 1955, for the licensing of munitions imports and exports was announced by Secretary Dulles on November 30 (press release 679). The schedule provides for a variable charge based on the licensed shipment ranging from \$1 for a licensed shipment of \$100 to \$80 for a licensed shipment of \$100,000 and over. No charge is made for licenses covering shipments amounting to less than \$100 in value.

This is in compliance with Executive Order 10575¹ by President Eisenhower as a part of legislation governing the control of munitions to and from the United States as provided by the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

Fees may be submitted with each separate application for a license in the form of a check or money order made payable to the Department of State. When several applications are submitted at the same time, one check or money order may be submitted to cover all the required fees. By special arrangement, regular exporters of munitions items may make advance payments to cover expected charges over a period of 6 months or less. This may be accomplished by writing to the Office of Munitions Control, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

¹ 19 Fed. Reg. 7249.

Final Assembly Action on Resolution on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

*Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

REVISED DRAFT INTRODUCED

U.S. delegation press release 2029 dated November 18

Let me briefly explain on behalf of the sponsors the revised text of Resolution L. 105, which is now before this committee.²

Our all-important objective has been all along to stress that which is feasible and doable. We are in the first instance looking to real accomplishments in 1955 and then to the more distant future. We believe that this resolution will best promote United Nations participation in the development and expansion of the use of atomic energy for peace, that as a result of the resolution new activity will start all over the world which will hasten that development.

During this debate we have heard many interesting ideas and have received a number of useful suggestions. All of us want this resolution to represent as much as possible the collective opinions of this committee. We have therefore made changes in our resolution in response to suggestions made during the debate. We believe—and it happens very often in the United Nations—that the changes are an improvement over the original draft.

Last Friday, November 12, at the close of our afternoon meeting, the sponsors received from the

Soviet delegation a number of suggested amendments to our draft resolution. Immediately thereafter we met to discuss these suggestions. We met again on Monday, November 15, to study them in greater detail and other suggestions by other members. At that meeting, we arrived at a consensus of views and I was authorized to convey them to the Soviet representative, which I did that very same night. Yesterday, the Soviet representative informed me that he was still awaiting instructions.

In an effort to expedite the work of this committee, the sponsors met again yesterday afternoon to review the draft resolution in the light of all the suggestions made during this debate. We reached agreement on a revised text. This text was transmitted to the Soviet representative early yesterday evening, and we agreed to meet this morning.

At our meeting this morning, Mr. Vyshinsky indicated that he accepted most of the provisions of our latest revision of the draft resolution but asked for certain changes which I will discuss when I come to the specific provisions of the resolution.

During the same period of time, this last week, the representative of India³ was good enough to communicate to the sponsors the ideas which he dealt with in his speech to this committee. His views, too, received the same careful consideration.

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 18, 19, and 23.

² U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L. 105/Rev. 1. For a text of the draft resolution as introduced on Nov. 6, see BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 745.

³ V. K. Krishna Menon.

Resolution on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy¹

U.N. doc. A/Resolution/230

B

The General Assembly,

Believing that the benefits arising from the momentous discovery of atomic energy should be placed at the service of mankind,

Desiring to promote energetically the use of atomic energy to the end that it will serve only the peaceful pursuits of mankind and ameliorate their living conditions,

Recognizing the importance and the urgency of international co-operation in developing and expanding the peaceful uses of atomic energy to assist in lifting the burdens of hunger, poverty and disease,

Believing also that all nations should co-operate in promoting the dissemination of knowledge in the realm of nuclear technology for peaceful ends,

A

Concerning an International Atomic Energy Agency

Recalling the initiative of the President of the United States, embodied in his address of 8 December 1953,

Noting that negotiations are in progress, and the intention that they should continue, for the establishment as quickly as possible of an International Atomic Energy Agency to facilitate the use by the entire world of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and to encourage international co-operation in the further development and practical application of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind,

1. *Expresses* the hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be established without delay;

2. *Suggests* that, once the Agency is established, it negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations;

3. *Transmits* to the States participating in the creation of the Agency, for their careful consideration, the record of the discussion of this item at the present session of the General Assembly;

4. *Suggests* that Members of the United Nations be informed as progress is achieved in the establishment of the Agency and that the views of Members which have manifested their interest be fully considered;

¹Approved unanimously by Committee I on Nov. 23 A/C. 1/759) and by the General Assembly on Dec. 4.

Concerning the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

1. *Declares* the interest and concern of the General Assembly in helping in every feasible way to promote the peaceful applications of atomic energy;

2. *Decides* that an international technical conference of Governments should be held, under the auspices of the United Nations, to explore means of developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy through international co-operation and, in particular, to study the development of atomic power and to consider other technical areas—such as biology, medicine, radiation protection; and fundamental science—in which international co-operation might most effectively be accomplished;

3. *Invites* all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to participate in the conference and to include among their representatives individual experts competent in the atomic energy field;

4. *Suggests* that the international conference should be held no later than August 1955 at a place to be determined by the Secretary-General and by the Advisory Committee provided for in paragraph 5 below;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, acting upon the advice of a small committee composed of representatives of Brazil, Canada, France, India, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, to issue invitations to this conference, to prepare and circulate to all invitees a detailed agenda, and to provide the necessary staff and services;

6. *Suggests* to the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee that, in making plans for the international conference, they consult with competent specialized agencies, in particular the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization;

7. *Invites* the interested specialized agencies to designate persons to represent them at the conference;

8. *Requests* that the Secretary-General circulate for information a report on the conference to all Members of the United Nations, and to other Governments and specialized agencies participating in the conference.

I think that we have gone a good distance in meeting all viewpoints expressed here, and I hope that there may be a unanimous vote in favor of the resolution.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I shall turn to the changes which we have made in our draft resolution.

We have added as the second paragraph to the preamble a provision reading, "*Desiring* to promote energetically the use of atomic energy to the end that it will serve only the peaceful pursuits of mankind and ameliorate their living conditions." The purpose of this addition is obvious. The first and second preambular paragraphs taken together not only recognize the benefits which can be derived from atomic energy but also express the intention of the General Assembly to promote energetically the realization of these benefits. This change, let me say, reflects one of the points brought up by the Soviet Union.

With respect to the second preambular paragraph, let me point out that the cosponsors are in complete agreement on the desirability of promoting atomic energy to the end that it will serve only the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Obviously that is the great goal of this program. It is the end that we are working for. This provision should not, however, and cannot, be interpreted as meaning that we have in any way accepted the idea that there should be a paper pledge on the banning of atomic weapons without proper safeguards and without corresponding measures concerning conventional weapons. That is a matter which we have dealt with in another context and it must not be confused with the program we are now considering.

The next change—What was formerly the second preambular paragraph and has now become the third paragraph has become modified to read as follows: "*Recognizing* the importance and the urgency of international cooperation in developing and expanding the peaceful uses of atomic energy to assist in lifting the burdens of hunger, poverty and disease." The effect of this change is to emphasize the importance of mobilizing the resources of all nations in the effort to put the atom at the service of mankind. This change is made in response to a constructive suggestion from the representative of India.

The next change—We now come to section A, Concerning an International Atomic Energy Agency. In the second preambular paragraph in this section we have added seven words. The para-

graph now commences, "*Noting* that negotiations are in progress, and the intention that they should continue, for the establishment as quickly as possible," etc. This change of those words, "and the intention that they should continue," is made in an effort to meet a suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union, who pointed out that nowhere in the resolution was there any specific suggestion that the negotiations to create the agency should continue. To be sure, this could be implied from the fact that we had noted that the negotiations were proceeding, but we agree with the Soviet representative that the resolution is improved by stating that the negotiations should continue.

The next change—I now come to the operative paragraphs in section A relating to the agency.

We have added a new first operative paragraph reading as follows: "*Expresses* the hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be established without delay." We believe that this fully meets one of the useful suggestions made by the representative of India. It stresses our concern that nothing shall interfere with the progress of the negotiations.

What is now the second operative paragraph of section A is amended to read, "*Suggests* that, once the Agency is established, it negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations." Now, Mr. Chairman, this paragraph brings us to one of the problems that has received greatest attention during these debates—the exact nature of the relationship between the agency and the United Nations. We had originally indicated that an appropriate form of agreement between the agency and the United Nations might be described as "similar to those of the specialized agencies." As you recall, that was in the original draft. We had thought that these words were sufficiently flexible and that they would not prejudice the results of the negotiations to form the agency. But it became apparent during our discussions in this committee that several delegations, including the Soviet Union, objected to this language. The change we have now made eliminates from the original draft the words "similar to those of the specialized agencies." Our reason for eliminating these words is to make it completely clear that the resolution will not prejudice the outcome of the negotiations to establish the agency. This change is acceptable to the interested delegations, including the Soviet Union.

The next change—A number of representatives

suggested that the resolution make specific mention of the desirability of the negotiating states' consulting with other states in connection with the establishment of the agency. As I stated previously, the United States is anxious to learn the views of all states interested in participating in the agency. The other sponsors have expressed similar intentions during these debates. It would not, of course, be feasible to have a conference of all 60 members of the United Nations to engage in negotiations for an agency of this nature. The thing we are most anxious to achieve is to see the agency established and operating as a going concern in the shortest possible time. Therefore, the negotiators must not be fettered with elaborate procedures and channels for the conduct of the negotiations. Although the intentions of the states now negotiating the agreement are clear, we believe that it would improve the resolution if it made specific mention of their intention fully to consider the views of all member states. We have, accordingly, amended the fourth operative paragraph under section A so that it now reads: "4. *Suggests* that Members of the United Nations be informed as progress is achieved in the establishment of the Agency and that the views of Members who have manifested their interest be fully considered."

The next change—The only change we have made in section B is the addition of the words "of Governments" in the first line of paragraph 2. The paragraph now begins, "*Decides* that an international technical conference of Governments should be held," etc. This is a clarification and is made in response to a suggestion from the representative of India.

The next change we were unable to accept—or, rather, this is a change we did not make. We were unable to accept a Soviet suggestion for a change in operative paragraph 3, which relates to the governments which are to be invited to the international technical conference. All states members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies are invited under this provision of our resolution. The Soviet representative suggested that we add a clause the effect of which was to invite all other states which expressed a desire to participate in the conference. The sponsors could not accept this change, Mr. Chairman. We believe that, since this conference is convened by the General Assembly, all states who are members of the United Nations system should be invited. That is

what our paragraph 3 does. But we believe that this present debate on the peaceful uses of atomic energy is not the place to settle the sharp differences of opinion over the status of states which are not members of the United Nations or of its specialized agencies. This is a United Nations conference and we believe it should therefore be limited to the members of the United Nations system.

Now, I conclude this statement, Mr. Chairman. We hope that this seven-power resolution as amended will commend itself to this committee. We have tried to take into consideration the views expressed in this extremely helpful debate. We believe that this resolution creates the framework under which, with cooperation and good will, we can make the most rapid progress. We hope and we believe that by the next session of the General Assembly we shall be discussing results instead of procedures, we shall be reporting the fruits of international cooperation instead of discussing how best to achieve such cooperation. We think that this resolution will—if I may use the phrase—turn the crank and thus start the beneficent chain reaction of helpful human actions throughout the world which will inure to the benefit of mankind. We sincerely believe that this resolution merits the unanimous support of this committee.

VIEWS OF OTHER STATES REQUESTED

U.S. delegation press release 2032 dated November 19

On behalf of the sponsors, I would like to say that we feel that this resolution has been very thoroughly considered indeed, and that we have reached the stage, which was reached also with the disarmament resolution at previous meetings, at which we do not feel that we can make any further revisions in the text. We have tried very hard to consider all viewpoints. I would like to express my appreciation to the distinguished Ambassador of Ecuador, Dr. Trujillo, when he said that he would not press his amendments. I would like also to give him my assurance that the views which he expressed will receive our most careful and sympathetic consideration, as will the ideas which motivate the amendments that he proposed.

Let me say, too, in connection with what he said and what I think was also said by the repre-

sentative of Burma¹ that there is the most complete intention on the part of the sponsors of this proposal that on the board of governors of the agency there be representatives of the underdeveloped countries. That is an assurance that I have made before and which I make again. I feel sure that that will happen and that the various regions of the world will be adequately represented.

This afternoon, the representative of India introduced amendments,² the first of which provides that the negotiations for the agency shall be broadened so as to include all states able and willing to participate. Now this could mean negotiations of more than 60 nations—all of the nations members of the United Nations plus those who belong to the specialized agencies. As we have made plain several times, we are opposed to this type of proposal, which we believe would delay matters for such a long time as very seriously to jeopardize this whole project, if not indeed to destroy it. But this emphatically does not mean that we are not eager actively to consult all governments and to get their views. As I said on November 15, the governments engaged in the current negotiations intend to consult before the agreement establishing the agency is submitted for ratification. In other words, it isn't a question of *fait accompli*, it isn't a question of a paper that is absolutely finished at all.

We intend to consult those governments which indicate an interest in participating in the agency, and the views expressed by the governments so consulted will, of course, be very seriously taken into account. I think it is clear to every member of this committee that the statement which I made then in behalf of the sponsors represents a serious engagement; it is an undertaking on our part to consult with every state which expresses an interest in participating in the agency. Furthermore, we have made it clear that such consultations will take place before the agreement is drawn up in the final form and before it is submitted for ratification.

Now, of course, we cannot say at this time just when the agreement will be drafted in the completed form, and that is why we cannot say now when it exactly will be practicable to consult with other states. But I am certain that if any state

wishes to submit its views before we have completed this agreement, we will be glad to receive them. We have already received a number of suggestions in the course of the present debate which we shall want to take into account in drafting the agreement. All views wherever and whenever submitted will be given the fullest consideration. No one is left out of this contemplation. All views will be taken into account. I am grateful for this opportunity to repeat that again in the most sincere and solemn manner of which I am capable.

INDIAN REPRESENTATIVE'S QUESTIONS ANSWERED

U.S. delegation press release 2033 dated November 19

I realize that the hour is getting very late and normally I would not ask to speak at this time, but I thought that it might be useful to all the members of the committee if our answers to Mr. Menon's questions could be in the record tonight, so that they would be available for study by members during the weekend recess. It is only for that reason that I ask to detain the committee for another few minutes.

Mr. Menon's first question was:

To what negotiations does the word "negotiations" in the second paragraph of the preamble of section A refer?

The answer of the sponsors is as follows: The negotiations referred to in the second preambular paragraph of section A are the negotiations among the eight states which have been consulting for some months now on plans for the establishment of this agency. These are the states listed as cosponsors of the resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.105/Rev.1,³ plus Portugal, which is not a member of the United Nations but is a member of the United Nations system of specialized agencies. I should have thought there was no question as to the fact that the seven sponsors of this resolution, plus Portugal, have been engaged in very active negotiations for creating the agency. We have stated this explicitly in the course of debate. This paragraph also refers to the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

¹James Barrington.

²U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 107.

³Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States.

Question number 2:

In operative paragraph 1 of section A, the sponsors, while accepting generally the suggestion made by us to insert a new paragraph, "Declares that an International atomic agency should be established without delay," have rephrased it as follows: "Expresses the hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be established without delay." This would appear to point to a definite agency. We had used the word "an" deliberately. We should be grateful for clarification as to the significance of the word "the."

To this question, our answer is as follows: Operative paragraph 1 speaks of "the International Atomic Energy Agency" rather than "an" agency for the simple reason that, so far as I know, only one such agency is in prospect, and that is the agency which we have been discussing in this committee. If, in the future, another agency comes into existence, nomenclature can be devised then to reflect that fact.

Question number 3:

Operative paragraph 2 of section A says "once the Agency is established." Who will be the parties who will establish the agency? How will the articles of the agency be formulated and how will the co-operation of the states other than the sponsors be obtained? Who would be the parties to the final act of establishment?

Our answer to this question is as follows: As we have indicated in our previous statements, it is not possible at this time to indicate exactly how the agreement for this agency will be formulated or precisely what its provisions will be. I can state, however, that the agreement, when it is formulated, will, of course, indicate who will be the parties to it and how the cooperation of other states must be obtained. But first it must be formulated, and these questions cannot be answered at this stage of the evolution of this idea.

Question number 4:

Operative paragraph 3 of section A limits the communication of the records of the Assembly to "States participating in the creation of the Agency." Since all the member states of the United Nations will receive the records in the normal way, is it the intention to address the states participating in the creation of the agency? Clarification is sought in this connection on the following points:

- (a) Who are the states "participating in the creation of the agency"?
- (b) Who will direct the Secretary-General as to who these states are?
- (c) Under what authority will the Secretary-General limit the circulation of these records to certain member states?

Our answer to this question is as follows: The purpose of operative paragraph 3 of section A is to bring to the particular attention of the states which are engaged in the current negotiations for the establishment of this agency the views expressed by the members of this General Assembly. Of course, the records are available to all members of the United Nations. The point is that this particular group of states to which I have already referred, which are currently negotiating for the establishment of this agency, are being asked to give particular attention to the views of the states represented in this committee. That is why the General Assembly would, under this paragraph, transmit these records to this particular group of states. It does not seem to us that there is any question of limiting the circulation of these records to certain member states, since they are obviously available in the normal way to every member of the United Nations.

Question number 5:

Operative paragraph 4 of section A provides that "the views of Members who have manifested their interest be fully considered." We would seek clarification on the following:

- (a) To be fully considered by whom?
- (b) What would the consideration amount to?
- (c) Who would be the "Members who have manifested their interest"?
- (d) Does "Members who have manifested their interest" mean all those who have spoken in the general debate, or states which hereafter express their interest, or those which hereafter identify themselves by some procedure? And what would that procedure be?

Our answer to that question is as follows: We assure the members of this committee that the states now engaged in negotiations for the establishment of this agency will give the most careful and serious consideration to the views of any member of this organization. As far as the negotiating states are concerned, they will consider the views not only of those states whose representatives have expressed themselves during the course of this debate but of any others that choose to state their views hereafter. There is no question of having any formal procedure for receiving such views since, of course, ordinary diplomatic channels will serve very well for this purpose.

Question number 6:

The wording of paragraph 2 of section B, as it stands, appears to suggest that this conference should consider not only atomic power but other technical areas, such as biology, medicine, radiation protection, not necessarily

related to atomic energy. Hence the suggestion we have made to include the words "in the atomic field." Is there any significance in the inability of the sponsors to agree to our suggestion?

Our answer to this question is as follows: The sponsors were unable to add the words "in the atomic field" to paragraph 2 of section B for the reason that those words seem out of place in the context of the paragraph as it now stands. Every one of the suggestions which are now listed for discussion at this conference is, of course, in the atomic field. We have sought to set forth a sort of outline for the agenda of the conference, and it did not seem helpful to have so general a phrase as the one which the representative of India has suggested.

That concludes our answers to the questions that the representative of India presented this afternoon. I appreciate the patience of the committee in bearing with me at this late hour.

NEW AGENCY'S RELATION TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL

U.S. delegation press release 2038 dated November 23

Let me begin my very brief remarks today by expressing appreciation for the very real understanding shown yesterday and again today by the representative of India in saying that he would not press his amendment. He asked, as did the representative of Ecuador before him, that his suggestions be borne in mind in the course of the future negotiations with regard to the agency.

In the same spirit, let me repeat that the sponsors will have in the forefront of their minds the various suggestions made during this debate. Let me in particular give to the distinguished representative of Lebanon⁷ the assurance of the sponsors that the agency, once it is established, will very definitely take into consideration the result of the technical conference. The purpose of the amendment suggested by the representative of Lebanon is useful, but the result which they seek is dependent in part upon the establishment of the agency by a given date; and as has been made clear many times, we, the sponsors of this resolution, do not feel it would be desirable to make further changes in the text. A very honest and comprehensive effort has been made to embody all points of view, and, having taken this posi-

tion with other members, we feel constrained to take it with all. But the states participating in the establishment of the agency are glad to assure the representative of Lebanon that they will carry out his suggestion just as soon as it becomes practicable to do so.

Now, Mr. Chairman, before beginning discussion of the textual proposals, let me also express the appreciation of the United States delegation for the endorsement given to this atoms-for-peace proposal by the Prime Minister of France, M. Mendès-France, yesterday. When he expressed the hope that the resolution could be passed by a unanimous vote, he said something which the sponsors certainly heartily endorse.

Now, I explained last Thursday [November 18] that we had deleted from paragraph 2 of part A of the pending resolution the phrase "similar to those of the specialized agencies." We had considered these words sufficiently flexible as not to prejudice in any way the results of the negotiations to form the agency. But, since several delegations, including the Soviet Union, objected to this language, the sponsors agreed to its deletion so as to make it completely clear that the resolution should not prejudice the outcome of the negotiations to establish the agency. I said then that this change was acceptable to the interested delegations, including the Soviet Union.

The Soviet delegation now deems it necessary to introduce an amendment⁸ to this paragraph, and on behalf of the sponsors I must reiterate our strong opposition to the concept embodied in this amendment.

The Soviet amendment would make this agency responsible to the General Assembly and to the Security Council. This is unacceptable for this reason: Having agreed that we do not wish to prejudice the negotiations by attempting to specify what the relationship of this agency will be to the United Nations, we obviously cannot accept any language which would make it responsible either to the General Assembly or to the Security Council. This relationship can only be worked out later.

This amendment, if accepted, would not only prejudice the negotiations but would, in all probability, doom them to failure because of the strong aversion in many quarters to tying the agency to the Security Council in this manner.

⁷ Karim Azkoul. The Lebanese amendments are contained in U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.108.

⁸ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.106/Rev. 1.

We must avoid a prior determination that this agency must be subordinated to, or operate under the instructions of, the Security Council. Such a relationship would shackle this organization with the abuses of the veto which have made it impossible for the Security Council to carry out its responsibilities under the charter.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in taking this stand, we are not in any way running counter to the very obvious truth that the Security Council, under the charter, has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and that the General Assembly also has responsibilities in this field. But this truth does not mean adopting language such as that contained in the pending amendment.

And, of course, if the situation should arise in connection with peaceful uses of atomic energy which endangers international peace and security—and this is a point I would like to stress—it would be a matter of concern both to the Security Council and the General Assembly, and any state would have the right to raise it in both bodies at any time to be dealt with by the United Nations, as are other situations of this nature.

This, I think, makes it clear that the sponsors have no intention of seeking to evade the procedures laid down by the charter. Any country can always bring to the attention of the Council any situation which in its view appears to endanger international peace and security. And, of course, this would be just as applicable in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy as it would in any other situation.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me take this opportunity to mention one other point which is somewhat minor. I would like to have the record show our notice of it. It involves the question of translation which is involved in the Russian text of Resolution L.105/Rev.1. I have been informed that the Russian text of the second preambular paragraph would translate into English as “seeking to promote by all means the use of atomic energy.” I understand in Russian that is *stremyas vsyacheski sodeystvovat*.

Now, this is virtually the language which the Soviet Union originally offered for this paragraph and which the sponsors did not accept. We understand that the point was met when we agreed to insert the word “energetically” in our text. We could not, of course, agree to the phrase “by all means” as meaning “by all methods.” We understand, accordingly, that the Soviet Union uses the

words “by all means” in the sense of “vigorously” or, as we have now indicated in our resolution, “energetically.”

The English and French texts are the official versions of this resolution, but the record should be clear that the meaning of this phrase is correctly conveyed by the English and French texts, whether or not the Russian translation is an exact equivalent.

SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMITTEE'S UNANIMOUS VOTE^o

U.S. delegation press release 2039 dated November 23

Let me at this historic moment express to all the delegates here my thanks for the courtesy which you have shown me during the past weeks when it fell to my lot to do the work on behalf of the United States concerning the atoms-for-peace proposal. I appreciate this courtesy very much and shall always remember it.

Let me also express my admiration for the manner in which this matter has been considered by the members of this committee. The high plane on which it has been treated has been a credit to the governments whose representatives sit here, and it has also contributed I believe significantly to the prestige of the United Nations.

As we all know, one of the main purposes of the United Nations is, in the words of the charter, “to serve as a center for harmonizing.” Whenever we can pass anything by unanimous vote, we can feel that the United Nations has to that extent been successful, because it has actually been a center for harmonizing.

Of course, in this case we have been unanimous about something which is very big and which will bring enormous good to mankind.

It has been a privilege to have had a part in this great venture and to have worked in partnership with you to put it into effect. May the decisions we have just taken mark the start of what President Eisenhower referred to as “a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive progress toward peace.”

^o The revised seven-power draft was adopted without change. The Soviet amendments were rejected; the amendments of India and of Lebanon were not put to the vote.

Continuing U.S. Interest in U.N. Technical Assistance Program

*Statement by Senator H. Alexander Smith
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

It is an honor for me to represent by Government at this important conference. This annual conference has become a symbol of practical internationalism to many people throughout the world. There is an old saying: "Out of man's need evolves a solution—that is the law of the universe." The United Nations technical assistance program, on a small scale, shows how valid this saying is.

To many millions throughout the world the United Nations has become real and of personal value because of the work of the 4,200 specialists who have carried the expanded United Nations technical assistance program forward in the last 4 years. Many have been freed from the scourge of malaria—the farmer has had his labor made doubly productive through the use of hybrid corn—children have been restored to health through the use of penicillin—these and millions of others like them now know the true meaning of international cooperation.

In pooling our knowledge through the United Nations technical assistance program, we are not only helping people but we are helping them to help themselves. This is doubly rewarding. Not only are immediate problems solved, but the groundwork is also laid for greater progress in the future. The program grows on its own successes.

The idea of technical assistance has met with almost universal support from people in all walks of life and in all nations. I can best give you the attitude of the United States on this program by quoting from the report of a special commission appointed by the President to study the entire field of United States foreign policy, known as the Randall Commission after its chairman, Clarence B. Randall of Chicago. The Commission recommended—

that within the limits imposed by congressional appropriations, the need for selecting only sound projects, the

¹Made at the fifth U.N. Technical Assistance Conference at U.N. Headquarters on Nov. 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 2041). At the conference 56 countries pledged the equivalent of about \$12,264,000 to the technical assistance program.

availability of trained technicians, and good administration, the technical cooperation program be pressed forward vigorously. . . . The Commission also recommends that the United States continue its support of the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program. . . .

The opinion of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, the body of which I am a member, was stated last July as follows:

The United Nations Technical Assistance Program is now in its fifth year of operations and has proved a worthwhile undertaking. The Committee feels that this program deserves continued United States support. It is more economic for the United States to share the burden of supplying know-how with other nations. Moreover, the United Nations program permits the worldwide recruitment of technicians.

I mention these authoritative opinions because they indicate the continuing interest at the highest levels of my Government in the program of technical assistance through the United Nations.

At the present time my delegation is not in a position to make and have recorded a pledge to the 1955 program. The Congress of the United States at its last session requested the Executive to refrain from making pledges to the United Nations technical assistance program until funds have been appropriated by the Congress. However, the President has authorized the United States delegation to state that he is prepared to request from the Congress funds for a United States contribution to the calendar year 1955 program. He has expressed the hope that the United Nations technical assistance program will continue to operate at least on its present level and that in the future it will obtain increasing support from all governments. I have been authorized to make this statement to indicate the President's continuing interest in this vital United Nations program.

Current Treaty Actions

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China

Mutual defense treaty. Signed at Washington December 2, 1954. Enters into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

Viet-Nam

Declaration respecting the rights of nationals concerning trademark protection, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 3, 1953, and October 25, 1954, with related note of November 22, 1954. Entered into force October 25, 1954.

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*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 808

December 20, 1954



UNITED NATIONS CONDEMNS ACTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN IMPRISONING AMERICAN FLIERS

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The Department of State bulletin

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December 20, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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United Nations Condemns Action of Communist China in Imprisoning American Fliers

On December 4 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, proposed that the ninth General Assembly add to its agenda the problem of 11 American fliers, members of the U. N. Command, who had been sentenced to imprisonment in Communist China. Three days later he addressed a second request to the Secretary-General, asking that the General Assembly consider four additional cases of imprisoned aviators. Following are the texts of Ambassador Lodge's requests, his statements in the General Committee and plenary session, and the resolution, sponsored by the 16 member governments whose forces had fought in Korea, which the General Assembly adopted on December 10.

LETTER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, DECEMBER 4

U.N. doc. A/2830

The Government of the United States of America, as the Unified Command of United Nations forces in Korea, proposes herewith the inclusion of the following additional item on the agenda of the ninth regular session of the General Assembly:

"Complaint of detention and imprisonment of United Nations military personnel in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement".

Pursuant to rule 20 of the rules of procedure, an explanatory memorandum is attached.

In view of the urgency and importance of this item, I request that a meeting of the General Committee be convened at the earliest possible moment.

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.

Explanatory Memorandum

Complaint of Detention and Imprisonment of United Nations Military Personnel in Violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement

A United States Air Force B-29 type aircraft, on a mission of the United Nations Command in

Korea, was attacked fifteen miles south of the Yalu River near the North Korean town of Sonchon and shot down on 12 January 1953. The officers and men of the United States Air Force on the plane were captured. More than a year and a half later, and long after the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement providing for the release of all captured personnel desiring repatriation, eleven officers and men from the above-mentioned aircraft were brought before a Chinese Communist military tribunal and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

This is a clear-cut violation of the Armistice Agreement.

The United States Government first learned of this action by the Chinese Communist authorities through a broadcast of the Peking radio on 24 November 1954. Immediately thereafter, the United States Government sought to communicate with the Chinese Communist authorities, both directly in Geneva and through the United Kingdom Government, to protest this serious violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.¹ The Chinese Communist authorities rejected these representations.

The Government and people of the United States are shocked and outraged by the treatment thus accorded to its airmen who were serving the cause of peace under the Charter, and hold these same feelings for the men of other nations who are held prisoner. The Governments of other nations hav-

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1954, p. 856.

Text of Resolution ¹

U.N. doc. A/L. 182 dated December 7

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item proposed by the United States of America as the Unified Command regarding eleven members of the United States armed forces under the United Nations Command captured by Chinese forces when undertaking a mission on 12 January 1953, at the direction of the United Nations Command,

Recalling the provisions of article III of the Korean Armistice Agreement regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war,

1. *Declares* that the detention and imprisonment of the eleven American airmen, members of the United Nations Command, referred to in document A/2830, and the detention of all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command desiring repatriation is a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement;

2. *Condemns*, as contrary to the Korean Armistice Agreement, the trial and conviction of prisoners of war illegally detained after 25 September 1953;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in the name of the United Nations, to seek the release, in accordance with the Korean Armistice Agreement, of these eleven United Nations Command personnel, and all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command still detained;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make, by the means most appropriate in his judgment, continuing and unremitting efforts to this end and to report progress to all Members on or before 31 December 1954.

¹Sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States; adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 10 by a vote of 47-5 (Soviet bloc). Afghanistan, Burma, India, Indonesia, Syria, Yemen, and Yugoslavia abstained from voting, and Saudi Arabia was absent.

ing troops in Korea share this feeling of indignation at this violation of the Armistice Agreement.

The United States believes this conduct of the Chinese Communist authorities has created a serious situation for the United Nations, which called for the action in Korea to repel Communist aggression, and which requested the United States to provide a Unified Command of United Nations forces in Korea. The United States believes the United Nations must now act promptly and decisively to bring about the release of these eleven officers and men and all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command still detained.

STATEMENTS IN GENERAL COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 6

U.S. delegation press release 2063

The United States, in its capacity as the Unified Command of the United Nations Forces in Korea, has requested the inclusion in our agenda of an item entitled "Complaint of detention and imprisonment of United Nations military personnel in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement."²

The decision to bring this matter before the Assembly results from exhaustive consultations with all the other United Nations members whose forces fought in Korea and who agree wholeheartedly on the urgent need for this step.

The facts underlying our complaint are given in the explanatory memorandum distributed as document A/2830, which is before us. Here is the story stated very briefly:

A United States Air Force B-29 type aircraft was dispatched on January 12, 1953, to conduct leaflet operations in North Korea. This flight was subject to the standing orders of the United Nations Command restricting all air operations to the territory of Korea south of the Yalu River. The aircraft bore the standard markings of the United States Air Force. All personnel aboard were members of the United States Air Force. They were in uniform and they carried the required identification documents, including documents identifying them as members of the United Nations Command.

The last contact with the aircraft was a spotting by the United Nations Command radar at approximately 2310 hours at a point about 15 miles south of the Yalu River near the North Korean town of Sonchon. The radar operator reported that his spotting showed that the B-29 had been attacked by 12 enemy fighters. The aircraft commander radioed a distress signal. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft disappeared from the radar scope, and this was the last that the United Nations Command heard of the plane at any time close to the time of its last flight.

After the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United Nations Command com-

²The General Committee on Dec. 6 decided, by a vote of 10-2 (Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R.)-2 (Burma, Syria), to recommend that the Assembly include the U.S. item and deal with it directly, without reference to committee.

ponent of the Military Armistice Commission made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to obtain an accounting of all the unrepatriated United Nations Command personnel, including the crew of this aircraft. Further unsuccessful efforts were made by the United States Government through the British representative in Peiping. At Geneva in June 1954, the Chinese Communists admitted holding the surviving 11 members of this crew. Then, on November 24, 1954, the United States Government learned from a radio broadcast of the Peiping radio that these 11 airmen were brought before a Chinese Communist military tribunal and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment as common criminals.

Immediately thereafter the United States sought to communicate with the Chinese Communist authorities both directly in Geneva and through the United Kingdom Government to protest this most serious violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The Chinese Communist authorities rejected these representations.

These are the principal facts, Mr. President, and we will add further details in the discussion of substance in the debate.

Let me say this: The Korean Armistice Agreement has imposed an obligation upon the parties to release all captured personnel desiring repatriation. The 11 American airmen, as uniformed and documented personnel of a component part of the United Nations Command shot down while on a combat mission, were entitled to be repatriated. The detention of these men more than a year after the deadline set by the Armistice Agreement for the release of captured personnel and the imprisonment of these men is a glaring violation of an essential provision of the Armistice Agreement.

Mr. President, it is an immemorial principle of human decency that a family looks after its own members. A nation must also look after its own, if it is to continue to be a nation. And the United Nations must show an equal interest in these men who by their personal efforts sought to repel an aggression which the United Nations itself was opposing. The thing that sustains the man in uniform when he is far from home is the thought that he is being supported by those for whom he is fighting. We in the United Nations cannot let these men down. They are United Nations men.

They were sent to Korea in response to a request from the United Nations.

For these reasons, Mr. President, the United States believes that the proposed item should be placed on the agenda and that the United Nations should act promptly and with determination to bring about the release of the 11 airmen and all other captured military personnel of the United Nations Command who are still detained.

It is incumbent upon me to make some reply to the statement which you have just heard.

The Soviet representative [Jacob A. Malik] makes a charge of espionage, and the charge he makes is totally unsupported. The only basis that he furnishes for it is, of all things, the Chinese Communist News Service, if you please. There is no factual basis whatever for such an assertion. The only thing on which these men could possibly spy would be the prison walls in which they have been incarcerated. Later on we will show you a map which contains the radar tracing showing exactly where that plane went and where it dropped. It is incontrovertible scientific evidence of just when that plane was shot down and where.

The Soviet representative talks about confessions which have been obtained from American personnel, and that, let me say, is no new story here. Last year we demonstrated the way in which false confessions were extracted from United Nations military personnel by what can only be described as torture—by subjecting them to physical deprivations, physical discomfort, every kind of hardship until the man would crack and then would confess to whatever it was that the Communist propaganda machine wanted him to confess to.³ We produced last year films showing some of these young Americans making these confessions from the Communist film, and then showing the same man getting off the boat in San Francisco and saying he had been coerced into making those so-called confessions. So, if the Soviet representative wants to tell us that we are going to be treated to some more brain-washing, we are not surprised and we expect it.

Then he made reference to the fact that it was the Chinese Communist "volunteers" and not the Chinese Communist Government that signed the

³ BULLETIN of Nov. 9, 1953, p. 641.

Korean Armistice Agreement. Well, of course, Mr. Chairman, everyone, including the individual who just uttered that statement, knows very well that the "volunteers" were a fiction. And to hide behind this fiction shows how weak the case actually is. When Chou En-lai went to Geneva he went as the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister and not as a "volunteer."

Finally, we—the United States in particular—are accused of seeking to intensify the cold war. Well, many of you in this room read the statement of President Eisenhower last week in which he counseled moderation and self-control and patience.⁴ Most of you in this room know Dwight Eisenhower and you know that, if there is one thing which is closest of all to his heart, it is peace in this world. And it simply is not believable that Dwight Eisenhower, whose instructions I am carrying out here, would seek to intensify the cold war. No one here believes that and I am quite sure that the Soviet representative does not either.

In connection with the statements made by the representatives of Burma and Syria [James Barrington and Rafik Asha], let me say that after the signing of the Armistice Agreement the United Nations Command component of the Military Armistice Commission demanded an accounting of all unrepatriated United Nations Command personnel, including the personnel of this aircraft believed to be held by the Communists. Five separate demands were made between September 9, 1953, and August 17, 1954, and no information concerning the members of this crew was given in reply. So we feel therefore that that particular remedy has been exhausted.

Now, Mr. President, the representative of the Soviet Union of course went into the substance of this whole question and would have been subject to the point of order—[Interrupted by the President].

Well, I had thought that it would not be in accordance with the rules for me to attempt an answer this afternoon to all the points of substance which were made by the delegate of the Soviet Union. I will reply to all the many points of substance which were made by the representative of the Soviet Union in the plenary meeting.

⁴ *Ibid*, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 887.

But I will simply make this last statement at this time, which is to point out that the Soviet representative in his first statement said that these 11 men, when they were captured, were in uniform—which is true. But this single admission by the Soviet representative reveals the whole falsity of the Communist case, for when did a spy ever go about his task dressed in the uniform of his country? It is typical of the contempt in which communism holds human intelligence to seek to make world opinion believe that a man in the full uniform of a colonel of the United States Air Force, complete with his wings and decorations and everything else, is going to try to spy in China!

Mr. President, let us hear no more of this foolish talk about espionage. As I said, I will deal later with the other points which the Soviet representative made.

LETTER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, DECEMBER 7

U.N. doc. A/2843

With further reference to my communication of 4 December 1954, I have the honour to request that you circulate this letter to all Members of the General Assembly in connexion with the proposed agenda item: "Complaint of detention and imprisonment of United Nations military personnel in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement".

In addition to those referred to in my communication of 4 December, there are four American airmen who were captured while engaged on missions of the United Nations Command in the Korean conflict, and whose detention is admitted by the Chinese Communists. This detention is in violation of the Armistice Agreement. The facts concerning their cases are as follows:

First Lt. Lyle W. Cameron, of Lincoln, Nebraska, was the pilot of an F-84 type aircraft which departed from Taegu Air Base, Korea, on 26 October 1952, to participate in an armed reconnaissance mission between Kanggye and Huichon in North Korea. After reaching the target area, and while bombing locomotives, his plane was damaged and he had to bail out. He landed safely at a point several miles south of Kanggye, and reported by his emergency radio that he was un-

hurt and would hide along a ridge. The other flight members soon left the area due to fuel shortage; upon returning later in the day, they found no trace of Lt. Cameron. The Peking radio on 30 October 1952, announced that Lt. Cameron had been captured after his plane was lost over China. In December of 1952, so-called news releases with pictures of Lt. Cameron were widely distributed by the Communists, who publicized his mission and the shooting down of his plane as an example of American aggression against China.

Captain Harold E. Fischer, of Swea City, Iowa, was the leader of a flight of F-86 type aircraft on a mission, 7 April 1953, in North Korea along the Yalu River. Hostile fighters were encountered and engaged in battle. Following this engagement, Captain Fischer radioed the other members of the flight to get out of the area. No further contact was made with Captain Fischer, and the Air Force failed to locate him or his aircraft. Propaganda broadcasts from Peking, on 10 April 1953, reported that Captain Fischer's aircraft had been shot down and that he was captured.

First Lt. Roland W. Parks, of Omaha, Nebraska, was a member of a flight of F-86 type aircraft which departed from Suwon Air Base, Korea, to participate in a combat mission over North Korea on 4 September 1952. During a sweep in North Korea along the Yalu River, hostile fighters were encountered and engaged in battle at an altitude of 28,000 feet. In the ensuing action, Lt. Parks became separated from the flight, and subsequently radioed that his gyro and radio compasses were inoperative and that he did not know his position. Repeated attempts to direct him toward friendly territory were unsuccessful; when it became apparent that he was low on fuel, he was requested to describe the terrain over which he was flying. His reply revealed that he was apparently over the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria. Five minutes later, Lt. Parks radioed that his engine had failed, and that he was bailing out. He appears to have been at this time in the vicinity of Dairen, Manchuria.

Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller, of Wynnewood, Pennsylvania, was leader of a flight of F-86 type aircraft on a combat mission in North Korea along the Yalu River on 23 January 1953. Hostile fighters were encountered and engaged in battle. During the ensuing action, Col. Heller's aircraft

was damaged by hostile fire and when last seen was at an altitude of 40,000 feet. Propaganda broadcasts from Peking on 28 January 1953 alleged that Col. Heller had invaded Manchuria and was captured when he bailed out of his damaged plane.

Chinese Communist representatives at Geneva admitted earlier this year that the Chinese Communists held these four jet pilots. Each of them continues to be detained by the Chinese Communist regime in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr.

DECEMBER 8 PLENARY STATEMENT SUPPORTING GENERAL COMMITTEE'S REPORT

U.S. delegation press release 2068 (Excerpts)

The General Assembly now has before it the report of the General Committee⁵ recommending inclusion in our agenda of the proposed item entitled "Complaint of detention and imprisonment of United Nations military personnel in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement." It was also the General Committee's recommendation that this item be considered directly in plenary, not later than today. The United States urges the approval of these recommendations.⁶

The decision to bring the present complaint before the United Nations came after thorough consideration by all of the member states whose forces fought in Korea. All 16 agreed on the necessity of urgent steps.

I expect to set forth later the known facts concerning military personnel of the United States Air Force who were taken prisoner while engaged on missions of the United Nations Command in the Korean conflict. It is enough now to state that 11 of these airmen have been sentenced, on trumped-up charges, by a Chinese Communist military tribunal to long prison terms. Four others are admittedly detained by the Chinese Communists although they too have long been entitled to re-

⁵ U. N. doc. A/2838.

⁶ The General Assembly decided in favor of including the item by a vote of 48-5 (Soviet bloc)-4 (Burma, India, Indonesia, and Syria). The vote on the General Committee's recommendation that debate begin immediately and without reference to committee was 44-5-8 (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia).

patriation. Large numbers of other missing United Nations military personnel—Americans and nationals of other countries—have also not been repatriated and have not been accounted for by the Communists.

On Monday [December 6], in the General Committee, we heard from the Communist representatives some elaborate legal or, more accurately, pseudo-legal arguments against the jurisdiction of the United Nations to consider the present item. I wish to deal shortly with these now.

Pseudo-Legal Arguments of Communists

First, there was mentioned the perennial argument based on article 2, paragraph 7 of the charter, which provides that the United Nations may not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. The Communist governments have their own dialectic interpretation of this provision. When it comes to problems in non-Communist countries, such as the questions before this Assembly relating to North or South Africa, the Communist delegations have no difficulty whatever in arguing that these are matters quite properly within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. But when charges were advanced that the satellite ex-enemy countries had violated their peace-treaty obligations, or that a democratic regime in Czechoslovakia was subverted with interference from abroad, there, of course, the Soviet delegation and its friends tried to raise the bar of domestic jurisdiction. The case before us involves mistreatment by Chinese Communist authorities of American and other United Nations military personnel engaged on a United Nations mission, where the mistreatment was in violation of an international agreement. There surely cannot exist a clearer case of international controversy to which article 2, paragraph 7 does not apply.

Secondly, it was argued in the General Committee that the United Nations is not competent to deal with the present item because the Armistice Agreement established special organs and provided special procedures for supervision of the armistice and for dealing with complaints of violations of the Armistice Agreement.

Mr. President, the Armistice Agreement established three principal bodies. In the first place, it

set up the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, which has completed its tasks, has been dissolved, and is not available as a forum.

Second, there is the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. This Commission is composed of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. According to paragraph 41 of the Armistice Agreement, it was to conduct inspections and maintain supervision of provisions of the Armistice Agreement relating to the introduction into Korea of reinforcements in troops and armaments. The Commission was given no function of interpreting the agreement. Although it was given certain powers of investigation, its composition with the built-in veto has made it a totally ineffective body for any supervision or investigation in Communist-held territory. Everybody knows what the veto means in the hands of the Communists. To bring our present complaint before that Commission would be an exercise in patent futility.

Finally, there is the Military Armistice Commission, which in paragraph 24 was given generally the duty to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violation. Mr. President, let me give now an account of the efforts made by the United Nations Command component in the Military Armistice Commission to follow this procedure and to induce the Chinese and North Korean Communist component to account for all United Nations military personnel still not repatriated or released, including the 11 American airmen from the B-29 and the 4 jet pilots.

Efforts Made in Military Armistice Commission

From Communist radio broadcasts, from letters received from Communist prison camps, from reports by returned prisoners, the United Nations Command painstakingly built up a list of 3,404 names. These were men who we had reason to believe had at one time been in Communist hands but for whom the Communists had never given an accounting. They were from all nations participating in the United Nations Command. On September 5 advance notice was given to the Communist component in the Military Armistice Commission and on September 9, 1953, the list was presented in the Commission with a request for an accounting for each person listed. The names

of the 11 airmen and the 4 jet pilots were on that list.

This was the Communist answer: "All those prisoners of war in our custody who insisted on repatriation were repatriated by September 6 and all those prisoners of war in our custody who requested not to be directly repatriated will, in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for custody." On October 3 the Communists added—without providing names—that 519 of those we had listed had already been repatriated and 380 had previously been reported as released at the front, escaped, or dead. But the men of the United Nations Command about whom we complain were neither repatriated nor turned over to the Repatriation Commission. The Communists in the Military Armistice Commission acted as if they did not exist.

As new information trickled in, the United Nations Command modified the list on November 2, 1953, and February 19, 1954—adding some names and deleting others. The list stood at 3,405 names on May 13, 1954, when a renewed request was made in the Military Armistice Commission for an accounting. Remember, again, that the names of the 11 airmen and the 4 jet pilots were on the list.

This was the Communist answer: "Prisoners of war of your side once held by our side were already completely repatriated in accordance with the Armistice Agreement." And the Communist spokesman, General Lee Sang Cho, did not accept the lists submitted to him, although a member of his staff picked them up from the conference table.

The same performance was repeated on May 22. Again there was the flat denial: "As early as . . . September 21, 1953, our side had concretely rejected this whole roster of your side as being crudely manufactured."

Finally, on August 17, 1954, a revised list of 2,840 names was presented to the Communist component of the Military Armistice Commission.⁷ This list took into account the latest information available to the United Nations Command. The United Nations Command representative explicitly requested a name-by-name accounting of what had happened to each listed prisoner. Re-

member, once again, that the names of the 11 airmen and the 4 jet pilots were on the list.

This was the Communist answer: "As to such an openly fabricated roster which your side submitted today in an attempt to slander our side, our side categorically rejects it. . . . There are no captured personnel of your side for whom our side has to give additional accounting." When reminded that at Geneva a few weeks earlier the Chinese Communists had admitted holding these airmen, the Communist representative brushed the question aside, saying: "The matter of these military personnel of your side allegedly retained by the authorities outside Korea, as a result of your personnel's activities, is beyond the authorities (*sic*) of the Military Armistice Commission. Our side considers that it is inappropriate to take up this irrelevant matter for discussion at the meeting of the Military Armistice Commission."

This time, the Communists left the lists lying on the table when they left.

This last chapter in the long efforts is revealing. The Soviet representative, as a rule, purports to speak with considerable authority when it comes to voicing the attitudes and opinions of the Chinese Communists and of the North Koreans. There is, however, the interesting discrepancy between the advice he has given to us in the General Committee last Monday and the position on this matter taken by the Communist representatives in the Military Armistice Commission. The Soviet and Czech delegates have claimed that the United Nations is not competent to deal with this problem because it must be dealt with in the Commission under the Armistice Agreement. The Chinese Communist and North Korean spokesmen claimed that the Military Armistice Commission was not competent to deal with the airmen detained outside Korea.

Every Remedy Exhausted

There is, Mr. President, no doubt that the United Nations Command has exhausted every remedy which it was able fruitfully to pursue under the armistice. In the light of the sorry record of the Military Armistice Commission, it should be understandable why, faced with the emergency created by the sentencing of our airmen, the United States has decided, in consultation with the other 15 nations with troops in

⁷ BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1954, p. 379.

Korea, to appeal to the General Assembly rather than the Military Armistice Commission.

Another pseudo-legal argument made in the General Committee by the Czechoslovakian representative is based on the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Czech representative [Jiri Nosek] argued, and I quote from a recorded transcription:

It is well known to the Government of the United States that if prisoners of war were actually involved—and I would like to say *if* prisoners of war were actually involved—the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the detention and on the completion of punishment would apply.

This argument is transparently false for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the Armistice Agreement provided for the repatriation of all prisoners of war desiring repatriation. A special agreement prevails over a general convention. The Armistice Agreement, which is a special agreement, is controlling here and clearly prevails over the provisions of the Convention if it were applicable. The Communists themselves, in the Military Armistice Commission, not only acknowledged but urged this result in regard to the repatriation of captured personnel. It was agreed in the Commission to return all prisoners of war—including those who were alleged to have committed crimes *before or after* their capture. This is what they said at the 16th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on August 31, 1953:

Our side has repeatedly stated that our side will repatriate, before the conclusion of the repatriation operation, all captured personnel of your side who insist upon repatriation, including those prisoners of war who committed crimes before or after their capture.

There is a certain irony in Communist delegates seeking to invoke the Geneva Convention of 1949. At the outset of the conflict in Korea, the United Nations Command announced that it would be governed by the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention, and it observed them scrupulously. A statement of undertaking to comply was elicited from the Communist side. But the Communists' gross repudiation of their promise was made known to the world by their obstinate refusal to permit the Red Cross representatives to visit the prisoner-of-war camps—as we did—and their refusal to provide the International Com-

mittee of the Red Cross with lists of prisoners captured by them—as we did. Even more terrible evidence is provided by the atrocities perpetrated upon United Nations personnel who were captured.

Another, and perhaps the most remarkable, argument of a legal nature was advanced in the General Committee. It was an argument pertaining not so much to the jurisdiction of the United Nations as to the substance of our complaint. This argument is to the effect that the Armistice Agreement binds the commander of the so-called Chinese People's Volunteers but does not bind the Chinese Communist regime in Peiping. This argument is used in support of the proposition that the Chinese Communist regime cannot be charged with the violation of an agreement to which it is not a party.

Mr. President, this modern myth about volunteers has been exploded so frequently that it is an insult to the intelligence of this body for another reference to be made to it at this late date. More than 800,000 Chinese soldiers participated in the Communist aggression in Korea. They came to Korea not with crude, homemade weapons but with modern arms of all types. The commander of these so-called "volunteers" was at the same time the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Chinese Communist Army and Deputy Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the highest military organ of the Peiping regime.

In February 1951, the General Assembly found that the Chinese Communist regime—not the "volunteers"—had engaged in aggression in Korea. Article 60 of the Armistice Agreement provided that the military commanders of both sides should recommend to their *governments* that they hold a political conference "of a higher level of both sides." What was the "higher level"? Who presumed to speak for the Chinese People's Volunteers in Geneva? Mr. Chou En-lai himself, the Prime and Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime.

Incidentally, by 1953 even Mr. Chou En-lai had tired of the pretense about the "volunteers." I refer you to his cablegram of September 13, 1953, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which was circulated as document A/2469. All through that cablegram Mr. Chou En-lai refers to the "two belligerent sides," clearly including the Chinese Communist regime on one of the two sides. There was no mention of "volunteers."

Armistice Agreement Binding

The Communist delegates who have sought to construct a legal argument that the Peiping regime is not bound by the Armistice Agreement cannot fail to be aware of the familiar rule of international law that a general armistice agreement may be concluded only on the authority of a government. If such an armistice is concluded in this manner, it binds the government which gave the authorization to the military commander signing the agreement.

The entire legal argumentation advanced on Monday by the Czech and Soviet representatives is nothing but a fraudulent quibble. This is how the argument goes: (1) The United States should have raised its complaint of the detention of the airmen in the Military Armistice Commission; (2) the Armistice Commission (according to the Chinese and Korean Communists in that Commission) is not competent to deal with the question because the airmen are held outside Korea; (3) the Chinese People's Volunteers are bound by the armistice, but they do not detain the airmen, so they could not violate the armistice; (4) the Communist regime in Peiping admits holding our airmen, but it is not bound by the armistice and therefore could not have violated it by detaining these men; (5) the provisions of the Geneva Convention allow this regime to detain, try, and sentence prisoners of war for alleged offenses, although the Communist component in the Military Armistice Commission stipulated that under the armistice even prisoners who had committed crimes must be given the opportunity of repatriation.

I believe, Mr. President, the barrenness of the arguments against inscribing the item before us is quite apparent, and I urge the Assembly to proceed without delay to inscription so that we may begin this very important debate on the merits.

DECEMBER 8 PLENARY STATEMENT ON U. S. COMPLAINT

U.S. delegation press release 2069 (Excerpts)

The 16 nations whose troops fought to uphold the United Nations Charter in Korea have decided to ask the Assembly to consider urgently the plight of the United Nations military personnel

detained and imprisoned contrary to the Korean Armistice Agreement. The United States in the exercise of its special responsibility as the Unified Command of all United Nations forces in Korea has made the formal proposal instituting the present proceeding.

A few days ago, the Peiping radio announced the sentencing and imprisonment of 11 American airmen who had fought in Korea. They could have been men of any of the many nations whose fliers fought in the skies over Korea on United Nations missions. They happened to be Americans, and I have the grave responsibility to try to convey to you the depth of the emotion and anguish with which the American people received the news of the Peiping so-called trial.

Any self-respecting government, Mr. President, has the elementary and historic duty to protect its men whom it sends to war.

In bygone days each government was the sole judge of the means for such protection and of the use of power to that end.

The United States has come before the United Nations because the United Nations was set up as a collective instrument for justice and because the United Nations has a very special responsibility for the men who went to fight in Korea in response to a call by the United Nations.

The story of the 11 airmen is a chapter in the long book about men who fought in Korea and fell into Communist hands.

The Communist military authorities in Korea failed to provide information and to account for large numbers of United Nations military personnel who were missing in action and we had reason to believe had been captured.

When finally the Armistice Agreement was signed, the Communists undertook to return all United Nations personnel desiring repatriation. The United Nations Command component of the Military Armistice Commission demanded an accounting of all unrepatriated United Nations Command personnel who were believed held by the Communists. Five separate demands were made between September 9, 1953, and August 17, 1954, and these demands included the 11 airmen. No satisfactory information was obtained in reply. A further request for information concerning these personnel was made through the United Kingdom representative at Peiping in May 1954. No answer was received to this inquiry.

Negotiations at Geneva

Then came the Geneva Conference. At Geneva on June 10, 1954, United States Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson submitted to Wang P'ing-nan, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist delegation to the Geneva Conference, lists of various categories of civilian and military personnel who, according to our best belief, had been prisoners of war in Communist custody. Ambassador Johnson stressed that these lists were based on our best information, and he requested that all persons named on the lists be released or accounted for. These lists included the names of the 11 B-29 crew members and the 4 Air Force jet pilots. Finally, at a meeting on June 15, the Chinese Communist representative admitted that there were United States military personnel imprisoned in Communist China for "violation of Chinese territorial air." On June 21, he acknowledged that the Chinese Communist regime had imprisoned 15 United States Air Force personnel, namely, the 11 surviving American crew members of the B-29 shot down on January 12, 1953, and 4 Air Force jet pilots. Wang stated that the remaining 3 members of the 14-man B-29 crew had died from injuries received in parachuting from the plane when it was shot down.

After these meetings in Geneva 5 months went by, and no further information was elicited from the Chinese Communists. They made no move to release any of the captured personnel admitted or believed to be detained by them.

In addition to the 15 United States airmen whom the Chinese Communists admitted holding on June 21, 1954, there remain 470 Americans of the United Nations Command who are believed to have been captured by the Communists and who have in no way been accounted for. This figure is exclusive of the numbers of United Nations military personnel from other countries, and of Republic of Korea military personnel, who have not been accounted for by the Communists.

We had hoped, through painstaking and persistent negotiation, to secure information on all of the missing men, and to bring about the release of all captured personnel still detained. In Panmunjom, in Peiping, and in Geneva these efforts brought no concrete response.

Then, on November 24, 1954, the Peiping radio announced suddenly that a Chinese Communist military tribunal had imposed long prison sen-

tences on 11 of the American fliers still held in China. The United States Government immediately made representations to the Chinese Communist authorities, through the United Kingdom Government and directly in Geneva. The representations were summarily rejected.

Story of the B-29

Here is the story of the plane manned by the 11 members of the United States Air Force imprisoned on the order of a Chinese Communist military tribunal. The plane was a B-29 type aircraft under the command of Colonel John K. Arnold, who was Commander of the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing. The crew all belonged to this wing, which was a component element of the 13th Air Force with headquarters at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands. The wing was engaged in operational flights supported by the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron of Yokota Air Base, Japan, under the command of the Far East Air Forces, all of which were components of the United Nations Command.

On January 12, 1953, this B-29 type aircraft was dispatched at 1720 hours, local time, from Yokota Air Base, Japan, to conduct leaflet operations in North Korea. The aircraft was operating as a part of and directly in support of United Nations Command combat operations. Assigned targets for the dropping of the leaflets were the North Korean cities of Pakchon, Pukchin, Kusong, Sonchon, Charyongwan, and Cholsan. This type of mission is a standard operation practiced generally in modern warfare. It was used extensively in Korea.

The flight on January 12, 1953, was subject to the standing orders of the United Nations Command restricting all air operations to the territory of Korea south of the Yalu River. The plane bore the standard markings of the United States Air Force. All personnel aboard were members of the United States Air Force, were in uniform, and carried the required identification documents, including documents identifying them as members of the United Nations Command. The plane was scheduled to return to Yokota Air Base at 0130 hours, local time, on January 13.

The last contact with the aircraft during its mission was a spotting by United Nations Command radar at approximately 2310 hours at a point about 15 miles south of the Yalu River near the

North Korean town of Sonchon. The radar operators reported spotting the B-29 attacked by 12 enemy fighters. The aircraft commander radioed the code word "May Day" at 2316 hours. This is an international distress signal, indicating in this case that the aircraft was damaged beyond control and was being abandoned. The aircraft disappeared from the radar scope shortly thereafter. A map has been prepared showing the flight plan of this aircraft and the place where it was last sighted on radar. I am having this map made available to all delegations.

No further reports or indications of the fate of this aircraft were obtained at the time by the United Nations Command, and its crew was thereafter listed as missing in action.

Between the date when the plane was shot down and June 1954, the only bit of information gleaned concerning the fate of these men was an item on the Peiping radio, January 21, 1953, announcing the capture of three of the crew members: Colonel Arnold, Major Baumer, and Captain Vaadi.

I should like to read the names of the surviving members of the crew into the record. As I have said, Col. John K. Arnold, now 41 years old, was Commander of the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing. His wife lives in Montgomery, Ala.

Maj. William H. Baumer, 32 years old, was the instructor pilot. His mother lives in Lewisburg, Pa.

Capt. Elmer F. Llewellyn, 29 years old, was navigator of the aircraft. His wife lives in Missoula, Mont.

Capt. Eugene J. Vaadi, 33 years old, was aircraft commander. His wife lives in Clayton, N. Y.

1st Lt. John W. Buck, 35 years old, was aircraft observer. His parents live in Armathwaite, Tenn.

1st Lt. Wallace L. Brown, 28 years old, was the pilot. His wife lives in Montgomery, Ala.

T. Sgt. Howard W. Brown, 32 years old, was flight engineer. His parents live in St. Paul, Minn.

Airman 1c Steve E. Kiba, 22 years old, was radio operator on the plane. His parents live in Akron, Ohio.

Airman 2c Harry M. Benjamin, Jr., 22 years old, was a scanner on the aircraft. His wife lives in Worthington, Minn.

Airman 2c Daniel C. Schmidt, also 22 years

old, was central fire-control gunner on the plane. His wife is now in Redding, Calif.

Airman 2c John W. Thompson, III, 23 years old, was also a scanner. His parents live in Orange, Va.

These men, after capture on a mission of the United Nations to restore peace in Korea, have been sentenced by a Chinese Communist military tribunal to prison terms ranging from 4 to 10 years.

I have already mentioned, Mr. President, that the Chinese Communist representative, Wang P'ing-nan, acknowledged at Geneva last June that his regime held 4 other United States Air Force personnel besides the 11 just named. I want to give the Assembly the facts in these cases as well.

[See Ambassador Lodge's letter of December 7.]

Mr. President, these 15 Americans have now been held in captivity for many long months, some of them for more than 2 years. Most of their fellow soldiers returned from Korea with their units. The families of these 15 are still waiting. We here have a grave responsibility to these men, to their families, to their fellow citizens in Alabama, Pennsylvania, Montana, New York, Tennessee, Minnesota, Ohio, Virginia, Nebraska, and Iowa and in all the United States.

Mr. President, the continued detention of any prisoners of war desiring repatriation is a clear-cut violation of the armistice in Korea concluded on July 27, 1953. The imprisonment of 11 members of the United States Air Force after a so-called trial before a Chinese Communist military tribunal is a severe aggravation of this breach of a solemnly undertaken international agreement.

Let me review the relevant provisions of the Korean Armistice. These are contained in article III of the main agreement and in the annex containing the Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Paragraphs 51 and 54, in article III, contain provisions now pertinent that read:

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this armistice agreement.

(a) Within sixty (60) days after this armistice agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering

any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

(b) Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this armistice agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

It was therefore the duty of the Communist authorities under the Armistice Agreement to deliver all prisoners of war either to the United Nations Command or to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

The four jet pilots I have named earlier were neither repatriated nor turned over to the Repatriation Commission. They continue to be held by the Chinese Communist authorities.

The 11 surviving members of the B-29 shot down on January 12, 1953, have not only been detained by the Chinese Communists but, according to a Peiping radio announcement, have been sentenced to prison for long terms by a Chinese Communist military tribunal for offenses alleged to have been committed prior to their capture.

In addition to these 15 American airmen, there are substantial numbers of United Nations Command military personnel from the United States and other countries who have not been repatriated or otherwise accounted for by the Communists in accordance with their international obligations.

These serious violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement are, unfortunately, not isolated instances occurring against a background of general Communist compliance with the armistice

terms. The fact is that these violations are paralleled by serious Communist breaches of the armistice in a number of areas besides that of the treatment of prisoners of war.

The Chinese Communist radio broadcasts have made much of the assertion that the crew of the B-29 came down in Chinese territory rather than in Korea. The most reliable information available to the United Nations Command indicated that Colonel Arnold's B-29 aircraft was attacked and abandoned by its crew over Korean territory. This is what the radar sightings show.

However, the place where the plane or crew members came down is irrelevant. The repatriation provisions of the Armistice Agreement make no distinction on the basis of the place of capture. Those provisions cover all prisoners of war, regardless of the precise locality where they may happen to have been captured.

The crux of the matter is that these 15 individuals, when captured, were members of the United Nations Command engaged in a mission of that Command. That is all that matters.

Trumped-up Espionage Charge

The Chinese Communist allegations of espionage made against the B-29 crew are, of course, false. The crew and the aircraft were on a regular leaflet mission of the United Nations Command in support of the general United Nations military operations being carried on in Korea under the United Nations. The crew were in uniform and carried all the appropriate documents of identity.

These considerations apart, the Chinese Communist position will not hold water. Even if the trumped-up charges against our airmen were true (which they are not), even if our men were guilty of crimes (which they are not), they would still be covered by the Armistice Agreement provision calling for the release of prisoners of war. This is confirmed by a statement of the Communists themselves in the 16th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission held at Panmunjom on August 31, 1953. In that meeting the representative of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers said:

Our side has repeatedly stated that our side will repatriate before the conclusion of the repatriation operation all captured personnel of your side who insist upon repatriation, including those prisoners of war who have committed crimes before or after their capture.

The United Nations Command representative answered:

We will repatriate all prisoners of war exactly in conformity with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and according to the present schedule. . . .

This construction placed upon the Armistice Agreement by the two sides so soon after the agreement was concluded establishes beyond doubt the import of the obligation undertaken by the parties.

In full compliance with this interpretation of its obligation, the United Nations Command has repatriated 418 captured Communist personnel accused of war crimes (314 Korean and 104 Chinese) together with 36 material witnesses; and in addition 166 accused of postcapture offenses (165 Koreans and 1 Chinese) together with 118 material witnesses. The charges in these cases comprised all kinds of offenses, including murder. All these men desired repatriation and were in fact repatriated by September 9, 1953. This is how the United Nations side complied with its obligation.

The Assembly should now be the judge of the compliance on the part of the Communists with their undertaking. By their own interpretation the Communists considered that the Armistice Agreement imposed an obligation to treat as prisoners of war eligible for repatriation all captured personnel regardless of alleged crimes committed either before or after capture. The Chinese Communist authorities, in continuing to detain some United Nations military personnel and in sentencing 11 of them for alleged crimes, have breached the armistice and ignored their contemporary understanding of it.

Returning briefly to the trumped-up charge of espionage: The Soviet representative on Monday offered, as a sample of the evidence of espionage, Colonel Arnold's alleged statement that his plane was disarmed and had only two guns in the tail. The fact is that Colonel Arnold's aircraft was a routine line B-29 modified for night operations. The modifications include painting the aircraft black, flame suppressors on the engines, removal of some of its armament, and flash dampeners on the remaining guns. In night operations, attacks can only be carried out from the rear, using radar sights, hence the complete armament is neither necessary nor useful.

This, Mr. President, is a sample of the evidence

on which the men were sentenced to long terms in prison.

Let me also recall in this connection that the Soviet representative made the specific statement last Monday that the 11 men we are talking about were in military uniform.

Let us see exactly what he said. I therefore quote a translation made from the official United Nations recording of Mr. Malik speaking in the Russian language. Eleven of these fliers, said Mr. Malik, and I use the precise words, were: "in the uniform of military personnel." The precise Russian words were: "*vuh formyo voyennostuzhashikh*." You can play the record and hear it yourself.

When I called attention on Monday to the fact that it was an insult to human intelligence to say that men of the United States Air Force *in uniform* were engaged in spying in China, the Soviet representative pleaded a mistake in translation.

Now, Mr. President, one of the marvels of the United Nations is the translating service. I have in the past praised the translators for the extraordinary speed and accuracy with which they do their work. In fact, accuracy is not a sufficiently strong word for the way in which these talented interpreters convey the true meaning and spirit of a speaker's thought.

It is, therefore, not surprising to note that in this case there was *no* error in translation, that the Soviet representative *did* say that the 11 aviators were "in the uniform of military personnel," and the phonographic record shows it.

It does not seem to me a very sporting debating tactic to resort to an impugnation of the accuracy of the interpreters, when what really happened was that the speaker himself made a statement, however inadvertently, which knocks his case into a cocked hat. As the French phrase has it: *Ce n'est pas très chic*.

Obviously the Soviet representative *did* say these men wore uniforms. Equally obviously it is inconceivable that members of the United States armed forces, men dressed in the uniform of United States military personnel, would be engaged in espionage in China. This marks the collapse of the Communist case, and trying to shift the blame onto the interpreters is not going to put it together again.

We have now a situation, Mr. President, where almost 18 months have elapsed since the dead-

line set by the Korean Armistice Agreement for the release of captured personnel. In glaring violation of an essential provision of that agreement, the Chinese Communists continue to detain a number of military personnel of the United Nations Command and have sentenced 11 of them to long terms of imprisonment. Action must be taken to bring about their release, and the release of all United Nations personnel entitled to repatriation.

The United States Government, in its capacity as the Unified Command of United Nations forces in Korea, has taken the steps I have described earlier to secure Chinese Communist compliance with the obligations imposed by the armistice. The efforts so far made by the United States Government have been summarily rebuffed. After intensive and extensive consultations with all the other United Nations members whose forces fought in Korea, we have brought this matter to the General Assembly for urgent consideration.

United Nations Responsibility

The United Nations has a clear responsibility here. It stems from its own action to mobilize collective strength in the defense of the Republic of Korea when that country was attacked 4½ years ago. The United Nations determined the facts. It called upon the North Korean attackers to withdraw; it recommended to members of the United Nations that they give every assistance, including that of armed forces, in the defense of Korea. It has found that the Chinese Communists also engaged in aggression. All this was done in the faith that the world organization could act effectively to counter aggression and help put the maintenance of peace on a lasting basis, where always before peace had been broken by some aggressor who thought he could succeed.

For these reasons the United States has come to the United Nations with an urgent appeal for United Nations efforts to secure justice.

President Eisenhower last week expressed the thought that the Chinese Communists' flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement in imprisoning United Nations military personnel might be a deliberate attempt to goad the United States

into some impulsive action in the hope of dividing us from the other free nations of the world. If so, then it certainly makes a mockery of Communist protestations about peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, as the President said:

. . . We owe it to ourselves and to the world to explore every possible peaceable means of settling differences before we even think of such a thing as war.

And the hard way is to have the courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single avenue open to us in the hope even finally of leading the other side to a little better understanding of the honesty of our intentions.

It is in this spirit that the United States has joined with the other 15 member nations who sent armed forces to fight in Korea in submitting to the General Assembly the draft resolution contained in document A/L.182. I will read its text. It is short and clear. [See p. 932]

We urge the General Assembly to adopt this resolution by an overwhelming vote. This will make clear the Assembly's view that the continuing detention of prisoners of war by the Chinese Communists is contrary to the Korean Armistice Agreement. It will engage the moral force of the Assembly to bring about the release of prisoners unlawfully held. Finally, it will provide means for seeking the release of captured personnel and for reporting on the progress of efforts at release.

Thousands upon thousands of fighting men from 16 members of the United Nations were thus sent to Korea at the behest of the United Nations to throw back the Communist aggression. At the end of the fighting, clear arrangements were agreed to for the release of captured prisoners. The Armistice Agreement containing these arrangements was noted with approval by the General Assembly on August 28, 1953. Now, the Communist side is openly violating these arrangements and compounding that violation by sentencing 11 of the men it holds unlawfully in order to exploit them in a shameless propaganda show based on trumped-up charges and fabricated evidence.

In these grave circumstances it is proper and necessary for the United Nations to insure that the rights of its fighting men shall be upheld and that the authority and dignity of the United Nations itself shall be preserved.

U. K. Statement on Imprisoned American Personnel

Following is the text of a statement made by Anthony Nutting, United Kingdom Representative to the General Assembly, at the December 8 plenary session of the General Assembly. Mr. Nutting spoke during debate on inscription of the U.S. complaint, following statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., (see p. 935) and Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet Representative.

In reply to a question in the House of Commons last Monday, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, used these words to describe the trial and sentence of the 11 American airmen by the People's Government of China:

On behalf of Her Majesty's Government and all civilized nations I deeply deplore this conduct.

After endorsing words which I, Sir, had used publicly to condemn this action when the news first broke upon us, Sir Anthony Eden went on to say that:

These men were airmen in uniform shot down on military operations on behalf of the United Nations during the Korean hostilities. As such, they should have been repatriated on conclusion of the Korean armistice. The Chinese action in holding these men back was a direct violation of the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

It is not allowable to any nation which wishes to act by civilized standards to treat officers, non-commissioned officers, or men in uniform as spies and treat them in the sort of way they have been treated by the Chinese Government.

I therefore rise to support the inscription of this item and to add the voice of the British public to that of all civilized communities in an effort to set aright this great and grievous wrong.

Lest there should be any doubt in the mind of my Soviet colleague about whom I represent here at this tribunal, let me make it quite clear to him that in saying this I represent both the Government and the mass of public opinion in Great Britain.

We have heard the representative of the Soviet Union. Seldom can this organization have heard so weak a case. Small wonder that he seeks to

prevent this question's being brought to the bar of world opinion.

The Soviet representative based his case on two grounds in the General Committee, and he has reverted to and repeated one of these grounds in this discussion upon inscription. The first of the two grounds consisted of a repetition of the charge of espionage, and the second, which he used in the General Committee, consisted of a plea that the Chinese People's Government is not bound by the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Both these attacks misfired, and our case for inscription remains both unassailed and unassailable.

Let me examine for one moment the Soviet charge that these 11 men were guilty of espionage. By what fact has this charge been supported? The Soviet representative has communicated to us extracts from the *procès-verbal* of the trial of these men. He has alleged that they confessed. As Mr. Malik well knows, that is the remarkable and sinister feature of Communist trials: the prisoner always confesses; the verdict is always "Guilty." No doubt this is more efficient; no doubt it is easier to invent the facts than to ascertain them; no doubt it is less embarrassing to have a prisoner confess his guilt than to have him plead and prove his innocence. But is it justice? Is it justice as we, the United Nations, mean justice—as we have subscribed to it in our charter?

It is clear from what Mr. Malik has told us that no attempt was made whatever to ascertain the facts about the mission upon which these men were engaged when captured. Still less was any attempt made to weigh these facts in the balance. Instead, the Chinese authorities appear to have relied exclusively upon their own version of the case.

The facts about the mission on which these men were engaged and on which they were shot down over North Korea—not over China—have been set out by the U.S. representative, Mr. Lodge. In addition, there is the admitted fact that these men

were in uniform. Are we asked to believe that 11 American airmen, packed into one single airplane and wearing their national uniform, were about to descend upon Chinese territory to conduct espionage? The idea is so fantastic that it is hard to understand how grown men can advance it as a serious charge. Do the Chinese authorities, does the Soviet representative, really believe that an American or a Britisher or any other serviceman of the United Nations Command would elect to go spying in China in the uniform of his country? Is this the garb in which he would choose to mix with the local population? Is this the sort of suiting in which he would best hope to slip unobtrusively into a Chinese military headquarters and there steal the latest military movement orders? Is this the sort of clothing in which he could most easily gain the confidence of the Chinese artisan engaged upon the production of military equipment?

Such thoughts could only issue from a mind confused and haunted by spy mania. I say, therefore, that, if anything were needed to prove to the civilized world the innocence of these 11 airmen, it is the tortuous confusion and the glib and hollow absurdity of the case brought forward by the Soviet Union.

As against this, what is the case for our considering this item? The facts are not in dispute. Article III of the Korean Armistice Agreement laid it down that by 25 September 1953 all prisoners of war insisting on repatriation should be handed over for repatriation. I repeat—by 25 September 1953. It is now December 1954. Yet, on 24 November 1954 the Chinese People's Government announced that 11 airmen who had been kept in captivity since January 1953 had been tried and sentenced for espionage.

The terms of the armistice are clear and unequivocal: all prisoners insisting upon repatriation should be handed over. So, equally, are the terms of the Chinese announcement that 11 prisoners of war have been detained and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. There can therefore be no particle of doubt that this action is a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

The Communists have argued that the provisions of the Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners do not extend, and cannot be held to extend, to prisoners who have, according to the Communists' lights, committed

such crimes as espionage. Well, how then do they explain the statement to which Mr. Lodge referred? How then do they explain the statements made at the 16th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom on 31 August 1953, when the representatives of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers said—and I would repeat it once again to the Soviet Union representative, for he failed to deal with this point:

Our side has repeatedly stated that our side will repatriate, before the conclusion of the repatriation operation, all captured personnel of your side who insist upon repatriation, including those prisoners of war who committed crimes before or after their capture.

I repeat:

... including those prisoners of war who committed crimes before or after their capture.

I do not for one moment accept that the terms of the Armistice Agreement could be interpreted in any way to exclude the right of repatriation for any category of prisoner who desired to be repatriated. Nor do I accept for one moment that any criminal charge lies against these airmen. But even if the Communists could substantiate their charges, and even if they could so twist the meaning of plain words, how can they twist the statement made in the Military Armistice Commission, which specifically and in terms included those prisoners of war against whom charges might lie of having committed crimes before or after their capture?

It was no doubt because the Soviet Union realized how unanswerable was the case against them that they have made out, and not so far withdrawn, the additional argument that the Chinese People's Government was not party to the armistice and therefore could not be accused of violating it.

I had really thought that the fiction that the Chinese People's Volunteers were entirely independent of the Chinese People's Government had been finally abandoned after the signature of the Armistice Agreement. Throughout the Korean war the Chinese People's Government sought to maintain this fiction. But, when over 75 percent of the so-called Chinese volunteers who were captured by the United Nations Command refused under any set of circumstances whatever to return to China, I thought the Communist world had decided to drop this unconvincing fable.

But I do not have to rely upon my opinion to find the answer to this prevarication about who signed the armistice and in whose name. I rely on a far greater authority than I could ever hope to be in regard to the policy and point of view of the Communist world. I rely upon no less an authority than that distinguished spokesman of the Soviet Union, the late Mr. Vyshinsky. At the 430th meeting of the General Assembly, on 28 August 1953, Mr. Vyshinsky used these words:

It is clear from the statement made by Mr. Chou En-lai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Government of China, on behalf of his Government, and published on 25 August 1953, that the representative of the People's Republic of China who signed the Armistice Agreement also regards their interpretation as erroneous.¹

I repeat:

... the representative of the People's Republic of China who signed the Armistice Agreement.

Thus, it is not a question of what I think or what Mr. Lodge thinks or what any other representative of the 16 powers may think. Mr. Malik's case in the General Committee the other day has been shattered, and shattered by his own predecessor's admission that the Armistice Agreement was signed by the representative of the People's Republic of China. Thus, nothing remains of the case the Soviet Union has brought against inscription save the ruins of meaningless and irrelevant verbiage. It must be obvious that all fairminded men can see this case for what it is: a miserable product of absurdity and hypocrisy.

I should now like to refer briefly to a suggestion which has been made that, before this matter was brought to the United Nations, the machinery of the Military Armistice Commission should have been more thoroughly employed. I do not think that the facts bear out the suggestion that the Military Armistice Commission has been bypassed in any way. After the Armistice Agreement was signed, the United Nations Command asked in the Military Armistice Commission for details of all unrepatriated United Nations Command personnel who it was believed were being held by the Communists. Included in this demand were the personnel of the aircraft in which the 11 airmen in question were flying. No less than five separate demands for information were made between 9 December 1953 and 17 August 1954. But no

information whatsoever was given to the Armistice Commission about the members of that air crew.

It is also, of course, a known fact that approaches have been made through the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peking and to the Secretary-General of the delegation of the People's Government of China at the Geneva Conference. Numerous other approaches have been made by the United Nations Command, but these have all met with a rebuff. The British Chargé d'Affaires at Peking presented, on 14 June last, lists of Commonwealth and United Nations Command servicemen missing after operations during the Korean hostilities. These lists included the names of the 11 American airmen. This approach also requested information about any men found at any time in territory under Chinese or North Korean control, whether or not they were included in the lists. In October the Chinese replied in the same negative vein in which they had earlier replied to the United Nations Command.

In the face of the history I have given of these efforts to get information about these men, I do not think that anyone can say that we have rushed hastily to the United Nations without seeking every other means open to us of ascertaining the fate of these missing men and securing their early release.

I would put this question to the Assembly—and it is relevant indeed to the inscription of this item: If the Armistice Commission failed to obtain satisfaction about men detained as prisoners of war, as it did, how could it do any better about men now imprisoned as common criminals?

What we are seeking to do here—as we have every right to seek it, to come before this Assembly and seek it—is to collect the voices and to secure the endeavors of this Assembly of world opinion in support of justice and fair treatment for innocent men.

I would only add the following remarks: What are we trying to do in this, the United Nations? The world today is deeply divided. But over the past few months we have seen—and this has been reflected in some of the debates here—a perceptible reduction in international tension. We, for our part, have striven and will go on striving to restore and rebuild a relationship of confidence between East and West. My country has made its contribution in the past years, and it will continue to contribute to this endeavor. But confidence is

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 430, paragraph 114.

a two-sided matter. It requires an effort by both parties. It is essentially a fragile thing. It can easily be shaken. And, if we are to have the confidence to make new agreements, new settlements of issues which are still outstanding today, we must proceed at least from the assurance that agreements previously arrived at will not be violated and cast aside.

Meanwhile, we are confronted with a matter which affects and touches every nation represented in this Assembly. This is a United Nations issue.

These airmen are not just members of the United States Air Force: they are the soldiers of the world organization, sent to fight by the will and at the call of the United Nations. Although they cannot hear us, we can and must speak for them. Their lives, their freedom, their future, their safety are our responsibility, the responsibility of each and every one of us present here today. They went forth to uphold our cause. We must uphold theirs.

United Nations Approves Fifteen-Power Report on Korea

On December 11 the General Assembly adopted a 15-power draft resolution approving the report on the Korean Political Conference (Geneva, April 26-June 15, 1954) submitted to the Secretary-General on November 11 (U.N. doc. A/2786) by "the Members of the United Nations who participated in the United Nations action in Korea and attended the Geneva Conference." The report affirmed the right of the United Nations to take collective action to repel aggression and expressed the intent of the 15 powers "to continue to support the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, in particular that of achieving a unified, independent, and democratic Korea by peaceful means." Following are four statements made in Committee I (Political and Security) by James J. Wadsworth and Sen. H. Alexander Smith, U.S. Representatives to the General Assembly.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR WADSWORTH¹

Question of South Korean and Communist Representation

U.S. delegation press release 2051 dated December 1

Taking these two proposals in reverse, I wish to support most strongly the proposal of the distinguished representative of Thailand to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to par-

ticipate without the right of vote in the debate of this committee on the Korean question.² The Republic of Korea is the innocent victim of the aggression which called forth the collective action of the United Nations, and it is the party primarily concerned with the question which we are now discussing. We must not forget that what is ultimately at issue here is the fate of the Korean people, who fought so bravely with the United Nations forces. It is in our view just and proper that a duly appointed representative of the Korean people should be given the opportunity to state their views before this body. The Republic of Korea has participated in our discussion in the past, and it would be unthinkable not to give it a voice in the present debate.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me at this time also express in the strongest possible terms the opposition of the United States to the proposal of the representative of the Soviet Union to invite to this table representatives of the Communist regimes which have been found to be guilty of aggression in Korea.³ These regimes have no right to participate in this discussion. They have done nothing to purge themselves of the aggression. They have, in fact, continued to demonstrate their

² U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.113, adopted by the Committee on Dec. 1 by a vote of 43-5-10.

³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.112, rejected on Dec. 1 by a vote of 9-39-10.

¹ Made in Committee I on Dec. 1.

aggressive intent since they continue to defy the accepted norms of international behavior and the recommendations of the United Nations. There is a vast difference, Mr. Chairman, between sitting across the table in a conference between belligerents and attempting to work out something and inviting certain of these belligerents to this table in order to participate in our deliberations.

I do not believe I need remind the members of this committee at any great length that the Communist regime of China continues to hold hundreds of United Nations captured personnel in violation of the armistice agreement. All of these individuals were captured while in the service of the United Nations Command and in the course of military operations conducted under the authority of the United Nations to repel the Communist aggressors in Korea. I will also not dwell at any length upon the news recently in the papers as to the 13 Americans who have received prison sentences under the trumped-up charge of espionage.

But I do wish to say and emphasize most strongly the view of my Government that these Communist regimes have no right to participate in the deliberations of this committee on this item.

Korean Political Conference

U.S. delegation press release 2050 dated December 1

The United Nations today faces a new threat. It is more subtle than overt aggression, but it is just as dangerous. It must be met with equal firmness. It goes to the heart of all of our work here. Because the United Nations had acted resolutely to hurl back their aggression, the Communist delegations at Geneva challenged the authority of the United Nations to take collective action against aggression. The fate of the United Nations and ultimately the security of all of us depends upon whether we meet this challenge successfully.

More than 4 years ago—on June 27, 1950—the Security Council determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constituted a breach of the peace and recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea in order to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

In taking this action the Security Council recalled the General Assembly resolution of October 21, 1949, which declared that the Government of

Resolution on Korean Question¹

U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.119

The General Assembly,

Having noted the report of the Unscurk (A/2711) signed at Seoul, Korea on 17 August 1954,

Having received the report (A/2786) on the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva from 26 April to 15 June 1954, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953,

Noting that the negotiations in Geneva have not resulted in agreement on a final settlement of the Korean question in accordance with the United Nations objective in Korea,

Recognizing that this objective should be achieved by peaceful methods and constructive efforts on the part of the governments concerned,

Noting that article 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 provides that the Agreement "shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides",

1. *Approves* the report on the Korean Political Conference (A/2786);

2. *Reaffirms* that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

3. *Expresses* the hope that it will soon prove possible to make progress toward these objectives;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to place this item on the provisional agenda of its tenth regular session.

¹ Adopted by Committee I on Dec. 8 by a vote of 50-5 (Soviet bloc)-4 (Burma, India, Saudi Arabia, Syria) and by the General Assembly on Dec. 11, 50-5-4 (Burma, India, Indonesia, Syria).

the Republic of Korea is the lawfully established government of the great majority of the people of Korea and that it is the only government in Korea based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate.

On February 1, 1951, the General Assembly found that the Communist Chinese regime, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, had itself engaged in aggression in Korea.

Thus began the implementation of the principle

of collective security which is set forth in the first article of the charter of the United Nations. It was the first time in history that an international organization had marshaled force to repel an act of aggression.

The collective action succeeded in repelling the aggression, and 1½ years ago the armistice agreement was signed.⁴ Not only had the Republic of Korea been saved, but all nations, large and small, had been made more secure, because the collective action had strengthened the United Nations by demonstrating its determination to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the charter.

Although the armistice agreement represented a victory for the principle of collective security, Korea continued to be a nation divided, its northern half still held in the ruthless grasp of the very forces which perpetrated the aggression. In these circumstances, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility in Korea—a responsibility which it cannot ignore or pass on to others—a responsibility to restore international peace and security in the area and to achieve its objective of a united, independent, and democratic Korea.

The effort to achieve the unification of Korea on a just and honorable basis and by peaceful means has been pursued with energy and determination by those nations which took part in the collective action at the call of the United Nations. These nations have had the repeated support and encouragement of the United Nations. That effort has been frustrated by the intransigent position of the Communist powers who exercise control over North Korea. These Communist powers, who now speak of relaxing tensions and achieving peaceful solutions of international questions, have belied their pretensions by obstructing the unification of Korea.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE KOREAN POLITICAL CONFERENCE

Paragraph 60 of the armistice agreement contains a recommendation by the military commanders to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that a political conference be held within 3 months to negotiate on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. On August 28, 1953, this Assembly adopted a resolution welcom-

ing the holding of such a conference and initiating certain steps to convene it.⁵

I shall not take the time of this committee to recall the delaying tactics adopted by the Communist side before they would even agree to discuss the preparations for the conference. Nor do I intend to review the rigid position taken by the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom when Ambassador [Arthur H.] Dean sought with utmost patience to find a reasonable basis for convening the political conference.

The impasse over the convening of the political conference on Korea finally ended at Berlin on February 18 of this year, when Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov agreed with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom and Secretary Dulles to sponsor a Korean Political Conference to meet at Geneva, Switzerland, on April 26.

THE KOREAN POLITICAL CONFERENCE

Thus the Korean Political Conference recommended in the armistice agreement was finally convened.

The Communist attitude afforded little ground for optimism. However, the Republic of Korea and 15 of the Allied participants who had contributed troops at the call of the United Nations attempted patiently and sincerely to secure agreement on the unification of Korea on the basis of the principles set forth in the resolutions of the General Assembly. These 16 nations made a number of proposals and suggestions consistent with these principles, which were reaffirmed in the following words in the Declaration by the Sixteen on the final day of the Conference:⁶

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.

2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision, for representatives in the national assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

These principles, Mr. Chairman, state precisely and without exaggeration the rights and powers of the United Nations in this case. We therefore be-

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1953, p. 132.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 366.

⁶ *Ibid.*, June 28, 1954, p. 973.

lieve that they constitute the basis for seeking a settlement of the Korean question.

The failure of the Korean Political Conference to find an agreed solution to the Korean question resulted directly from the refusal of the Communist side to accept these principles as a basis for a settlement. The Communist side not only rejected these principles outright, but they also attacked the very foundations of the United Nations. Mr. Molotov, Mr. Nam Il, and Mr. Chou En-lai (who was there as Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime and presumably not speaking merely for the so-called Chinese People's Volunteers) repeatedly asserted that the United Nations was itself a belligerent in the Korean war and had lost its competence and moral authority to play a part in the settlement of the Korean question. Thus at Geneva they used political means to press their war against the United Nations.

For its part, the United States believes that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Chou En-lai, and Mr. Nam Il were wrong—completely and utterly wrong. We hold that the United Nations has both the competence and the moral authority to deal with this question. The United States therefore believes that it is essential to continue to adhere firmly to both of the principles which I have quoted above from the Declaration by the Sixteen. The first of these, which asserts the authority of the United Nations, is necessary in order to uphold the validity of the charter and the legality of the collective action undertaken to repel the Communist aggression. This principle was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution of August 28, 1953. The principle of collective security embodied in article 1 of the charter would have been undermined had the Allied participants accepted the repudiation of the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea.

The United States is equally convinced of the necessity and the validity of the second principle. Genuinely free elections are essential to the unification of Korea. They are the only means by which the Korean people can be given a voice in deciding their own future without fear or coercion. To insure that such elections would be impartial and effective, and to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly, we take the position that they should be conducted under the supervision of the United Nations.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of these issues we have been discussing. The United Nations has a unique interest in Korea. The Republic of Korea was recognized by the United Nations. The aggression in June 1950 was condemned by the United Nations. The United Nations called for forces to go to Korea to repel the aggression. The Communist Chinese were found by the United Nations to be aggressors. Soldiers from 16 nations fought and died in Korea because the United Nations engaged in collective action against aggression. Their sacrifices will have been in vain if we now permit the authority and competence of the United Nations to be called in question.

PROPOSALS OF THE ALLIED DELEGATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE

At Geneva the Allied delegations put forward several proposals in conformity with these principles. On April 27, Dr. Pyun, then Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, presented a proposal based on the October 7, 1950, resolution of the General Assembly.⁷ That resolution called for the taking of all constituent acts, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea. Dr. Pyun proposed that elections under United Nations supervision should be held in North Korea, pointing out that elections had taken place recently in South Korea under the supervision of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). He asked that the Republic of Korea not be put on the same plane as the North Korean regime, which has no legal basis and has demonstrated its aggressive character.

Speaking of this proposal, Secretary Dulles pointed out on April 28 that a workable plan for unifying Korea was already at hand in the form of the United Nations General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950. He urged that the interrupted work of UNCURK be resumed and that the Chinese Communists withdraw their forces from North Korea so that the United Nations could "complete its task in an atmosphere free of menace." This proposal was rejected by the Communist delegations.

In a further effort to achieve a peaceful settle-

⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1950, p. 648.

ment of the Korean problem, Dr. Pyun on May 22 presented a complete proposal which provided for elections both in North Korea and in the Republic of Korea. In summary this proposal called for:

1. The holding of free elections in North Korea, where such elections have not hitherto been possible, and in South Korea, in accordance with the constitutional processes of the Republic of Korea, these elections to be held under United Nations supervision within 6 months, on the basis of a secret ballot and universal adult suffrage;

2. A census under United Nations supervision, with a view to apportioning the number of representatives in the national legislature in proportion to the population in the electoral districts in all parts of Korea;

3. Complete freedom of movement for United Nations supervisory personnel and freedom of movement and of speech for candidates for election;

4. Maintenance of the constitution of the Republic of Korea, subject to amendment by the all-Korean legislature to be convened in Seoul immediately after the elections;

5. Completion of the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops 1 month in advance of the election date;

6. Commencement of the withdrawal of United Nations forces prior to the elections, the withdrawal to be completed when the unified government had achieved control throughout Korea as certified by the United Nations; and

7. A guaranty of the territorial integrity and independence of a unified Korea by the United Nations.

The United States believed then, as it does now, that this proposal would have permitted the unification of Korea on a just and honorable basis and in complete conformity with the principles laid down by this Assembly. Under this proposal, the Korean people would have had the opportunity to express their will in conditions of freedom, with adequate and impartial safeguards against undemocratic electoral practices.

PROPOSALS OF THE COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS

By their flat rejection of this proposal, the Communist rulers of North Korea revealed once more their fear of honest elections. They also revealed their intention of maintaining an illegal

grip on part of the Korean nation in preparation for a new attempt to bring all of Korea under Communist control.

This is the unmistakable objective of the counterproposals submitted by the Communist side. In essence, the Communist proposals provided that:

1. Elections throughout Korea must be prepared and conducted by an "all-Korean Commission" in which North Korea and the Republic of Korea would have equal representation and which could function only by agreement between the two;

2. International supervision of the elections must be limited to a new "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission" composed of an equal number of Communist and non-Communist nations, which would function only by agreement between the two components; and

3. All non-Korean forces must be withdrawn from Korea prior to the holding of elections, no distinction being made between the aggressors' forces and those of the United Nations, thus allowing the Chinese Communist armies to remain within easy striking distance whereas United Nations forces would be dispersed to all parts of the world.

The Communist proposals failed to provide any guaranty that the elections would be carried out in freedom. In fact, they gave no assurance that the elections would ever take place, since the North Koreans were given a built-in veto with which to prevent agreement except on their terms. The so-called Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission would have come into operation only if the "all-Korean Commission" had first reached agreement on the conduct of the elections. Even then the provision for unanimous agreement would have enabled the Communist members to frustrate the Commission's operations and prevent any effective supervision of the elections.

To the very end, the Communist delegations persisted in their repudiation of the authority of the United Nations and their insistence on a veto over the elections. The basis for their position on the elections is clear. They knew then, as they know now, that genuinely free elections in Korea would free North Korea from Communist domination. There was never any indication that they were prepared to alter the status quo in Korea, except on a basis which would have assured them

by political means the conquest of Korea which they had failed to gain by military aggression.

In the closing days of the Conference, the Communist delegations sought to turn the failure to reach agreement into a victory for Communist propaganda. Hastily prepared "proposals" were offered in an effort to blur the vital issues at stake. Mr. Nam Il blandly proposed, in effect, that the idea of impartially supervised elections be discarded; that the Republic of Korea work out measures for economic and cultural relations with the North Korean regime—this only after the withdrawal of foreign forces and the reduction of the forces of the Republic of Korea to a level equal to that of North Korea. With the obvious intent of confusing the debate at this Assembly, the North Korean regime recently made a similar proposal to the Republic of Korea. Naturally, the Republic of Korea has refused to accept this proffered Trojan horse.

Mr. Molotov's proposal on the final day at Geneva was different, but equally deceptive in intent. He suggested that both sides agree on a set of general objectives. But he left to what he called "further examination" all of the basic issues to which the Conference had failed to find solutions. He did not abandon in the slightest degree the Communist position which had made it impossible to solve these issues at the Conference.

As the Allied delegations have indicated in their report, these proposals could only have served to conceal the serious issues of principle which remained unresolved and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there was agreement when, in truth, there was none. Accordingly, in the Declaration by the Sixteen, issued on the final day of the Conference, the Allied delegations regretfully recorded their conclusion that, so long as the Communist side rejects the two fundamental principles which we consider essential, further consideration of the Korean question by the Conference would serve no useful purpose.

PROSPECTS FOR KOREAN UNIFICATION

Speaking for the United States, Mr. Walter Bedell Smith rejected a final propaganda gesture by the Chinese Communist delegate, who called for a resumption of the Korean Political Conference at some future date. Mr. Smith said,

This is not a permanent body—set up outside of or beyond the control of the United Nations. It was given

a specific mission which it has not been able to achieve as yet. . . . It was my impression that our Declaration had made it very clear that the Communist side could resume negotiations at any time under favorable conditions by simply accepting the two fundamental principles which we have declared . . . and without which negotiations would be fruitless.

After further careful study of the situation, the United States continues to maintain this position. The Korean Political Conference came to an end on June 15, 1954. It ended in failure for the reasons which I have summarized. The United States is not prepared to undertake new negotiations so long as the Communists reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable.

To undertake further negotiations in the absence of a change in the Communist position is to court a new failure. The result of a new failure would be a damaging blow to the prestige and authority of the United Nations and to the morale of the Korean people.

Mr. Chairman, after the long debate of the past 6 years in this body, it is all too easy to forget that we are discussing the fate of nearly 30 million Koreans who live in the shadow of Communist tyranny and who claim only the right to shape their own destiny in freedom. Those who had the opportunity of a free choice chose to defend their freedom with great bravery and immense sacrifice. If their future is to be cast repeatedly on the conference table solely for the purpose of demonstrating our willingness to negotiate, even when no constructive result is in prospect, it would not be surprising if the people of Korea should lose faith in us and in the very process of negotiation.

I am certain that the Korean people will agree in the future, as they have in the past, to participate with us in negotiations for a just and honorable settlement. But they deserve some assurance that constructive results may be anticipated and that they will not merely be subjected to unending pressure to yield on matters affecting their very existence. There cannot be a settlement of the Korean question which is not responsive to the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

Nor should there be a settlement of the Korean question which is unworthy of those who fought and died to defend the Republic of Korea and the United Nations. I can speak only for the hundreds of thousands of young men who went from

the United States to fight in Korea. Of these, more than 130,000 were casualties, 34,000 of them dead or missing in action. Fifteen other members of the United Nations and above all the Republic of Korea can speak of similar losses. We must not repudiate these sacrifices by abandoning the principles which inspired them.

Until the Communists cease their attacks upon these principles, no constructive results can be expected from negotiations on the Korean question. If we have learned anything from our numerous and protracted negotiations with them, it is the importance of careful preparation and careful timing to assure that negotiations are conducted under favorable conditions. At this time, when Communist China has just furnished fresh evidence of its brutal and illegal treatment of captured personnel of the United Nations Command in violation of the armistice agreement, the members of this committee will surely agree that conditions for negotiation are not favorable.

But we should not despair. We should not lose faith that our objectives will be achieved. We must be firm and constant in the principles we know to be right. We must hold fast to the only course which will bring us to the United Nations goal of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. We must not fail the people of Korea—or ourselves.

STATEMENTS BY SENATOR SMITH *

Fifteen-Power Draft Resolution

U.S. delegation press release 2058 dated December 3

I wish to express my regret at being absent in the opening of the discussions because as a member of the United States Senate during this last week we were in our closing session and I have been compelled to be there until late last night. However, I was here this morning and early enjoyed the fine presentation of the issues involved in this matter that is before us.

I have a brief statement to make at this time. The United States delegation was interested to hear the suggestion made this morning by the representative of Sweden [Rolf Sohlman] that an effort be made to merge the Indian draft resolu-

tion⁹ with the draft resolution submitted by the 15 powers.¹⁰ This suggestion was later endorsed by the representative of Peru [Victor Andres Belaunde]. We sincerely appreciate the keen interest which these and other delegations have demonstrated in trying to facilitate a just and honorable settlement of the Korean question. In view of the suggestion put forward by the representatives of Sweden and Peru, I should like to make a brief observation of the resolution presented by the group of 15 nations and the draft presented by the representative of India.

When the committee began its consideration of this item, the group of 15 nations agreed unanimously to sponsor the resolution which is now before the committee. The United States delegation believed, in common with others of the group of 15, that they owed it to this body and to themselves to put forward a resolution which embodied their views on the Korean question in the clearest possible manner, although of course open to suggestions that may be made by this whole committee. Having, together with the Republic of Korea and the Union of South Africa, taken part together in the resistance against aggression at the call of the United Nations, and having participated in the Geneva Conference, the group of 15 believed that the General Assembly should have the views which they have developed as the result of their common experience.

It is true that the two resolutions in question are similar in many respects. However, I should like to call the committee's attention to the most significant difference between the resolution sponsored by the 15 nations and the Indian draft resolution. The Indian draft resolution merely states that the General Assembly has "received" the report on the Korean Political Conference. The resolution presented by the 15 nations calls upon the General Assembly to "approve" this report. There are lesser points of difference which I will not discuss at this time.

The 15 members of the United Nations who participated in the Geneva Conference pursuant to the recommendation of the General Assembly have formally reported upon their participation in that Conference. I hope sincerely that the General Assembly will agree that it can do no less than to approve the report which the 15 members have submitted.

* Made in Committee I on Dec. 3 and 8.

⁹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.118.

¹⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.119.

In conclusion, may I say that I am sure that the Indian representative [V. K. Krishna Menon] and I, and indeed all of us, have the same objective in mind. We want to see a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. Unfortunately, there is one rather fundamental difference between us, as I have explained, but I am certain that this will not in any way change the fact that the 15 nations and India all want to achieve a just and honorable settlement of the Korean question.

Summary of U. S. Position

U.S. delegation press release 2070 dated December 8

At this stage in our discussion of the Korean question it may be useful to look back at the ground we have covered. Then we may have a better basis for voting on the resolutions before us.

A great many things have been said here by the Soviet representative and those who support him which are nothing more than echoes of the falsehoods and distortions of the past. We do not intend to take up the time of this committee to reply to them. As a matter of fact, the committee has heard a number of excellent and penetrating statements which have revealed that there is a widespread understanding of the extent to which these distortions have become part of the Communist dogma on Korea. But we believe that the essentials of what has been said can be summarized in a few general conclusions:

1. The Geneva Conference did not solve the Korean question. We can all agree on that.
2. The Geneva Conference failed because the Communists refused to accept genuinely free elections in Korea and rejected the authority of the United Nations.
3. The Communist position has not changed. We mean by that, the Communists have still given no evidence that they would be willing to accept either the authority of the United Nations or genuinely free elections in Korea.
4. The U. S. S. R. proposes another conference on Korea at an early date and on precisely the same basis as the recent Conference which failed.
5. Because the Communist position is unchanged, such a conference would be futile.

We believe that these conclusions give us clear guidance as to the way in which this committee should dispose of the resolutions before it. The

resolution introduced by the Soviet Union suggests further negotiations before the Communists give any indication of any kind that they are willing to negotiate on a reasonable basis. Clearly this is a device. The Soviet delegate is trying to make it appear that the Soviets have an interest in a reasonable settlement. Actually, we feel that they do not. They are still insisting upon a settlement which would make Korea a Communist satellite. Therefore we believe that this device should be rejected.

All of these efforts to offer the shadow of false hope instead of the substance of reality should be put firmly aside. The U.S.S.R. proposal for a new conference on Korea is one of these efforts, and we trust that it will be rejected.¹¹

The second resolution introduced by the representative of the Soviet Union proposes the abolition of UNCURK.¹² This resolution is a part of the determined Communist rejection of the authority and competence of the United Nations. They claim that it is a biased committee, that it can do no useful work, that it is too favorable to the Republic of Korea. Yet they quote from the UNCURK report,¹³ quoting only those positions unfavorable to the Republic of Korea. We should all read the entire report of UNCURK. It stands as a vivid proof of the falsity of the Communist contentions. UNCURK has done effective work. It is both the symbol and the instrument of the United Nations in Korea. It should not be abolished. Quite the contrary. Unless the Communists fear a clear-eyed and detailed examination of the real conditions in North Korea, let them give UNCURK the same access to North Korea that it has to South Korea. Then and only then will this committee really have an adequate basis for judging what is going on in North Korea.

We have discussed the two resolutions proposed by the Soviet Union. There are two other resolutions before this committee—the one introduced by the 15 nations who participated for the United Nations in the Geneva Conference—and in that resolution the U.S. is a party—and the one introduced by India.

We all appreciate the efforts which the distinguished representative of India is making to pro-

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 116, not brought to a vote.

¹² U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 117, rejected on Dec. 8 by a vote of 5-50-1 (Syria).

¹³ U.N. doc. A/2711.

mote a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. I have talked with him personally and am absolutely convinced of his sincerity in trying to bring about a solution of the problem. His statement to this committee yesterday morning made it clear that he has in view the same basic objectives as do those of us who participated in the Korean action in response to the call of the United Nations.

However, there are differences of approach which are reflected in these two resolutions. On Friday, we pointed out the most important difference. This is the fact that the Indian resolution only notes that the report to the United Nations on the Geneva Conference has been received, whereas the resolution of which the United States is a cosponsor proposes that the report be approved. Close examination shows that the 15-power resolution also emphasizes more clearly than the Indian resolution the role of the United Nations in Korea. These differences are substantive and not merely differences in language.

The 15-power resolution was drafted and submitted to this committee because its sponsors believe it is essential to reassert in a clear-cut manner the overall responsibility and the objectives of the United Nations in this matter. This has been the issue throughout the long discussion on Korea in this Assembly. It was the issue at Geneva. It remains the issue upon which the unification of Korea will turn.

I regret to say that the Indian resolution in my judgment subordinates this basic issue. Its adoption would be taken as a signal that we are prepared to consider the unification of Korea on some other basis. That is, we are sure, not the intention of the representative of India, but that is the effect of his resolution. Had the distinguished representative of India found it possible to agree with the sponsors on the need to reassert these principles in a clear-cut manner, there would have been no need for the 15 powers to submit any resolution at all.

Since the issue has emerged in this way, however, the United States cannot vote for the Indian draft resolution. That is why we support the motion of the representative of Turkey to give priority to the 15-power proposal, and that is why

we hope that the 15-power resolution will receive the overwhelming support of this committee.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman—lest there be any misunderstanding—we should like to reemphasize a point which Ambassador Wadsworth said in opening the discussion of this question. President Eisenhower has stressed the same point in more general terms in some of his recent public statements.

For our part, the United States is not closing the door to further discussions with the Communists for the peaceful unification of Korea. Dr. Pyun in his statement to this committee gave clear indication that the Republic of Korea feels the same way. The door is not being closed. However, the United States believes that there is no point in further discussions until the Communists have given evidence that they mean to negotiate on the sound basis of moral principles and United Nations responsibility. Nothing can be gained if they intend to repeat the same things they said at Geneva and have said here. We mean business. When they show that they do, there will be some point in further negotiations.

Letters of Credence

Rumania

The newly appointed Minister of the Rumanian People's Republic, Anton Moisesescu, presented his credentials to the President on December 7. For the text of the Minister's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 699.

Greece

The newly appointed Ambassador of Greece, George V. Melas, presented his credentials to the President on December 9. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 710 of December 9.

Soviet Propaganda Charges Against U. S. Efforts To Deter Aggression in Asia

Statement by C. D. Jackson

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

Just last week the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was given a clear picture of how the Soviet bloc is using the United Nations as a propaganda sounding-board to increase world tensions. I am happy to say that this Committee was not fooled by the Soviet bloc maneuver.²

Today we have just been treated to another superb example of propaganda tactics, really skillful propaganda tactics. I am referring to Mr. Sobolev's bland statement, just a clause and a sentence just a few minutes ago, to the effect that the United States started the war in Korea, had attacked North Korea. Now if anyone here believes that statement, then they can believe Mr. Sobolev's other statements which are inevitably built upon that premise, that is, the propaganda structure. But if, on the contrary, we accept the fact

of unprovoked North Korean aggressive attack against South Korea in which there were no United States troops—and that has been the finding of the United Nations—then curiously enough, the truth of practically everything else that Mr. Sobolev said, the truth of practically every statistic which he reeled out for us at considerable length, is, to say the least, in serious doubt. That is why I say that the Soviet charge against alleged United States aggression is nothing but propaganda based on a propaganda premise.

This Committee saw through the baseless charges submitted under the Czech item. In fact, the crude propaganda attempt of our Soviet colleagues blew up in their faces and was turned against them. This Committee pronounced itself in no uncertain terms. It placed the responsibility for fostering so-called war propaganda right where it belongs. It again went on record decisively that it is the unwarranted and continued maintenance of the Iron Curtain by the Kremlin rulers that today constitutes the overriding reason for false and hostile propaganda against peace.

Today we find ourselves facing the Bamboo Curtain.

This item is not new. A similar item and similar resolutions were brought into the Security Council and the General Assembly in 1950. The Security Council rejected the Soviet proposal by 9 votes to 1. The General Assembly never voted on the Soviet proposal. In fact, the debate on it was interrupted in November 1950 when the Assembly turned its attention to a fact of war and disregarded their propaganda falsehood. That fact of war was the Chinese Communist military intervention in Korea.

¹Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Dec. 9 (U. S. delegation press release 2072).

²Debate on a Czechoslovak proposal (U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.16) opened in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 30. The draft resolution recommended that all states "take effective measures against all forms of propaganda tending to create hostility and hatred among nations and increasing the danger of a new world war." On the same date the United States, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, France, Honduras, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom jointly offered amendments (U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.17) which had the effect of deleting four of the draft's five paragraphs and placing emphasis on the removal of barriers to free exchange of information and ideas.

The original Czechoslovak draft was not put to a vote. The amended version was adopted on Dec. 2 by a vote of 35-5-10 (U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.19); Czechoslovakia joined the other Soviet-bloc delegations in voting against it. The vote in the Dec. 11 plenary was 45-5-9.

For texts of statements made during the committee debate by C. D. Jackson, see U.S. delegation press releases 2049 of Nov. 30, 2052 of Dec. 1, and 2054 of Dec. 2.

Let us not for a moment forget that the introduction of this general subject at the United Nations in 1950 was a prelude to Communist China's engaging in aggression in Korea, of which Communist China still stands convicted. I ask my Soviet colleague: Why have you taken this old item off the shelf and revived it? Is it intended to hide your own intentions to commit or push-button further aggressions in the Far East? This is something we should all ponder during the course of this debate. Certainly the recent actions of the Soviet Union's Chinese Communist partners do not reassure us on this score.

Close on the heels of the Geneva Conference the Chinese Communists began to develop a full-scale propaganda campaign, both for domestic and foreign consumption, promising the "liberation" of Formosa, even though the world knows that the people of Free China are desperately opposed to the tyrannical form of government which has been imposed on their mainland brethren. This propaganda campaign has already achieved the magnitude of the "Resist America—Aid Korea" campaign by means of which the Chinese Communists sought to stir up support for their aggression in Korea in defiance of the United Nations.

But the Chinese Communists have not relied upon words of hate and threats of belligerent action alone to create tensions in the Formosa area. They have resorted to bombs and shells to heighten the effect. On September 3 Chinese Communist artillery pumped nearly 5,000 shells onto the Islands of Big and Little Quemoy, thus deliberately inflaming a situation which had been quiescent for nearly 5 years. Since then the Communists have continued to bomb and shell these and other small islands which have always been held by the Government of China. It could not have been mere coincidence that this well-developed and systematic campaign for the "liberation" of Formosa was launched when a new campaign was needed for the internal purpose of reviving the faltering enthusiasm for the actions of the Chinese Communist regime. Externally, of course, the Chinese Communists and their Soviet partners hoped to split the United States from its allies. Let me advise the Soviet representative, however, that the mutual interest of the United States and its allies in freedom and justice is so basic that no amount of cheap political warfare can break them apart.

On August 11 Chou En-lai told the 33d session of the "Central People's Government Council":

The liberation of Taiwan is a glorious, historic mission of the Chinese people. Only by liberating Taiwan from the rule of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group, only by fulfilling this glorious task, can we win complete victory in the great cause of liberating the Chinese people and thus further safeguard the peace and security of Asia and the world.

Again on September 23, 1954, Mr. Chou addressed the "National People's Conference" as follows:

The Chinese people must liberate Taiwan. As long as Taiwan is not liberated, China's territory is not intact, China cannot have a tranquil environment for peaceful construction and peace in the Far East and throughout the world is not secure. On August 11, 1954 the Central People's Government Council passed a resolution urging all Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army to redouble their efforts in all fields of work and strive to liberate Taiwan and eliminate the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group, so as to complete our people's sacred task of liberation. On August 22, all the democratic parties and groups and people's organizations of China issued a joint declaration on the liberation of Taiwan in response to this call of the Central People's Government.

If the Chinese Communist regime is not seeking to provoke new armed conflict, what is the meaning of this language contained in "an order of the day to all commanders and fighters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" issued by General Peng Te-huai, Minister of Defense of the Chinese Communist regime, on October 1, 1954 (the same General Peng, incidentally, who signed the Korean Armistice Agreement as commander of the so-called People's Volunteers)?

The struggle to liberate Taiwan, therefore, is still an unfinished task in the Chinese People's war of liberation. It is the glorious duty of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to liberate Taiwan. . . .

Only yesterday Chou En-lai said:

To liberate Taiwan and liquidate the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique is a matter which falls entirely within the scope of China's sovereignty and internal affairs and no interference by any other country will be tolerated.

I ask the Soviet delegate, can the effect of such statements be other than to increase tensions? Can it be that they are not deliberately designed to increase tensions? All of us are familiar with the ominous meaning of the word "liberation" in the mouths of the Communists. History has taught us that it spells conquest, aggression, and the force-

ful imposition of Communist rule upon unwilling peoples. This is the course to which Chou En-lai has publicly committed his regime, and he stands the more exposed against the background of the continuous stream of similar statements which have poured from the mouths of other Chinese Communist officials, punctuated at frequent intervals by the roar of Communist gunfire.

And the Soviets, apparently feeling the need to give aid and comfort to the Chinese Communists, have pitched in with a similar orchestration. In his address of September 30 in Peiping, Mr. N. S. Khrushchev said:

The Soviet people deeply sympathize with the noble cause of the great Chinese people, support the Chinese people in their determination to liberate their suffering brothers from the oppression of the Chiang Kai-shek brigands on Taiwan, and to eliminate the Chiang Kai-shek brigands on the Island.

How does this kind of Soviet support for Chinese Communist plans to attack Formosa square with Communist protestations of devotion to peace and early disarmament? How do these bellicose Communist statements on Formosa contribute to a reduction of international tensions? If the Soviet Government's support of peace and disarmament is sincere, then why does it not undertake to moderate its bellicose ally? Apparently the Soviet Government prefers to overlook these provocative words and deeds of its Chinese partner and tries to confuse the world with charges of aggression by the United States.

False Accusations Against U. S.

Let us now look briefly at some of the accusations that are being hurled at us. The Soviets allege the forcible seizure and occupation of Formosa by United States armed forces. Certainly it is obvious to everyone that the United States has neither seized nor occupied Formosa. There are some 8 or 9 hundred United States Army, Air Force, and Naval officers and men stationed on Formosa for the purpose of training the military forces of the Chinese Government. They are there at the request of that government. It is a patent absurdity to claim that the United States with a few hundred men engaged in a training mission has seized or occupied Formosa, garrisoned by half a million Chinese.

Let me stress again that the small group of United States military officers are in Formosa at

the invitation of the Chinese Government. The military and economic assistance extended to the Chinese Government is nothing new. It is a manifestation of the traditional concern of the United States for the well-being of China. The United States is proud of its long record of friendship and assistance to the Chinese Government. The United States has traditionally stood and still stands for the independence and territorial integrity of China. Historically the United States has maintained this stand in opposition to imperialist pressures.

Many examples could be given of the continuity of the American policy in this respect, but I will cite only a few this morning. Defense of China's independence and territorial integrity was the purpose of the "Open Door Notes" of Secretary of State John Hay in 1899, of the United States Circular Note to the Powers in 1902, of the United States appeals to both belligerents in the Russo-Japanese War in the years 1904-05, and of the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908. The United States took a firm stand against aggression in Manchuria in 1932 and refused to recognize any arrangements which impaired the open-door policy. From 1937 down to the present, the United States has provided both economic and military aid to the Government of China. Through private institutions the people of the United States have also made contributions to the welfare and education of the Chinese people. I recall these facts simply to make clear the continuity of American policy toward China. The United States has consistently stood for the independence and territorial integrity of China. It has for many years extended assistance to the Government of China when that Government has sought such aid.

The record of the United States, therefore, gives the lie to the Soviet accusation that the United States has violated Chinese territorial rights and international agreements respecting China. It exposes the falsity of the Communist contention that its economic and military assistance programs conceal imperialistic or aggressive designs.

As to the accusations that the United States is perpetrating and abetting aggressive acts in the Formosa area, let us examine the actual situation. I have already described for you the deliberate and systematic campaign initiated by the Chinese Communist regime at the close of the Geneva Conference to stir up tensions as to the Formosa

situation. A part of this campaign has been the launching of attacks against islands held by the Chinese Government. It was only natural and right that the Chinese Government should have defended itself against such attacks and should have sought to destroy the war vessels and the artillery emplacements used by the Communists in making such attacks. As the Chinese Government has publicly stated, its actions have been designed purely as a defense against these attacks launched by the Communists as a part of their burgeoning campaign to seize territories of Free China. Communist propaganda has deliberately distorted these defensive actions.

Shelling of Quemoy

For example, for domestic purposes it played up the heavy shelling of Quemoy as "victory." The military responses which it has provoked by these attacks have been heavily played in its propaganda as "acts of aggression" by the Chinese Government and the United States. When, several weeks after the initial heavy Communist shelling of Quemoy, military activities in the area slackened, the Communists found it necessary to bomb the Tachen Islands, presumably in the hope of provoking retaliation which could be ballyhooed as further "aggressive action."

A part and parcel of this Communist campaign of word and deed to increase tensions over the Formosa area has been the marked increase in publicity given to trials of so-called counter-revolutionaries and spies in Communist China. These spy trials have suddenly been multiplied rapidly and given unusual prominence in Peiping propaganda output. The victims of these trials are invariably portrayed as agents of the Chinese Government and/or the United States, and their alleged plots are linked with the so-called aggressive designs of their alleged principals. The climax of this exercise in stirring up war hysteria in China and heightening international tensions was the sentencing of 11 United States Air Force personnel of the United Nations Command. These trumped-up charges are said by the Communists to "prove" United States aggression against China. It is by such false accusations as this, as well as by provocative armed attacks and a constant barrage of propaganda, that the Chinese Communist regime seeks to create the illusion of United States aggression.

But the military activities of the United States with respect to Formosa are a matter of record. They are the antithesis of aggression. They are designed to prevent aggression and to promote stability. In June 1950 the then President of the United States ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa because in the circumstances of the Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea "the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area." The purpose of the United States was clearly to prevent the spread of war and to maintain stability in the area of Formosa. This purpose was achieved.

Following the Korean Armistice, tensions in the area were focused in Indochina, and it was clear that the continuance of the Seventh Fleet mission was important to the maintenance of stability in the general area. Although a settlement was arrived at during the Geneva Conference designed to contribute to the reduction of tensions in Indochina, the Chinese Communist regime lost no time in launching a campaign aimed at the forcible seizure of Formosa, which had the effect of maintaining and increasing tension in that area. If it had not been for the continuing mission of the Seventh Fleet, these Communist threats might already have been turned into the hideous spectacle of a fresh armed assault upon freedom-loving people. In brief, the Seventh Fleet has carried out its mission successfully and has accomplished its objective of preventing the spread of war to Formosa. It is not engaged in nor has it abetted any provocative or offensive actions, but it has made a significant contribution to stability, a stability which the Communists are now doing their best to upset.

Last week the Government of the United States and the Government of China took an important step to contribute further to the stability of the Formosa area. On December 2 they signed a Mutual Defense Treaty.³ The nature and purpose of this treaty was clearly set out in a joint statement by the United States and Chinese Governments issued on December 1 on the conclusion of negotiations of this treaty. In this joint state-

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1954, p. S95.

ment the United States and Chinese Governments pointed out “. . . this treaty between the United States and the Republic of China will be defensive in character. It will reaffirm the dedication of the parties to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” The purpose of the treaty was clearly stated in these words: “It is directed against threats to the security of the treaty area from armed attack and provides for continuing consultation regarding any such threat or attack.” This treaty follows the general pattern of other security pacts which the United States has concluded with countries in the Western Pacific. It forms another link in the system of collective security which provides the essential framework for the defense by the free people of the Western Pacific against Communist aggression. This treaty can be construed as a threat only by a would-be aggressor.

This mutual security treaty with the Republic of China solemnizes and gives permanency to the previous steps of the United States to stabilize the situation in the area of Formosa. It is designed to deter aggression—to prevent the kind of Communist miscalculation which could lead to an effort to invade Formosa. I maintain that this is a contribution to peace, not to war.

Let any impartial observer review these facts and decide for himself who it is that is promoting and encouraging war and the increase of international tensions as between the mainland of China and Formosa.

Communist Definition of Aggression

The root of the matter is that in Communist jargon any effort to create a defense against expanding communism is called aggression. I could cite examples to prove this point from all over the world, but I shall confine myself to Asia.

As early as 1946, when the Second World War was over and the United States made clear its policy of continued support of the Republic of China, the propaganda of Chinese communism proceeded to paint the United States as the aggressive successor to imperial Japan.

In 1950 the Communist aggression in Korea was painted by Moscow and Peking as a defense against a mythical attack from the south, and the United Nations response to that aggression had no sooner taken place than it was portrayed as a

cover for aggression by the United States. The world is long weary of this lie.

In 1950 the United States joined with Australia and New Zealand in a defensive treaty and with the Philippines in another defensive treaty, and, sure enough, Soviet communism condemned both these treaties as acts of aggression.

In 1952 the United States concluded a Security Treaty with Japan and in 1953 it signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea. These steps were taken as a means of strengthening further the defenses of the free world in the Western Pacific. But the Soviet and Peking Communists have from the beginning labeled them as aggressive.

Then in September of this year an eight-power Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed at Manila.⁴ The parties are Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty provides that in case of aggression by armed attack each of the parties will act to meet the common danger and that in case of aggression by other means, such as subversion, the parties will consult immediately to agree on measures for the common defense. This last provision is important because, as Secretary Dulles said on September 15, “subversion and indirect aggression have been principal tools of international communism.”

These are the provisions of the Manila pact, and the only provisions, concerning aggression. And what is the reaction from the centers of world communism? The same as before: that the treaty is an act of aggression.

And now comes the mutual security treaty with the Republic of China. Can anyone be surprised that this too, in Communist language, is labeled as an act of aggression? As recently as yesterday Chou En-lai said: “The mutual security treaty concluded by the United States Government with the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique is in every sense a treaty of war and aggression. United States imperialism is hostile to the Chinese people.” How long do Moscow and Peking think they can fool the intelligent peoples of Asia with this outworn inversion of the truth? How many people in Europe are likely to believe it—people who so well remember how Hitler launched

⁴ *Ibid*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

World War II by accusing Poland of committing aggression against him?

The Facts of History

In our search for the truth, we do not need to depend on such misuse of words. We have the facts of recent history in Asia, and from those facts we can easily answer the question I raised a few moments ago: Who is the real aggressor in Asia? Permit me to divide this question into some concrete questions of fact.

First, who was it that signed a treaty in 1945 to support the Republic of China and in the same year turned over vast stocks of captured Japanese arms to the internal Communist enemies of that Republic? Who in the meanwhile closed the port of Dairen to Chinese Nationalist troops so that they could not interfere with the Chinese Communist conquest of Manchuria? To both questions the answer is written in history: the Soviet Union.

Second, who was it that established a Korean Communist army in North Korea from 1945 to 1950, supplied and trained that army, provided Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry to be its leaders, and posted its own military officers to give the signal for the southward aggression on June 25, 1950? The answer is: the Soviet Union, with the complicity of Communist China.

Third, who sent armies of so-called "volunteers," a million strong, into Korea in late 1950 to continue the aggression after the original aggressor army had nearly been crushed by United Nations forces? And who, for this act, was found guilty of aggression by the United Nations General Assembly? We all know the answer: Communist China.

Fourth, who in 1952 subjected helpless prisoners of war in Korea to weeks and months of deprivation and torture in order to extract false confessions from them about a totally fictitious germ warfare campaign, and bolstered this propaganda barrage with fraudulent so-called scientific commissions in Peking, all the while resisting any impartial investigations—thus mounting one of the most colossal and fraudulent hate campaigns in modern history? The answer is known: Communist China.

Fifth, who in 1953 signed a solemn armistice

agreement in Korea, forbidding the reinforcement of armed forces and requiring that every prisoner of war be sent home if he wished to go—and then shamelessly violated both these provisions, introducing reinforcements into North Korea and denying to hundreds of United Nations prisoners of war, citizens not only of the United States but of several other countries as well, the right to return home? The answer is plain: Communist China.

Sixth, who in 1954 selected 11 American airmen from among these illegally detained prisoners, put them through a mock trial and conviction, and sentenced them to jail terms ranging from 4 to 10 years, all on fabricated charges of espionage? Again, Communist China.

Seventh, who in all this propaganda, and not alone in the infamous germ warfare campaign, has sought to instill a frenzied hatred of America into the minds of the Chinese people, our traditional friends? Who developed as a basic propaganda the three slogans that begin: "We Must Hate America; We Must Despise America; We Must Look Down Upon America"? Who has fomented all this primitive hatred, which is the spiritual father of aggression and war? The answer is the same: Communist China.

And in the face of all these overt acts of aggression and violence, those who support Red China in this body are now asking us to condemn as "aggression" the adoption of a posture of resistance to their imperial ambitions. To bow to this demand would be to adopt the principle that self-defense against Communist attack is an international crime.

The United States continues to act in the belief that international peace and security can be attained, even against great obstacles, by patience and firmness in the right. But it cannot be attained by bowing to the will of a convicted aggressor.

Mr. Chairman, I fervently hope that the Committee will promptly dispose of the unsubstantiated charges made in this Committee by voting down decisively the resolution tabled by the Soviet Union.⁵

⁵ The draft resolution (U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.23) was rejected by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Dec. 10 by a vote of 5-39-7 and by the plenary on Dec. 17 by a vote of 5-44-8.

U. N. Human Rights Day, 1954

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS December 10, 1954, marks the sixth anniversary of the proclaiming of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a common standard of achievement for all nations and all peoples, and is observed by the member states of the United Nations as Human Rights Day; and

WHEREAS December 15, 1954, marks the one hundred and sixty-third anniversary of the adoption of our Bill of Rights as the first ten Amendments of the Constitution of the United States; and

WHEREAS these same rights are secured to us in the Constitutions and basic laws of our States and Territories; and

WHEREAS an attachment to the noble principles of individual liberty and equal opportunity for all, as enunciated in these great documents, is the foundation of our democracy and a safeguard against dictatorship and tyranny:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby call upon the citizens of the United States to join with peoples throughout the world in observing December 10, 1954, as United Nations Human Rights Day, and on this day and on December 15, the anniversary of our Bill of Rights, as well as throughout the year, to give profound thanks to Almighty God for the rights the people of our Nation have so long enjoyed—freedom of speech and of the press; freedom to worship in accord with the dictates of conscience; fair trial and freedom from arbitrary arrest; the right to own property and to profit by the fruits of our labors. For these rights and freedoms men and women in many countries have striven and died, as our forefathers strove and died, and as today still others strive and die in defense of human dignity against the claims of totalitarian governments. Let us as free men stand firm in our faith in liberty for all nations and all peoples. Let us by example and cooperation strengthen the world-wide recognition of human rights as the basis for a lasting and prosperous peace.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this third day of December in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-ninth.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3079; 19 Fed. Reg. 8089.

Opening of Washington Studios of Voice of America

REMARKS BY THEODORE STREIBERT¹

We are happy to welcome you here this afternoon at the formal opening of the Washington headquarters of the Voice of America. From these new studios we broadcast round the clock 7 days a week and reach practically every corner of the world with 75 programs each week in 38 different languages. This is a fitting occasion on which to reaffirm the principles which have guided the operations of the Voice since the establishment of the Information Agency on August 1 a year ago and to rededicate ourselves to the purposes the Voice is attempting to accomplish in the interest of the United States.

The Voice and the other elements of the Information Agency play an important supporting role in American foreign policy. It is our job to communicate U.S. policies and actions to peoples overseas. The President and the National Security Council have made this our basic mission—to communicate and interpret U.S. policies, to keep U.S. aims clear in the minds of people throughout the world, and counteract Communist distortions and misrepresentations.

Obviously we could not carry out this mission without the closest possible relationship within and guidance from the Department of State.

From the first day of our existence as a separate agency we have had the best help and sympathy and cooperation from Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary Carl McCardle and the members of his Public Affairs staff, and from the other officers of the Department. On behalf of the staff, I wish to express how much we appreciate this friendly day-to-day working relationship.

Our program structure here at the Voice consists primarily of news. It is hard, factual news, avoiding any propagandistic overtones and intended to give credible, reliable accounts of news events. We aim to build up a reputation among listeners for credibility and reliability.

In addition to straight news, the content consists of news commentaries, political commentaries, special events, roundups of editorial com-

¹ Made at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Building, Washington, D. C., on Dec. 1. Mr. Streibert is the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

ment from the U.S. press, and religious programs. For some areas of the world we include specialized material of interest to those particular areas.

These programs go out over a network of 30 shortwave transmitters in the United States and 45 additional transmitters, both shortwave and mediumwave, located at strategic positions throughout the world.

One of the principal objectives of the Voice is to bring the truth about the policies of the United States to the peoples of the Soviet orbit by penetrating through the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. The peoples of the Soviet itself have very little means of knowing what is going on in the world except what their Government wishes them to know. We can constantly bring them the truth, both by revealing it when it is withheld by their own authorities and by setting the record straight when distorted versions are imposed on them. Gradually there may develop a skepticism, or deposit of doubt, about the intentions of the Kremlin rulers and their policies.

To the enslaved peoples of the satellites, our news and commentaries from the outside world can also continue to bring evidence of our interest in their freedom and hope for their ultimate liberation.

For these purposes—reaching behind the Curtains—the Voice is devoting three-quarters of its total programs and two-thirds of its budget, about \$10 million of the total \$16 million budget. There are 6½ hours daily of these programs designed to penetrate the Curtains, and many are repeated at different times and on different frequencies to provide added reception.

The Communists have become increasingly bitter about the Voice. In 1953 the press of the U. S. S. R. and Communist China attacked us more than 500 times. From these sources every knock is a boost, as we see it. And, of course, they go to great expense and effort in jamming to prevent their people from listening to Voice broadcasts. But we know our signals *do* get through.

The second function of the Voice is to serve the countries of the free world in their languages with news and interpretation of U.S. policies.

Third, the Voice brings news in English every day to the far quarters of the globe—so that U.S. citizens and all English-speaking people can keep in touch with us.

The wisdom of Congress in directing that the Voice of America be moved from New York to Washington is already becoming apparent in practice. All of the major activities of the Agency are now located here. Organizationally, we are now much more closely knit. Also, the Voice operators are closer to their source of daily foreign policy guidance—the State Department.

Another benefit is the considerable psychological value of being able to open our programs with the words "This is Washington." By originating its programs here, in the shadow of the Capitol dome, the Voice takes on added authority and strength.

The new location will also make it easier for members of Congress to speak over the Voice, which we are very anxious to have them do as often as possible, because it is effective program material—particularly when they speak in the language of the listening audience. No less than 158 members of Congress have contributed their time and persuasiveness to Voice of America broadcasts over the past 2 years.

As I have said, a very large portion of our output is concerned with making known to the peoples of other countries the foreign policy of the United States.

It is my privilege now to introduce to you the chief of the senior department of our Government—the man who bears the heavy responsibility of determining our foreign policies and actions. Even prior to his coming to this high office he spent many months assisting in developing and carrying forward our foreign policy. Ten years ago this summer he came to Washington and worked as a good partner in the creation of a nonpartisan policy toward the United Nations, which was then just coming into being.

Beginning nearly 2 years ago he has demonstrated that he is one of the most dynamic Secretaries of State in our history. The record of his foreign travels, as he worked mightily and courageously to unite our allies and turn back the tide of Communist expansion, puts to shame the combined achievements of Odysseus, Magellan, and Marco Polo. Again and again President Eisenhower has expressed his profound gratitude toward him and his great confidence in his work.

I introduce to you a fine gentleman who has on many occasions confirmed his interest in the work

of the U.S. Information Agency, including the Voice of America—the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 682 dated December 1

It is a pleasure to be here at the opening of the Washington studios of the Voice of America. The handsome invitation said “formal opening.” But I do not feel that the accent is on formality as old friends gather here in a common cause.

The cause is to tell others the truth about America—our United States of America. The USIA does this through many ways, of which the Voice is the best known, the most direct, and the most intimate.

Much of what others want to know relates to policies made in Washington. So, it is fitting that the studios of the Voice should be relocated in the Nation’s Capital. I am bound to say, however, that I hope that this will not mean that Washington news will monopolize the Voice. Our country speaks with many voices, and sometimes it seems to me that the most authentic voices are to be found outside of our political Capital. Perhaps the term “Voices of America” would better define what it is we seek to project, which is the truth about this great and many-sided Nation of ours.

And yet there are times when our Nation speaks as one voice. That is when, as now, the basic values of our civilization are challenged. At these times we speak as one in our determination to resist and overcome the challenge. There are naturally and properly differences as to how best to proceed. But on basic matters there is impressive unity.

It is symbolic of that unity that I, who am the head of one of the departments of Government, speak here at this meeting of another independent agency. It shows that the Department of State and the USIA are one in purpose.

At the time when this Agency was created, President Eisenhower said:

It is not enough for us to have sound policies dedicated to goals of universal peace, freedom, and progress. These policies must be made known to and understood by all peoples throughout the world. That is the responsibility of the new United States Information Agency.

It is the Department of State which, under the

President, makes our foreign policies. It is you who help to make them known to and understood by all peoples throughout the world. In this joint task we cooperate and your Director, Mr. Streibert, and I meet frequently, and appropriate members of his staff meet with members of the State Department, so as to assure close and harmonious working relations.

You of the USIA are dedicated to spreading the truth, not fiction. In particular you want to get that truth to those in captivity behind the Iron Curtain. There the people are fed an incessant diet of falsehoods. Only through such agencies as yours does the truth penetrate. It is of vital importance that this should happen. Otherwise, there would be brainwashing on a vast national scale. A third of the world’s population—800 million people—live in a nightmare world which has no counterpart in the world of reality.

You deal with fact—the great story of our Nation. It is your high mission to tell that story day after day as it unfolds so that all may find in it hope and take from it courage.

Possibility of Holding Big Four Conference

Press release 704

At his news conference on December 7, Secretary Dulles was asked for comment on press reports of French initiative in sounding out the U. S. S. R. about the possibility of a Four Power Conference in May. The Secretary made the following reply:

Those reports imply a purpose on the part of the French Government which goes beyond anything of which we have been informed. There has been, as you all know, a pretty general expression which has been shared by the representatives of the three Western Powers of Great Britain, France, and the United States and also, indeed, by the Federal Republic of Germany through Chancellor Adenauer when he was here, to the effect that once the plans for the consolidation of the defenses of Western Europe are completed, so that a conference would not degenerate into a maneuver to prevent that, then we would hope for an opportunity to have talks which might really be con-

structive and deal seriously with some of the grave issues: the issue of the Austrian Treaty, which indeed could be dealt with without a conference by a mere act of signing; the question of the unification of Germany. There is also the point which I alluded to in my Chicago speech,¹ which I believe was quoted by Mr. Mendès-France in a recent statement of his, to the effect that we would be glad to encourage by talks, if that would help, a limitation upon the armament of the Eastern Soviet bloc comparable to the limitations which will be imposed as a self-denying ordinance upon the members of the Western European group.

Asked whether there are any arrangements by which the three Western Powers will consult or coordinate in advance steps they may be taking individually through diplomatic channels with the Soviets in the coming months, Mr. Dulles replied:

As I said, there was a pretty general consensus which has been expressed by the President and myself for the United States and by the responsible heads of the Governments of France and the United Kingdom and also of Germany with respect to the possibility of having a useful consultation sometime next spring when, presumably, the London-Paris accords will have been ratified so that that step will not any longer be a matter for debate and discussion. Now we have not gotten down to the point of thinking concretely as to when such a meeting might be held, although I think Mr. Mendès-France mentioned the possibility of May being a date when presumably the ratifications would have been behind us. But there has been no concerted action by the three Western Powers to fix a date or agenda or anything of that sort as yet.

Return of Ambassador Bohlen to Moscow

Press release 702

At his news conference on December 7, Secretary Dulles was asked whether he had concluded his talks with Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen and whether Mr. Bohlen expected to return shortly to Moscow. Mr. Dulles made the following reply:

Yes, we have concluded our talks and he is

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1954, p. S90.

going back in the normal course. He is leaving tomorrow.

Asked whether Mr. Bohlen's return would promote an exploration of the idea of normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Mr. Dulles replied:

There has been an iron curtain almost, you might say, within Moscow between the representatives of the Western countries, in particular, and the high officials of the Soviet Government. The talk which Mr. Bohlen had with the Soviet Prime Minister at the reception shortly before he left Moscow was a step in the way of doing away with that complete barrier, and it would, I think, be helpful and desirable if there could be opportunities for informal talks between the representatives of the foreign diplomats and the high officials of the Soviet Union. That is the kind of thing which comes about only gradually, naturally. The talks are informal, the kind which often take place in Washington with foreign diplomats, and I think we would all welcome it if that atmosphere could be brought into the Moscow situation.

Asked whether Soviet officials had given any indications of reducing tensions or dropping some of the police surveillance of diplomats in Moscow, Mr. Dulles replied:

There has been nothing of a formal nature at all that I am aware of in that respect.

Asked whether Mr. Bohlen had been instructed to make any specific proposals about reducing tensions when he returns, the Secretary replied:

No, other than that Mr. Bohlen is aware of our general sentiments, as I have just now expressed them, and certainly he would feel authorized to encourage any development along that line.

Economic Assistance to Underdeveloped Areas

Press release 701

At his news conference on December 7, Secretary Dulles was asked a series of questions relating to the possibility of U.S. economic assistance to underdeveloped areas. He first was asked whether he would discuss with the Prime Minister of Ceylon an Asian aid program. The Secretary replied:

I have no intention of doing so, but if he brings it up I will, of course, tell him the state of our thinking on that subject. You will recall that in my Chicago speech of last week¹ I did not refer to an Asian aid program. I did refer to the fact that it is normal in a free society that highly developed countries should assist in the capital development of the underdeveloped countries. I didn't specify underdeveloped countries in any particular part of the world. There are such underdeveloped countries not only in Asia but in the Near East and in South America, and that broad problem is under active consideration by the United States Government.

Asked how advanced this consideration is and how close it is to a policy decision, Mr. Dulles replied:

It is advanced, I would say, to the point where the principle is accepted—the general principle which I laid down in my speech in Chicago a week ago Monday, a speech which the President indicated he had read and approved. So I would say that that is clear policy of the administration.

Now the question of how to implement that policy is a very complicated one. It involves many agencies of our Government. It involves the question of how best to stimulate that development through private capital, which is the normal way by which it is done. It involves the proper role of government aid versus private aid. It involves the question of the creation of the investment climate in the recipient country.

All of these problems are extremely difficult problems. I think it is generally known that Mr. [Joseph M.] Dodge is making a study with a view to making recommendations as to how we shall organize ourselves in the administration to deal with that type of problem. As I say, it involves many different agencies of the Government, and the first important thing is to be able to coordinate our own thinking and planning in this field. That is being studied by Mr. Dodge, who will shortly make a report. Until that is worked out, we do not have any concrete plans except those that are already reflected in the MSA legislation and in the policies and actions of the Export-Import Bank.

Asked whether the principle which has been accepted also involves a shift of emphasis from mili-

tary to economic development, the Secretary replied:

I would not say that it is a shift of emphasis from the military because I believe that until there is some effective method of controlling and limiting armaments, or until there is greater confidence in the world, it is necessary to keep a very high emphasis upon the military. It does, I think, reflect recognition of the fact that the present phase of the struggle between the world of Communist despotism and the free nations is shifted to some extent, for the time being perhaps, more to economic competition, and that there is less fear than there was, I'm glad to say, of open military activities. So perhaps we need to give more thought to this phase of the problem than has been the case during recent years when primary emphasis was placed upon the military.

Asked whether Mr. Dodge will make specific recommendations as to the size and scope of the policy, or whether he will merely study it and organize the mechanics of formulating such a foreign economic policy, Secretary Dulles replied:

I think that the latter is the more likely scope of his report. In other words, I think that he will deal primarily with the question of how to get organized, so that we will be able to come up quickly with agreed policies which will take into account the legitimate views of all of the government agencies involved.

Asked whether it is the expectation of the administration to submit a program to the next Congress for economic development in Asia along the lines indicated in the Secretary's Chicago speech, Secretary Dulles replied:

I would think it likely, yes.

Asked whether he thought there is any relation between this cautious attitude now on aid to Asia and the resignation of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida of Japan, the Secretary replied:

No, I do not think that there is any relationship there.

Asked whether our European allies are helping with this development of underprivileged areas in Asia, Secretary Dulles replied:

There is a very considerable amount of activity on the part of the better developed and industrial-

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1954, p. 890.

ized European nations to bring about capital developments in a number of the underdeveloped areas. Now that's being done to a very considerable extent through private activity, but oftentimes with government guaranties of credit and the like, which is a perfectly legitimate and effective way of doing this business. The Germans, I would say, are perhaps doing more today in activities designed to promote development in underdeveloped areas than any other European country. They are doing it, obviously, because they think it is good business to do it, but that in itself is no reason for not doing it.

Asked whether the German contribution is higher than Great Britain's under the Colombo Plan, the Secretary replied:

I am talking in general here about the underdeveloped countries. I think it is a mistake if you try to divide it up in terms of particular areas. In the main, there is a very considerable amount of activity going on for the development of underdeveloped countries, and much of that is being done privately, although to some extent with the help of government guaranties. I can't give you the precise figures because when it is done privately the figures are not as easy to get as when they are done by governmental grants.

One of the greatest mistakes that we make is to assume that nothing is done unless the government does it. I have repeatedly said that that is one of our greatest errors—when we go for statistics and figures we only go to governmental figures. We believe in free enterprise, free economy, and that the greater part of this task should normally be done by private people who do it because they think it is the advantageous thing to do. It is mutually advantageous because, as I said in my speech at Chicago, provident loans are usually repaid, and repaid with interest, so it is a good thing to do.

This country was largely developed by capital in Europe, private capital, and preferably it should be done by private capital. The business of government is primarily to help create an investment climate such that private capital does the job. Therefore, I don't like to think of this

task in terms only of its solution by governmental activities.

Asked whether he was suggesting that the magnitude of the problem in Asia can be dealt with by private capital rather than by a considerable government program, Secretary Dulles replied:

No. I believe that there will have to be in some Asian countries perhaps more of a governmental assist than in some other countries because the political hazards in some of these countries are greater than in other parts of the world. On the other hand there is a considerable opportunity for private capital to function in India, for example, and it is already doing so to some extent. Private capital is functioning in Ceylon. To some extent, there is a field which can be developed by private capital in the Far East.

There are some countries where the political risks are so great that you can hardly expect private capital to take the risk, and the political risk is perhaps greater in parts of Asia than it is in some others. Therefore, I think there may have to be a larger measure of governmental assistance there than would be the case if the political risks were less.

Asked the extent to which Latin American countries figure in the administration's thinking on economic aid programs to underdeveloped areas, Mr. Dulles replied:

They are very much in our minds. Of course, that matter was very fully and fairly discussed, I think, at the Rio Conference, which has just ended, and statements were made there as to the prospective activities of the Export-Import Bank. That is an area where, while a certain amount of governmental aid to financing is doubtless necessary for the time being, there is also a considerable scope for private capital going in. Some of the countries, such as Venezuela, just to pick one as an example, have been very largely developed by private capital going in. Somewhere between \$1 billion and \$2 billion has recently gone into Venezuela from private sources, and the end is not yet in sight. So that illustrates the very considerable possibilities of development through private capital. But they will have to be both.

U.S. Grants Additional Economic Assistance to Berlin

The Foreign Operations Administration mission at Bonn, Germany, announced on November 24 that the U.S. Government will make an additional grant of economic assistance for Berlin in the amount of \$23,695,000.

The purpose of this U.S. assistance is to contribute to the continuation of Berlin's economic growth and the development of the general welfare of the Berlin population and, in particular, to augment the availability of long-term capital for risk investment designed to expand Berlin's industrial capacity and create additional permanent working places. This assistance supplements funds already made available for the above purposes, including current investment, reconstruction, and refugee housing programs.

Discussions are at present being conducted between representatives of the U.S. High Commissioner, Dr. James B. Conant, and the Federal Government in regard to the programing of the economic assistance.

Food Shipments to Flood Victims of Central and Eastern Europe

White House press release dated December 3

The President is pleased to learn that the SS. *Mormacport*, carrying flood relief cargo to the people of the Soviet Zone of Germany and Czechoslovakia, is due to arrive today at the East German port of Wismar. She is the first of a number of ships carrying relief aid to the flood victims of Central and Eastern Europe under the program the President announced last July 29.¹ That program was an expression of the American people to help others meet the aftermath of disaster no matter where they may live.

Because no American ship has called at ports

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 9, 1954, p. 197.

The cargo of the SS. *Mormacport* included 1,714 tons of barley for East German consumption and 2,000 tons of corn for Czechoslovakian relief. On December 9 the White House announced that on December 11 the SS. *Mormacsurf* would arrive at Wismar with a cargo of 2,000 tons of corn for East Germany and 1,000 tons of corn for Czechoslovakia and on the same date the SS. *Mormacmoon* would reach the port of Stettin, Poland, with 4,000 tons of corn for Czechoslovakia.

behind the Iron Curtain in recent years and because of the necessity of assuring that this relief will be appropriately administered under Red Cross principles, these shipments have been delayed beyond the immediate emergency period. The grains will arrive there just in time for the winter season and, the President trusts, will alleviate the hardships caused by this summer's floods.

The President knows that this relief will be received in the spirit in which it is given: a gift from the American people to help relieve the famine and needs caused by floods and nature's forces. The best wishes of the American people go with every parcel to the people of the Soviet Zone of Germany and Czechoslovakia, now held in cruel bondage.

Work of Foreign Bondholders Protective Council

Press release 705 dated December 7

Secretary Dulles and Ralph Demmler, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, met on December 7 with representatives of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council to review the work of the Council and its relations with the Government. Harvey H. Bundy, President of the Council, and James Grafton Rogers, formerly President of the Council and now Chairman of its Executive Committee, were the principal spokesmen for the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council. They pointed out that the Council has been active since the war in negotiating adjustments on the dollar bonds of a number of countries, including Italy, Japan, Germany, Austria, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and others.

Secretary Dulles complimented the Council on the success of its efforts and noted that the elimination of default situations is an important step in reestablishing the confidence of private investors and in encouraging the international movement of private capital. The Secretary acknowledged the important public service being performed by the members of the Council and expressed his gratification that the Council expects to continue its operations.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952.¹

Adherences deposited: Argentina, September 23, 1954; Pakistan, November 10, 1954.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands (applicable to the Kingdom in Europe, Surinam, and Netherlands New Guinea), October 29, 1954.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention and three related protocols. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952.²

Ratified by the President: November 5, 1954.

Ratification deposited: United States, December 6, 1954.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.¹

Ratification deposited: Ukrainian S. S. R., November 15, 1954.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953.¹

Acceptance deposited: Monaco, November 12, 1954.

Whaling

Amendments to paragraphs 6, 7(a), 7(b), 9(b), and 10(d) of the schedule to the international whaling convention signed at Washington December 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at the Sixth Meeting of the International Whaling Commission at Tokyo July 19-23, 1954.

Operative: November 8, 1954.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement concerning a special program of facilities assistance pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2010), with agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels November 23, 1954. Entered into force November 23, 1954.

Italy

Agreement for a technical cooperation program for the trust territory of Somaliland under Italian administration. Signed at Rome June 28, 1954. Entered into force June 28, 1954.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Japan

Agreement relating to the transfer of military equipment and supplies to Japan. Effected by exchange of three notes at Tokyo November 19, 1954. Entered into force November 19, 1954.

Korea

Mutual Defense Treaty. Signed at Washington October 1, 1953. Entered into force November 17, 1954.

Proclaimed by the President: December 1, 1954.

Norway

Agreement amending the agreement of May 25, 1949 (TIAS 2000) relating to the use of funds resulting from the sale of U. S. surplus property in Norway and made available under the provisions of the Fulbright Act. Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo August 12 and October 30, 1954. Entered into force October 30, 1954.

Peru

Agreement relating to duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges for relief supplies and packages for Peru. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima October 21 and 25, 1954. Entered into force October 29, 1954 (date of receipt by the United States of Peruvian note of October 25, 1954).

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to cooperative technical assistance activities in British Guiana pursuant to article 11, paragraph 1 (b) of the agreement for technical cooperation of July 13, 1951 (TIAS 2281). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 29 and July 12, 1954. Entered into force July 12, 1954.

THE DEPARTMENT

Designations

Julius C. Holmes as senior European political adviser to the U.S. delegation to the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, effective November 30 (press release 692 dated December 2).

Bernard G. Bechhoefer as Special Assistant to the U. S. Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations, effective December 1.

Tyler Thompson as Deputy Administrator for the Refugee Relief Program, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs, effective December 1.

Edward J. Sparks as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, effective December 5 (press release 697 dated December 6).

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Press releases issued prior to December 5 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 682 of December 1 and 692 of December 2.

No.	Date	Subject
†696	12/5	Hoover: return from Rio de Janeiro.
697	12/6	Sparks: appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary (rewrite).
†698	12/6	Phillips: appointed to Committee on Refugees.
699	12/7	Rumania credentials (rewrite).
†700	12/7	Note on Polish ships.
701	12/7	Dulles: aid to underdeveloped areas.
702	12/7	Dulles: return of Ambassador Bohlen.
*703	12/7	Dulles: visitors from Ceylon and Iran.
704	12/7	Dulles: possibility of Big Four Conference.
705	12/7	Foreign Bondholders Council.
†706	12/7	Agreement on Iranian oil.
*707	12/8	Educational exchange.
*708	12/8	Program for Shah's visit.
†709	12/8	Dulles: anniversary of "Atoms for Peace."
710	12/9	Greece credentials (rewrite).
*711	12/9	Graduates of FSI course.
†712	12/10	Foreign Relations volume.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 809

December 27, 1954



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The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXI, No. 809 • PUBLICATION 5703

December 27, 1954

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Anniversary of "Atoms for Peace" Proposal

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 709 dated December 8

A year ago today the President of the United States made his momentous "Atoms for Peace" proposal for international cooperation. I think there is much reason for sober satisfaction if we survey today the progress which has been made toward fulfilling the promise of this unprecedented proposal.

In the United Nations, the General Assembly on December 4, 1954, unanimously endorsed the efforts which have been made to implement the President's proposal, while expressing the hope that an International Atomic Energy Agency, as urged by the President, "be established without delay."¹

Even the Soviet Union joined in this vote although expressing certain qualifications in its support for the present plan and without proffering any material support for the Agency at this time. The acceptance by the United Nations of the President's "Atoms for Peace" plan constitutes the most hopeful development in this field since the inception of the atomic age.

During the past year steady progress has been made in pursuit of the goal proposed by the President December 8, 1953.

We have conducted negotiations with the Soviet Union looking to its contribution of fissionable material to an international agency to be created and used to bring the peaceful benefits of atomic energy to the whole world.

I conferred several times with Foreign Minister Molotov on this matter at Berlin and Geneva, and several notes were exchanged.² Despite initial lack of interest by the Soviet Union in the United States proposal, our perseverance in this negotia-

tion finally has resulted in an apparent change in the Soviet position.

Late in September the U. S. S. R. indicated a willingness to resume the discussions. Since then further notes have been exchanged on a confidential basis.

We do not relinquish the hope expressed by the President December 8, 1953, that the United States and the U.S.S.R. can in this way "open up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress toward peace."

However, as I said in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1954,

The United States remains ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union. But we shall no longer suspend our efforts to establish an international atomic agency.

The United States is determined that President Eisenhower's proposal shall not languish until it dies. It will be nurtured and developed. We shall press on in close partnership with those nations which, inspired by the ideals of the United Nations Charter, can make this great new force a tool of the humanitarian and of the statesman, and not merely a fearsome addition to the arsenal of war.

The United States has in the meantime gone ahead with concrete steps proving our intense interest in developing the peacetime aspects of atomic energy and making these benefits available to the world.

For example, at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, on Labor Day ground was broken for the world's first commercial-size atomic power plant. In a nationwide broadcast on this occasion the President proclaimed this nation's willingness to share atomic technology for similar purposes with other countries of good will.³

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1954, p. 919.

² For texts of notes, see *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 478.

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 396.

Following upon the initiative of the United States, the United Nations is sponsoring a conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This will be held next year and should develop clearly the current state of peaceful atomic energy technology.

The President has authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to allocate 100 kilograms of enriched uranium of nonweapons grade for use in research reactors which foreign countries may construct. The British have also generously announced their intention to allocate 20 kilograms of such material. Such reactors would greatly augment the world's peaceful research capabilities. The allocation of this material probably constitutes the single most important step which the United States has taken to implement its firm support for international cooperation to develop quickly the peacetime benefits of atomic energy.

An essential part of this program for international cooperation is the authorization given by the 83d Congress in amending the Atomic Energy Act to permit the United States to provide information and fissionable material, under appropriate safeguards, to other countries for nonmilitary uses.

This assistance in the construction of research reactors is but one of the interim programs which the United States is undertaking during the period while the Agency is being formed.

In order that nationals of other countries may develop nuclear skills, the Atomic Energy Commission is setting up a reactor training school which will be open to qualified engineers and scientists. The Department of State will shortly transmit to our diplomatic missions abroad instructions as to applications for such training.

A special course in radioisotope techniques for scientists from overseas will be offered next May at the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies.

In addition, training programs and courses in the utilization of atomic energy in biology, medicine, and agriculture will be offered next year at various institutions throughout the United States to qualified foreign students. Through technical cooperation programs, special arrangements are being made to supply this type of assistance to individuals from underdeveloped areas.

Collections of all unclassified and declassified information on atomic energy which has been published by the United States Government are being made available to other countries.

I might add that not only the Government but American private and philanthropic groups are interested in furthering international development of the atom for peace.

One example of such cooperation is given by the group of citizens who set up the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship Program a year ago. I understand that, in the allocation of its resources in the coming year, this program will begin to coordinate with some of the foregoing activities.

It is particularly gratifying to see how the President's proposal has called forth many offers of materials and other support from other nations. We value, as well, the backing pledged by many nations in their statements wishing us well in this venture which may in due course increase production and bring increasing well-being to the underdeveloped areas of the world. This is in keeping with the great American tradition of finding new ways whereby a free society can enrich human life materially, intellectually, and spiritually and can share those fruits of liberty with men everywhere.

This, then, is an accounting of our efforts during the past year to implement President Eisenhower's historic "Atoms for Peace" proposal. We will continue to strive "to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote [our] entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

**REMARKS BY LEWIS L. STRAUSS
CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION¹**

On an occasion such as this, it would be appropriate under ordinary circumstances to begin with a quip or anecdote, but I am ill suited for it today. It is a sad week for me—for all of us in the Atomic Energy Commission. At this very hour in the Rockefeller Chapel of the University of Chicago, I understand that memorial services for one of the great men of our age are being solemnized. In the early hours of Sunday morning [November 28] the telephone beside my bed in Virginia rang to bring me the tragic news of the death of Enrico Fermi.

This great man, who had lived in your midst with the utmost modesty for the past 15 years, was

¹ Made before the Executives' Club of Chicago, Ill., on Dec. 3 (Atomic Energy Commission press release).

the true architect of the Atomic Age. We shall no longer be able to show him any recognition for the fact that he had been in the forefront of the march of human knowledge for more than 30 years, or for the fact that his contributions to theoretical and experimental physics enabled free men to hold Communist tyranny at bay for the last 9 of those years.

Just a dozen years ago yesterday a pile of graphite blocks and uranium billets which he had put together under the stands at Stagg Field became the first atomic reactor. Today there are more than two score of them, of one design or another, in our country. One, installed in the submarine *Nautilus*, will soon be driving her through the deep at hitherto undreamed-of standards of performance. Another, now building at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, will be delivering at least 60,000 kilowatts of electrical energy to light the homes and turn the wheels in that industrial area. These are only prototypes of many, many more to come.

I had the great good fortune to know Fermi for 16 years. In the late thirties he helped me in an attempt to make radioisotopes cheaply so that they would be available for cancer therapy to replace scarce, expensive radium. Thanks to the discoveries which he made, such isotopes are now not only very cheap but plentiful, and medical researchers have them in abundance and great variety to aid their attack on cancer and other dread diseases. It is tragic to think that, had Enrico Fermi been spared but a few more years, his life might have been saved by medical advances stemming directly from his own great achievements.

I had the sad privilege on yesterday of delivering to his widow the award voted to him some days ago as a tribute from his grateful fellow citizens represented by the Atomic Energy Commission with the approval of President Eisenhower. In future years these awards will be known as the "Fermi Prize." Besides perpetuating his name, which of course needs no action of government as a memorial, it is our hope that they may stimulate and encourage others to go forward into the unknown reaches of knowledge, to explore, to chart, to call up their followers, to instruct them, and then to press ahead again. Like the Italian navigator to whom he was compared 12 years ago,⁵ Fermi, as did Columbus, found a new continent—

more than continent, a new world. Those of us he leaves upon its beachheads cannot do otherwise in the presence of his example but penetrate the interior and develop the riches he opened up for the good of all men everywhere.

Time for Inventory

This being the last month of the year, it is an appropriate time for stocktaking and inventory. We might profitably pause long enough for a trial balance of the ledger on the 12 years of experience since Fermi's first atomic pile made the instruments chatter as they recorded the generations of neutrons born of the first chain reaction.

In the 12 years, we have on one side of the ledger appropriations of public funds in the neighborhood of 14 billion dollars for the whole atomic energy project in war and peace. To balance this we have vast plants, great discoveries, and vital stockpiles of weapons and fissionable material. These weapons have indeed been the first and paramount concern of the Atomic Energy Commission, and many people think that the production of bombs is all that there is to show for the gigantic expenditure of treasure and effort. A good case could be made for the fact that this would be well enough were it indeed the whole story, but it is not. I would like to give you a quick preview of some of the other items on the credit side of the ledger. They are growing so rapidly in number that the ink is scarcely dry in recording one before another is ready for entry. From among those I shall list, we will arbitrarily omit specific reference to medical progress—itself worth perhaps all that has been spent—in order to concentrate on fields that might conceivably be of specific interest in this great capital of agriculture and industry.

Much has been said and written about electrical energy from the atom, but a strong economy depends on many factors other than plentiful power. For example, a recent publication of the Department of Agriculture states that crop production losses, due to all causes, average "about \$13 billion worth of goods per year, nearly one-third of the potential production. Some 120 million fewer acres of cropland . . . would have produced the 1942 to 1951 volume of food, feed, and fiber production if all these causes of loss had been eliminated."

We all know of the splendid job that the Department of Agriculture has done and is doing

⁵ For an account of Mr. Fermi's role in the 1942 experiment, see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1954, p. 607.

through education and research to reduce these losses. One of the causes of agricultural loss most difficult to combat is disease—plant disease. One of the methods which shows great possibilities in this line is the production of mutants of crops which are resistant to disease. These mutants can be produced by radiation.

Experiments with radiation designed to produce such beneficial mutations in plants have been carried on successfully in the laboratories of the Commission at Brookhaven, Long Island, and elsewhere. There has been notable success in the development of a strain of oats which is resistant to the disease known as rust. Rust-resistant oats, if they can be perfected for more species, will be a potential saving for the American economy in excess of \$50 million per annum. For the purposes of our imaginary balance sheet, we might capitalize this at 3 percent and set up a sound asset of \$1½ billion.

Other researchers are working on other cereal and leguminous crops. Some who are familiar with what is going on foresee our entire investment in atomic energy returned many times over in its effect on agriculture alone. As instances, we might note two of many—I am told that our tomato crops suffer a great annual loss in yield due to the disease known as wilt. It has been found that by using a proper localized dosage of irradiation at least one generation of wilt-resistant tomato seedlings can be produced. And here in Chicago, the meat-packing center of the world, some of you, I am sure, already know that pre-packaged meat products, if exposed to mild gamma-ray pasteurization, can remain in the grocer's stock for nearly 21 days instead of 3. Studies show that a complete facility for this purpose could be built for considerably less than three-quarters of a million dollars. If financed with 6 percent money, a charge of a small fraction of a cent per pound of the irradiated product would suffice to amortize it in 5 years.

The item next on the credit side is a very large one. This is the "Atoms for Peace" plan of President Eisenhower, the proposal which he made to the General Assembly of the United Nations just a year ago next week. Ever since we first suggested atomic energy cooperation for the mutual benefit of nations as an alternative to war, and ever since we offered to give some of our technical know-how and to make available some of our material atomic wealth to other countries, the Com-

munist world has belittled and distorted our suggestions and our proposals. The Soviets charged that our proposition was not and would never be specific; and, while they filibustered the discussions concerning atomic cooperation, they denounced us by saying that we were trying to narrow the scope of our offer and that it had been insincere in the first place.

U.S. Offer of Fissionable Material

Then about 2 weeks ago we offered to earmark 100 kilograms of fissionable material for use by other countries.⁶ You may perhaps be interested to know what can be done with 100 kilograms of such material. There has been considerable speculation as to what it could do for the countries that may eventually receive it. Having heard some mistaken statements, this may be a good place to put the figures into proper perspective. In the first place, the fissionable material which we will provide will not be of weapons grade. It will be in a form particularly suitable for peaceful application.

One of the best examples of peaceful use of this 100 kilograms of fissionable material would be as fuel for research reactors. There is a particular research reactor which might be of special interest to you because it is located not very far from here, and it is in the public eye today.

I speak of the research reactor known as CP-5. We perhaps overindulge in code names. CP-5 means Chicago Pile No. 5 at the Argonne Laboratory. The distinguished director of the Laboratory, Dr. Walter H. Zinn, under whose wise and devoted supervision this reactor has been designed, constructed, and operated, is here with us today. This is a significant occasion for the CP-5 because the Commission is making the first announcement that we have removed the security restrictions as to access which have surrounded it. The CP-5 reactor has been, in the main, declassified; and pertinent information concerning its construction and operation will be available. This is another example of the efforts of the Atomic Energy Commission to make atomic energy facilities more accessible to American industry. During the past 6 months, while still under security requirements, many irradiation services have been carried on in the CP-5 for both universities and industry; but now we expect that much more use can be made of this modern research instrument.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 836.

Other countries could use allocations from the 100 kilograms of fissionable material in research reactors like the CP-5, which is fueled with aluminum-clad uranium, enriched in the isotope 235, and cooled and moderated with heavy water. This combination of materials permits the realization of a high neutron flux, which is an important feature of a research reactor. Fortunately this high flux is obtained at a modest rate of fuel consumption. Even with such economy the Argonne reactor is surpassed only by our Materials Testing Reactor in Idaho; and we believe that it exceeds, in effectiveness, any research reactor overseas.

Our people estimate that 100 kilograms of uranium 235 is sufficient to provide the critical inventory for 15 such reactors and to keep them in operation approximately 5 years and still have almost two-thirds of the fuel inventory unconsumed.

These 15 reactors would multiply many times the research reactor capabilities of the free world, excluding the United States. Each of them could produce more radioisotopes of varied types than are presently needed by Holland or Switzerland or Belgium or, for that matter, any country in the world.

One of the most important assets of this tool is its versatility. The high neutron flux created inside the octagon-shaped reactor is employed by placing objects to be irradiated into one of the more than 50 apertures which penetrate its eight sides and top. By using just one of these more than 50 access holes, a radioactive cobalt source of, say, a thousand curies could be made each year. This would be equivalent to 1,000 grams of radium, which used to sell for \$30,000 per gram. All of you must have heard of the use of radiocobalt as a gamma-ray source in combating cancer.

Irradiation of one ounce of gold, which would occupy a very small part of the available space in another of the pile apertures, would provide enough radioactive gold, when placed in colloidal suspension, to treat many scores of patients for malignancies. And even the spent fuel elements from this type reactor have valuable service to perform. They can be placed into a facility so that the gamma radiation which they emit can be used for the pasteurization and sterilization of foods. For instance, such a facility would kill the trichinae in pork and, it is believed, will preserve other food products for extended periods.

Carbon 14, a radioactive form of carbon, can

be produced in such a nuclear reactor. This isotope has proved to be extremely useful in biological research because all living organisms, plant and animal, are composed of 30 to 40 percent carbon. Plants are being grown in specially designed greenhouses in which the air is arranged to contain enriched amounts of carbon 14 in the form of carbon dioxide. All of the carbon compounds—sugar, amino acids, proteins, and fats—formed by the plants grown under such conditions are radioactive. This technique is being used in connection with a currently much-debated subject. Tobacco plants have been used to produce radioactive cigarette tobacco and tobacco compounds. These are employed as tracer tools in medical studies to further our knowledge of the effects of tobacco on the organism. I am sorry that there are as yet no final results with which to enlighten those who, like myself, enjoy smoking.

The CP-5 type reactor can also be used for radiation physics measurements; studies of the nuclear properties of matter; reactor engineering experiments to develop better materials and instruments for future reactors; and for medical therapy, both by direct use of external beams and by producing sources for such use elsewhere. Such reactors can also be training centers for the education of new operators and scientists to advance nuclear technology. We have already noted that they can be producers of radioisotopes for uses too numerous to mention.

But the most remarkable point to remember is that just one of these reactors will put a country into business in all of these fields. And lest you think that such a versatile piece of equipment as the CP-5 reactor is fabulously expensive, the total cost (exclusive of fuel and moderator) for the reactor, the reactor building, and the associated laboratories is only about \$2¼ million. It might be considerably less expensive in countries where construction costs are lower. Some types of research reactors may indeed be built for sums measured in hundreds of thousands rather than millions of dollars.

I have consumed so much of your time with this major item on the credit side of our balance sheet that we can only glance momentarily at other industrial uses. One of my colleagues a few weeks ago calculated that these uses were already saving American industry a \$100 million annually. This results from applications in thickness, quality, and wear gauging and control devices, in pipeline and

cracking plant applications, in gamma-ray radiography of castings to locate flaws, in fertilizer and insect controls, in catalytic functions. The list is long and is growing almost daily as new applications are discovered. Under the new Cole-Hick-enlooper Act, native American inventiveness will in 5 years be free to develop in the atomic energy field almost as easily as in other areas, and we can look for even more momentum to develop as that day approaches.

When the Commission began 8 years ago, atomic energy was not only a Government monopoly but a military province with no early promise of large-scale peaceful application. Eight short years have seen a phenomenal change. American industry has moved into the field with boldness and resolution and with confidence based upon the sound technology of many resourceful research organizations. I believe that the next 8 years will bring an accelerating increase in both discovery and application. We are just at the early dawn of the new age and, if we can find the means of avoiding war, we will go forward into a period of prosperity and good works such as men have never witnessed nor scarcely even imagined.

Strengthening Man's Hope for Peace on Earth

Remarks by the President¹

Christmastide is a season of hope—of heartening hope—for peace on earth, good will among men. This year, even as two thousand years ago, when the Prince of Peace was born into the world, the drums of war are stilled. In their silence, after a whole generation of almost ceaseless beating, many people—already become fathers and mothers—enjoy the first peaceful Christmas they have known. So mankind's unquenchable hope for peace burns brighter than for many years.

Our hope, true enough, is blemished by some brutal facts.

Oppression, privation, cruel suffering of body and mind imposed on helpless victims—these scourges still wound in too many places the daily living of mankind.

Even at this happy season, we dare not forget crimes against justice, denial of mercy, violation

of human dignity. To forget is to condone and to provoke new outrage.

Neither dare we forget our blessings. To count them is to gain new courage and new strength, a firmer patience under test and a stouter faith in the decency of man and in the providence of God.

Among the greatest of man's blessings this Christmas is his strengthened hope of lasting peace. But hope without works is the prelude to disillusionment. They whose cause is just must be prepared to meet the harsh challenge of inertia, privation, despair, statism, materialism. This bright Christmas must not be followed—ever—by a Christmas of universal tragedy.

We Americans know that a mighty part of promoting and serving peace is ours to do.

With our friends, we must enlarge the design of our partnership so that we who marched together in evil days when war and fear of war darkened the earth shall enjoy together in days of light the rich rewards of a secure and stable era.

There are some who have believed it possible to hold themselves aloof from today's worldwide struggle between those who uphold government based upon human freedom and dignity and those who consider man merely a pawn of the state. The times are so critical and the difference between these world systems so vital and vast that grave doubt is cast upon the validity of neutralistic argument. Yet we shall continue faithfully to demonstrate our complete respect for the right of self-decision by these neutrals. Moreover, because they hate aggression and condemn war for conquest, even as we, there is provided a strong foundation upon which we can proceed with them to build mutual understanding and sympathy.

Now, with those who stand against us, in fear or in ignorance of our intentions, we have chosen the hard way of patient, tireless search in every avenue that may lead to their better understanding of our peaceful purposes. They know, as well as we, that the world is large enough, the skills of man great enough, to feed and to clothe and to house mankind in plenty and in peace. This universal knowledge could be the fruitful beginning of a prosperous life together.

America speaks from strength—strength in good allies, in arms, in readiness, in ever-increasing productivity, in the broader sharing of the abundant fruits of our economy, in our unchanging devotion to liberty and to human justice. Her voice is for peace based upon decency and right.

¹ Made at the lighting of the National Community Christmas Tree, Washington, D. C., on Dec. 17.

But let no man think that we want peace at any price, that we shall forsake principle in resigned tolerance of evident evil, or that we may pawn our honor for transitory concession.

At this Christmas season, America speaks too in humble gratitude for the friendship of peaceful peoples across the world. Without their warm confidence and faithful partnership, this earth would be a bleak ground of aimless and endless clash and conflict.

And America joins with all believers of every faith in a prayer of thanks and a plea that, whatever lies ahead, we may be strong and courageous and wise in the doing of our own task in accord with the Divine will.

To all the dwellers of the earth, I speak for this Republic—and directly from the heart of every one of its citizens—when I say that this nation prays for you, all of you, the fullness of the Christmas spirit, peace and good will.

NATO Council Meeting

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 718 dated December 14

I am leaving for Paris to attend one of the regular semiannual meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Also present there will be the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Humphrey; the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Anderson; and the Director of Foreign Operations, Mr. Stassen.

At this meeting we, with our friends and allies, will check on the progress made and look to the future. We will do so in the light of the "long haul" concept which was adopted 20 months ago and which was designed to assure strength at a cost which we could afford to live with for the considerable time that may be necessary.

This meeting, like preceding meetings, will emphasize the defensive character of NATO. What we do at NATO need cause no alarm for any peace-loving country. We would indeed be glad if the attitude of others was such that we did not have to be steadily thinking about developing the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, until we see dependable signs of change in the aggressive and expansionist mood of the international Communists, we must not relax our efforts. We shall neither be intimidated

nor lulled into a false sense of security. We shall patiently and steadily persist in measures of collective security.

Accord Reached on U.S.-Philippine Trade Negotiations

JOINT STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 15

Press release 717 dated December 14

The United States Delegation and the Philippine Economic Mission, after less than three months of continuous negotiation, have reached agreement on a revision of the 1946 Trade Agreement to be recommended to the Congresses of their two countries.¹ Notwithstanding honest differences of opinion between the Delegations on several of the issues involved, and despite their vigorous presentation by each side, agreement was reached in a relatively short period because of the spirit of friendship and goodwill which persisted throughout the negotiations.

The agreement reached underscores the desire of both nations to put their trade relationship on a more normal and stable basis. This Agreement:

1. Yields to the Philippines control over its own currency by eliminating Article V thereof;
2. Eliminates most absolute quotas on Philippine articles entering the United States;
3. Eliminates quota allocation limitations on Philippine articles subject to quotas in the United States;
4. Makes the enjoyment of parity rights by citizens of either country in the territory of the other reciprocal;
5. Makes imposition of quantitative restrictions on the products of both countries reciprocal;
6. Gives to citizens of either country the right to engage in business activities in the territory of the other on a reciprocal basis;
7. Provides security exceptions in the mutual interest of both countries;
8. Increases tariff preferences for Philippine articles entering the United States;

¹Copies of the final act of the negotiations may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

9. Decreases tariff preferences for United States articles entering the Philippines;

10. Eliminates the prohibition against the imposition of Philippine export taxes;

11. Provides for elimination of the Philippine exchange tax and the dual rate of exchange it creates by substitution of an import levy to be progressively reduced and eliminated;

12. Permits the Philippines to ask the United States Congress for possible increases in the sugar quota when other nations are permitted to do so; and

13. Increases duty-free quotas on Philippine articles which are subject to declining duty-free quotas in the United States.

It is hoped that with these changes the Philippines will sooner succeed in attaining a better balanced economic status as a free nation. It is also hoped that these changes will further strengthen the friendly and mutually beneficial political and economic relations between the two peoples.

JOSÉ P. LAUREL, *Chairman*

Philippine Economic Mission to the United States

JAMES M. LANGLEY, *Chairman*

United States Delegation for Philippine Trade Negotiations

REMARKS BY WALTER S. ROBERTSON ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS²

Press release 719 dated December 15

Nearly 3 months ago, it was my privilege to welcome you, Senator Laurel, and the other distinguished members of the Philippine delegation and to extend to you the warm greetings of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles.³ At that time, I said that my Government was ready to give sympathetic consideration to the proposals which the Philippine Government might wish to advance and I expressed confidence that the discussions would be frank and cordial and that the outcome would represent the best interests of our two countries.

We have met today to witness the signing, by the chairmen of the Philippine and the United

States delegations, of the agreement which the delegations have reached after nearly 3 months of discussions. I heartily congratulate the chairmen and members of both delegations for the completion of their difficult and important task, the development of a plan for the revision of the Philippine Trade Act which will now be referred to the United States and Philippine Governments for further action. It will be the responsibility of the chairmen to comment about the nature of the agreement. I should like to emphasize only one aspect of the discussions but an aspect which is of great importance to both of our countries, namely the atmosphere of friendship and sympathetic understanding in which the discussions were carried on. Differences of opinion have been resolved in a spirit of mutual respect and confidence. Entirely apart from the important substantive points about which agreement has been reached, the manner in which this has been accomplished cannot fail, I believe, to make even stronger the ties of friendship which unite our countries.

It has been a great pleasure, Senator Laurel, to have you and your distinguished associates as guests in our country. As you return to your country, I bid you Godspeed. Both personally and on behalf of my Government, I assure you of a warm welcome when you visit us again—which I hope will be very soon. And to Mr. James M. Langley, the distinguished and able chairman of the American delegation, I wish to express on behalf of Secretary Dulles our deep appreciation for his tireless, selfless, and dedicated services.

U.S. Policy of Granting Asylum to Victims of Oppression

TEXT OF DECEMBER 8 NOTE TO POLAND

Press release 700 dated December 7

Following is the text of a note delivered on December 8 by the United States Embassy at Warsaw to the Polish Foreign Office regarding the Polish ships Praca and Gottwald.

The Embassy of the United States presents compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and refers to its note of November 20, 1954. The United States Government again rejects as with-

² Made at the signing of the agreement on Dec. 15.

³ BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1954, p. 542.

out basis in fact the version contained in that note of the interception of the Polish-flag vessels *Praca* and *Gottwald*. The United States had no connection with this action or with the decision of so many crew members from these ships to seek asylum.

These vessels were intercepted by the naval forces of the Republic of China. If the Polish Government is genuinely interested in pursuing this matter in a practical way rather than in dispatching a series of notes purely for propaganda purposes, it could seek a solution of this issue with the Government of the Republic of China through diplomatic channels.

The note of the Polish Government refers to the presence in the area of the Island of Formosa of aircraft of the United States Navy. These United States aircraft operate in conjunction with the Seventh Fleet of the United States Navy, which has been ordered by the President of the United States to patrol the waters around Formosa in order to prevent an attack on that island. The mission of the Seventh Fleet has been and will continue to be to contribute to the security of the Far East. The United States reaffirms its intention to devote its efforts to the maintenance of peace and stability in that area and hopes that other governments will contribute their efforts to the same end.

In discussing the decision of the officers and crew of the two vessels to seek asylum in the free world, the Polish Government's note reveals its concern that large numbers of Poles have fled from their homeland. Many of these people who have escaped from political and religious persecution in Poland, or have refused to return there, have sought asylum in the United States. The United States Government, true to its traditional policies of granting asylum to those suffering from oppression, has welcomed and will continue to welcome persons such as the Polish officers and seamen from the *Praca* and *Gottwald* who sought refuge in this country.

POLISH NOTE OF NOVEMBER 20

In its notes of October 12¹ and 26, 1953, concerning the seizure of the Polish merchant vessel *Praca* by warships on the waters of the Far East, controlled by the United States Armed Forces, and its detention together with the

entire crew on the Island of Taiwan, and in its note of May 15, 1954,² concerning a similar illegal act involving another Polish merchant ship, the *President Gottwald*, the Government of the Polish People's Republic made reference to a number of facts proving the responsibility of the United States for those acts of attack and violation of the rights of the Polish flag.

The Polish Government emphasized, in particular, that the mentioned ocean area was under the control of the United States Armed Forces and that units of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, entirely subordinate to the United States, were committing piratical assaults in that area, aimed against peaceful navigation, directed against peaceful and international communication, and intended to evoke tension in international relations.

Unable to deny these irrefutable facts, the United States Government preferred to limit itself, in its notes of October 20¹ and November 3, 1953, to a proofless refusal to accept any responsibility for the above-mentioned acts of violence. This does not by any means change the fact that the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which executed the acts of violence and which has been denounced by the entire Chinese nation, could commit these deeds only under the patronage and support of the United States.

In its above-mentioned notes the Government of the Polish People's Republic protested against the illegal acts, the victims of which were Polish seamen and Polish ships, and demanded that the United States Government undertake appropriate steps in order for the seized crews, vessels, and cargoes to be released immediately and returned to Poland.

However, despite demands on the part of the Polish Government and protests by the Polish people, families of the imprisoned seamen, and numerous international organizations, the crew of the *President Gottwald* has been kept in custody for 6 months and deprived of the possibility of returning to their fatherland and their families. Like the crew of the vessel *Praca*, the crew of the *President Gottwald* has also been subject to brutal pressure and attempts at corruption; like criminals, they are being held under guard of police equipped with automatic weapons. An atmosphere has been created which leads the sailors to acts of desperation, the suicide of one of them being a glaring confirmation of this.

The aim of all these brutal thugs is to destroy the morale of the seamen and to force from them a decision to break faith with their fatherland. The copy attached to the note—the original of which is in the hands of the Polish Government—of a statement³ by the seamen of the *Praca*, who as a result of the prolonged efforts of the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the aid of the Swedish Red Cross have returned to Poland, is convincing proof of the pressure put on the Polish seamen and the leading role in this action of the representatives of the United States, including the Ambassador of the United States to Taiwan.

Recently the seamen of the *President Gottwald*, physically and morally maltreated, turned to the International

¹ For the U. S. rejection of the May 15 allegations, see *ibid.*, May 31, 1954, p. 824.

² Not printed here.

³ BULLETIN of Nov. 9, 1953, p. 640.

Red Cross with a request for aid in obtaining freedom and in repatriation to Poland.

The behavior of the Government of the United States and its subordinates is a glaring violation of the universally obligatory principles of international law and the elementary rights of personal freedom, whose slogans the United States politicians fence with so willingly.

An additional and striking confirmation of the role of the United States authorities in the action against the Polish seamen is the latest act of recruiting, by means of moral pressure and terror, and transporting to the United States a group of Polish seamen only for the purpose of using them as compliant tools in the anti-Polish propaganda, which is not very fastidious in its methods.

Protesting categorically against these methods, which are contrary to international law, the Government of the Polish People's Republic repeats its demands for the release of the seamen held on Taiwan, the return of the *Praca*, and *President Gottwald* and their cargoes, and the punishment of those guilty of the illegal acts.

Results of Inter-American Economic Conference

Following is the text of a statement made by Under Secretary Hoover, vice chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy (November 22–December 2), on his return from Brazil, together with the final declaration approved unanimously at the closing session of the Conference.

STATEMENT BY MR. HOOVER

Press release 696 dated December 5

We have just returned from the Rio Conference of Ministers of Finance or Economy in Brazil.

The United States delegation and I believe that this Conference represents a notable milestone in the strengthening of the traditional ties of friendship and cooperation between the United States and the neighboring Republics of Latin America.

Underlying the economic and financial work of our delegation was the firm determination of the 21 countries to work together, in the words of President Eisenhower, as "good partners."

Many resolutions were passed at this Conference. Among them were decisions to study transportation, to work together to improve harbor facilities, to cooperate in lessening the barriers to maximum flow of trade and commerce, to improve the development of resources, and to expand travel

between our countries. These were practical decisions which will produce tangible, constructive benefits to all.

These decisions depended upon certain basic principles that were uppermost in all of our minds. It was recognized that, first, by working more closely together, we could strengthen the ties between our countries and, second, that private enterprise and sound economic practices would benefit all our peoples.

The one message I would like to bring from the people of Latin America is to express the spirit of friendship and cooperation which is felt toward our country. I have been in every country of Latin America and have spent much of my life working there. Never have I seen this spirit of good partnership more in evidence than at the Conference from which we have just returned.

TEXT OF FINAL DECLARATION

[Unofficial translation]

We leave this Conference with the satisfaction of having proved that the American nations here represented are in complete agreement as regards their great objectives in the economic field. These may be summarized as a determination to speed up the progress of each and every one of them within the framework of freedom and justice, through substantial intensification of our inter-American economic, financial, and technical cooperation.

Naturally, in analyzing the means for obtaining the goal which we are unanimously seeking, there were differing points of view as to the most adequate measures for reaching the common objective. We were glad to see the energy and frankness which characterized the discussions. Not one delegation failed to present carefully thought-out projects. The energy with which the representatives of the several governments upheld their respective points of view demonstrated the absolute independence of thought prevailing in this hemisphere and the interest felt by the governments in promoting the welfare of their peoples.

The discussions showed also that all the American nations are resolved to grapple with economic problems with the same fervor and resolution with which on different occasions they have attacked common political problems. Further, the American family of nations demonstrated a clear reali-

zation of the imperative necessity that the principle of economic cooperation set forth in article 26 of the Charter of the Organization of American States become a more palpable reality in order that by close fraternal cooperation, always with scrupulous respect for institutional differences, each can assure that the common effort to conquer the want now afflicting great masses of people in this hemisphere may produce maximum results.

We are convinced that the results of this economic conference justify holding others of the same kind; and, furthermore, the progress which we have here jointly achieved augurs that this meeting will be the first of a series in which at regular intervals the American Republics meet together to weigh the progress which they have achieved separately and collectively in strengthening this great agricultural, industrial, and financial structure which we are raising in the hemisphere and under whose protection we shall progress toward that life to which our natural and human resources give us the right to aspire.

We wish to express our gratitude for the technical cooperation given us during the meeting by the Technical Secretary of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Economic Commission for Latin America, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund.

We take pleasure in announcing that we have agreed to recommend to our governments that the next meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy be held at Buenos Aires in 1956.

Development Assistance Agreement Signed by U.S. and Guatemala

Press release 715 dated December 13

The Department of State announced on December 13 the signing of a Development Assistance Agreement between the United States and Guatemala. The agreement sets forth certain understandings governing the furnishing of U.S. economic assistance to Guatemala. This is in addition to the assistance provided under the technical cooperation program, which is being carried out pursuant to the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, signed in Guatemala City on September 1, 1954.

Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State

for Inter-American Affairs, signed for the United States and Lt. Col. José Luis Cruz-Salazar, the Ambassador of Guatemala, signed for Guatemala.

Under the agreement the United States will be able to furnish certain extraordinary assistance to Guatemala in accordance with specific project arrangements to be signed by the two Governments. Included among the specific projects now ready for signature by both Governments is the allocation of approximately \$3 million to assist the Guatemalan Government to complete the important Pacific Slope Highway.

The Foreign Operations Administration and the Department of State jointly announced on October 30 that \$6,425,000 was being made available to Guatemala. Of this, \$1,300,000 was to be for technical assistance, \$1,425,000 for the Inter-American Highway, \$500,000 for the Roosevelt Hospital, and \$3,200,000 for unspecified development projects.

Normal Diplomatic Relations Resumed With Honduras

Press release 720 dated December 16

The U.S. Government on December 16 reestablished diplomatic relations with Honduras. This was done by a note from the American Embassy at Tegucigalpa, which was in reply to a cable sent the Secretary of State by the Honduran Foreign Minister on December 6 stating that all public powers had been assumed on that date by Julio Lozano Diaz in the capacity of Supreme Chief of Honduras.

The note transmitted today to the Honduran Government expressed confidence in the continuance of the traditionally friendly relations which have so long existed between the peoples and governments of the United States and Honduras.

Arrangements for Participation in Iranian Oil Consortium

Press release 706 dated December 7

The Department of State announced on December 7 that the five American oil company members of the Consortium, which recently concluded an agreement with Iran for the production and sale

of Iranian oil,¹ are prepared to transfer, at cost, a portion of their participation to other American oil companies which meet certain requirements. This is in line with the understanding reached last year, when the possibilities of an agreement between Iran and the Consortium were first considered, that it would be desirable to provide an opportunity for additional American oil companies to participate in the Consortium in the event negotiations between Iran and the Consortium reached a successful conclusion. The agreements which have been executed make it possible to carry out that understanding.

The agreement between the Imperial Government of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company, on the one hand, and the Consortium of eight oil companies, on the other, became effective October 29, 1954. The Consortium members also entered into agreements among themselves, effective the same day, relating to their respective share percentages in the Consortium, including the minimum amount of crude oil and refined products each will take or pay penalties for failure to take, capital outlays, the conduct of operations, and the like. Under these agreements, five American oil companies, namely, Gulf Oil Corporation, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc., Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), Standard Oil Company of California, and the Texas Company, each acquired an 8 percent interest in the Consortium.

The agreements provide, among other things, that within 6 months from October 29, 1954, the five American members of the Consortium may each transfer up to one-eighth of its participation in the Consortium to one or more other established American oil companies (or to an American company formed by such other companies) which satisfy the requirements specified in the agreements (paragraph 21, Participants Agreement). Important requirements are that each additional participant possess sufficient responsibility to, and does, assume its proportion of the obligations arising under the agreements and that the Government of Iran give its consent in writing to the transfer of an interest to such company. If transfer is made to more than one eligible company, such companies will be treated for all the purposes of the agreements as a single participant

and will be required to appoint a common agent to act for all of them in all matters relating thereto, provided that each such eligible company will have the right to dispose freely and individually of its share of Iranian oil. If applications by eligible companies exceed the total which is available for subscription, such companies also will be expected to agree among themselves as to the portion which each is to subscribe.

The right of the five American members of the Consortium to make transfers under this provision of the agreements will expire April 29, 1955. In view of the desirability of securing the judgment of a qualified and disinterested party on the responsibility of applicants and in view of the time element involved, any established American oil company interested in acquiring a participation in the Consortium should file certain information with Price Waterhouse & Company on or before January 22, 1955. General information as to the cost and other obligations incident to participation, together with an outline of the information which should be filed with Price Waterhouse & Company, can be obtained from that firm at 56 Pine Street, New York, N. Y. Price Waterhouse & Company will not publish the name of any company supplying information or divulge the information supplied. The firm will, however, determine whether any interested company possesses the responsibility to undertake the obligations required to be assumed in connection with the participation it seeks.

For any company found by Price Waterhouse & Company to possess the required responsibility, the Department of State will lend its facilities in obtaining a determination as to whether the Iranian Government would be willing to approve such company as a participant in the Consortium.

Each such company that meets the necessary requirements will then be afforded an opportunity to study the agreements involved before deciding whether or not it desires to acquire an interest. The companies which decide to acquire an interest will be expected not later than April 1, 1955, to agree upon the manner in which they will be organized and be represented in the Consortium. Thereafter, the five American members of the Consortium will arrange, in conjunction with such companies, the transfer of interest.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 16, 1954, p. 230.

Transfer of U. S. Submarine to Italian Navy

*Remarks by C. Burke Elbrick
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

It is a great honor for me to represent the Secretary of State on this important occasion. His Excellency, the Ambassador of Italy, is with us here to receive on behalf of his Government the U. S. S. *Barb*, the first of two submarines being delivered to the Italian Navy to provide training for Italian units in antisubmarine warfare. The Congress of the United States has specifically authorized the President to lend these vessels to Italy for this purpose.

The presence here of the Italian Ambassador, Signor [Alberto] Tarchiani, and of Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations and formerly Commander in Chief of the Nato Forces Southern Europe, exemplifies, as it were, the foreign policy objective of both Italy and the United States to join together with the free countries of Western Europe in measures for common defense against totalitarian aggression. The bulwark of this defense is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The transfer of this ship today is but one of many acts our two Governments have been taking to develop and to strengthen further this defense system, which is already a powerful deterrent to aggression.

No one familiar with the history of the Italian *Risorgimento* can be surprised to find present-day Italy in the forefront of the common defense of the civilized community of nations. By their own historical experience, Italians know that divided states cannot withstand the aggressive force of organized power. The Italian people have developed a great consciousness of the true necessity of political unity and of the fact that no member of the free world community can stand alone today. Based on the recognition of this national feeling, the Italian Government is playing a leading role in promoting the economic, political, and military integration of Western Europe. Moreover, the Italian people are increasingly aware of the dangers which external aggression poses to their great

spiritual heritage. This realization further strengthens their determination to resist Soviet propaganda blandishments and to join with the Nato countries in collective security arrangements.

Italy and the United States are partners in these security arrangements, and the transfer of the U. S. S. *Barb* today is new evidence of this close partnership as well as of the many traditional ties which bind our countries together. In this common endeavor lies our mutual self-preservation.

I note that the Italian officers and crew which will take this ship to Italy are here with us today. I hope their stay in the United States has been a pleasant one. I know they will take back to Italy more than the technical knowledge acquired here. I am sure that they will take back with them the strong friendship, esteem, and good will which this country feels for Italy.

I wish them a pleasant voyage and success in future missions.

Joseph Dodge Named Chairman of Council on Foreign Economic Policy

White House press release dated December 11

On December 11 the White House made public the following letter from President Eisenhower to Joseph M. Dodge.

MY DEAR MR. DODGE: It is my desire that we proceed as rapidly as possible to bring about improvements in the organization of the Executive Branch for the development and coordination of foreign economic policy, including its relation to domestic economic policy where it is involved. I have discussed the objectives of this program with the Cabinet, my Advisory Committee on Government Organization, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and with you.

I am most pleased that you have agreed to continue to serve the Government and to organize on my behalf this very important undertaking. Effective immediately I am designating you as Special Assistant to the President to assist and advise me in accomplishing an orderly development of foreign economic policies and programs and to assure the effective coordination of foreign economic matters of concern to the several departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.

¹ Made on the occasion of the transfer of the submarine U. S. S. *Barb* to the Government of Italy at the U.S. Naval Submarine Base at New London, Conn., on Dec. 13 (press release 713).

More particularly, in respect to foreign economic matters, I shall look to you to provide for the anticipation of problems and issues, ensure advance preparation, analyze information for the purpose of clarifying and defining issues, and determine the primary responsibilities of the executive agencies for the preparation of original documents and for any other steps necessary to produce a coordinated and agreed upon governmental position.

There now are numerous standing and *ad hoc* interdepartmental coordinating mechanisms, as well as a complex of overseas departmental operations, each dealing with a limited aspect of our foreign economic policy. I expect that the arrangements established by this letter, with the cooperation and assistance of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and his staff and with the benefit of other studies in this field of activity now underway, will lead to a substantial simplification of the present structure.

You are authorized to establish and to serve as the chairman of a Council on Foreign Economic Policy through which executive agencies can participate effectively in this undertaking. The Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, or their principal deputies, should comprise the initial basic membership of the Council. All of them are regular members of the Cabinet and three of them are regular members of the National Security Council.

In addition, *ex officio* members will be my Administrative Assistant for Economic Affairs, my Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and a member of my Council of Economic Advisers. The heads of other departments and agencies should be invited by the chairman to participate in meetings of the Council when matters of direct concern to them are under consideration.

You may provide yourself with such staff as is necessary to assist you in connection with these duties. In addition, I anticipate that from time to time provision will need to be made for a limited number of special task forces for the review of specific foreign economic matters that are so extensive or complicated as to make it advisable to organize them as special projects.

Because the formulation of foreign economic policy in many instances is an integral part of the formulation of national security policy or of international financial policy, I want you, as

quickly as possible, to establish appropriate working relations with the National Security Council and the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, respectively, to the end that in those instances referred to the desired integration will be effected. The achievement of such integration will be furthered by your attendance at such meetings of those organizations as you consider necessary, as well as attendance by a representative of those organizations at meetings of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy when appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Committee on Mineral Policy Reports to President

White House press release dated December 1

On December 1 the President received the final report of the Cabinet Committee on Mineral Policy, a report designed to provide the basis for national policies affecting the production and use of metals and minerals. The report was approved by the President after discussion by members of the Cabinet at several recent Cabinet meetings.

The report contains 11 recommendations. Three are designed primarily to enhance the security of the Nation; one is intended to bring about closer Government-industry relations in the mining field; and seven are directed toward the encouragement of an orderly and vigorous development of domestic mineral resources.

Security Recommendations

The three recommendations dealing with security which the Committee termed "overriding in importance" are:

1. That a complete review be undertaken of all stockpile objectives for strategic and critical metals and minerals, and new long-term objectives established to assure, over a period of time, the acquisition of adequate stocks of these materials, and thereby reduce—and where possible eliminate—foreseeable wartime shortages.

2. That the supply-demand situation for each of the metals and minerals be evaluated periodically on a case-by-case basis to establish the proper level of efficient domestic production required as an adequate component of the mobilization base.

3. That the Office of Defense Mobilization review with the Departments of Interior and Commerce, and other agencies concerned, the tasks which need to be carried on to build and maintain the mobilization base for metals and minerals and issue necessary delegations of authority to assure full coverage of mobilization planning for metals and minerals within the policy framework and criteria established by ODM.

Domestic Development

In addition to security considerations, the Committee gave attention to the development of domestic mineral resources.

"A major objective of mineral policy," the report stated, "is a full and orderly program for the development and conservation of the country's mineral resources. An orderly development and wise use of the Nation's resources is an essential element in a strong and sound economy."

The Committee, in its report and in discussions with the Cabinet and the President, emphasized that the development of mineral resources is primarily a function of private enterprise and that actions of Government in this field should be limited to those which are in the national interest but not likely to be undertaken by private industry.

The Committee's recommendations relating to domestic resources are:

4. That the tax structure as it affects the discovery and production of minerals should be periodically reviewed in order to eliminate, where possible, such deterrents as may be found to exist to the sound development of the Nation's mineral resources.

5. That the program of financial assistance to private industry for exploration such as that now administered by the Defense Minerals Exploration Administration be strengthened and continued.

6. That the Department of the Interior—the Federal agency with major responsibility in this field—accelerate those activities which must precede or supplement private exploration such as topographic and geologic mapping, geologic research, and the development of geochemical and geophysical theories and techniques.

7. That the Department of the Interior expand direct exploration activities aimed at the discovery of new mineralized areas or critically short materials essential to security but that work in this field be confined to that which provides data as to the

probable location and general potential of mineral deposits; and, further, that this type of search be undertaken by the Federal Government only when it clearly is in the national interest and when it is reasonably certain that the work will not be done by private industry.

8. That the Secretary of the Interior develop recommendations for such revisions of the mining laws as may be desirable to recognize and thus encourage the use of newer methods of exploration.

9. That the Secretary of the Interior take such steps as may be necessary to strengthen and coordinate the collection and dissemination of facts concerning the Nation's mineral resources and factors pertaining to their production and utilization.

10. That the Department of the Interior intensify its program of mineral and metal research aimed at the development of latent resources, new mineral raw materials, and improved utilization of existing raw materials and coordinate its minerals and metal research with that of other Federal agencies and, as practicable, with research in industry.

In offering a final recommendation, the Committee expressed the belief that the objectives sought by mineral policy can be more effectively achieved if closer cooperation can be developed between Government and the mineral industries. The Committee, therefore, recommended:

11. That the Secretary of the Interior develop ways and means of establishing and maintaining through some workable body the contacts between the mining industry and Government necessary to give force and effect to the recommended policies.

Committee Actions

The Committee was appointed by the President on October 26, 1953. In addition to Secretary McKay as Chairman, the Committee is composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget served as consultants.

In their letter of transmittal, the members of the Committee pointed out that, during the interim since the submission of a preliminary report in March of this year, a number of actions have been

taken implementing recommendations made at that time.

The recommendation that the strategic stockpile be expanded in the interests of national security became effective by the President's announcement of March 26, 1954.

The delegation of authority by ODM covering mobilization planning for metals and minerals became effective November 12.

Action has been taken by ODM to continue and strengthen the program of the Defense Minerals Exploration Administration.

Substantial progress along the lines of the recommendation regarding the elimination of tax deterrents has been made in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

In his appointment of the Committee in October 1953, the President called attention to the depressed conditions in segments of the mining industry existing at that time and specifically referred to the situation of lead and zinc producers. The Committee gave particular attention to this problem as a representative test case. Announcement of the stockpile policy last March resulted in a firming up of the lead and zinc market, the letter of transmittal noted, and when a purchase program was inaugurated under the new policy, the market prices of both commodities rose substantially.

Danish Liberalization of Dollar Imports

Press release 721 dated December 17

The following joint statement of the Departments of Commerce and State was released on December 17.

The U.S. Government welcomes the announcement by the Danish Minister of Commerce that Denmark is liberalizing imports from the dollar area by abolishing import licensing requirements for a wide variety of dollar goods.

While a full list of the goods freed is not yet available, the Danish Government has indicated that this relaxation of restrictions on imports from the dollar area involves a liberalization of 38 percent of Denmark's dollar imports, based upon dollar imports in 1953.

This first stage of dollar liberalization includes

such commodities as unmanufactured tobacco, cotton, asphalt, lumber, paper, many chemicals, medicinal articles, optical glassware, various tools and instruments, sewing machines, agricultural machinery, textiles, printing, packing and other machines, machine tools, and telephone and telegraph equipment.

It is expected that this first step in the liberalization of dollar imports will be followed by further liberalization measures as soon as conditions permit.

This voluntary action by the Danish Government is commended as an example of the constructive action taken by those countries whose dollar position permits the adoption of measures in the direction of freer trade. There has been much progress recently in the relaxation of foreign restrictions on a large variety of U.S. exports.

Other Western European countries which recently have freed imports from the United States and Canada include Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg—86 percent; Germany—70 percent; the United Kingdom—49 percent; Sweden—45 percent; and Italy—23 percent.

President Decides Against Absolute Quota on Clothespins

White House press release dated November 22

The President, on November 22, declined to accept the recommendations of three members of the U.S. Tariff Commission for an absolute quota on imports of spring clothespins.¹

The Tariff Commission made an investigation into the effect of trade-agreement concessions on domestic manufacture of spring clothespins pursuant to section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act. In its report, the Commission was equally divided. On two earlier occasions, when domestic producers made similar applications, the Tariff Commission by a majority vote declined to recommend restrictive action against imports. In the Commission's report on its latest investigation, three Commissioners found that spring clothespins are being imported into this country in such increased quantities as to cause serious injury to the domestic industry. The other three

¹ Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D. C.

Commissioners took the position that any unsatisfactory conditions that there may be in the industry at this time are not properly attributable to increased imports. Under present law, split decisions in the Commission are forwarded to the President for resolution and he is authorized to consider the findings of either as the findings of the Commission.

The President, in identical letters to Senator Eugene D. Millikin, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Representative Daniel A. Reed, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, stated that "no clear case has been made for further restricting imports of spring clothespins" and that "such hardship as may have been experienced lately by domestic producers and workers has been due to domestic developments which do not warrant action under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act."

The President said that, even if some restrictive action were warranted in this case, he would be particularly hesitant to impose an absolute quota on imports in a case of this kind. "Only in exceptional situations," he said, "has the United States resorted to controlling imports by absolute quotas, as in the case of a few farm products where a supported price in the American market was attracting an excessive quantity of imports."

Text of President's Letter

NOVEMBER 20, 1954

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The United States Tariff Commission on October 6, 1954, submitted to me a report of its escape clause investigation on spring clothespins under Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act.

The members of the Commission are equally divided on the question of whether relief is warranted. Under the present law, I am authorized to consider the findings of either as the findings of the Commission. This is the third application. The prior two were turned down by majority votes of the Commission.

The group of Commissioners which concludes in this case that relief is called for believes that the permissible increase in duty under the escape clause authority would be insufficient to bridge the gap between the prices of the domestic and foreign products, and recommends the imposition of an absolute limit upon the quantity of spring clothespins that may be imported annually hereafter to 450,000 gross. That would amount to a reduction of over half in the volume of recent imports.

The second group of Commissioners takes the position

that any unsatisfactory conditions that there may be in the industry at this time are not properly attributable to increased imports.

I naturally am deeply concerned by the reported unemployment in this industry, though I am pleased to learn that the very latest employment reports from New England are more encouraging. Close study of all the data available, however, leads me to conclude, with the second group of Commissioners, that no clear case has been made for further restricting imports of spring clothespins and that such hardship as may have been experienced lately by domestic producers and workers has been due to domestic developments which do not warrant action under Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act.

The outstanding fact in this situation is that total sales of all clothespins have been definitely on the decline in the United States. Despite this general trend, total sales of spring clothespins, with which we are here concerned, have been substantially maintained at a level more than double that of the pre-war years. Nearly all spring clothespin manufacturers also produce slotted pins, and where financial losses have occurred, they appear to be due to the marked decline in sales of slotted pins rather than to imports of spring clothespins. Moreover, the extent of the decline in the over-all sales of clothespins has been much greater than the total quantity of spring pins imported.

The decline in the use of clothespins seems clearly attributable to recent domestic developments. Over 2½ million automatic driers have been installed in American homes and apartment houses since the close of the war. Also, more laundry apparently is being done outside the home in laundromats and commercial laundries.

The reported decline in employment is due at least in part to the fact that several of the domestic firms have during the last few years installed additional equipment in order to improve their efficiency. With this increased mechanization they have required a smaller number of persons to turn out the same amount of goods.

Even if some restrictive action were warranted in this case, I should be particularly hesitant to impose an absolute quota on imports in a case of this kind. We have been very concerned that sales abroad of many American export products have been seriously hurt during recent years by quantitative limitations imposed by various foreign countries, thus curtailing the play of competition even when our product and its price are better.

Only in exceptional situations has the United States resorted to controlling imports by absolute quotas, as in the case of a few farm products where a supported price in the American market was attracting an excessive quantity of imports.

In view of all these considerations, no change in the present import treatment of spring clothespins seems warranted.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Reorganization of German Coal, Iron, and Steel Industries ¹

The following Order No. (V) 6-G issued by the Combined Steel Group of the Allied High Commission for Germany pursuant to Allied High Commission Law No. 27 ² (Reorganization of German Coal, Iron and Steel Industries), as amended by Allied High Commission Law No. 76, ³ is deemed to be of interest to certain U. S. citizens as having legal effect upon them or their property. Provision for review of this order will be found in Article 13 of Law No. 27, as amended by Article 4 of Law No. 76.

ORDER No. (V) 6-G

To:

1. Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft in Liquidation auf Grund des Gesetzes Nr. 27 über die Umgestaltung des deutschen Kohlenbergbaues und der deutschen Stahl- und Eisenindustrie, in Düsseldorf.

2. Rheinstahl-Union Maschinen- und Stahlbau Aktiengesellschaft, in Düsseldorf.

Hannoversche Maschinenbau-Aktien-Gesellschaft vormals Georg Egestorff (Hannomag), Hannover-Linden.

Eisenwerk Wanheim Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Duisburg-Wanheim.

Nordseewerke Emden Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Emden.

Dortmunder Union Brückenbau Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund.

Siegener Eisenbahnbedarf Aktiengesellschaft, Dreis-Tiefenbach, Kreis Siegen.

Concordiahütte Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Bendorf/Rhein.

Wagner & Co. Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Dortmund.

Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Aktien-Gesellschaft in Essen-Ruhr.

Dortmunder Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund.

Rheinische Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Gelsenkirchen.

Hansa Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund.

Erin Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, in Castrop-Rauxel.

Hamborner Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, in Duisburg-Hamborn.

Dortmund-Horder Huttenunion Aktiengesellschaft, in Dortmund.

Rheinische Rohrenwerke Aktiengesellschaft, in Mulheim-Ruhr.

Huttenwerke Phoenix Aktiengesellschaft, in Duisburg-Ruhrort.

Rheinisch-Westfälische Eisen- und Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft, in Mulheim-Ruhr.

Eisenwerke Mulheim/Meliderich Aktiengesellschaft, Mulheim-Ruhr.

Eisenwerke Gelsenkirchen Aktiengesellschaft, Gelsenkirchen.

Huttenwerke Siegerland Aktiengesellschaft, in Siegen i/W.

Friedrichshütte Aktiengesellschaft, Herdorf.

3. All other Successor Companies, including their Subsidiaries, of Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft in Liquidation.

4. The National City Bank of New York, in New York;

Irving Trust Company, in New York; Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, in Frankfurt/M.

Whereas the Liquidators of Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft in Liquidation under Law No. 27 on Reorganization of German Coal and Iron and Steel Industries (hereinafter referred to as "Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG i.L.") have submitted a Plan dated 10 December 1953 (hereinafter referred to as "Plan") for the treatment of claimants under the following dollar bond and debenture issues (hereinafter referred to as "Old Bond Issues"):

Rheinische Union Twenty-Year 7 percent Sinking Fund Mortgage Gold Bonds, issued under Indenture, dated as of 1 January 1926. Trustee: Irving Trust Company.

Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft, 25-Year 6½ percent Sinking Fund Mortgage Gold Bonds, Series A, issued under Indenture, dated as of 1 June 1926. Trustee: The National City Bank of New York.

Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft, 25-Year 6½ percent Sinking Fund Mortgage Gold Bonds, Series C, issued under said Indenture, dated as of 1 June 1926. Trustee: The National City Bank of New York.

Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft, 20-Year 6½ percent Sinking Fund Debentures, Series A, issued under Indenture, dated as of 1 July 1927. Trustee: Irving Trust Company.

and

Whereas the Plan provides for the refunding of the outstanding debt under the said Old Bond Issues and the transfer of the debt so refunded to the following successor companies, and no others, derived from Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG i. L. (hereinafter referred to as "Obligor Companies") in the following respective percentages:

	Percent
Rheinstahl-Union Maschinen- und Stahlbau Aktiengesellschaft, Düsseldorf	9.5000
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft, Essen	25.3400
Hamborner Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Duisburg-Hamborn	1.5837
Erin Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Castrop-Rauxel	4.7512
Dortmund-Horder Huttenunion Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund	14.7065
Rheinische Rohrenwerke Aktiengesellschaft, Mulheim-Ruhr	12.9414
Huttenwerke Phoenix Aktiengesellschaft, Duisburg-Ruhrort	12.9414
Rheinisch-Westfälische Eisen- und Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft, Mulheim-Ruhr	12.3535
Huttenwerke Siegerland Aktiengesellschaft, Siegen	5.8823
	100.0000

and

Whereas the Obligor Companies will issue their Obligations pursuant to the Plan and to the provisions of the Declaration and Agreement of Deposit attached thereto as Annex 16 (hereinafter referred to as "Declaration"), which Obligations are to be secured by security mortgages to be registered on operating properties (real estate and mining properties) of the following companies (hereinafter referred to as "Mortgagor Companies"), all as provided in the Plan:

¹ 19 Fed. Reg. 6815.

² 15 Fed. Reg. 8591.

³ 19 Fed. Reg. 6611 (BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1954, p. 654).

Hannoversche Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft, vormalig Georg Egestorf (HANOMAG), Hannover-Linden	\$712, 500	
Eisenwerk Wanheim Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Duisburg-Wanheim	712, 500	
Nordseewerke Emden Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Emden	475, 000	
Dortmunder Union Brückenbau Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund	190, 000	
Siegener Eisenbahnbedarf Aktiengesellschaft, Dreis-Tiefenbach Kreis Siegen	118, 750	
Concordiahütte Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Bendorf/Rhein	95, 000	
Wagner & Co., Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Dortmund	71, 250	
		\$2, 375, 000
Dortmunder Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund	2, 375, 625	
Rheinische Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Gelsenkirchen	3, 167, 500	
Hansa Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund	791, 875	
		6, 335, 000
Hamborner Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Duisburg-Hamborn	396, 000	
Erin Bergbau Aktiengesellschaft, Castrop-Rauxel	1, 188, 000	
Dortmund-Hörder Huttenunion Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund	3, 677, 000	
Rheinische Rohrenwerke Aktiengesellschaft, Mulheim-Ruhr	3, 235, 000	
Huttenwerke Phoenix Aktiengesellschaft, Duisberg-Ruhrort	3, 235, 000	
Eisenwerke Mulheim/Meiderich Aktiengesellschaft, Mulheim-Ruhr	1, 235, 200	
Eisenwerke Gelsenkirchen Aktiengesellschaft, Gelsenkirchen	1, 852, 800	
		3, 088, 000
Huttenwerke Siegerland Aktiengesellschaft, Siegen	1, 176, 800	
Friedrichshütte Aktiengesellschaft, Herdorf	294, 200	
		1, 471, 000
		25, 000, 000

and

Whereas such Obligations will be the several Obligations of the respective Obligor Companies and will not provide for any form of joint liability on the part of any of them within the meaning set forth in Annex 15 to the Plan, and

Whereas Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau has agreed to undertake its unconditional guaranty for the fulfillment of the said Obligations and of the Declaration as set forth in the Plan, and

Whereas The National City Bank of New York and Irving Trust Company have, by letter dated 10 December 1953, agreed to act in accordance with the terms of the Plan as Depositaries of the Obligations to be issued by the above-named Obligor Companies, and

Whereas the Combined Steel Group has determined that the Plan provides fair and equitable treatment to the claimants under the Old Bond Issues in compliance with Article 5 of Law No. 27 without prejudicing the rights of other claimants to such fair and equitable treatment,

The combined steel group hereby orders as follows:

ARTICLE I

(1) The "Plan for the Treatment of Claimants under United States Dollar Bond and Debenture Issues of Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft in Liquidation" ⁴ attached hereto and incorporated herein, is approved and enters into force. The refunding and the transfer of the debt so refunded as provided for in the Plan becomes effective as from 1 January 1953. If an Obligor Company was not yet in existence at that date, the debt allocable to it is being transferred to it as of 1 January 1953, effective as of the date of its registration in the commercial register.

(2) Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG I.L., each of the Obligor Companies, each of the Mortgagor Companies, The National City Bank of New York, Irving Trust Company and

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau shall forthwith take, each in its own capacity, all action necessary for the implementation and execution of the Plan. The National City Bank of New York and Irving Trust Company, as Depositaries, shall, in particular, accept and hold the Obligations to be issued by the Obligor Companies subject to the terms and provisions of the Plan and of the Declaration and shall

⁴ Copies of the Plan may be obtained by interested bondholders by application to the Combined Steel Group, c/o The Allied General Secretariat, Allied High Commission for Germany, Bonn, Germany.

Copies of the Plan are available for inspection by interested bondholders at the following places:

Office of German Affairs, Department of State, Twenty-first Street and Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.
Corporate Trust Department, The National City Bank of New York, 55 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

Corporate Trust Department, Irving Trust Company, 1 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

Public Reference Room, Securities and Exchange Commission, 425 Second Street NW., Washington, D. C.

The following other offices of the Securities and Exchange Commission:

Federal Building, Post Office Square, Boston, Mass.

Room 350, Peachtree-Seventh Building, Atlanta, Ga.

Room 630, Bankers Building, 105 West Adams Street, Chicago, Ill.

Room 162, New Customs House, 19th and Stout Streets, Denver, Colo.

Room 301, United States Court House, 10th and Lamar Streets, Fort Worth, Tex.

42 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

Room 334, Appraisers Building, 630 Sansome Street, San Francisco, Calif.

Room 304, 905 Second Avenue Building, Seattle, Wash.

Room 1628, Standard Building, 1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio.

Room 1074, Federal Building, Detroit, Mich.

Room 1737, United States Post Office and Court House, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, Calif.

Room 400, Pioneer Building, Fourth and Roberts Streets, St. Paul, Minn.

distribute to the claimants under the Old Bond Issues Participation Certificates and Scrip in the form and manner provided in the Declaration.

ARTICLE II

(1) The Mortgagor Companies shall secure the liabilities resulting from the respective Obligations by registering in favor of The National City Bank of New York and Irving Trust Company security mortgages on operating properties (real estate and mining properties) of such mortgagor companies as provided in Article VII of the Plan. These mortgages shall be in the respective amounts set out in Column (2) of Annex 10 of the Plan in currency of the United States of America; no consent of any German authority will be required for the entry of the mortgages in currency of the United States of America; Paragraph 15 of the "Verordnung über die Eintragung von Hypotheken in ausländischer Währung vom 13. Februar 1920 (RGBI. S. 231) in der Fassung des Gesetzes vom 12. März 1931 (RGBI I S. 31)" shall not be applicable. The mortgages shall be entered as first mortgage liens in the land registers of the real estate to be mortgaged and in the mining registers of the mining properties to be mortgaged; in the cases specified in Article VII, Paragraph 2, sentence 2 of the Plan, the mortgages shall be registered at the rank immediately after the existing liens referred to in Annex 13 to the Plan, but they shall move up to the first rank as soon as and to the extent that the prior liens are either cancelled or revert to the owner, and, in order to assure this result, preliminary notices of cancellation shall be registered in favor of The National City Bank of New York and Irving Trust Company.

(2) The transfer of the mortgages and of the claims secured thereby to successors and assigns of The National City Bank of New York and Irving Trust Company is governed by the general rules of law.

ARTICLE III

(1) To the extent that reservations of priority (Rangvorbehalte) or preliminary notices (Vormerkungen) provided for in previous orders of the Combined Steel Group and the Combined Coal Control Group have been entered in the land registers, the mortgages shall be entered in exercise of such reservations of priority or in cancellation of such preliminary notices.

(2) To the extent that such reservations of priority or such preliminary notices will not be fully utilized by the entry of a mortgage, or will not be made use of for the entry of a mortgage, the reservation of priority or the preliminary notice, ranking after such mortgage, will remain in existence in such a way that the owner shall be entitled to make use of the remaining reservation of priority or of the remaining preliminary notice in favor of any creditor, without prejudicing, however, the rights of any person other than the creditors of the refunded debt to claim a rank below that required for securing such debt.

ARTICLE IV

(1) To prove to the land registry that a real estate or a mining property of a Mortgagor Company is or is not a

real estate or a mining property to be mortgaged in accordance with Article II of this Order, the written statement of the Managing Directors (Vorstand) or of the Managers (Geschäftsführer) of such company shall be sufficient, which statement is not required to be in the form prescribed in Paragraph 29 of the land register ordinance (Grundbuchordnung).

(2) No consent of the party in interest will be required either for the cancellation of a preliminary notice entered pursuant to a previous order of the Combined Steel Group or for the correction of the land register to the extent that such notice was not utilized for the entry of the mortgage.

ARTICLE V

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 of Regulation No. 6 under Law No. 27, Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG i.L., is hereby released from any and all liability under any of the Old Bond Issues as from 1 January 1953 and from any and all liability under the refunded new debt as from the date of its transfer to the Obligor Companies. Neither The National City Bank of New York nor Irving Trust Company as Trustees nor any holder of any bond or debenture including interest coupons pertaining thereto under the Old Bond Issues, or of any claim based thereon, shall have any right to enforce the same or any of the provisions of any of the indentures referred to herein against either Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG i.L., or its Liquidators, or against any of its successor companies, or against any of the properties of either Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG i.L. or any of its successor companies or of any subsidiary of any such successor company, and no holder of any such bond or debenture, including interest coupons, under the Old Bond Issues or of any claims based thereon shall have any other right or claim by reason of the holding or ownership thereof, or otherwise, except to surrender the said bond or debenture or interest coupons in exchange for Participation Certificates or Scrip, or both, in the manner provided in the Declaration, after such bond or debenture or interest coupons shall have been validated pursuant to the Validation Law for German Foreign Currency Bonds, dated 25 August 1952, or, in the case of non-validation, to claim compensation under Part V of said Law against the Obligor Companies, severally, in the respective percentages indicated above.

ARTICLE VI

Article 7, Paragraph 1 of Law No. 27 applies to all measures which will be taken in compliance with the provisions of the Plan or of its Order. The term "Taxes and other duties" used in Law No. 27 will include turnover taxes and transfer taxes as well as other duties, fees and costs, which otherwise would have to be paid in consequence of these measures, subject to the provisions of the following sentence. The treatment of the deconcentration measures for profit and property taxation purposes is determined by the orders of the competent highest fiscal authority of the Land which will establish them in agreement with the persons subject to taxation.

ARTICLE VII

The English and German texts of the Plan and its Annexes are equally authentic.

This Order, under the authority granted in Regulation No. 22 under Law No. 27 of the Allied High Commission, shall be issued and become effective on 1 October 1954 and is to be published as provided in Decision No. 16 of the Allied High Commission.

W. G. DANIELS,
Acting U. S. Chairman.
E. A. JANET,
French Chairman.
A. H. DAUNCEY,
U. K. Chairman.

For the Secretary of State:

GEOFFREY W. LEWIS,
Deputy Director, Office of German Affairs,
Bureau of European Affairs.

OCTOBER 13, 1954.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Commodities—Wheat

Agreement revising and renewing the international wheat agreement of 1949 (TIAS 1957). Dated at Washington April 13, 1953. Entered into force July 15, 1953, with respect to parts 1, 3, 4, and 5; and August 1, 1953, with respect to part 2. TIAS 2799.
Accession deposited: Italy, December 10, 1954.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.¹
Accession deposited: Germany, November 24, 1954.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

German External Debts

Administrative agreement concerning the Arbitral Tribunal and the Mixed Commission under the agreement on German external debts of February 27, 1953 (TIAS 2792), with annex and exchange of letters. Signed at Bonn December 1, 1954, by the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom. Entered into force December 1, 1954.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement extending agreements for United States Air Force, Army, and Naval Missions to Colombia (TIAS 1893, 1892, and 1563, respectively). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá October 6 and November 4, 1954. Entered into force November 4, 1954.

Germany

Agreement concerning tax relief to be accorded by the Federal Republic of Germany to United States expenditures in the interest of the common defense, with annex and exchange of letters. Signed at Bonn October 15, 1954. Enters into force upon the deposit of an instrument of ratification by the Federal Republic with the United States.

Guatemala

Development assistance agreement. Signed at Washington December 13, 1954. Entered into force December 13, 1954.

Iran

Agreement extending the military mission agreement of October 6, 1947, as amended and extended (TIAS 1666 and 2947). Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran September 22 and November 22, 1954. Entered into force November 22, 1954.

U.N. Refers Soviet Piracy Charges to International Law Commission

*Statements by C. D. Jackson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*

On December 13 the Ad Hoc Political Committee began debate on the last item on its agenda, a Soviet-sponsored resolution entitled "Complaint of violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China Seas" (A/AC.76/L.24). The Soviet resolution called for condemnation of "piratical raids" on merchant shipping carried out by "naval vessels based on the island of Taiwan and controlled by the United States authorities." The following day the Syrian delegation offered a substitute resolution (A/AC.76/L.25) calling on all concerned to "resolve their differences by recourse to appropriate peaceful processes" and asking all member states to "abstain from acts which would be considered contrary to the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas." Neither the Soviet nor the Syrian resolution was brought to a vote. Instead, the committee on December 15, by a vote of 35-5-15, adopted a draft resolution cosponsored by the United States, Cuba, and the Philippines (A/AC.76/L.26) referring the matter to the International Law Commission for study. The recommendation of the committee was approved in plenary session on December 17 by a vote of 39-5-14. Following are the statements made by Mr. Jackson in the committee on December 13, 14, and 15 and in the plenary session on December 17.

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 13

U.S. delegation press release 2082

Fellow delegates, if you will permit me to use publishing terminology, I'd say we are today dealing with chapter 3 of the same old volume, entitled "How To Use the United Nations for Propaganda

Purposes." We have survived the Czech item on propaganda. (At least that one was honestly named.) Then we had the Soviet item accusing the United States of aggression in the Formosa area.¹ And this morning once again the Soviet delegate [Jacob A. Malik] has unmistakably linked this item with today's item.

I would like to draw your serious attention to the fact that the present item not only owes its parentage to the previous Soviet item on aggression but has its grandfather in the Czech item and therefore deserves the same treatment that the whole family has received. We are dealing again today with another of these items introduced by the Soviet Union or one of its satellites whose purpose is not to seek a practical and reasonable solution to some specific problem. Its purpose is to convert this forum into a sounding board for Soviet propaganda.

This item, like the one the committee has just completed, is another cold-war item. This is made evident by the words we have heard this morning. It is made evident by the Soviet explanatory memorandum.

It seems to me that our French colleague has presented the conclusive proof that this is a cold-war item. We should not forget that it was the Soviets themselves, on their own initiative, who appealed to the French to exercise their good offices in the *Tuapse* case. We should also not forget that the Chinese Government accepted the suggestion immediately.

At that moment the Soviets should have withdrawn the item. How could the Soviets, if they

¹For statements by Mr. Jackson on this item, see BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1954, p. 957.

were acting in good faith, propose on the one hand a serious good-offices effort by the French with the Chinese Government and at the same time plan to carry on this debate in the most inflammatory and intemperate manner which could only interfere with, if not completely nullify, the requested good offices.

The statements made by the Soviet delegate have a familiar ring. They contain many of the same distortions and the same fantastic accusations against the United States Government which were presented by the Soviet delegate and his colleagues from the Communist orbit in their vain attempt to confuse this body into condemning the United States as an aggressor in Formosa.

This committee on December 10 decisively rejected these false charges. Only the Soviet bloc voted in favor of their own resolution. This committee was not deceived by the utterly false picture of the United States position respecting Formosa painted by the Communist delegates. Yet they are now having another go at it. This can hardly be taken as a compliment to the intelligence of this committee.

Among the familiar themes we are hearing again is that the United States has seized and occupied Formosa. The United States is therefore responsible—according to this absurd contention—for each and every action taken by the forces of the Chinese Government. The distinguished delegate of China has ably set forth his case in respect to the actions taken by the forces of his Government in the waters surrounding Formosa. I will come back to this question later. But first permit me to deal with the allegations that the United States Government is a party to these actions of the Chinese Government.

When the last item was discussed by this committee, it was pointed out that the United States has neither seized nor occupied Formosa. I presented the facts as to the activities of the United States Seventh Fleet and the purpose of its mission. That purpose is, and has been, the maintenance of stability in the Formosa area. Now in connection with this item we are not only hearing over again the outworn Soviet charges, but they are being related to the detention of the three vessels named in document A/2741. This is being done despite the fact that the accusations with respect to the three vessels have all been contained in notes to my Government from the Soviet and Polish Governments and have been categorically

rejected. This is all a matter of public record. I should like to read certain pertinent extracts from notes which my Government has sent to the Polish and Soviet Governments on these matters.

Accusations Rejected

On October 12, 1953, a Polish note alleged that the United States Government was responsible for the seizure of the tanker *Praca*, on the ground that the forces of the Chinese Government on the island of Taiwan were under the political and military control of the United States. In a note to the Polish Government, dated October 20, we replied as follows:²

The United States Government rejects categorically the false charges contained in the Ministry's note and wishes to make clear to the Polish Government that the United States Government had no connection with the detention of the *Praca*.

Following the seizure of the vessel *Gottwald* by the Chinese Navy, the Polish Government in a note dated May 15, 1954, accused my Government of responsibility for this action. In addition, other baseless and provocative charges were made. We were accused of both inspiring the seizure and taking part in it directly. We were accused of gangsterism, of increasing tensions in the Far East, of aggression. On May 20 the United States Government replied as follows:³

The United States Government rejects as completely without foundation the allegations made by the Polish Government. The United States Government has had no connection whatever with this incident.

On June 24, the Soviet Government transmitted to the Government of the United States a note concerning the detention of the tanker *Tuapse* which contained the assertion that

It is entirely obvious that seizure of a Soviet tanker by a war vessel in waters controlled by the U. S. naval fleet could be carried out only by the naval forces of the U. S.

On June 26 the United States answered this note as follows:⁴

The United States Government rejects as completely without foundation the allegations made by the Soviet Government that Naval Forces of the United States have seized or otherwise interfered with the movement of the Soviet tanker in question.

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 9, 1953, p. 640.

³ *Ibid.*, May 31, 1954, p. 824.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 12, 1954, p. 51.

The allegations contained in these notes were based on the same false premise that the United States has seized and occupied Formosa. These accusations against the United States of aggression in Formosa were discredited in their entirety by the action of this committee last week. And yet this is the very premise upon which this morning's Soviet resolution is based and the premise previously rejected by this committee.

There is another allegation made in connection with these cases which should be noted. It is alleged by the Soviet Union that United States military aircraft have indulged in provocative actions and violated freedom of commercial navigation over the open sea in the region of Taiwan. I would like to read in full to the members of the committee the text of the United States note of November 29 to the Soviet Union in reply to these unwarranted charges.⁵

The Soviet representative alleged this morning that United States military aircraft fired on ships off Hainan. I should like to read the following note of the United States Government.⁶

Question of Military Cargoes

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss the background against which this Soviet item should be considered. Is it one which leads us to believe that the sponsor of this item is genuinely concerned with the principle of the freedom of the seas, or is there reason to believe that he has other fish to fry?

It is quite possible that the Soviet Union is upset because there has been some interference with the supply of fuel for the Air Force of the Chinese Communist regime. The Chinese Communist ally of the Soviet Union has been announcing almost daily that its "war of liberation" is not yet finished—that Formosa must be taken. This sinister task, if we can believe the words of the Chinese Communist leaders themselves, has been entrusted to the Chinese Red Army, Navy, and Air Force. It will be hard to carry out this task without adequate supplies of fuel. Is that what upsets the Soviet delegate?

⁵ *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 901.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1954, p. 241.

The cargo carried by the Soviet tanker *Tuapse* may be described as kerosene. This is an innocent-sounding label. It is reported, however, that this seemingly innocent cargo is in every respect suitable for simple conversion into fuel for jet aircraft. It is known, too, that the cargo of the tanker *Praca* also contained kerosene of a grade entirely useful for jet aircraft. This is the testimony of Capt. Leonard Wasowski, master of the *Praca*:

Captain Wasowski decided not to return to Communist Poland, following the detention of his ship by the Chinese Government, and requested asylum on Formosa because, to use his own words, he had "had enough of communism." Captain Wasowski subsequently applied for entry to the United States, together with 21 men from the *Praca* and *Gottwald*, and he is now living in New York City.

There were circumstances of his last voyage which left no doubt in Captain Wasowski's mind that he had a military cargo on board the *Praca*. Before he sailed, he was given secret written instructions as to how to proceed with his cargo in Far Eastern waters. These were not instructions given to a captain responsible for a cargo of oil for the lamps of China. Captain Wasowski, whose crew included 17 Chinese headed by a political officer, was instructed to maintain radio silence after leaving Singapore and to give a wide berth to Formosa. In short, he was ordered to behave as though he were going through a war zone.

I have here a signed statement by Captain Wasowski, master of the *Praca*, which I would like to read to you.

Like all the Polish captains of the Chinese trade I got the secret instruction (in writing) covering my duties when I will sail through the Chinese Sea.

As far as I can remember, that instruction had the following points:

1) Radio silence should be maintained from the time of passing Singapore till 24 hours before reaching the Chinese port.

2) Sharp lookout should be kept when sailing east of Singapore.

3) I should avoid approaching Formosa's coast less than 60 miles.

4) In case of interference by any foreign ship, I should deny anybody's right to board my ship. I may yield only before force. In such a case I should point out that the Polish Government doesn't recognize Chiang Kai-shek and is free to trade with Red China.

5) In case of trouble I should send the TTT telegrams announcing that my ship was stopped unlawfully at high seas.

Regarding the cargo, I may say it was kerosene and in 1952 when I carried exactly the same kind of cargo I was confidentially informed by the Russians who boarded the ship in Constantza that it is needed badly for the jets fighting in Korea. Therefore I assumed the kerosene was to be used for military purposes.

My ship *Praca* was without any doubt the property of Red China.

It is known to me that the cost of overhauling the ship in Belgium (over \$2 million in U.S. dollars) was covered by the Bank of China through the Bank of Poland.

While I asked for political asylum on Formosa, nobody ever suggested such defection to me. I was neither induced nor bribed.

I did ask for asylum because I wanted to be free and because I disapprove everything that is going on in Poland under the Communist regime.

I can quite understand why this whole business of defection should be a very sensitive and sore subject to the delegate from Poland [Stanislaw Skrzyszewski]—very sensitive. In fact, the fact that 21 crewmen of the *Gottwald* and the *Praca*, plus the captain of the latter vessel—making 22 in all—have been welcomed in the United States is no doubt irritating and embarrassing to the Polish Government, which has been confronted with defections on a wholesale basis. I think they really win a prize on that one. In this connection I should like to refer to a few of the more well known cases in the past 2 years, and I think that everyone will agree that none of these ladies or gentlemen had their arms twisted in order to defect—and I also apologize for what will probably be some mispronunciation of Polish names.

Well, there is Andrzej Panufnik, foremost composer, who defected in Switzerland in July 1954.

There is Krystyna Bujnowska, member of the famous "Mazowsze" dance ensemble, who defected in Paris in November 1954.

[At this point the representative of the U. S. S. R. intervened on a point of order. The Chairman did not sustain the point of order and requested the U.S. representative to proceed.]

Well, I won't offend the Soviet representative by reading the rest of this list. The reason I've made this reference was because the Polish representative had treated us to a half hour of talk about the alleged measures used to get the Polish seamen to come to this country. There is one basic difference between the Polish seamen whose alleged statements were read by the Polish delegate this afternoon and Captain Wasowski and the other seamen about whom he was talking, and that really

is a very basic difference. The difference is that these 22 Polish seamen and Captain Wasowski are right here in this country, a great many of them in this city. I have no doubt that if the delegate from Poland wished to speak with them, or if any of the other delegates wished to speak with them and find out the circumstances of their defection and of their seeking asylum, they would be delighted to oblige. In fact, I wonder if it wouldn't be a good idea to challenge the Polish delegate to such an interview.

Now, what is the reason for transporting jet fuel to Communist China in these tankers?

The Peiping regime has recently announced that it is building its own airplanes. It has not claimed that it is constructing jet planes for commercial uses. It is clear that jet fuel bound for Communist China is intended solely for the jet planes of the Chinese Communist Air Force.

The source of these jet planes is well known. They appeared frequently in Korea in combat against the Air Force of the United Nations Command—that is, in support of the Communist aggressors in Korea. During the Korean action there were a total of 44,165 sightings of MIG-15 aircraft alone. Almost 1,000 tons of petroleum products were consumed each day by the Communist side during the fighting in Korea. All indications are that these petroleum products were furnished to the Chinese and North Korean Communist forces by the Soviet Union.

The transport of this large quantity of oil for the military machines used by the Communist aggressors in Korea, in addition to the heavy load of other military supplies, severely taxed the capacities of the Trans-Siberian and Communist railway systems. These rail facilities continue to be hard pressed in order to supply the needs of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East as well as the Chinese and North Korean Communist fuel requirements for military transports, naval and aircraft. The petroleum from the Soviet Union for the Chinese Communist war machine is carried therefore almost exclusively in tankers of the Soviet Union and other countries in the Communist orbit and disposed mainly in Shanghai, Tsingtao, and Dairen, where storage facilities are available. In recent months there has been an increase in this traffic in jet kerosene and high-octane gasoline coming from the Black Sea ports to Chinese Communist ports, where storage depots are available for military operations directed

against Formosa, Quemoy, and other islands on the Formosa Straits.

Increasing Tensions in Formosa Area

You will recall my statement in this committee of December 9⁷ in which I described briefly the actions taken by the Chinese Communist regime in recent months in increasing tensions in the Formosa area not only through intensive and systematic propaganda for war but by armed attacks on the territory held by the Government of China. The situation confronting the Chinese Government is indeed ominous.

Here is the Chinese Communist Minister of Defense, Peng Te-huai—the same general who commanded the so-called Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea—proclaiming to the vast army under his control, in an order of the day, October 1, 1954, that "the struggle to liberate Taiwan . . . is still an unfinished task in the Chinese People's war of liberation."

We have also the Chinese Communist Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai declaring that "Taiwan must be liberated" and Chiang Kai-shek's government "liquidated," while the Chinese Communist Army men on the coast facing Taiwan are openly exhorted to prepare for combat. And while all this is going on, the Soviet Union is busily pouring thousands of tons of jet fuel for the Chinese Communist Air Force into storage depots on the Chinese mainland. During 1954, 17 tankers with approximately 90,000 tons of petroleum from the Soviet bloc arrived at Chinese Communist ports.

This is the background against which we should consider the actions taken by the Soviet Government in submitting this and the previous propaganda item to the General Assembly. The Soviet objective is to have the United Nations preside over and assist in the liquidation of the freedom of Formosa. It seeks to undermine the measures of self-defense being taken by the Government of the Republic of China and to render it helpless to resist any armed assault which the Chinese Communist partners of the Soviet Union are apparently preparing from the mainland. If the Soviet motives were genuinely those of seeking to relieve tensions, these sinister objectives would not be pressed. The Soviets would instead moderate

their partners who are whipping up a frenzy for continuing the so-called unfinished war of "liberation" against Formosa.

So, fellow delegates, once again this committee is face to face with the same Soviet maneuver in a new uniform.

As I said in conclusion on December 9 in connection with the analysis of who is planning and actually carrying on aggression in the China area, in the face of all these overt acts of aggression and violence, those who support Red China in this body are now asking us to condemn as "aggression" the adoption of a posture of resistance to their imperial ambitions. To bow to this demand would be to adopt the principle that self-defense against Communist attack is an international crime.

In the face of the dangerous military situation confronting his country, the Chinese delegate [T. F. Tsiang] has taken an eminently reasonable position as to the way to deal with the question before us. He has reminded us that in the past the substantial majority of differences arising from incidents of the type referred to in the explanatory memorandum of the Soviet Union have been solved on the basis of negotiations, taking into account the individual circumstances surrounding each case. His stand is moderate and practical. It paves the way for the settlement, by means of negotiation or other peaceful procedure, of differences which may have arisen in connection with the activities of the Chinese naval vessels in the waters surrounding Formosa.

My Government believes this general approach is sound.

As to the Soviet resolution, we have already shown that it belongs to the same family as the Soviet resolution on aggression, which this committee rejected decisively on December 10. This and the aggression resolution are both based on the same false premise. The resolutions were introduced for the same transparent purpose of inflammatory propaganda. Therefore this resolution deserves exactly the same treatment as its predecessors. In our view, it is entirely unacceptable. It should be rejected.

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 14

U.S. delegation press release 2087

I will be really very brief exercising the right of reply.

We have really been treated this afternoon to a

⁷ *Ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1954, p. 957.

superb demonstration of the points that I was trying to make yesterday with respect to the propaganda content of this Soviet resolution. Today my Government—and I guess myself—have been challenged on innumerable points by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Most of them are beside the point. The point before us is this resolution, and I would like just to try to bring the discussion back.

It was rather entertaining to hear the distinguished delegate from Czechoslovakia [Gertruda Sekaninova] quote the old Czech proverb which, if I understood correctly, was "Ja nic, ja musikant." She translated it into something having to do with being caught in the cookie jar. Now, actually, what those words mean—what the proverb says is, "I am not involved here, I am only a musician." That is particularly apt in connection with this afternoon's discussion and what we heard yesterday from the Soviet bloc. There was a time when everybody played their own tune, only this time we have been treated to a whole series of variations on one theme.

Now, trying to get back to the resolution before us, the Soviet representative and his friends here allege that the United States has seized and occupied Formosa. The fact is that the United States has extended aid and protection to the Chinese Government on Formosa in its time of danger and at the express request of that Government. Furthermore, they allege that the United States military forces are in charge of Formosa. The fact is, as I have said before, that there are some 800 American military personnel on the island as contrasted with probably half a million military personnel of the Government there.

Mr. Malik has made much of the fact that, because the Seventh Fleet patrols the area, the United States controls whatever happens there. The distinguished delegate from the United Kingdom [Ivor T. M. Pink] I think has taken care of that point better than I could. I would simply be repeating what he said. There is a difference between patrol and control, at least in the English language.

Finally, the Polish representative alleges that the United States played a part in forcing Polish seamen to come to the United States. Well, that just isn't so, and the facts are quite the reverse. The record of Polish naval defections to the West in the past 5 years is estimated at 1,000 Polish

seamen alone, which is a somewhat clear indication of what the situation is.

Now, since the Soviet resolution, supported by the Soviet delegation and the Soviet bloc speeches, says that the United States seized Formosa, that the United States military control Formosa, that the United States controls the vessels of the Chinese Government, that the United States aircraft have fired upon Polish ships, that the United States is party to coercion against members of the crews of foreign ships in Formosa, that the United States has seized vessels of foreign governments—since none of these accusations are true, the United States categorically and completely rejects the Soviet resolution.

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 15

U.S. delegation press release 2089

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee has been considering the current item proposed by the U.S.S.R. and a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation, with reference to particular incidents involving certain ships in the China seas. This debate, by its very nature, could not deal adequately with those general principles of international law which would govern the actions of states with respect to the regime of the high seas, nor is this committee actually the proper forum for such a debate.

The draft resolution proposed yesterday by the distinguished delegate of Syria [Adib Daoudy] would make pronouncements concerning the whole question of the regime of the high seas. There has not been such a consideration of the subject matter in this committee nor indeed in the competent United Nations bodies as would warrant our proceeding here with this type of resolution. The subject matter of the Syrian draft resolution is one which ought to be dealt with in the context of a full and expert consideration of the complex questions of international law which are involved.

Such a study is in fact under way at the present time in the International Law Commission. The Commission has requested the comments of governments on its drafts and has just been requested by the Assembly itself to submit its final report to the eleventh session of the General Assembly on this whole matter.

It would appear appropriate therefore for our committee to transmit the Syrian resolution along

with the records of our debate here to the International Law Commission. It would also be useful to invite governments to make known their views concerning the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas to the International Law Commission, so that the Commission might take these views into account in the preparation of its final reports.

This would seem a sounder way to proceed than for the General Assembly on the recommendation of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to adopt hastily a resolution whose consequences might be far-reaching. It would be imprudent for the Assembly to act on the basis of a clearly insufficient debate.

For these reasons my delegation, joining with the delegations of Cuba and the Philippines, is submitting the following resolution.⁸ It goes without saying that this resolution should be voted on immediately after the vote on the Soviet proposal. If there should be any question on this, I shall make a motion to that effect.

PLENARY STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 17

U.S. delegation press release 2097

When the Soviet delegation presented its original resolution on the matter of the high-seas piracy of the United States Navy, we labeled that item a propaganda item. We tied it in with a previous item, the aggression item, which was also a propaganda item. And we tied those two in with an earlier item, the Czech resolution on war propaganda—the correctly named one—and we tied them all together.

Immediately an anguished howl went up from the Soviet bloc. What do you mean propaganda? This is substantive; this is serious; this is peace; this is freedom; this is all the great big words. And we listened to 3 days of debate of a degree of vilification and violence, intemperance and inflammatory language from them that is well-nigh indescribable, including one day such coarseness and vulgarity from one of the Soviet bloc members that he had to be rebuked by the chair.

In an effort to get things going and to smooth things over, the Syrian delegation introduced a resolution, a substitute resolution. The following day the Soviet delegation announced to an as-

tounded *Ad Hoc* Political Committee that they were not pressing their resolution and instead would back the Syrian resolution. In other words, they did not even have enough conviction about their resolution to go down fighting on it.

That is what I meant when I said originally that this was a propaganda item, and it is still today a propaganda item. They proved it themselves the day before yesterday when they said they would not press it.

Now, three Soviet bloc delegates have spoken here this morning on this item, and they have spoken just as though what was before this group was their original resolution. They went through the same victrola record all over again three times—and we still probably have two to go. Have they forgotten that the day before yesterday they said they were not going to press their item—they have not reintroduced it—and they said they were going to back the Syrian resolution? What kind of performance is this?

Shouldn't we here today stick to what is before us, namely, the resolution cosponsored by Cuba, the Philippines, and the United States?

The United States Government, in concert with those Governments, sponsored the draft resolution which was adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee by a substantial majority.

Since the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee debated for the most part incidents involving certain ships in the China Seas, it could not deal adequately with those general principles of international law which would govern the actions of states with respect to the regime of the high seas. Nor did we believe that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was actually the proper forum for such a debate. The International Law Commission is already engaged in a study of the regime of the high seas and related questions and has already been requested by the General Assembly to be ready with its final reports for consideration of them at the Assembly's eleventh session. It seemed, therefore, appropriate to transmit to the International Law Commission the records of the debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the present agenda item, together with relevant documents—and high among the relative documents is the draft resolution introduced by Syria—for the Commission's information in conjunction with the work now in progress on the regime of the high seas.

As I said earlier, it should be noted that the Soviet Union has in effect withdrawn its own

⁸ See page 1003.

Resolution on Freedom of Navigation

U.N. doc. A/AC.76/L.26

The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution _____ (IX) of 14 December 1954 which *inter alia* requested the International Law Commission to complete its final report concerning the régime of the high seas, the régime of territorial waters and related problems in time for the General Assembly to consider these matters at its eleventh regular session,

1. *Decides* to transmit to the International Law Commission the records and documents, including the draft resolution of Syria contained in document A/AC.76/L.25, of the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at which item 71 of the agenda of the ninth regular session of the General Assembly was considered;

2. *Invites* the Governments of Member States to transmit to the International Law Commission their views concerning the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas.

resolution, conceded that its propaganda charges against the free world were hollow and unsubstantiated, and has confirmed our claim that this item was per se a propaganda item.

Now it is not my intention to weary the General Assembly with another point-by-point refutation such as we have been listening to this morning. However, I would remind the General Assembly that most of the Soviet charges made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee revolve around the alleged aggressive activities of the United States Navy in the area of Formosa. The Soviet resolution and the Soviet bloc statements are clear evidence that the purpose of this item and resolution was to make cold-war propaganda.

The mission of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Formosa area has nothing to do with controlling commercial traffic in these waters. It does not interfere with freedom of the seas. Its mission is to defend Formosa against hostile attack. There cannot be the slightest doubt that such a hostile attack is being threatened from the mainland, particularly in light of the fact that the Chinese Communist authorities have repeatedly gone on record as to their hostile intentions.

I would like to underscore the reasonable and practical approach taken by the Chinese delegate with respect to the questions discussed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. He reminded us that in the past the substantial majority of differences arising from the incidents of the type referred

to in the explanatory memorandum of the Soviet Union have been solved on the basis of negotiations, taking into account the individual circumstances surrounding each case. My Government believes that this stand is sound and gives hope for the settlement, by means of negotiation or other peaceful procedure, of differences which may have arisen in connection with the activities of the Chinese naval vessels in the waters surrounding Formosa.

General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Admission of New Members

Following is the text of the resolution on "Admission of New Members to the United Nations" as adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on November 23. For a statement of the U.S. position by James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Representative, made in the Ad Hoc Political Committee on November 2, see BULLETIN of November 22, 1954, p. 786.

U.N. doc. A/Resolution/228

The General Assembly,

Noting the growing general feeling in favour of the universality of the United Nations, membership in which is open to all peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out those obligations,

Having considered the report (A/2720) of the Committee of Good Offices established by General Assembly resolution 718 (VIII) of 23 October 1953,

Noting that, notwithstanding the best endeavours of the Committee of Good Offices, the problem remains unresolved,

Further noting the views recorded by the Committee of Good Offices that possibilities of reaching an understanding remain and that "different views may eventually be harmonized within the spirit of the Charter",

1. *Expresses appreciation* of the work and efforts of the Committee of Good Offices;

2. *Decides* to send back to the Security Council the pending applications for membership, together with a full record of the discussions at the present session of the General Assembly, for further consideration and positive recommendations;

3. *Suggests* that the Security Council consider the desirability of invoking the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 28 of the Charter to help resolve the problem;

4. *Requests* the Committee of Good Offices to continue its efforts;

5. *Requests* the Security Council and the Committee of Good Offices to report to the General Assembly during the present session if possible and in any event during the tenth session.

Increasing the Effectiveness of the U.N. Technical Assistance Program

STATEMENT BY JAMES P. NASH U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY¹

Technical assistance has become one of the most dynamic ways yet devised of increasing the welfare of people and their opportunities for advancement. It is probably one of the most universally supported programs of international economic cooperation. It involves a comparatively small expenditure for a tremendous amount of good.

Interest in the economic development of lesser developed countries has been expressed by my Government frequently and forcefully. In an address given only a few weeks ago, on October 20, in New York City, President Eisenhower said: "We must devise means by which more highly developed countries can assist peoples who face the difficulties of an earlier stage of economic development." One of the best ways to achieve this is through the United Nations expanded program of technical assistance.

For the first 3 years of this program the United States has contributed a total of \$36 million, or approximately 60 percent of all funds pledged to the central fund. For 1954, although our percentage share was reduced to approximately 51 percent of the total, the dollar amount of our pledge increased to \$13,861,809.

Although my Government is not in a position at this time to make a pledge for calendar year 1955, the President has authorized the United States delegation to state that he is prepared to request from the Congress funds for a United States contribution to the 1955 program. He hopes that the United Nations technical assistance program will continue to operate at least at its present level and that in the future it will obtain

increasing support from all governments. While the President's request to the Congress does not constitute a pledge and should not be so considered, it does indicate his continuing interest in this vital United Nations program.

The position of the United States on this subject has been fully stated in the letter of November 1, 1954, from Ambassador Lodge to the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee, Extra-Budgetary Funds.²

Let me turn now to the resolution adopted last summer by the Economic and Social Council relating to the administration of the program.³ Much serious thought has been given to this resolution by governments, by various delegations and within various bodies of the United Nations system. The principles involved have been thoroughly canvassed. In order to secure the widest possible support among all nations for an effective expanded multilateral technical assistance program on a continuing and stable basis, it is necessary that differences in points of view be reconciled.

It is likewise true in this program, as in so many other types of institutional endeavor, that very much depends on the attitudes of the individuals who, in the end, make up the institution. From this point of view, sympathetic understanding and reciprocal good will are frequently more important than legislative texts. The expanded program is no exception to this rule. We can all take satisfaction in the fact that the discussions which have gone on over the last 12 months with respect to these organizational arrangements have taken place in an atmosphere of mutual good will.

My delegation wishes to emphasize what must be clear to all who have become familiar with the workings of the expanded program: that is, that

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Nov. 19 (U.S. delegation press release 2030).

² BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1954, p. 879.

³ U.N. doc. E/Res. XVIII/18.

the participating organizations in this program are its operating arms, without which there would be no program at all. From the technical skill, the overall competence, and the devotion of these agencies have come the achievements of the program. My Government takes the position that the whole context in which the program operates must be one which utilizes fully the planning and operations of the specialized agencies within their respective spheres, in order that their demonstrated effectiveness may be continued at a high level of performance. What we are seeking is closer and more effective coordination and not centralization.

From this point of view, my delegation wishes to establish clearly our understanding of the way the procedures outlined in the resolution will work.

First, we would assume it to be thoroughly understood that the activities of resident representatives, including the development of country programs, are carried out in full cooperation with the field personnel of the participating organizations. This necessarily would require that the resident representative would consult with agency representatives on all matters affecting their agencies, would keep them informed of any developments that come to his knowledge, and would carry on negotiations affecting their programs jointly with them. As an obvious counterpart to this, agency representatives would of course similarly keep the resident representative informed.

Also, with regard to resident representatives, we assume, of course, that these officials will not have technical staffs of their own and that they depend upon the personnel of the participating agencies in development and execution of the country programs.

Second, the same thought would carry over to the staffing of the Technical Assistance Board. We assume that the TAB will continue to look to the participating organizations for substantive assistance in the technical fields and that the TAB staff will be concerned with those aspects of the program which involve general problems and interrelationships transcending the particular field of concern of any one of the participating organizations. We certainly would not wish to see the growth of a new and costly bureaucracy.

Third, the resolution provides that the Technical Assistance Committee should review the overall program in the light of its importance for economic development. The resolution specifi-

cally provides that the review should not deal with country allocations or with the technical aspects of the program or with the national development plans of the respective governments. The resolution indicates that TAC shall be concerned with overall priorities, evaluation of the projects, and the program interrelationships.

We would like to explain our understanding of paragraph 1 (b) (iv) of the resolution.⁴ In order that the concept of country planning can be given the widest practicable application and at the same time provision can be made for adequate overall review, we understand that in the review and approval of the program by TAC there will be no material shifting of programs or reallocation of funds among the specialized agencies or among the agencies within any given country for the given year. The evaluation and review authorized to be made by TAC under the present resolution is much the same as has been authorized in the past, an evaluation and review of the program as authorized in TAC's original terms of reference—"to make for the Council critical examinations of activities undertaken and results achieved under the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance." As we see it, the committee will continue to be largely concerned with eliminating duplication and achieving more effective coordination.

Fourth, with respect to the allocation of the 5 percent "free money,"⁵ the executive chairman has himself declared that he "will consult with the participating organizations as appropriate." To remove any possible ambiguity about this statement, my delegation would assume it to be understood that the executive chairman would consult either with the agencies or with TAB with respect to the allocation of the free money.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to end my remarks with technical comment on procedures, important though these are to the effectiveness of the entire program. I want to say once again that the idea of technical assistance is a deeply rooted part of United States policy. My Government recognizes the importance of technical assistance in promoting the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. It has strongly supported the United Nations expanded program since its inception.

⁴ See annex III to A/Resolution/229.

⁵ See annex III, paragraph (b) (v).

U.N. doc. A/Resolution/229

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Economic and Social Council regarding the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance,⁷

Mindful that this Programme constitutes one of the most fruitful achievements of the United Nations,

Convinced that a further expansion of this Programme would contribute substantially to the promotion of economic development and social progress in the under-developed countries,

Noting with satisfaction the wide moral and material support given so far to the Expanded Programme and the readiness of Governments to contribute to this enterprise of international co-operation,

Considering that the Economic and Social Council has taken steps to ensure that the Expanded Programme is operated with increased efficiency,

Recognizing the need for adequate programme planning at the country level and the important role of the participating organizations whose technical skills and competence make possible the achievements of the Programme, and also being desirous of promoting more effective co-ordination of the work of the participating organizations in order that the whole Programme might be more effective,

Considering, in particular, resolutions 521 A (XVII) and 542 B (XVIII) of the Economic and Social Council,

Having noted the first report (A/2661) of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the ninth session of the General Assembly relating to the Expanded Programme, and having welcomed the statement of the Secretary-General that the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination would, in its forthcoming study of the organizational relationships in the Expanded Programme, take full account of this report,

A

1. *Invites* Governments to give the fullest support to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and to announce their pledges for the year 1955 at the forthcoming Fifth United Nations Technical Assistance Conference, in order to ensure the continued growth of the Programme;

2. *Recommends* that Governments and participating organizations continue to pay due regard to making the aims and operations of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance more widely known;

⁶Sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, France, India, Indonesia, Iraq, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia; adopted unanimously by Committee II on Nov. 24 and by the General Assembly on Nov. 26.

⁷See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 3*, doc. A/2686, chapter III.

1. *Approves* the arrangements recommended by the Economic and Social Council and reproduced in annex I to the present resolution regarding the reconstitution of the Special Reserve Fund of the Expanded Programme as a Working Capital and Reserve Fund;

2. *Approves* the recommendation of the Council that the financial arrangements for the year 1954 as laid down in Council resolution 492 C (XVI), section II, and reproduced in annex II to the present resolution, be continued for the year 1955;

3. *Approves* the recommendations of the Council regarding the future system of allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme, outlined in annex III to the present resolution and included in Council resolution 542 B (XVIII), section II, amending resolutions 222 (IX) and 433 (XIV);

4. *Requests* the Council to study the means of securing, where possible, contributions to the Expanded Programme on a continuing basis;

C

Refers to the Economic and Social Council the comments and recommendations contained in the first report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the ninth session of the General Assembly (A/2661):

D

Requests the Economic and Social Council to furnish to the General Assembly at its tenth session a report on the progress made in the consideration of the questions raised in the first report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the ninth session together with the comments of the Advisory Committee on the report of the Council.

Annex I

WORKING CAPITAL AND RESERVE FUND OF THE EXPANDED PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

(Recommended by the Economic and Social Council in resolution 521 A (XVII))

(a) The Special Reserve Fund shall be reconstituted as a Working Capital and Reserve Fund, which will serve as a continuing operating reserve and which may be used for the following purposes:

(i) To make advances to participating organizations pending the receipt of contributions from Governments, for the purpose of initiating or continuing approved programmes within an organization's approved earmarkings;

(ii) To improve and facilitate currency management, by making currencies available for exchange with organizations' allocated currencies, for the purchase of needed currencies pending collection of particular contributions, and for advances of currencies which would otherwise have to be purchased by organizations with dollars;

(iii) For such other purposes as may be approved by the Technical Assistance Committee from time to time;

(b) The size of the Working Capital and Reserve Fund shall be determined from time to time by the Technical Assistance Committee;

(c) Withdrawals from the Working Capital and Reserve Fund shall be replaced before the end of the financial period in which they are made.

Annex II

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR 1955

(From paragraph 5 of section II of resolution 492 C (XVI) of the Economic and Social Council)

(a) Seventy-five per cent of total funds available, excluding carry-over, shall be available for allocation to the participating organizations after approval of country programmes by the Technical Assistance Board, in accordance with the percentages set forth in paragraph 8 (c) ^a of Council resolution 222 (IX) as amended and modified pursuant to paragraph 19 of the report of the Technical Assistance Committee to the thirteenth session of the Council;

(b) The balance of funds available, including carry-over, shall be retained in the Special Account (i) to cover the necessary minimum expenses of TAB and the resident representatives; and (ii) for further allocation to the participating organizations, as provided in Council resolution 433 (XIV);

(c) In establishing the level of the necessary administrative expense in the whole Programme, the need for economy, in view of the present level of operational expenditure, shall be fully taken into account.

Annex III

SYSTEM OF ALLOCATION OF FUNDS UNDER THE EXPANDED PROGRAMME

(Approved by the Economic and Social Council in paragraph 1 of section II of resolution 542 B (XVIII))

(a) As from 1 January 1955 and in relation to the programme for 1956 and subsequent years, the funds of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance shall no longer be allocated to the organizations participating in the Programme on the basis of percentages fixed in advance. The funds shall be distributed on the basis of the requests submitted by Governments and the priorities established by them, subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) below;

(b) The planning and approval of the programmes, and the allocation of funds for their implementation, shall be subject to the following procedure and principles:

(i) TAB shall formulate early in the year, as a guide in planning country and regional programmes, target figures showing the amount of expenditure on technical assistance which it may be possible to undertake during the ensuing year on the basis of an assumed financial availability. In order to ensure stable programming, sharp reductions in country target figures in any single year should normally be avoided, subject to the availability of financial resources. Country target figures, including agency sub-totals for each of the participating organizations, derived from their activities during the preceding year, shall be communicated to the respective Governments. Governments shall, however, be at liberty to present their requests without being bound by these sub-totals;

(ii) Programmes shall be drawn up at the country level by the requesting Governments, in consultation with the resident representatives or such representatives of TAN as may be specially assigned for the purpose, due regard being paid to continuing commitments. Participating organizations shall continue to be responsible for advising and assisting the appropriate Government authorities in the technical planning of individual projects. The responsibility for co-ordinating consultations between Governments and participating organizations shall rest with the resident representatives or such representatives of TAN as may be specially assigned for the purpose;

(iii) The country programmes shall be forwarded by requesting Governments, with an indication of the priorities established by them, to TAB through the resident representatives. TAB shall consider the programmes, draw up the over-all Programme for the following year, including estimates of administrative and indirect operational costs, and submit it, with its recommendations, to TAC. In drawing up the Programme, TAN shall ensure that the ratio between the programmes to be implemented by the different participating organizations will make possible the authorization of allocations in accordance with sub-paragraph (vi) below;

(iv) TAC shall review the over-all Programme in the light of its importance for economic development; this review should not deal with country allocations or with the technical aspects of the Programme or the national development plans of the respective Governments, but should be concerned with over-all priorities, evaluation of the projects and the programme inter-relationships. On the basis of this review, TAC shall approve the Programme, and its approval shall be a prerequisite for any commitment in regard to the implementation of the Programme. The preparation and review of the Programme and all other necessary steps shall be carried out in such a way that TAC will be in a position to approve the over-all Programme and authorize allocations to the participating organizations by 30 November, at the latest;

(v) Subject to the confirmation of the General Assembly, TAC shall authorize the allocation of funds to each of the participating organizations in proportion to their share in the approved over-all Programme, subject to paragraph (vi) below. These funds shall be drawn from the net financial resources, after setting aside the expenses of the TAB secretariat, the Reserve and Working Capital Fund, and a sum amounting to 5 per cent of the estimated resources for the financial year, which shall be allocated by the Executive Chairman of TAN to meet any urgent needs which may arise during the implementation of the annual Programme;

(vi) In order to avoid substantial fluctuations in the total amounts entrusted to each participating organization from year to year, the amount allocated to each of them for the coming year shall not be less than 85 per cent of the amount allocated to them under the current year's Programme, except that, if the estimated net financial resources for the ensuing year fall below the total allocations made during the current year, the amount allocated to each participating organization shall not be less than 85 per cent of its proportion of the allocations for the current year;

(vii) Any extraordinary requests submitted by a Government for modification of the programme, received subsequent to TAC approval of the annual Programme, may be approved by TAN and reported

^a Formerly paragraph 9 (c).

to TAC at its next meeting. Should it not be possible to effect necessary increases and decreases within the programme of the country concerned, the funds available for allocation by the Executive Chairman under paragraph (v) may be used for this purpose;

(c) Tac shall continue to be under the authority of the Economic and Social Council, and its decisions subject to general policy review by the Council;

(d) The appropriate organs of the participating organizations are requested to continue to review the technical aspects of the programmes for which they assume responsibility, in the same way, in so far as possible, as they examine their regular programmes.

Economic and Social Council's Work in Social Field

*Statement by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

I should like at this time to express the views of the United States delegation on chapter IV and on several sections of chapter V of the Report of the Economic and Social Council.² Later in our debate my colleague, Mr. Johnson, will discuss the parts of chapter V dealing with trade union rights, forced labor, and slavery.

Chapter IV of the report of the Council hardly does justice to the wide range of activity carried on by the United Nations in the social field. The report summarizes the action taken by the Council and its Commissions, but it makes no mention of the work of the Secretariat. For this reason, may I call the attention of the Committee to the Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization³ which, on pages 60 to 63, summarizes the activities of the Secretariat in the whole social field. Inasmuch as you have very properly ruled, Mr. Chairman, that members of the Committee must confine their remarks to chapter IV and chapter V of the report, I shall not comment on these activities, even though they are relevant to our discussion. In order to prevent a recurrence of this difficulty next year, may I suggest to the Secretariat that the Report of the Economic and Social Council should include a brief summary of the work of the Secretariat, or

perhaps a paragraph referring to the pertinent aspects of the Report of the Secretary General. In that way we would be able next year to discuss the work of the Secretariat within the confines of chapters IV and V of the Report of the Council.

Turning now to section II of chapter IV, I should like to pay tribute to the work of UNICEF. Last year the General Assembly changed the name of UNICEF and removed the word "Emergency." This change reflected a significant development in the programs of UNICEF. It reflected the firmly established trend toward projects which promote the development of permanent services for children, especially in underdeveloped countries. Aid for maternal and child health programs has reached a volume comparable to the big mass health campaigns. This is a welcome trend, because it means that health and community services, particularly in rural areas, can consolidate and continue the achievements gained in the mass health campaigns.

In some instances governments are beginning to take over activities initiated or aided by UNICEF and are continuing them on their own account. This is a heartening development, and my delegation hopes that there will be an increasing number of such instances. Having been associated with the earlier work of UNICEF, when the emphasis was necessarily on emergency programs, I am personally very pleased with this new development. In fact, this is the real test of the success of UNICEF. This is the real test that the work of UNICEF is bringing permanent results—the kind of permanent results which the General Assembly has emphasized in its resolutions concerning UNICEF. It is essential that UNICEF direct its activities to effecting not temporary but permanent improvement in the health and well-being of children.

United States representatives in the Executive Board of UNICEF, the Social Commission, and the Economic and Social Council have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the closest possible coordination between the work of UNICEF and that of the specialized agencies, as well as the social welfare program of the United Nations itself. My delegation is pleased that much has been done to provide for close collaboration between UNICEF and the World Health Organization, and it urges that this collaboration be continued and strengthened. Similar collaboration, especially in the planning of joint projects, should be further developed between UNICEF and UNESCO, and between

¹ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Nov. 19 (U. S. delegation press release 2028).

² U.N. doc. A/2686.

³ U.N. doc. A/2663.

UNICEF and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

One development which was of concern to the United States delegation at the last session of the Council is worth mentioning before this Committee. I am referring to the new policy by which UNICEF undertakes the financing of limited local costs. I just wish to repeat the concern of the United States delegation that this new policy, unless applied with proper caution, could undermine the important self-help character of UNICEF aid—a characteristic which we recognize is of cardinal significance in the development of permanent and lasting benefits for children.

Work in the Narcotics Field

May I turn now, Mr. Chairman, to the work of the United Nations in the field of narcotics. This is a subject of vital importance to the United States Government, because it directly affects the lives and well-being of many thousands of our citizens and the safety of our whole population. Our Government has always supported, and will continue to support, international action to control the manufacture and trade in narcotic drugs.⁴ This is a kind of "collective security"—security from the illicit traffic in drugs—to which all governments should give their fullest support.

One of the most important developments in recent years has been the conclusion of the International Opium Protocol in June 1953. The Protocol represents a major step forward in the international system for controlling narcotics. It will result in reducing the quantity of opium available for the illicit traffic. I am happy to report, Mr. Chairman, that the United States was one of the 36 states which signed the Protocol. The United States Senate, last August, voted 71 to 0 to give its advice and consent to ratification. My delegation earnestly hopes that the Protocol will be ratified by the largest possible number of states, in order that the illicit traffic in drugs—surely one of the great evils of our times—may be brought under control.

An earlier step in this common effort to control the traffic in drugs was the conclusion of the Protocol on Synthetic Drugs in 1948. This Protocol has been ratified by 43 states. Because of the importance of controlling this new category of drugs,

my delegation hopes that many more states will ratify the Protocol.

It is also gratifying to my delegation to see that the majority of the nations of the world have outlawed the synthesis and importation of heroin. Our medical colleagues tell us that heroin is not indispensable to medical practice. There are, however, a few nations which continue to permit the synthesis and importation of this drug, which is highly dangerous from the standpoint of producing addiction.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, may I point out that the origin of much of the narcotics seized in illicit traffic can be traced to Communist China. Reports indicate that the volume of this nefarious trade is indeed large. When one takes into consideration the all-embracing controls in effect in a police state such as Communist China, one cannot but conclude that there is at least official complicity in this illegal traffic.

For this reason, our delegation supports the recommendation made earlier in the debate by the distinguished representative of China that special attention should be paid to this problem.

Turning now, Mr. Chairman, to chapter V of the report, may I comment very briefly on section VI, concerning freedom of information. I had intended to speak at some length in our general debate on the subject of freedom of information and its relation to human rights. However, Mr. Chairman, I shall try to heed your appeal to avoid, so far as possible, a double debate on subjects that form separate items later on our agenda. I shall do no more, therefore, than express general endorsement for the action taken by the Economic and Social Council to promote freedom of information. Our delegation will wholeheartedly support the recommendation of the Council that the Secretary-General be authorized to provide technical assistance, on the request of governments, in the field of freedom of information. As Mr. Johnson will explain when the Committee reaches the next item, our Government reaffirms its devotion to the freedom of speech and freedom of the press and desires to cooperate in every activity of the United Nations designed to promote these essential freedoms.

Status of Women

Similarly, Mr. Chairman, it will not be necessary for me to enter into a lengthy discussion of

⁴ For an article on this subject, see BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1954, p. 366.

section XI, concerning the status of women, since one issue in that field will be debated later on our agenda. May I express the appreciation of my delegation, however, for the steady progress that is being made, year by year, in the achievement of political rights by women throughout the world. The latest report of the Secretary-General showed that women now enjoy full political rights in 60 countries. Since the publication of that report, the Government of Colombia has taken action extending full political rights to women. I understand also that the President of Peru, where women enjoy only limited voting rights, has also indicated interest in equal suffrage. I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating the representatives of those countries on their progress in assuring equality for women. In particular, may I congratulate our colleague in this Committee, Miss Aguilar of Peru, for her leadership in this cause.

In stressing political rights, Mr. Chairman, I do not overlook the need for promoting equal rights for women in the economic, social, and cultural fields. I stress political rights, and the progress that is being made toward wiping out the old forms of discrimination that still remain in a few countries, because history shows that equal suffrage is a prerequisite for equal rights in other fields.

The Commission on the Status of Women has been giving special attention to all of these problems and has developed a number of useful methods for dealing with them. However, some of the resolutions proposed in the Commission—like the one of private law that is on our agenda—have been so completely directed toward the specific provisions of the legislation of Member States and so encumbered with details that the United States representative in the Commission, Mrs. Hahn, has been unable to vote for them. I should hope that, in the future, the Commission might devote more attention to practical measures for promoting rights for women, especially through education.

One part of chapter V that requires no action at this session of the General Assembly is section II, dealing with self-determination. The Commission on Human Rights has already been requested by the Council to give further study to the preparation of recommendations on measures for promoting the right of self-determination. Since the question of self-determination is of considerable

interest to this Committee, however, I should like to outline briefly the views of my Government.

My delegation wishes to reaffirm that the United States, in accordance with its own traditions and with the Charter of the United Nations, upholds the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The United States will continue to support the principle of self-determination and to encourage the development of a free society of nations where each may be free to enjoy government and other institutions of its own choosing.

Principle of Self-Determination

Only 2 months ago, the United States and seven other nations proclaimed at Manila the Pacific Charter, which fully recognizes the principle of self-determination. The Pacific Charter states:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they [the signatory states] uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities;

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

As Secretary Dulles said after the Manila Conference: "The Pacific Charter, on which the East and the West did meet, may well prove to be the most momentous product of the Conference."

Some of the speakers in our debates have left the impression that the right of self-determination relates only to non-self-governing and trust territories. I should like to point out, however, that the right of self-determination relates not only to the old colonial empires but also to the new Communist empire in Europe and Asia. In fact, the problem of self-determination is much more significant and urgent in the vast new empire that now extends from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. I fear that some of our members have become so concerned about the problem of self-determination in non-self-governing territories, especially two or three territories in North Africa, that they have completely overlooked the problem of self-determination in a vastly larger area of the world.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, may I comment briefly on section III of chapter V, entitled "Development of the Work of the United Nations for Wider

Observance of, and Respect for, Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Throughout the World." This rather formidable title accurately describes the task of the next session of the Commission on Human Rights. During its first 10 sessions, the Commission has been largely preoccupied with the drafting of international instruments—first, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and, more recently, the Draft Covenants. For the first time in 10 years, the Commission will be able to give its full attention not only to the report of the Subcommission on Discrimination and Minorities but also to all other items on its agenda.

The most important task before the Commission, now that the Draft Covenants have gone forward to the General Assembly, will be to devise practical measures for promoting human rights. The agenda of the Commission already contains a number of different proposals concerning such practical measures for the promotion of human rights—proposals from various governments, from the Secretary-General, and from nongovernmental organizations. My Government, for example, has introduced three proposals for an action program, encompassing biennial reports from governments, special studies of individual rights, and technical assistance.⁵

These proposals have received support from many of the governments, specialized agencies, and nongovernmental agencies that have had the opportunity to study them. Many constructive comments and suggestions about these proposals have already come in. These comments and suggestions will provide a useful basis for the discussion of these proposals at the next session of the Commission.

All of these many proposals will require careful study and discussion by the Commission. The really significant thing is that the Commission will have an opportunity to review all these proposals, to improve and perfect them, and to consolidate them into a practicable program for fostering human liberty.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Report of the Council shows that the United Nations is moving ahead in the broad program of practical action in the social field, in improving conditions for families and children, and in promoting freedom of information, the status of women, and human

rights in general. It is experimenting with many different techniques and methods. It is turning the spotlight of public opinion on the need to further human freedom and on the need to remedy violations of human rights when they occur. Progress is necessarily slow, but the very fact that our organization is debating these problems, and is trying to find solutions for them, should give encouragement and hope to peoples everywhere.

U. N. High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees

The Department of State announced on December 6 (press release 698) that Christopher H. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, would represent the U.S. Government at the fifth session of the U. N. High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees, convening at Geneva, Switzerland, on that day. Mr. Phillips is assisted by one adviser, Henry F. Nichol, conference attaché, Resident U. S. Delegation to International Organizations at Geneva.

By a resolution of December 3, 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nations created a High Commissioner's Office for Refugees to provide for the legal and political protection of refugees and displaced persons. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart of the Netherlands was elected High Commissioner for a 3-year term beginning January 1, 1951, and was subsequently reelected for a 5-year term beginning January 1, 1954.

In response to a request by the High Commissioner, made in accordance with the statute of his office, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on September 10, 1951, established the U. N. High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees. This Committee is composed of the representatives of the Vatican and the following governments, both members and nonmembers of the United Nations, which have demonstrated an interest in and devotion to the refugee problem: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Israel, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.

In a report on the activities of his office for the period June 1953 to May 1954, the High Commissioner dealt, among other things, with the pos-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1953, p. 727.

sibility of promoting permanent solutions for the problems of the most needy refugees of concern to his office. Reference was made to the belief that, since few refugees desired to be repatriated and since the opportunities for overseas settlement were limited, stress should be placed on efforts to integrate refugees into the economies of their countries of residence. A program, developed on the basis of experience gained with a Ford Foundation grant, was outlined for the promotion of permanent solutions for the problems of refugees. That program was primarily designed to stimulate the integration of refugees into agriculture; their establishment in trades, small businesses, and professions; the construction of housing; the vocational training and retraining of refugees to facilitate their integration or resettlement; aid to university students; the creation of community centers; the promotion of resettlement opportunities overseas; and the establishment of resettlement counseling services for refugees.

Study of the matter by Ecosoc at its eighteenth session (Geneva, June 29–August 6, 1954) and

then by the General Assembly at its current session resulted in (1) authorization to the High Commissioner to undertake the program; (2) authorization to the High Commissioner to make appeals for funds for the promotion of permanent solutions for the problems of refugees, as well as for the provision of emergency assistance to the most destitute cases; and (3) a decision that Ecosoc, on the basis of recommendations to be made by the High Commissioner upon the advice of his Advisory Committee, should (a) “establish an Executive Committee responsible for giving directives to the High Commissioner in carrying out his programme and for exercising the necessary controls in the use of funds” or (b) “revise the terms of reference and composition of the Advisory Committee in order to enable it to carry out the same duties.”

The basic task of the fifth session of the Advisory Committee will be to consider the High Commissioner's proposal and to determine the amount of the funds to be sought in the form of voluntary contributions to finance the new program.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

General Assembly

- Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by Australia. Admission to the United Nations of Laos and Cambodia. Letter dated 22 August 1954 from the Minister of State for External Affairs of Australia, addressed to the Secretary-General. A/2709/Add.1, August 31, 1954. 4 pp. mimeo.
- Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. Note by the Secretary-General. A/2714, August 31, 1954. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Admission of New Members. Report of the Committee of Good Offices. A/2720, September 9, 1954. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Draft Report of the Committee on Information from Non-self-governing Territories. A/AC.35/L.184, September 10, 1954. 37 pp. mimeo.
- Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa. Report of the United Nations Good Offices Commission. A/2723, September 15, 1954. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Addendum. A/2648/Add.2, September 15, 1954. 20 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

- Adoption of the Agenda and Allocation of Items to Committees. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/BUR/138, September 16, 1954. 13 pp. mimeo.
- Economic Development of Under-developed Countries. Question of the Establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. Summary of comments of Governments on the report of the Committee of Nine made in accordance with General Assembly resolution 724 B (VIII). Presented by the Secretary-General. A/2727, September 17, 1954. 36 pp. mimeo.
- Question of South West Africa. Supplement to the report of the Committee on South West Africa to the General Assembly. A/2666/Add.1, September 17, 1954. 16 pp. mimeo.
- Organization of the Secretariat. Report of the Secretary-General. A/2731, September 21, 1954. 24 pp. mimeo.
- Agenda of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly. Adopted by the General Assembly at its 476th, 477th and 478th plenary meetings on 24 and 25 September 1954. A/2737, September 25, 1954. 5 pp. mimeo.
- International Co-operation in Developing the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Letter dated 25 September 1954 from the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General [transmitting copies of communications exchanged by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.]. A/2738, September 27, 1954. 39 pp. mimeo.
- Application, Under the Auspices of the United Nations, of the Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples in the case of the Population of the Island of Cyprus. Letter dated 25 September 1954 from the Permanent Representative of Greece addressed to the Secretary-General. A/C.1/747, September 27, 1954. 10 pp. mimeo.

Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 712 dated December 10

The Department of State released on December 18 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Volume III, The Far East*. This is the first of the series of five volumes of diplomatic correspondence to be published for the year 1938. Documents in this volume deal with the undeclared war between China and Japan and with problems arising from it. A second volume on the Far East in 1938 will appear shortly.

The deepening of the international crisis caused by the conflict in China and the danger of general war among the great powers form the principal subjects of this volume of papers from State Department files. The prominent role played by the Soviet Union and by Chinese Communists in developing the situation is pictured in many documents now published for the first time.

Significant reports on the chance of mediation, on the possibility of war between the powers, on the future of the Republic of China, and on specific problems resulting from intensification of the undeclared war are revealed under seven general headings. These cover politico-military developments, Manchuria, China's appeal to the League of Nations for sanctions against Japan, financial and other aid by the powers to China, and questions relating to Japanese bombing activities and Japanese impairment of China's revenue administrations.

The documentation on the undeclared war consists of nearly 450 pages. It begins with a telegram from Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson at Hankow reporting Japanese terms submitted to China through the German Ambassador and concludes with a telegram from Adm. Harry E. Yarnell at Shanghai reporting the latest Japanese terms for restoration of peace. The question of mediation repeatedly crops up during the year.

The position of the United States was stated early in 1938 by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles as follows (p. 47) :

First, That action in the direction of mediation could be taken by this Government only if there came to it an

official indication from the Japanese Government and a similar indication from the Chinese Government that good offices or mediation by this Government are desired by those Governments respectively; Second, That this Government could act only on the basis of and in the light of its being understood that the settlement must be consistent with both the principles and the provisions of the [Washington] Nine Power Treaty [of February 6, 1922]; and Third, That it is the position of this Government that the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty are susceptible of modification, amendment and alteration, but only by recognized processes of negotiation and agreement, not by unilateral action on the part of any one power.

Efforts were made by various private individuals, including Dr. John Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University near Peiping, to sound out officials on both sides and in countries not party to the hostilities; but the United States did not encourage these efforts and nothing came of them (pp. 109-124 *passim*). On March 11 Ambassador Johnson reported conversing with John Foster Dulles, then visiting China in a private capacity (pp. 119-121), while the Japanese Ambassador in London, Shigeru Yoshida, was endeavoring unofficially to promote some form of mediation (pp. 139-140, 207-209). However, as Secretary of State Hull explained to the Chinese Ambassador on August 3 (p. 252),

... this Government has been keeping in mind all phases of the mediation question since the outbreak of hostilities and that it continues to do so, but that this does not necessarily mean that there are in immediate prospect any new developments.

Estimates on the likelihood of war between Japan and the Soviet Union remained more or less unchanged during the year, except that a crisis in Europe or fighting on the Manchuria-Korea-Siberia frontier momentarily colored predictions. The usual view was that neither country would go to war; this was modified at times by the condition that the Russians would not go to war without active support from Britain and France and perhaps also from the United States (pp. 5, 19, 116, 136, 293, 296, 310, 400, 470). For example, on August 5 American Chargé d'Affaires Alexander C. Kirk at Moscow reported (p. 470) Soviet Foreign Commissar M. M. Litvinov as telling him "that the Soviet Government 'knew' that Japan did not desire a war with the Soviet Union" but that "the only manner of dealing with those nations was to meet force or threat of force with the same weapons."

Meanwhile various forms of aid—loans and mu-

nitions—were delivered to China by various powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Fear of involvement in war influenced policy in regard to extending further aid to China, although a proposal for doing so received attention from high officers in the State Department (memorandum of July 23 by John Carter Vincent, pp. 234-237). Another proposal, however, warned that "retaliatory measures against Japan" might mean a "serious risk of armed conflict" (memorandum of December 5 submitted by four Department officers, pp. 406-409). Nevertheless, definite action to aid China was advocated on December 22 by Stanley K. Hornbeck, Far East Adviser on Political Relations (pp. 425-427).

Interest in the Communist question in China increased during 1938. An instruction on February 10 to keep the Department informed of developments (pp. 78-80) was followed by a series of reports from the field in regard to Communist tactics and policies (pp. 246-247, 253-254, 273-275, 299-300, 313-314, 333-334). A report on February 17 from Manchuria (p. 444) stressed that Communists there were linked to Moscow and not to Yen-an, their center in northwest China. Ambassador William C. Bullitt on May 9 telegraphed (pp. 164-165) that Sun Fo, son of the late Sun Yat-sen, after negotiating in Moscow, had arrived in Paris with the assertion "that the Chinese Communist leaders were now cooperating in full loyalty with Chiang Kai-shek" and there "was no danger of communism in China." Sun told of a long talk with Stalin, who "was apprehensive that Germany might attack the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union should make war on Japan." Ambassador Johnson followed this with a despatch on May 23 (pp. 173-181) reviewing political events in China since December 1936 when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped at Sianfu. The outcome of his detention "left the Chinese Government and its leadership definitely pledged to a policy of resistance by force to further Japanese encroachment" (p. 175).

"The path of Soviet Russia has been a wary one," wrote Mr. Johnson, but their hope was "that the Chinese would continue resistance to Japan to the point where Japan would be exhausted, believing that a Japan exhausted and occupied in China would not be a menace to Soviet Russia" (p. 180). The Ambassador concluded a lengthy survey by saying, "The East is apparently doomed to a pe-

riod of warfare and turmoil which will last for years" (p. 181). In another despatch, dated November 19, Mr. Johnson described the editorial policy of a Communist paper at Chungking and summarized it as follows (p. 389): "In short, this newspaper pleads for a coalition of the democracies, including China and the Soviet Union, to curb what it terms the 'Fascist group.'" Japan, Germany, and Italy were meant. As late as November 29 the Ambassador reported (p. 398) that Chinese Communist leaders were then "sincerely desirous, even at the expense of fundamental principles, of cooperating with other anti-Japanese elements in the task of expelling the Japanese from Chinese territory."

Copies of this volume (iii, 768 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$3.50 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

How Foreign Policy Is Made. Pub. 5585. General Foreign Policy Series 92. 20 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet which summarizes the factors and considerations involved in determining the course of American foreign policy.

Foreign Service List, October 1, 1954. Pub. 5605. 122 pp. 40¢.

A quarterly list which includes the field staffs of the U.S. Foreign Service, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Foreign Operations Administration.

Your Opinion Counts. Pub. 5606. General Foreign Policy Series 93. 12 pp. 10¢.

A pamphlet aimed at making the American public more aware of its role in formulating foreign policy.

The Philippine Rehabilitation Program—Report to the President by the Secretary of State, August 31, 1954. Pub. 5611. Far Eastern Series 67. 30 pp. Limited distribution.

A report on the program of aid sponsored by the United States Government under Title III of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946.

A Message for America. Pub. 5631. General Foreign Policy Series 95. 4 pp. Limited distribution.

By Walter Bedell Smith . . . on his retirement as Under Secretary of State, October 1, 1954.

Human Rights—A Guide Book for Community Leaders. Pub. 5636. International Organization and Conference Series IV, 24. 24 pp. Limited distribution.

Some background information prepared by the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO for the use of community leaders in initiating programs for the observance of Human Rights Day.

American Principles. Strengthening Man's Hope for Peace on Earth (Eisenhower)	980
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Press releases issued prior to December 13 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 696 of December 5, 698 of December 6, 700 and 706 of December 7, 709 of December 8, and 712 of December 10.

No.	Date	Subject
713	12/13	Elbrick: transfer of submarine to Italy.
*714	12/12	Dulles: death of Hugh Gibson.
715	12/13	Agreement with Guatemala.
*716	12/14	Agreement with Philippines.
717	12/14	U.S.-Philippine negotiations.
718	12/14	Dulles: departure for NATO meeting.
719	12/15	Robertson: U.S.-Philippine negotiations.
720	12/16	Resumption of relations with Honduras.
721	12/17	Danish dollar imports.
†722	12/17	Release of Colombo plan report.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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